LECTURES 



ON 



THEOLOGY 



BY 






AUGUSTUS H. STRONG. 



PRINTED FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS IN THE 

ROCHESTER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY. 



ROCHESTER: 

PRESS OF E. R. ANDREWS. 

1876. 




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S* 



ENTERED, ACCORDING TO ACT OP CONGRESS, IN THE YEAR 1876, BY 

AUGUSTUS H. STRONG, 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS, AT WASHINGTON. 




cr 

a: 

x 



TO 

JOHN B. TREVOR, Esq., 

THROUGH WHOSE LIBERALITY THE AUTHOR IS ENABLED TO PRESENT 
THESE LECTURES IN THEIR PRESENT FORM, THE WORK IS 
GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED. 



PREFATORY NOTE. 



These Lectures are printed, not published. They are a first essay 
at the preparation of a general scheme of instruction in systematic theology. 
They constitute a mere outline, to be filled in by extemporaneous illustra- 
tion. They will also be modified and expanded, as occasion arises, by the 
dictation of additional matter. 

The references appended to the successive sections of the notes are not 
given as authorities. They are intended simply to facilitate further investi- 
gation on the part of the student, by directing him to other sources of inform- 
ation or suggestion. It has been the aim, in general, to mention not only 
the authors whose views are favored, but also those who best represent the 
views combated, in the text. 

For these reasons, the success of the student will greatly depend upon 
the amount of private reading and thought devoted to the topics under 
review, and upon his consequent ability to enter into the discussions, and 
to appropriate whatever may be valuable in the more full expositions, of the 
class-room. 



CONTENTS. 



PART I.— PROLEGOMENA, .... 1-16 

Chapter I. — Idea op Theology, 1- 8 

I. — Definition of Theology, 1 

II.— Aim of Theology, 1 

III. — Possibility of Theology — grounded in : 2- 6 

1. The existence of a God, 2 

2. Man's capacity for the knowledge of God, 2-4 

3. God's revelation of himself to man, 5- 6 

IV. —Necessity of Theology, 6- 7 

V.— Relation of Theology to Religion, 7-8 

Chapter II. —Material op Theology, 9-12 

I. — Sources of Theology, 9-11 

1-4. Nature and Scripture, 9-10 

5. Scripture and Rationalism, 10-11 

6. Scripture and Mysticism, 11 

7. Scripture and Romanism, 11 

II. — Limitations of Theology, 12 

Chapter III. —Method op Theology, 13-16 

I. — Requisites to the study of Theology, 13 

II. — Divisions of Theology, 13-14 

HI.— History of Systematic Theology, 15 

IV.— Order of Treatment, 16 

V. —Text-books in Theology, 16 

PART II.— THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, 17-30 

Chapter I. — Origin of our Idea op God's Existence, 17-21 

I.— First Truths in General, 17-18 

II. —The Existence of God a First Truth, 18-20 

1. Its universality, 18-19 

2. Its necessity, 19 

3. Its logical independence and priority, 19-20 

III. — Contents of this Intuition, 21 

Chapter II. — Corroborative Evidences op God's Existence,. 22-27 

I. — The Cosmological Argument, 22-23 

II.— The Teleological Argument, 23-25 

III.— The Moral Argument, 25-26 

IV.— The Ontological Argument, 26-27 

Chapter III. — Erroneous Explanations of the Facts, 28-30 

I.— Materialism, 28-29 

II.— Materialistic Idealism, 29-30 

III.— Pantheism, 30 



VI CONTENTS. 

PART III.— THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD, 31-59 

Chapter I. — Preliminary Considerations, 31-38 

I.— Reasons a priori for expecting a Revelation from God, 31-32 

II — Marks of the Revelation man may expect, 32-33 

III. — Miracles as attesting a Divine Revelation, 33-36 

1. Definition of Miracle, 33 

2. Possibility of Miracles, 33-34 

3. Probability of Miracles, 34 

4. The amount of Testimony necessary to prove a Miracle, _ . . 34-35 

5. Evidential force of Miracles, 35 

6. Counterfeit Miracles, 35-36 

IV.— Prophecy as attesting a Divine Revelation, 36-37 

V. — Principles of Historical Evidence applicable to the proof of 

a Divine Revelation, 37-38 

1. As to Documentary Evidence, 37-38 

2. As to Testimony in General, 38 

Chapter II. — Positive Proofs that the Scriptures are a 

Divine Revelation, 39-49 

I. — Genuineness of the Christian Documents, 39-43 

1. Genuineness of the Books of the New Testament, 39-43 

1st. The Myth-theory of Strauss, 41-42 

2d. The Tendency-theory of Baur, 42 

3d. The Romance-theory of Renan, 43 

2. Genuineness of the Books of the Old Testament, 43 

II. — Credibility of the Writers of the Scriptures, 43-45 

III. — Supernatural Character of the Scripture Teaching, 45-48 

1. Scripture Teaching in General, 45-46 

2. Moral System of the New Testament, 46 

3. The Person and Character of Christ, 46-47 

4. The Testimony of Christ to himself, 47-48 

IV. — Historical Results of the Propagation of Scripture Doctrine, 48-49 

Chapter III. — Inspiration of the Scriptures, 50-59 

I. — Definition of Inspiration, 50 

II. — Proof of Inspiration, 50-51 

III. — Theories of Inspiration, 51-53 

1. The Intuition-theory, 51 

2. The Illumination-theory, 52 

3. The Dictation-theory, 52-53 

4. The Dynamical-theory, 53 

IV. — The Union of the Divine and Human Elements in Inspira- 
tion, 53-54 

V. — Objections to the Doctrine of Inspiration, 54-59 

1. Errors in matters of Science, 55-56 

2. Errors in matters of History, 56 

3. Errors in Morality, 56-57 

4. Errors of Reasoning, ■. 57 

5. Errors in Quoting or Interpreting the Old Testament, 57 

6. Errors in Prophecy, 58 

7. Certain Books unworthy of a Place in inspired Scripture, _ 58 

8. Portions of the Scripture Books written by others than the 

Persons to whom they are ascribed, 58 



CONTENTS. Vll 

9. Sceptical or Fictitious Narratives, 58-59 

10. Acknowledgment of the Non-inspiration of Scripture Teach- 
ers and their Writings, 59 

PART IV.— THE NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD, 60-120 

Chapter I. — The Attributes of God, 60-71 

I. — Definition of the term Attributes, 60 

II. — Relation of the Divine Attributes to the Divine Essence, 60-61 

III. — Methods of Determining the Divine Attributes, 61-62 

IV. — Classification of the Attributes, 62-63 

V. — Absolute or Immanent Attributes, 63-67 

First Division. — Spirituality, and Attributes therein in- 
volved, 63-65 

1. Holiness, 64 

2. Love, 6^65 

3. Truth, 65 

Second Division. — Infinity, and Atttributes therein in- 
volved, 65-67 

1. Self -existence, 66 

2. Immutability, 66 

3. Unity, : 66-67 

VI. —Relative or Transitive Attributes, 67-70 

First Division.— Attributes having relation to Time and 

Space, 67 

1. Eternity, 67 

2. Immensity, 67 

Second Division. — Attributes having relation to Creation, 68-69 

1. Omnipresence, 68 

2. Omniscience, 68-69 

3. Omnipotence, 69 

Third Division. — Attributes having relation to Moral Be- 
ings, 69-70 

1. Justice, or Transitive Holiness, 69-70 

2. Goodness and Mercy, or Transitive Love, 70 

VII. — Concluding Remarks, 70-71 

1. Each of the Attributes qualified by all the others, 70 

2. Holiness the fundamental Attribute, 70 

3. The Reconciliation of Justice and Mercy, 71 

4. The Holiness of God the Ground of Moral Obligation, ... 71 
Chapter II. — Doctrine of the Trinity, 72-85 

I. — In Scripture there are Three who are recognized as God: ... 72-77 

1 . Proofs from the New Testament, 72-76 

A. The Father is recognized as God, 72 

B. Jesus Christ is recognized as God, 72-75 

C. The Holy Spirit is recognized as God, 75-76 

2. Intimations of the Old Testament, 76-77 

A. Passages which seem to teach Plurality of some 

sort in the Godhead, ■ 76 

B. Passages relating to the Angel of Jehovah, 77 

C. Descriptions of the Divine Wisdom and Word, 77 

D. Descriptions of the Messiah, - 77 



Vlll CONTENTS. 

II. — These Three are so described in Scripture, that we are com- 
pelled to conceive of them as distinct Persons, 78-79 

1. The Father and the Son are Persons distinct from 

each other, 78 

2. The Father and the Son are Persons distinct from the 

Spirit, 78 

3. The Holy Spirit is a Person, 78-79 

III. — This Tripersonality of the Divine Nature is not merely eco- 
nomic and temporal, but is immanent and eternal, 79-80 

1. Scripture Proof that these Distinctions of Personality 

are eternal, _ _, 79 

2. Errors refuted by the Scripture Passages, 79-80 

A. The Sabellian, 79-80 

B. TheArian, 80 

IV. — While there are three Persons, there is but one Essence, 80-81 

V. — These three Persons are Equal, 81-83 

1. These Titles belong to the Persons, 81 

2. Qualified Sense of these Titles, 82 

3. Generation and Procession consistent with Equality, . - 82-83 
VI, — The doctrine of the Trinity inscrutable, yet not self -contra- 
dictory, but the Key to all other Doctrines, 84-85 

1. The Mode of this triune Existence is inscrutable, 84 

2. The Doctrine of the Trinity is not self-contradictory, 84 

3. The Doctrine of the Trinity has important Relations to 

other Doctrines, 84-85 

Chapter III. — The Decrees op God, 86-91 

I. — Definition of Decrees, 86 

II. — Proof of the Doctrine of Decrees, _ - 86-88 

1. From Scripture, 86 

2. From Reason, ' 87-88 

A. From the Divine Omniscience, 87 

B. From the Divine Wisdom, 87-88 

C. From the Divine Immutability, 88 

D. From the Divine Benevolence, 88 

III. — Objections to the Doctrine of Decrees, 88-91 

1 . That they are inconsistent with the Free Agency of Man, 88-89 

2. That they take away all Motive for Human Exertion, 89-90 

3. That they make God the Author of Sin, 90-91 

IV. — Concluding Remarks, 91 

1. Practical Uses of the Doctrine of Decrees; 91 

2. True Method of Preaching the Doctrine, 91 

Chapter IV. — The Works op God, or the Execution op the 

Decrees, 92-120 

Section I. — Creation, 92-103 

I. — Definition of Creation, - 92 

II.— Proof of the Doctrine, 92-94 

1. Direct Scripture Statements, 92-93 

2. Indirect Evidence from Scripture, 93-94 



CONTENTS. IX 

III.— Opposing Theories, 94-97 

1. Dualism, 94-95 

2. Emanation, 95 

3. Creation from Eternity, 95-96 

4. Spontaneous Generation, 96-97 

IV.— The Mosaic Account of Creation, 97-100 

1. Its Twofold Nature, 97-98 

2. Its Proper Interpretation, 98-100 

V.— God's End in Creation, 100-102 

1. The Testimony of Scripture, ._„ 100-101 

2. The Testimony of Reason, 101-102 

VI. — Relation of the Doctrine of Creation to other Doctrines,.-- 102-103 

1. To the Holiness and Benevolence of God, 102 

2. To the Wisdom and Free Will of God, 102 

3. To Providence and Redemption, 102-103 

Section II. — Preservation, 103-106 

I. — Definition of Preservation, 103 

II. — Proof of the Doctrine of Preservation, 103-104 

1. From Scripture, 103-104 

2. From Reason, 104 

III. — Theories which virtually deny the Doctrine of Preservation, 104-105 

1. Deism, 104-105 

2. Continuous Creation, 105 

IV. — Remarks upon the Divine Concurrence, 105-106 

Section III. — Providence, 106-113 

I. — Definition of Providence, 106 

II.— Proof of the Doctrine of Providence, 106-108 

1. Scriptural Proof, , 106-107 

2. Rational Proof , 107-108 

III.— Opposing Theories, 108-110 

1. Fatalism, 108 

2. Casualism, 108-109 

3. Theory of a merely General Providence, 109-110 

IV. — Relations of the Doctrine of Providence, 110-113 

1. To Miracles and Works of Grace, 110-111 

2. To Prayer and its Answer, 111-112 

3. To Christian Activity, 112-113 

4. To the evil Acts of Free Agents, 113 

Section IV. — Good and Evil Angels, 114-120 

I. — Scripture Statements and Intimations, 114-118 

1. As to the Nature and Attributes of Angels, 114-115 

2. As to their Number and Organization, 115-116 

3. As to their Moral Character, 116 

4. As to their Employments, 116-118 

A. The Employments of Good Angels, 116-117 

B. The Employments of Evil Angels, 117-118 

II. — Objections to the Doctrine of Angels, 118-119 

1. To the Doctrine of Angels in General, 118 

2. To the Doctrine of Evil Angels in Particular, 118-119 

III. — Practical Uses of the Doctrine of Angels, 119-120 

1. Uses of the Doctrine of Good Angels, 119-120 

2.' Uses of the Doctrine of Evil Angels, 120 



X CONTENTS. 

PART V.— ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN, 121-170 

Chapter I. — Preliminary, 121-129 

I.— Man a Creation of God, 121-122 

II. — Unity of the Race, 122-124 

1. Argument from History, 122 

2. Argument from Language, 123 

3. Argument from Psychology, 123 

4. Argument from Physiology, 123-124 

III. — Essential Elements of Human Nature, 124-127 

1. The Dichotomous Theory, 124-125 

2. The Trichotomous Theory, 125-127 

IV.— Origin of the Soul, 127-129 

1. The Theory of Preexistence, 127 

2. The Creatian Theory, 128 

3. The Traducian Theory, 128-129 

Chapter II.— The Original State of Man, 130-135 

I.— Essentials of Man's Original State, 130-132 

1. Natural Likeness to God, or Personality, 130 

2. Moral Likeness to God, or Holiness, 130-1 32 

A. The Image of God as including only Personality, 131 

B. The Image of God as consisting simply in Man's 

Natural Capacity for Religion, 132 

II. — Incidents of Man's Original State, : 132-135 

1. Results of Man's Possession of the Divine Image, 132-133 

2. Concomitants of Man's Possession of the Divine Image, 133-135 

1st, The Theory of an Original Condition of Savagery, 134 

2nd. The Theory of Comte as to the Stages of Human 

Progress, 134-135 

Chapter III. — Sin, or Man's State op Apostasy, 136-170 

Section I.— The Law op God, 136-139 

I.— Law in General, 136-137 

II.— The Law of God in Particular, 137-138 

1. Elemental Law, 137-138 

2. Positive Enactment, 138 

III. — Relation of the Law to the Grace of God, 139 

Section II.— Nature op Sin, 140-145 

I. —Definition of Sin, 140-143 

1. Explanations, 140 

2. Proof, '. 140-142 

3. Inferences, 142-143 

II.— The Essential Principle of 'Sin, 143-145 

1. Sin as Sensuousness, 143 

2. Sin as Finiteness, 144 

3. Sin as Selfishness, 144-145 

Section III. — Universality op Sin, 146-148 

I. — Every human being who has arrived at moral consciousness, 
has committed acts or cherished dispositions contrary to 
the Divine Law, 146-147 



CONTENTS. XI 

II. — Every member of the human race without exception, pos- 
sesses a corrupted nature, which is the source of actual 

sin and is itself sin, 147-148 

Section IV. — Origin of Sin, 148-151 

I. — The Scriptural Account in Genesis, 148-149 

1. Its General Character not Mythical or Allegorical but 

Historical, 148 

2. The Course of the Temptation and the resulting Fall, 148-149 
II. — Difficulties connected with the Fall, considered as the per- 
sonal Act of Adam, 149-150 

1. How could a holy Being fall ? 149 

2. How could God j ustly permit Satanic Temptation ? 149-150 

3. How could a Penalty so great, be justly connected with 

Disobedience to so slight a Command ? 150 

III. — Consequences of the Fall — so far as respects Adam, 150-151 

1. Death, 150-151 

A. Physical Death, or the Separation of the Soul 

from the Body, 150 

B. Spiritual Death, or the Separation of the Soul 

from God, 150-151 

2. Positive and formal Exclusion from God's Presence, _ _ 151 
Section V. — Imputation of Sin, 151-162 

I. — Theories of Imputation, 151-160 

1. The Pelagian Theory, 151-153 

2. The Arminian Theory, 153-154 

3. The New-School Theory, 154-156 

4. The Federal Theory, 156-157 

5. Theory of Mediate Imputation, 157-158 

6. Theory of Adam's Natural Headship, 158-160 

II. — Objections to the Doctrine of Imputation, 160-162 

Section VI. — Consequences of Sin to Adam's Posterity,-.- 162-169 

I.— Depravity, 162-164 

1. Depravity Partial or Total ? 162-103 

2. Ability or Inability ? 163-164 

II.— Guilt, 165-167 

1. Nature of Guilt, 165 

2. Degrees of Guilt, 165-167 

III.— Penalty, 167-169 

1. Idea of Penalty, 167 

2. Actual Penalty of Sin, 167-169 

Section VII. — The Salvation of Infants, 169-170 

PART VI— SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVA- 
TION THROUGH THE WORK OF CHRIST AND 

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, 171-227 

Chapter I. — Christology, or the Redemption Wrought by 

Christ, 171-199 

Section I. — Historical Preparation for Redemption, 171-172 

I. — Negative Preparation, in the History of the Heathen World, 171 

II. — Positive Preparation, in the History of Israel, 171-172 



Xll CONTENTS. 

Section II. — The Person op Christ, 172-181 

I. — Historical Survey of Views respecting the Person of Christ, 172-174 

1. The Ebionites, 172 

2. TheDocetae, 173 

3. TheArians, 173 

4. The Apollinarians, 173 

5. The Nestorians, 173 

6. The Eutychians, 173 

7. The Orthodox Doctrine, 174 

II.— The two Natures of Christ,— their Reality and Integrity,... 174-175 

1. The Humanity of Christ, 174-175 

A. ItsReality, 174 

B. Its Integrity, 174-175 

2. The Deity of Christ, 175 

III. — The Union of the two Natures in one Person, 176-181 

1. Proof of this. Union, 176-177 

2. Modern Misrepresentations, of this Union, 177-179 

A. The Theory that the Humanity in Christ is a Con- 

tracted and Metamorphosed Deity, 177-178 

B. The Theory of a Union between the Divine and 

the Human Natures, which is not completed 

by the Incarnating Act, 178-179 

3. The Real Nature of this Union, 179-181 

Section III. — The Two States of Christ, 182-185 

I.— The State of Humiliation, 182-184 

1. The Nature of Christ's Humiliation, 182-184 

2. The Stages of Christ's Humiliation, 1 84 

II.— The State of Exaltation, 184-185 

Section IV. — The Offices of Christ, 185-199 

I.— The Prophetic Office of Christ, 185-186 

II.— The Priestly Office of Christ, 186-198 

1. Christ's Sacrificial Work, or the Doctrine of the Atone- 

ment, 1 186-198 

A. Scriptural Methods of Representing the Atonement, 186-187 

B. The Institution of Sacrifice, especially as found in 

the Mosaic System, 187-189 

C. Theories of the Atonement, 189-196 

1st. The Socinian, or Example Theory of the 

Atonement, ' 189-190 

2nd. The Bushnellian, or Moral-influence Theory 

of the Atonement, 190-191 

3rd. The Grotian, or Governmental Theory of the 

Atonement, 191-192 

4th. The Irvingian Theory, or Theory of a Sub- 
jective Atonement, . 192-193 

5th. The Anselmic, or Commercial Theory of the 

Atonement, 193-194 

6th. The Ethical Theory of the Atonement, 194-196 

D. Extent of the Atonement, 196 

E. Objections to the Doctrine of Atonement, 196-198 

2. Christ's Intercessory Work, 198 

III.— The Kingly Office of Christ, 199 



CONTENTS. Xlll 

Chapter II. — The Reconciliation of Man to God, or the Ap- 
plication of Redemption through the Work 

of the Holy Spirit, 200-227 

Section I. — The Application of Christ's Redemption, in its 

Preparation, 200-203 

I.— Election, 201-202 

1. Proof of the Doctrine of Election, 201 

2. Objections to the Doctrine of Election, 201-202 

II.— Calling, 202-203 

A. Is God's General Call Sincere ? 203 

B. Is God's Special Call Irresistible ? 203 

Section II. — The Application of Christ's Redemption, in its 

Actual Beginning, 204-223 

I. — Regeneration, 204-209 

1. Scripture Representations, 204 

2. Necessity of Regeneration, 204-205 

3. The Efficient Cause of Regeneration, 205-206 

4. The Instrumentality used in Regeneration, 207 

5. The Nature of the Change wrought in Regeneration, . _ 208-209 
II.— Conversion, 209-214 

1. Repentance, 210-211 

Elements of Repentance, 210 

Explanations of the Scripture Representations, 211 

2. Faith, 211-214 

Elements of Faith, 212 

Explanations of the Scripture Representations, 212-214 

III.— Union with Christ, . 214-217 

1. Scripture Representations of this Union, 215 

2. Nature of this Union, 215-21G 

3. Consequences of this Union, 216-217 

IV.— Justification, 217-223 

1. Definition of Justification, 217 

2. Proof of the Doctrine of Justification, 218-219 

3. Elements of Justification, 219-220 

4. Relation of Justification to God's Law and Holiness, _ . 220-221 

5. Relation of Justification to Union with Christ and the 

Work of the Spirit, 221-222 

6. Relation of Justification to Faith, 222-223 

7. Advice to Inquirers demanded by a Scriptural View of 

Justification, . 223 

Section III. — The Application of Christ's Redemption, in 

its Continuation, 223-227 

I. — Sanctification, 223-226 

1. Definition of Sanctification, 223-224 

2. Explanations and Scripture Proof, 224 

3. Erroneous Views refuted by the Scripture Passages, - _ 225-226 

A. The Antinomian, 225 

B. The Perfectionist, 225-226 

II. — Perseverance, 226-227 

1. Proof of the Doctrine of Perseverance, 226-227 

2. Objections to the Doctrine of Perseverance, 227 



XIV CONTENTS. 

PART VII.— ECCLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE 

CHURCH, 228-255 

Chapter I. — The Constitution of the Church, or Church 

Polity, 228-238 

I.— Definition of the Church, 228-229 

1. The Church, like the Family and the State, is an Insti- 

tution of Divine Appointment, 229 

2. The Church, unlike the Family and the State, is a Volun- 

tary Society, 229 

I.— Organization of the Church, 229-232 

1. The Fact of Organization, 229-230 

2. The Nature of this Organization, 230-231 

3. The Genesis of this Organization, 231-232 

III.— Government of the Church, 232-238 

1. Nature of this Government in General, 232-235 

A. Proof that the Government of the Church is 

Democratic or Congregational, 233 

B. Erroneous Views as to Church Government, re- 

futed by the Scripture Passages, 233-235 

(a) The World-church Theory, or the Ro- 

manist View, 233-234 

(b) The National-church Theory, or the 

Theory of Provincial or National 
Churches, 234-235 

2. Officers of the Church, 235-237 

A. The Number of Offices in the Church is two, _ - . 235 

B. The Duties belonging to these Offices, 235-236 

C. Ordination of Officers, 236-237 

(a) What is Ordination ? 236 

(b) Who are to Ordain ? 236-237 

3. Discipline of the Church, 237 

A. Kinds of Discipline, 237 

B. Relation of the Pastor to Discipline, 237 

IV. — Relation of Local Churches to each other, 237-238 

1. The General Nature of this Relation is that of Fellow- 

ship between Equals, 237-238 

2. This Fellowship involves the Duty of special Consulta- 

tion with regard to Matters affecting the common In- 
terest, - 238 

3. This Fellowship may be broken by manifest Departures 

from the Faith or Practice of the Scriptures on the 

part of any Church, 238 

Chapter II.— The Ordinances of the Church, 239-255 

L— Baptism, 239-248 

1. Baptism an Ordinance of Christ, _■ 239-240 

2. The Mode of Baptism, 240-242 

A. The Command to Baptize is a Command to Im- 

merse, 240-241 

B. No Church has the Right to Modify or Dispense 

with this Command of Christ, 241-242 



CONTENTS. XV 

3. The Symbolism of Baptism, 242-243 

A. Expansion of the Statement as to the Symbolism 

of Baptism, 242 

B. Inferences from the Passages referred to, 242-243 

4. The Subjects of Baptism, 243-248 

A. Proof that only Persons giving Evidence of being 

Regenerated, are proper Subjects of Baptism, . . 243-244 

B. Inferences from the Fact that only Persons giving 

Evidence of being Regenerate, are proper Sub- 
jects of Baptism, '. _ _ 244-245 

C. Infant Baptism, 245-248 

(a) Infant Baptism without Warrant in the 

Scripture, 245-246 

(b) Infant Baptism expressly Contradicted 

by Scripture, 246 

(c) Its Origin in Sacramental Conceptions 

of Christianity, 246 

(d) The Reasoning by which it is supported, 

Unscriptural, Unsound and Dangerous 

in its Tendency, 246-247 

(e) The Lack of Agreement among Pedo- 

baptists, 247 

(f) The Evil Effects of Infant Baptism,. __ 247-248 
II.— The Lord's Supper, 248-255 

1. The Lord's Supper an Ordinance instituted by Christ, 248 

2. The Mode of Administering the Lord's Supper, 248-249 

3. Symbolism of the Lord's Supper, 249-250 

A. Expansion of the Statement as to the Symbolism 

of the Lord's Supper, 249 

B. Inferences from this Statement, 249-250 

4. Erroneous Views of the Lord's Supper, 250-251 

A. The Romanist View, 250 

B. The Lutheran and High Church View, 251 

5. Prerequisites to Participation in the Lord's Supper, _ _ _ 251-255 

A. There are Prerequisites, 251 

B. Laid down by Christ and his Apostles, 251 

C. The Prerequisites are Four, 252-253 

First, — Regeneration, 252 

Secondly, — Baptism, 252 

Thirdly, — Church Membership, 253 

Fourthly,— An Orderly Walk, 253 

D. The Local Church is the Judge whether these 

Prerequisites are fulfilled, 253-254 

E Special Objections to Open Communion, 254-255 

PART VIIL— ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL 

THINGS, 256-271 

I.— Death Physical, 256-258 

That this is not Annihilation, argued, 

1. Upon Rational Grounds, : 256-257 

2. Upon Scriptural Grounds, 257-258 



XVI CONTESTS. 

II.— The Intermediate State, 258-260 

1. Of the Kighteous, 258-259 

2. Of the Wicked, 259 

Refutation of the two Errors : 

(a) That the Soul sleeps, between Death and 

the Resurrection, 259 

(b) That the Suffering of the Intermediate 

State is Purgatorial, 259-260 

III. —The Second Coming of Christ, 260-268 

1. The Nature of Christ's Coming, 260 

2. The Time of Christ's Coming, 261 

3. The Precursors of Christ's Coming, 261 

4. Relation of Christ's Second Coming to the Millennium, 262-263 
I V.— The Resurrection 263-265 

1. The Exegetical Objection, 263-264 

2. The Scientific Objection, 264-265 

V.— The Last Judgment, 265-267 

1. The Nature of the Final Judgment, 266 

2. The Object of the Final Judgment, 266 

3. The Judge, in the Final Judgment, 266-267 

4. The Subjects of the Final Judgment, 267 

5. The Grounds of the Final Judgment, 267 

VI.— The Final States of the Righteous and of the Wicked, 267-271 

1. Of the Righteous, 267-268 

A. Is Heaven a Place as well as a State ? 268 

B. Is this Earth to be the Heaven of the Saints ?_.. 268 

2. Of the Wicked, 268-271 

Replies to Objections, 269-271 

A. Misinterpretation of Scripture Terms, 268-269 

B. Scripture teaches Ultimate Restoration, 269 

C. Scripture teaches Ultimate Annihilation, 269-270 

D. Eternal Punishment inconsistent with God's Jus- 

tice, 270 

E. Eternal Punishment inconsistent with God's Be- 

nevolence, 270 

F. Preaching of Eternal Punishment a hindrance to 

the success of the Gospel, 271 



LECTURES ON THEOLOGY 



PART I. 

PROLEGOMENA. 



CHAPTER I. 

IDEA OF THEOLOGY. 

I. Definition. — Theology is the science of God and of the relations 
between God and the universe. 

Though the word ' theology ' is sometimes employed in dogmatic writings 
to designate that single department of the science, which treats of the divine 
nature and attributes, prevailing usage, since Abelard (A. D. 1079-1142) 
entitled his general treatise " Theologia Christiana, " has included under 
that term the whole range of Christian doctrine. 

Theology, therefore, gives account not only of God, but of those relations 
between God and the material and spiritual universe, in view of which we 
speak of Creation, Providence, and Redemption. 

Luthardt, Compendium der Dogmatik, 1, 2. Blunt, Dictionary Doct. 
and Hist. Theology, Art. Theology. 

n. Aim. — In defining theology as a science, we indicate its aim. Science 
does not create ; it discovers. Science is not only the observing, record- 
ing, verifying, and formulating of objective facts ; it is also the recogni- 
tion and explication of the relations between these facts, and the synthesis 
of both the facts and the rational principles which unite them, in a compre- 
hensive, rightly proportioned, and organic system. 

Theology answers to this description of a science. It discovers facts 
and relations, but does not create them. As it deals with objective facts and 
their relations, so its arrangement of these facts and relations is not optional, 
but determined by the nature of the material with which it deals. In fine, 

The aim of theology may be stated as being the ascertainment of the 
facts respecting God and the relations between God and the universe, and 
the exhibition of these facts in their rational unity, as connected parts of a 
formulated and organic system of truth. 

Dove, Logic of the Christian Faith, 14. Whewell, History Inductive 
Sciences, I., Introd., 43. 



2 PROLEGOMENA. 

HI. Possibility. — A particular science is possible only when three condi- 
tions combine, namely, the actual existence of the object with which the 
science deals, the subjective capacity of the human mind to know that 
object, and the provision of definite means by which the object is brought 
into contact with the mind. 

In like manner, the possibility of theology has a threefold ground : 1. 
in the existence of a God who has relations to the universe ; 2. in the 
capacity of the human mind for knowing God and certain of these relations ; 
and 3. in the provision of means by which God is brought into actual 
contact with the mind, or in other words, in the provision of a revelation. 

1. In the existence of a God who has relations to the universe. It 
has been objected, indeed, that since God and these relations are objects 
ajjprehended only by faith, they are not proper objects of knowledge or 
subjects for science. We reply that faith is only a higher sort of knowl- 
edge. Physical science rests also upon faith — faith in human testimony 
and in our primitive cognitions — but is not invalidated thereby, because 
this faith, though unlike sense-perception or logical deduction, is yet a 
cognitive act of the reason, and may be defined as certitude with respect 
to matters in which verification is unattainable. 

So the faith which assures us of theological facts is not to be confounded 
with opinion or imagination. It is simply certitude with regard to spiritual 
realities, upon the testimony of our own rational nature and upon the tes- 
timony of God. Its only peculiarity as a cognitive act of the reason is, that 
it is conditioned by holy affection. As the sciences of aesthetics and ethics 
respectively, are products of reason as including in the one case a power of 
recognizing beauty practically inseparable from a love for beauty, and in 
the other case a power of recognizing the morally right practically insepa- 
rable from a love for the morally right, so the science of theology is a 
product of reason, but of reason as including a power of recognizing God 
which is practically inseparable from a love for God. 

This recognition of invisible realities upon God's testimony, and as con- 
ditioned upon a right state of the affections, is faith. As an operation of 
man's higher rational nature, though distinct from ocular vision or from rea- 
soning, it is a kind of knowing, and so may furnish proper material for a 
scientific theology. 

Foundations of our Faith, 12, 13. Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 
1-45. Sir Win. Hamilton, Metaph, , 44. Shedd, History of Doctrine, 
1:154-164. Presb. Quarterly, Oct., 1871; Oct., 1872; Oct., 1873. Cal- 
derwood, Philos. Infinite, 99, 117. Hopkins, Outline Study of Man, 
77, 78. Pkilippi, Glaubenslehre, 1 : 50. Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 2-8. 
Xew Englander, July, 1873, 481. Princeton Eeview, 1864, 122. 

2. In the capacity of the human mind for knowing God and certain of 
these relations. But it has been urged that such knowledge is impossible, 

A. Because we can know only phenomena. We reply: 
(a) That we know mental as well as physical phenomena. 
■(b) That in knowing phenomena, whether mental or physical, we know 
substance as underlying the phenomena, and as manifested through them. 



POSSIBILITY OF THEOLOGY. 6 

(c) That oiir minds bring to the observation of phenomena not only this 
knowledge of substance, but also the knowledge of time, space and cause, 
realities which are in no sense phenomenal. Since these objects of knowl- 
edge are not phenomenal, the fact that God is riot phenomenal cannot pre- 
vent us from knowing him. 

Martineau, Essays Philos. and Theol., 1: 24-40, 207-217. Bib. Sac, 
Apl., 1874, 211. McCosh, Intuitions, 138-154. Porter, Human Intel- 
lect, 619-637. Alden, Philosophy, 44. Hopkins, Outline Study of 
Man, 87. Bowne, Beview of H. Spencer, 47. Fleming, Vocab. of 
Philosophy, Art. Phenomenon. 

B. Because we can know only that which bears analogy to our own 
nature or experience. We reply : 

(a) That it is not essential to knowledge, that there be similarity of 
nature between the knower and the known. The mind knows matter, 
though mind and matter are opposite poles of existence. 

(b) That our past experience is not the measure of our possible knowl- 
edge. Else all revelation of higher characters to lower would be precluded, 
as well as all progress to knowledge which surpassed our present attain- 
ments. 

(c) That even if knowledge depended upon similarity of nature and 
experience, Ave might still know God, since we are made in God's image 
and there are important analogies between the divine nature and our own. 

Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 122. Bib. Sac, Oct., 1867, 624. 
McCosh, Art. hi International Beview, Jan., 1875, 105. 

C. Because we know only that of which we can conceive, in the sense of 
forming an adequate mental image. We reply: 

(a) It is true that we know only that of which we can conceive, if by the 
term 'conceive,' we mean our distinguishing, in thought, the object known 
from all other objects. Bat, 

(6) The objection confounds conception with that which is merely its 
occasional accompaniment and help, namely, the picturing of the object by 
the imagination. In this sense, conceivability is not a final test of truth. 

(c) That the formation of a mental image is not essential to conception 
or knowledge, is plain when we remember that, as a matter of fact, we both 
conceive and know many things of which we cannot form a mental image of 
any sort that in the least corresponds to the reality ; for example, force, 
sj)ace, our own minds. So we may know God, although we cannot form an 
adequate mental image of him. 

McCosh, Intuitions, 186-189. Murphy, Scientific Bases, 133. Porter, 
Human Intellect, 392. Bowne, Beview of H. Spencer, 30-34. 

D. Because we can know truly only that which we know in whole and 
not hi part. We reply: 

(a) That the objection confounds partial knowledge with the knowledge 
of a £>art. We know the mind in part, but Ave do not know a part of the 
mind. 



4 PROLEGOMENA. 

(b) That if the objection were valid, no real knowledge of anything 
would be possible, since we know no single thing in all its relations. 

We conclude that although God is a being not composed of parts, we 
may yet have a partial knowledge of him, and this knowledge, though not 
exhaustive, may yet be real and adequate to the purposes of science. 

Bowne, Review of H. Spencer, 72. Martineau, Essays, 1: 291. 

E. Because all predicates of God are negative, and therefore furnish no 
real knowledge. We answer: 

(«) That predicates derived from our own consciousness, such as spirit, 
love, and holiness, are positive. 

(6) The terms infinite and absolute, moreover, express not merely nega- 
tive, but positive ideas, since "negation of one thing is possible only by 
affirmation of another. " 

Since predicates of God, therefore, are not merely negative, the argu- 
ment mentioned above furnishes no valid reason why Ave may not know him. 

Calderwood, Moral Philosophy, 248 ; Philosophy of the Infinite, 272. 

F. Because to know is to limit or define. Hence the Absolute as un- 
limited, and the Infinite as undefined, cannot be known. We answer: 

(a) That God is absolute, not as existing in no relation, but as existing 
in no necessary relation ; and, 

(6) That God is infinite, not as excluding all co-existence of the finite 
with himself, but as being the ground of the finite, and so unfettered by it. 
God is therefore limited and defined in such a sense as to render knowledge 
of him possible. 

Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 130. Calderwood, Phil, of Inf., 
158. McCosh, Intuitions, 186. Hickok, Rational Cosmology, 85. 

G. Because all knowledge is relative to the knowing agent ; that is, what 
we know, we know, not as it is objectively, but only as it is related to our own 
senses and faculties. In reply: 

(a) We grant that we can know only that which has relation to our facul- 
ties. But this is only to say that we know only that which we come into 
mental contact with, that is, we know only what we know. But, 

(6) We deny that what we come into mental contact with, is known by us 
as other than it is. So far as it is known at all, it is known as it is. In other 
words, the laws of our knowing are not merely arbitrary and regulative, but 
correspond to the nature of things. 

We conclude that, in theology, we are equally warranted in assuming 
that the laws of our thought are laws of God's thought, and that the results 
of normally conducted thinking with regard to God correspond to the object- 
ive reality. 

Alden, Intellectual Philosophy, 71-79. Porter, Human Intellect, 523. 

Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 1 : 22. Murphy, Scientific Bases of 

Faith, 103. Mill, Examination of Sir William Hamilton, 1: 113-134. 

Bib. Sac, Apl., 1868, 341. McCosh, Intuitions, 139-146, 340, 341. 

Princeton Review, 1864, 122. Bowne, Review of H. Spencer, 76. 



POSSIBILITY OF THEOLOGY. 

3. In God's actual revelation of himself and certain of these rela- 
tions. As we do not in this place attempt a positive proof of God's existence 
or of man's capacity for the knowledge of God, so we do not now attempt 
to prove that God has brought himself into contact with man's mind by 
revelation. We consider the grounds of this belief hereafter. Our aim at 
present is simply to show that, granting the fact of revelation, a scientific 
theology is possible. This has been denied upon the ground: 

A. That revelation, as a making known, is necessarily internal and sub- 
jective, and hence can furnish no objective facts such as constitute the proper 
material for science. We answer: 

(«) That common usage does not warrant this restriction of the term 
revelation to a mode of intelligence or a quickening of man's cognitive 
powers. Although revelation in its widest sense may include, and as con- 
stituting the ground of the possibility of theology, does include, both insight 
and illumination, it may also be used to denote simply a provision of the 
means of knowledge. 

Boston Lectures, 1871, 58. Luthardt, Fundamental Truths, 193. Auber- 
len, Divine Eevelation, Introduction, 29. Martineau, Essays, 1: 171, 
280. Bib. Sac, 1867, 593; 1872, 428. Kahnis, Dogmatik, 3: 37-43. 
Mtzsch, System of Christian Doctrine, 72. 

(b) Hence it may be, and as we shall hereafter see, it is, in great part, 
an external revelation in works and words. Theology has to do with inward 
revelations only as they are expressed in, or as they agree with, this objective 
standard. 

B. That many of the truths thus revealed are too indefinite to constitute 
the material for science, either because they belong to the region of the 
feelings, or because they are beyond our full understanding. We reply: 

(a) That theology has to do with subjective feelings only as they can be 
defined, and shown to be effects of objective truth upon the mind. These 
are not more obscure than the facts of morals or psychology, and the same 
objection which would exclude such feelings from theology, would make 
these latter sciences impossible. Moreover, 

(6) Those facts of revelation which are beyond our full understanding, 
may, like the nebular hypothesis in astronomy or the atomic theory hi chem- 
istry, furnish a principle of union between great classes of other facts 
otherwise irreconcilable. We may define our concepts of God, and even of 
the Trinity, at least sufficiently to distinguish them from all other concepts, 
and whatever difficulty may encumber the putting of them into language 
only shows the importance of attempting it and the value of even an approxi- 
mate success. 

C. Because there is no orderly arrangement of these facts either in 
nature or in Scripture, and hence an accurate systematizing of them by the 
human mind is impossible. We reply that the like argument would 
equally show all physical science to be impossible. Though revelation does 
not present to us a dogmatic system ready-made, a dogmatic system is not 
only implicitly contained therein, but parts of the system are wrought out 



b PROLEGOMENA. 

in the epistles of the New Testament, as for example in Romans 5: 12-19,. 
and 1 Timothy, 3: 16. 

Martinean, Essays, 1: 29, 40. Am. Theol. Rev., 1859. 

IV. Necessity. — The necessity of theology has its grounds: 1. in the 
organizing instinct of the human mind; 2. in the relation of systematic 
truth to the development of character ; 3. in the importance to the preacher 
of definite and just views of doctrine ; 4. in the intimate connection 
between correct doctrine and the safety and aggressive power of the church ;. 
5. in the direct and indirect injunctions of Scripture. 

1. In the organizing instinct of the human mind. This organizing 
principle is a part of our constitution. The mind cannot endure confusion 
or apparent contradiction in known facts. The tendency to harmonize and 
unify its knowledge appears so soon as the mind becomes reflective ; just in 
proportion to its endowments and culture, does the impulse to systematize 
and formulate increase. 

This is true of all departments of human inquiry, but it is peculiarly true 
of our knowledge of God. Since the truth with regard to God is the most 
important of all, theology meets the deepest want of man's rational nature. 
Theology is a rational necessity. If all existing theological systems were 
destroyed to-day, new systems would rise to-morrow. 

So inevitable is the operation of this law that those who most decry the- 
ology, show nevertheless that they have made a theology for themselves, 
and often one sufficiently meagre and blundering. Hostility to theology, 
where it does not originate in mistaken fears for the corruption of God's 
truth, or in a naturally illogical structure of mind, often proceeds from a 
license of speculation which cannot brook the restraints of a complete Scrip- 
tural system. 

Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 27-52. 

2. In the relation of systematic truth to the development of character. 
Truth thoroughly digested, is essential to the growth of Christian character 
in the individual and in the church. All knowledge of God has its influ- 
ence upon character, but most of all the knowledge of spiritual facts in their 
relations. 

Theology cannot, as has sometimes been objected, deaden the religious 
affections, since it only draws out from their sources and puts into rational 
connection with each other, the truths which are best adapted to nourish 
the religious affections. On the other hand, the strongest Christians are 
those who have firmest grasp upon the great doctrines of Christianity ; the 
heroic ages of the church have been those which have witnessed most con- 
sistently to them ; the piety that can be injured by the systematic exhibition 
of them must be either weak or mystical or mistaken. 

3. In the importance to the preacher of definite and just views of 
doctrine. The chief intellectual qualification must be his power clearly and 
comprehensively to conceive, and accurately and powerfully to express the 
truth. He can be the agent of the Holy Spirit in converting and sanctify- 
ing men, only as he can wield ' ' the sword of the Spirit, which is the word 
of God" (Eph. 6: 17), or in other language, only as he can impress truth 
upon the minds and consciences of his hearers. 



NECESSITY OF THEOLOGY. ? 

Nothing more certainly nullifies his efforts, than confusion and inconsist- 
ency in his statements of doctrine. His object is to replace obscure and 
erroneous conceptions among his hearers, by those which are correct and 
vivid. He cannot do this without knowing the facts with regard to God hi 
then- relations — knowing them, in short, as parts of a system. With this 
truth he is put in trust. To mutilate it or misrepresent it, is not only sin 
against the Revealer of it — it may also prove the ruin of men's souls. 

The best safeguard against such mutilation or misrepresentation, is the 
diligent study of the several doctrines of the faith in their relations to each 
other, and especially to the central theme of theology, the person and work 
of Jesus Christ. 

4. In the intimate connection between correct doctrine and the safety 
and agressive power of the church. The safety and progress of the church 
is dependent upon her "holding the form of sound words" (2 Tim. 1: 13), 
and serving as "pillar and ground of the truth " (3: 15). Defective under- 
standing of the truth results sooner or later in defects of organization, of 
operation, and of life. 

Thorough comprehension of Christian truth as an organized system, fur- 
nishes on the other hand not only an invaluable defense against heresy and 
immorality, but also an indispensable stimulus and instrument in aggressive 
labor for the world's conversion. 

5. In the direct and indirect injunctions of Scripture. The Scrip- 
tures urge upon us the thorough and comprehensive study of the truth 
(John 5: 39, "Search the Scriptures"), the comparing and harmonizing of 
its different parts (1 Cor. 2: 13, "comparing spiritual things with spiritual"), 
the gathering of all about the great central fact of revelation (Col. 1: 27, 
"which is Christ hi you, the hope of glory"), the preaching of it hi its 
wholeness as well as in its due proportions (2 Tim. 4: 2, "Preach the 
word "). 

The minister of the gospel is called ' ' a scribe instructed unto the king- 
dom of heaven" (Matt. 13: 52); the pastors of the churches are at the same 
time to be teachers (Eph. 4: 11); the bishop must be "apt to teach" (1 Tim. 
3: 2); "rightly dividing the word of truth" (2 Tim. 2: 15); "holding fast 
the faithful word as he hath been taught, that he may be able by sound 
doctrine both to exhort and to convince the gainsayers" (Tit. 1: 9). 

V. Relation to Religion. — Theology and religion are related to each 
other as effects, in different spheres, of the same cause. As theology is an 
effect produced in the sphere of systematic thought by the facts respecting 
God and the relations between God and the universe, so religion is an 
effect which these facts produce hi the sphere of individual or collective 
life. With regard to the term 'religion,' notice: 

1. Its derivation. The derivation from religare, 'to bind,' or 'to 
bind back, ' is negatived by the authority of Cicero, and of the best modern 
etymologists ; by the difficulty on this hypothesis of explaining such forms 
as religio, religens ; and by the necessity, in that case, of presupposing a 
knowledge of sin and redemption, which was foreign to the ancient heathen 
world. 



b PROLEGOMENA. 

The more correct derivation is from relegere, ' to go over again, ' ' care- 
fully to ponder. ' Its original meaning is, therefore : ' reverent observance ' 
(of duties due to the gods). 

Andrews' Latin Lexicon, in voce. Nitzsch, System of Christian Doc- 
trine, 7. Yan Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 75-77. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 
1 : 6. Kahilis, Dogmatik, 3 : 18. For advocacy of the derivation from 
religare, see Lange, Dogmatik, 1 : 185-196. 

2. False conceptions. 

A. Religion is not merely, as Hegel declared, a kind of knowing ; for 
it would then be only an incomplete form of philosophy, and the measure of 
knowledge in each case would be the measure of piety. 

B. Religion is not, as Schleiermacher held, the mere feeling of depend- 
ence ; for such feeling is not religious unless exercised toward God and 
accompanied by moral effort. Finally: 

C. Religion is not, as Kant maintained, morality or moral action ; for 
morality is conformity to a law of right, while religion is essentially a rela- 
tion to a person. 

Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1: 14. Julius Muller, Doct. Sin, 1: 175. Hagenbach, 
Encyclopadie, 17-32. Fisher, Essays on Supernatural Origin of Chris- 
tianity, 563-570. Shedd, Sermons to the Natural Man, 244^246. 
Liddon's Elements of Religion, Lecture I. Bib. Sac, 9: 375. 

3. Essential idea. Religion in its essential idea is a life in God, or in 
other words, a life lived in recognition of God, in communion with God, and 
under control of the indwelling Spirit of God. 

Since it is a life, it cannot be described as consisting solely in the exercise 
of either one of the powers of intellect, affection, or will. As physical life 
involves the unity and cooperation of all the organs of the body, so religion 
or spiritual life, involves the united working of all the powers of the soul. 

To feeling, however, we must assign the logical priority, since holy affec- 
tion toward God, imparted in regeneration, is the condition of truly knowing 
God and of truly serving him. 

Yan Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 81-85. Jiilius Muller, Doctrine of Sin, 2: 
227. Nitzsch, System of Christian Doctrine, 10-28. Luthardt, Fund. 
Truths, 147. Twesten, Dogmatik, 1: 12. 

4. Inferences. From this definition of religion it follows : 

A. That in strictness there is but one religion. Man is a religious being, 
indeed, as having the capacity for this divine life. He is actually religious, 
however, only when he enters into this living relation to God. False relig- 
ions are the caricatures which men given to sin, or the imaginations which 
men groping after light, form of this life of the soul in God. 

Peabody, Christianity the Religion of Nature, 18. Yan Oosterzee, Dog- 
matics, 88-93. 

B. That the content of religion is greater than that of theology. The 
facts of religion come within the range of theology only so far as they can 
be definitely conceived, accurately expressed in language, and brought into 
rational relation to each other. 

Blunt, Diet. Doct. and Hist. Theol., Art. Theology. Sir Wm. Ham- 
ilton, quoted in Calderwood's Phil, of Infinite, 499. 



CHAPTER II. 

MATERIAL OF THEOLOGY. 

I. Soukces or Theology. — God himself, in the last analysis, must be the 
only source of knowledge with regard to his own being and relations. 
Theology is, therefore, a summary and explanation of the content of God's 
self -revelations. These are first, the revelation of God in nature ; secondly 
and supremely, the revelation of God in the Scriptures. 

1. Nature. By nature we mean not only physical facts, or facts with 
regard to the substances, properties, forces, and laws of the material world, 
but also spiritual facts, or facts with regard to the intellectual and moral 
constitution of man, and the orderly arrangement of human society and 
history. 

2. Natural Theology. The Scriptures assert that God has revealed 
himself in nature. There is not only an outward witness to his existence 
and character in the constitution and government of the universe (Ps. 19 ; 
Acts 14: 17; 17: 24; Rom. 1: 20), but an inward witness to his existence 
and character in the heart of every man. (Rom. 1 : 19, to yvuorbi ;=the known 
of God. Compare the anOKa74"KTtrcu, of the gospel, in 1: 17, with the 
a-oKaM'-rerai, of wrath, in.1: 18. Rom. 1: 32, to oiKaico/m eirr/vovrec. Rom. 2: 
15, epyov ypa-rbv. Therefore even the heathen are without excuse, Rom. 1 : 
20). The systematic exhibition of these facts, whether derived from obser- 
vation, history, or science, constitutes natural theology. 

Shedd, Homiletics, 11. 

3. Natural Theology supplemented. The Scriptures declare, however, 
with equal plainness, that the revelation of God in nature does not supply 
all the knowledge which a sinner needs (Acts 17: 23 ; Eph. 3:9). This reve- 
lation is therefore supplemented by another, in which divine attributes and 
merciful provisions only dimly shadowed forth in nature, are made known 
to men. This latter revelation consists of a series of supernatural events 
and communications, the record of which is preserved in the Scriptures. 

There is, indeed, an internal work of the divine Spirit by which the outer 
word is made an inner word, and its truth and power are manifested to the 
heart. This teaching of the Spirit, however, is not a giving of new truth, 
but an "illumination of the mind to perceive the truth already revealed. 
Christian experience is but a testing and proving of the truth objectively 
contained in Scripture. 

While theology, therefore, depends upon the teaching of the Spirit to 
interpret, and upon Christian experience to illustrate the Scriptures, it 
looks to the Scriptures themselves as its chief source of material and its 
final standard of appeal. We use the word revelation, therefore, henceforth, 
to designate the objective truth made known in Scripture. 

Twesten, Dogmatik, 1 : 344. Calvin's Institutes, B. I. , ch. 7. Hackett on 
Acts, ^17: 23. Hodge on Romans, 1: 20. Hodge, Syst. Theology, 1: 15. 



10 PROLEGOMENA. 

4. The theology of Scripture not unnatural. Though we speak of 
the systematized truths of nature as constituting natural theology, we are 
not to infer that Scriptural theology is unnatural. Since the Scriptures 
have the same author as nature, the same principles are illustrated in one as 
in the other. All the doctrines of the Bible have their reason in that same 
nature of God which constitutes the basis of all material things. 

Christianity is a supplementary dispensation, not as contradicting, or cor- 
recting errors in, natural theology, but as more perfectly revealing the 
truth. Christianity, indeed, is the ground plan upon which the whole crea- 
tion is built — the original and eternal truth of which natural theology is 
but a partial expression. 

Hence the theology of nature and the theology of Scripture are mutu- 
ally dependent. Natural theology not only prepares the way for, but it 
receives stimulus and aid from, Scriptural theology. Natural theology may 
now be a source of truth, which, before the Scriptures came, it could not 
furnish. 

Peabody, Christianity the Relig. of Nature, Lecture 2. Dove, Logic 
of the Christian Faith, 318, 333. Bib. Sac, July, 1871, 136. 

5. Scripture and Rationalism. Although the Scriptures make known 
much that is beyond the power of man's unaided reason to discover or fully 
to comprehend, they contain nothing which contradicts a reason condi- 
tioned in its activity by a holy affection, and enlightened by the Spirit of 
God. To reason in the large sense, as including the mind's power of cog- 
nizing God and moral relations — not in the narrow sense of mere reasoning, 
or the exercise of the purely logical faculty — the Scriptures continually 
appeal. 

A. The proper office of reason, in this large sense, is : 

(a) To furnish us with those primary ideas of space, time, cause, right,, 
and God, which are the conditions of all subsequent knowledge. 

(b) To judge with regard to man's need of a special and supernatural 
revelation. 

(c) To examine the credentials of commiuiications professing to be such 
a revelation. 

(d) To receive and reduce to system the facts of revelation, when such 
an one has been properly attested. 

(e) To deduce from these facts their natural and logical conclusions. 
Thus reason itself prepares the way for a revelation above reason, and 

warrants an implicit trust in such revelation when once given. 

B. Rationalism, on the other hand, holds reason to be the ultimate 
soruce of all religious truth, while Scripture is authoritative only so far as 
its revelations agree with previous conclusions of reason, or can be ration- 
ally demonstrated. Every form of rationalism, therefore, commits at least 
one of the following errors:' 

(a) That of confounding reason with mere reasoning, or the exercise of 
the logical intelligence. 

(6) That of ignoring the necessity of a holy affection as the condition of 
all right reason in religious things, and the absence of this holy affection hi 
man's natural state. 



SOURCES OF THEOLOGY. LI 

(c) Tliat of regarding the unaided reason as capable, even in its normal 
and unbiased state, of discovering, comprehending and demonstrating all 
religious truth. 

Mansell, Limits of Religious Thought, 96. Calderwood, Philosophy 
of Infinite, 126. Hodge, Theology, 1: 34, 39, 55. Luthardt, Funda- 
mental Truths, Lecture TIE. Miller, Fetich in Theology, 212. Twesten, 
Dogniatik, 1: 167-500. 

6. Scripture and Mysticism. 

A. True mysticism. We have seen that there is an illumination of the 
minds of all believers by the Holy Spirit. The Spirit, however, makes no 
new revelation of truth, but uses for his instrument the truth already 
revealed. The illuminating work of the Spirit is, therefore, an opening of 
men's minds to understand the Scriptures. 

As one thus initiated into the mysteries of Christianity, every true believer 
may be called a mystic. True mysticism is that higher knowledge and fel- 
lowship which the Holy Spirit gives through the use of the Scriptm-es as 
a means. 

B. False mysticism. Mysticism, however, as the term is commonly 
used, errs in holding to the attainment of religious knowledge by direct 
communication from God, and by passive absorption of the human activi- 
ties into the divine. It either partially or wholly loses sight of : 

(a) The outward organ of revelation, the Scriptures. 

(6) The activity of the human powers in the reception of all religious 
knowledge. 

(c) The personality of man, and by consequence, the personality of God. 

Xitzsch, System of Doctrine, 35. Herzog, Encyclopaedic, Art. Mystik, 
by Lange. Yaughan, Hours with the Mystics. Morell, History of Phi- 
losophy, 58 ; 191-215 ; 556-625 ; 726. Hodge, Syst. Theology, 1: 61-69 ; 
97-101. Fleming, Yocab. of Philosoi:>hy, in voce. Tholuck, Introduc- 
tion to Bluthensanrmlung aus der Morgenlandischen Mystik. 

7. Seripture and Romanism. While the history of doctrine, as show- 
ing the progressive apprehension and iinfolding by the church, of the 
truth implicitly contained in the Scriptures, is a subordinate source of the- 
ology, Protestantism recognizes the Bible as the only primary and absolute 
authority. 

Bomanism, on the other hand, commits the twofold error : 

A. Of making the church, and not the Scriptures, the immediate and 
authoritative source of religious knowledge. 

Hodge, Systematic Theology, 1 : 61-69. E. G. Kobinson, Sermon in 
Madison Avenue Lectures, 387. 

B. Of making the relation of the individual to- Christ dependent upon his 
relation to the church, instead of his relation to the church depending 
upon, following, and expressing his relation to Christ. 

Schleiermacher, Glaubenslehre, 1 : 6-38. Martensen, Christian Dog- 
matics, 30. 



12 PROLEGOMENA. 

II. Limitations op Theology. — Although theology derives its material 
from God's twofold revelation, it does not profess to give an exhaustive 
knowledge of God and of the relations between God and the universe. It 
has its limitations: 

1. In the finiteness of the human understanding. This gives rise to a 
class of necessary mysteries, or mysteries connected with the infinity and 
incomprehensibleness of the divine nature. (Job. 11: 7; Rom. 11: 33.) 

Calderwood, Philos. Infinite, 491. Sir Win. Hamilton, Discus, on Phi- 
losophy, 22. 

2. In the imperfect state of science, both natural and metaphysical. 
This gives rise to a class of accidental mysteries, or mysteries which consist 
in the apparently irreconcilable nature of truths which, taken separately, 
are perfectly comprehensible. 

3. In the inadequacy of language. Since language is the medium 
through which truth is expressed and formulated, the invention of a proper 
terminology in theology, as well as in every other science, is a condition and 
criterion of its progress. The Scriptures recognize a peculiar difficulty in 
putting spiritual truths into earthly language. (1 Cor. 2: 13. 2 Cor. 3: 6; 
12: 4.) 

4. In the incompleteness of our knowledge of the Scriptures. Since 
it is not the mere letter of the Scriptures that constitutes the truth, the 
progress of theology is dependent upon hermeneutics or the interpretation 
of the word of God. 

5. In the silence of written revelation. For our discipline and proba- 
tion, much is probably hidden from us, which we might even with our 
present powers comprehend. 

6. In the lack of spiritual discernment caused by sin. Since holy 
affection is a condition of religious knowledge, all moral imperfection in the 
individual Christian and in the church, serves as a hindrance to the work- 
ing out of a complete theology. 

We do not, therefore, expect to construct a perfect system of theology. 
All science but reflects the present attainment of the human mind. No 
science is complete or finished. However it may be with the sciences of 
nature and man, the science of God will never amount to an exhaustive 
knowledge. 

We must not expect, then, to demonstrate all Scripture doctrines upon 
rational grounds, or even in every case to see the principle of connection 
between them. Where we cannot do this, we must, as in every other sci- 
ence, set the revealed facts in their places and wait for further light, 
instead of ignoring or rejecting any of them because we cannot understand 
them or their relation to other parts of our system. 

Though our knowledge may be imperfect, it will have great value still. 
Our success in constructing a theology will depend upon the proportion 
which clearly expressed facts of Scripture bear to mere inferences and 
assumptions, and upon the degree in which they all cohere about Christ, 
the central person and theme. 



CHAPTER III. 

METHOD OF THEOLOGY. 

I. Bequisites to the study. — The requisites to the successful study of 
theology are: 

1. A disciplined mind. Only such a mind can patiently collect the 
facts, hold in its grasp many facts at once, educe their connecting princi- 
ples by continuous reflection, suspend final judgment until its conclusions 
are verified by Scripture and experience. 

2. An intuitional as distinguished from a merely logical habit of 
mind, — or, trust in the mind's primitive cognitions, as well as in its processes 
of reasoning. The theologian must have insight as well as understanding. 
He must accustom himself to ponder spiritual facts as well as those which 
are sensible and material ; to see things in their inner relations as well as 
their outward forms ; to cherish confidence in the reality and the unity of 
truth. 

Vinet, Outlines of Philosophy, 39, 40. Dove, Logic of Christian Faith, 
1-29, and especially 25. 

3. An acquaintance ivith physical, mental and moral science. The 
method of conceiving and expressing Scripture truth is so affected by our 
elementary notions of these sciences, and the weapons with which theology 
is defended and attacked are so commonly drawn from them as arsenals, 
that the student cannot afford to be ignorant of them. 

Baptist Quarterly, 2: 393. 

4. A knowledge of the original languages of the Bible. This is neces- 
sary to enable us not only to determine the meaning of the fundamental 
terms of Scripture, such as sin, righteousness, atonement, but also to inter- 
pret statements of doctrine by their connections with the context. 

5. A holy affection toward God. Only the renewed heart can properly 
feel its need of divine revelation, or understand that revelation when given. 

6. The enlightening influence of the Holy Spirit As only the Spirit 
fathoms the things of God, so only he can illuminate our minds to apprehend 
them. 

II. Divisions oe Theology. — Theology is commonly divided into Bibli- 
cal, Historical, Systematic and Practical. 

1. Biblical Theology aims to arrange and classify the facts of revela- 
tion, confining itself to the Scriptures for its material, and treating of doc- 
trine only so far as it was developed at the close of the apostolic age. 

2. Historical Theology traces the development of the Biblical doctrines 
from the time of the apostles to the present day, and gives account of the 



14 PROLEGOMENA. 

results of this development in the life of the church. By doctrinal devel- 
opment, we mean the progressive unfolding and apprehension by the 
church, of the truth explicitly or implicitly contained in Scripture. 

As giving account of the shaping of the Christian faith into doctrinal 
statements, Historical Theology is called the History of Doctrine. As 
describing the resulting and accompanying changes in the lif e of the church, 
outward and inward, Historical Theology is called Church History. 

3. Systematic Theology takes the material furnished by Biblical and 
Historical Theology, and with the aid of these seeks to build up into an 
organic and consistent whole all oiu* knowledge of God and of the relations 
between God and the miiverse, whether this knowledge be originally derived 
from nature or from the Scriptures. 

It is to be clearly distinguished from Dogmatic Theology. Dogmatic 
Theology is the systemization of the doctrines as expressed in the symbols of 
the church, together with a grounding of these in the Scriptures and an 
exhibition, so far as may be, of their rational necessity. Systematic Theology, 
on the contrary, begins not with the symbols, but with the Scriptures. It 
asks first, not what the church has believed, but what is the truth of God's 
revealed word. It examines that word with all the aids which nature and 
the Spirit have given it, using Biblical and Historical Theology as its ser- 
vants and helpers, but not as its masters. Systematic Theology, in fine, is 
theology proper, of which Biblical and Historical Theology are the incom- 
plete and preparatory stages. 

4. Practical Theology is the system of truth considered as a means of 
renewing and sanctifying men, or in other words, theology in its publication 
and enforcement. To this department of theology belong Homiletics and 
Pastoral Theology, since these are but scientific presentations of the true 
methods of unfolding Christian truth, and of bringing it to bear upon men 
individually and in the church. 

The application of the term Practical Theology to a systematic exhibition 
of the contents of the Christian consciousness, making it equivalent to 
the theology of Christian experience, is a misuse of the word ' practical ' 
(jvpaoaco). 

5. Other departments of theology, so-called. It has sometimes been 
asserted that there are other departments of theology not included in those 
above mentioned. But most of these, if not all, belong to other spheres of 
research and cannot properly be classed under theology at all. 

Moral theology so-called, or the science of Christian morals (ethics, or 
theological ethics), is indeed the proper result of theology, but is not to 
be confounded with it. 

Speculative theology so-called, respecting, as it does, such truth as is 
matter of opinion, is either extra-scriptural, and so belongs to the province 
of the philosophy of religion, or is an attempt to explain truth already 
revealed, and so falls under the province of Systematic Theology. 

Bib. Sac, Apl., 1852, 375. Luthardt, Compendium der Dogmatik, 5. 
Hagenbach, Encylopgedie, 109. 



HISTORY OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 15 

III. Histoey of Systematic Theology. 

1. In the Eastern Church systematic theology may be said to have had 
its beginning and end in John of Damascus (700-760). 

2. In the Western Church we may (with Hagenbach) distinguish three 
periods : 

A. The period of Scholasticism, introduced by Peter Lombard (died 
1164), and reaching its culmination in Thomas Aquinas (1221-1274) and 
Duns Scotus (1265-1308). 

B. Tne period of Symbolism, represented by the Lutheran theology of 
Philip Melancthon (1497-1560), and the Reformed theology of John Cal- 
vin ( 1509-1564) ; the former connecting itself with the Analytic theology of 
Calixtus (1585-1656), and the latter with the Federal theology of Cocceius 
(1603-1669). 

C. The period of Criticism and Speculation, in its three divisions : the 
rationalistic, represented by Sender (1721-1791) ; the transitional, by Schlei- 
ermacher (1768-1834) ; the evangelical, by Nitzsch, Midler and Tholuck. 

3. Among theologians of views diverse from the prevailing Protestant 
faith may be mentioned: 

A. Ballarmine (1542-1621), the Roman Catholic ; 

B. Arminius (1560-1609), the opponent of predestination ; 

C. Laelius Socinus (1525-1562), and Faustus Socinus (1539-1604), the 
leaders of the modern Unitarian movement. 

4. British theology, represented by : 

A. The Baptist, John Banyan (1628-1688), John Gill (1697-1771), and 
Andrew Fuller (1754-1815). , 

B. The Puritan, John Owen (1616-1683), Richard Baxter (1615-1691), 
John Howe (1630-1705), and Thomas Ridgeley (1666-1734). 

C. The Scotch Presbyterian, Thomas Boston (1676-1732), John Dick 
(1764-1833), and Thomas Chalmers (1780-1847). 

D. The Methodist, John Wesley (1703-1791). 

E. The English Churchmen, Richard Hooker (1553-1600), Gilbert Bur- 
net (1643-1715), and John Pearson (1613-1686). 

5. American theology, running in two lines: 

A. The Reformed system of Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758), modified 
successively by Joseph Bellamy (1719-1790), Samuel Hopkins (1721-1803), 
Nathaniel Emmons (1745-1840), Leonard Woods (1774-1854), C. G. Finney 
(bom 1792), and N. W, Taylor (1786-1858). Calvinism, as thus modified, 
is often called the New England, or New School theology. 

B. The older Calvinism, represented by R. J. Breckinridge (born 1800), 
Charles Hodge (bom 1797), E. J. Baircl, and William G. T. Shedd; the two 
former favoring, and the two latter opposing, antecedent imputation. All 
these, however, as holding to views of human depravity and divine grace 
more nearly conformed to the doctrine of Augustine and Calvin, are dis- 
tinguished from the New England theologians and their followers, by the 
popular title of Old School. 

On the history of Systematic Theology, see Hagenbach and Shedd, 
Hist, of Doctrine ; Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1 : 44-100 ; Kahnis, Dogmatik, 
1: 15-128: Hase, Hutterus Redivivus, 24^52. 



16 



PROLEGOMENA. 



IV. Order of treatment. 

1. Various methods of arranging the topics of a theological system. 

A. The Analytic method of Calixtus begins with the assumed end of 
all things, blessedness, and thence passes to the means by which it is 
secured. 

B. The Christological method of Hase, Thomasius and Andrew Fuller, 
treats of God, man, and sin as presuppositions of the person and work of 
Christ. 

C. The Federal method of Cocceius, Witsius and Boston, treats theology 
under the two covenants. 

D. The Trinitarian method of Leydecker and Martensen regards Chris- 
tian doctrine as a manifestation successively of the Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit. 

E. The Anthropological method of Chalmers and Kothe. The former 
begins with the Disease of Man and passes to the Bemedy ; the latter 
divides his Dogmatik into the Consciousness of Sin and the Consciousness 
of Redemption. Mention may also be made of the 

F. Historical method adopted in Jonathan Edwards's History of Re- 
demption ; and 

G. The Allegorical method of Dannhauer, in which man is described as 
a wanderer, life as a road, the Holy Spirit as a light, the church as the 
candlestick, God as the end, and heaven as the home. 

2. We adopt the Synthetic method. This proceeds from causes to 
effects, or in the language of Hagenbach, ' ' starts from the highest principle, 
God, and proceeds to man, Christ, redemption, and finally to the end of 
all things." 

In such a treatment of theology we may best arrange our topics in the 
following order: 

1st. The existence of God. 

2d. The Scriptures a revelation from God. 

3d. The nature, decrees and works of God. 

4th. Man in his original likeness to God, and subsequent apostasy. 

5th. Redemption through the work of Christ and of the Holy Spirit. 

6th. The nature and laws of the Christian church. 

7th. The end of the present system of things. 
Hagenbach, Hist. Doctrine, 2: 152. 

V. Text-books in Theology valuable for reference : 

1. Compendiums. Hase, Hutterus Redivivus. Luthardt, Compen- 
dium der Dogmatik. Hodge, Outlines of Theology. 

2. Confessions. Lutheran: Hase, Libri Symbolici. Reformed: Me- 
meyer, Collectio Confessionum. Comparison of both: Winer, Comparative 
Darstellung. English Church: Thirty-nine Articles. Presbyterian: West- 
minster Confession. Methodist: Doctrines and Discipline of the Meth. 
Epis. Church; Baptist: New Hampshire Confession. 

3. Extended treatises. Turretin, Dick, Hodge, Van Oosterzee, Phil- 
ippi, Luthardt (Fundamental and Saving Truths), Baird (Elohim Revealed). 

4. Monographs. Miiller, Doctrine of Sin. Dorner, Hist. Doctrine 
Person of Christ. Shedd, Discourses and Essays. 



PART II. 

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 



CHAPTER I. 

ORIGIN OF OUR IDEA OF GOD'S EXISTENCE. 

The existence of God is a first truth ; in other words, the knowledge of 
God's existence is intuitive. Logically, it precedes and conditions all 
observation and reasoning. Chronologically, only reflection upon the phe- 
nomena of nature and of mind occasions its rise in consciousness. 

With the great majority of German, and a constantly increasing number 
of English and American theologians, we regard the existence of God as the 
most important of those necessary truths, such as space, time, causality, 
substance,, which are assumed as the foundations of all our other knowledge. 
Calvin, Institutes, Book I., Chap. 3. Nitzsch, System of Christian 
Doctrine, 15-26, 134-140. Julius Muller, Doctrine of Sin, 1: 78-84. 
Ulrici, Leib und Seele, 688-725. Porter, Human Intellect, 497. Hickok, 
Eational Cosmology, 58-89. Farrar, Science hi Theology, 27-29. Bib. 
Sac, July, 1872, 553; and January, 1873, 204. Fetich in Theology, 
110-122. Fisher, Essays, 565-572. Tulloch, Theism, 314, 336. Hodge, 
Systematic Theology, 1: 191-203. 
Remark 1. Derivation. 'God' allied to Persian khoda=lord, ruler. 
Oedf, either from ri d-i]fii =orderer, creator; or from (Sanscrit) dyaus (divus), 
=the bright heaven. D'hSk from Tlhx (Arabic) =to fear, adore; plural, 
of many in one=one who combines in himself many reasons for adoration. 
Webster's Dictionary, in voce. Kahnis, Dogmatik, 3: 175, 176. 
Remark 2. Definition. God is the absolutely perfect being. All more 
extended definitions are but expansions of this one. 
Hodge, Systematic Theology, 1 : 366. 

I. First truths in general. 

1. Their nature. 

A. Negatively. A first truth is not, 

(a) Truth written prior to consciousness upon the substance of the soul ; 
for such passive knowledge implies a materialistic view of the soul ; 

(6) Actual knowledge of which the soul finds itself in possession at 
birth ; for it cannot be proved that the soul has such knowledge ; 

(c) An idea, undeveloped at birth, but which has the power of self- 
development apart from observation and experience ; for this is contrary to 
all we know of the laws of mental growth. 

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 1: 17. Origen adv. Celsum, 1: 4. Calvin, 
Institutes, 1:3:3. 

2 



18 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 

B. Positively. A first truth is a knowledge which, though developed 
upon occasion of observation and reflection, is not derived from observation 
and reflection, — a knowledge on the contrary which has such logical priority 
that it must be assumed or supposed, hi order to make any observation or 
reflection possible. 

Such truths are not, therefore, recognized first in order of time ; some of 
them are assented to somewhat late in the mind's growth ; by the great 
majority of men they are never consciously formulated at all. Yet they con- 
stitute the necessary assumptions upon which all other knowledge rests, and 
the mind has not only the inborn capacity to evolve them so soon as the 
proper occasions are presented, but the recognition of them is inevitable so 
soon as the mind begins to give account to itself of its own knowledge. 

Kant, Critique of Pure Eeason, Introduction, 1. Cousin, True Beauti- 
ful and Good, 39-64; also, History Philosophy, 2: 199-245, Porter, 
Human Intellect, 501, 519. McCosh, Intuitions, 48, 49. 

2. Their criteria. The criteria by which first truths are to be tested 
are three: 

A. Their universality. By this we mean not that all men assent to them 
or understand them when propounded in scientific form, but that all men 
manifest a practical belief in them by their language, actions and expec- 
tations. 

B. Their necessity. By this we mean not that it is impossible to deny 
these truths, but that the mind is compelled by its very constitution to 
recognize them upon the occurrence of the proper conditions, and to employ 
them in its arguments to prove their non-existence. 

C. Their logical independence and priority. By this we mean that these 
truths can be resolved into no others, and proved by no others ; that they 
are presupposed in the acquisition of all other knowledge, and can therefore 
be derived from no other source than an original cognitive power of the 
mind. 

Porter, Human Intellect, 510. 

II. The Existence of God a first truth. 

1. That the knoivledge of God's existence answers the first criterion of 
universality , is evident from the following considerations: 

A. It is an acknowledged fact that the vast majority of men have actually 
recognized the existence of a spiritual being or beings, upon whom they 
conceived themselves to be dependent. 

B. Those races and nations which have at first seemed destitute of such 
knowledge, have uniformly, upon further investigation, been found to 
possess it, so that no tribe of men with which we have thorough acquaint- 
ance can be said to be without an object of worship. We may presume that 
further knowledge will show this to be true of all. 

C. This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that those individuals in 
heathen or in Christian lands, who profess themselves to be without any 
knowledge of a spiritual power or powers above them, do yet indirectly 
manifest the existence of such an idea in their minds and its positive influ- 
ence over them. 



EX1STEXCE OF GOD A FIRST TRUTH. 19 

D. This agreement among individuals and nations so widely separated 
in time and place, can be most satisfactorily explained by supposing that it 
has its ground not in accidental circumstances, but in the nature of man as 
man. The diverse and imperfectly developed ideas of the Supreme Being 
which prevail among men, are best accounted for as misinterpretations and 
perversions of an intuitive conviction common to all. 

Ulrici, Leib und Seele, 688. Tylor, Primitive Culture, 1: 377 s<j. 
Alexander, Evidences of Christianity, 22. Calderwood, Philosophy of 
Infinite, 512. Liddon, Elements of Religion, 50. Methodist Quarterly 
Review, Jan., 1875, 1. Tholuck, Art. on Heathenism, its origin and 
nature, in Bib. Rep., 1832: 86. Pearson on Infidelity, 19. 

2. That the knowledge of God's existence answers the second criterion 
of necessity, will be seen by considering: 

A. That men, under circumstances fitted to call forth this knowledge, 
cannot avoid recognizing the existence of God. In contemplating finite 
existence there is inevitably suggested the idea of an infinite being as its 
correlative. In danger men instinctively cry to God for help. In the com- 
mands and reproaches of conscience the soul recognizes a Lawgiver and 
Judge whose voice conscience merely echoes. 

Calderwood, Philosophy of Infinite, 46; and Moral Philosophy, 77. 
Hopkins, Outline Study of Man, 283-285. 

B. That men, in virtue of their humanity, have a capacity for religion. 
This recognized capacity for religion is proof that the idea of God is a nec- 
essary one. If the mind upon proper occasion did not evolve this idea, 
there would be nothing in man to which religion could appeal. 

C. That he who denies God's existence must tacitly assume that existence 
in his very argument, by employing logical processes whose validity rests 
upon the fact of God's existence. The full proof of this belongs under the 
next head. 

3. That the knowledge of God's existence answers the third criterion 
of logical independence and priority, may be shown as follows: 

xA. It cannot be derived from any other source than an original cognitive 
power of the mind. 

(a) Not from external revelation, whether communicated through the 
Scriptures or tradition ; for unless man had from another source a previ- 
ous knowledge of the existence of a God from whom such a revelation might 
come, the revelation itself could have no authority for him. 

Gillespie, Necessary Existence of God, 10. Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1 : 117. 

(6) Not from experience, whether sense-perception or reflection ; for the 
idea of God is not that of a sensible or material object, nor is it a combina- 
tion of such ideas. Since the spiritual and infinite are direct opposites of 
the material and finite, no experience of the latter can account for our idea 
of the former. 

Porter, Human Intellect, 86, quotation from Locke, Essay, 2:1:4. 
Cousin, True Beautiful and Good, 48, 49. 



20 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 

(c) Not from reasoning ; because, 

(c 1 ) The actual rise of this knowledge in the great majority of minds is 
not the result of any conscious process of reasoning. . On the other hand, 
upon occurrence of the proper conditions, it flashes upon the soul with the 
quickness and force of an immediate revelation. 

(c 2 ) The strength of men's faith in God's existence is not proportioned 
to the strength of the reasoning faculty. On the other hand, men of great- 
est logical power are often inveterate sceptics, while men of unwavering 
faith are found among those who cannot even understand the arguments for 
God's existence. 

Dove, Logic of the Christian Faith, 21. 
(c 3 ) There is more in this knowledge than reasoning could ever have fur- 
nished. Men do not limit their belief hi God to the just conclusions of 
argument. The arguments for the divine existence, valuable as they are 
for purposes to be shown hereafter, are not sufficient by themselves to war- 
rant our conviction that there exists an mfinite and absolute being. 

It will appear upon examination that the a priori argument is capable of 
proving only an abstract and ideal proposition, but can never conduct us to 
the existence of a real being. It will appear that the a posteriori argument 
from merely finite existence, can never demonstrate the existence of the infi- 
nite. In the words of Sir Wm. Hamilton : "A demonstration of the abso- 
lute from the relative is logically absurd, as in such a syllogism we must 
collect in the conclusion what is not distributed in the premises." (Discus- 
sions, 23.) 

Neither do men arrive at the knowledge of God's existence by inference ; 
for inference is but condensed syllogism, and is equally open to the objection 
just mentioned. 

Whately, Logic, 290-292. Jevons, Lessons in Logic, 81. Thomp- 
son, Outline Laws of Thought, sections 82-92. Calderwood, Philoso- 
phy of the Infinite, 60-69 ; Moral Philosophy, 238. Turnbull, Baptist 
Quarterly, July, 1872, 271. Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 239. 
B. It is presupposed in all other knowledge as its logical condition and 
foundation. Not only does the validity of the simplest mental acts, as 
sense-perception, self-consciousness, and memory, depend upon the assump- 
tion that a God exists who has so constituted our minds that they give us 
knowledge of things as they are, but the more complex processes, such as 
induction and deduction, can be relied on only by presupposing a thinking 
Deity who has made the various parts of the universe to correspond to each 
other and to the investigating faculties of man. While we cannot demon- 
strate that God is, we can show that in order to the existence of any other 
knowledge, men must assume that God is. 

Peabody, Christianity the Religion of Nature, 23 : " Induction is syllo- 
gism, with the immutable attributes of God for a constant term." Por- 
ter, Human Intellect, 492 : ' ' Induction rests upon the assumption, as it 
demands for its ground, that a personal or thinking Deity exists." See 
also pages 486, 508, 509, 518, 519, 585, 616, 662. Whately, Logic, 270. 
New Englander, Oct. , 1871 ; Art. on Grounds of Confidence in Induc- 
tive Reasoning. Fisher, Essays on Supernatural Origin of Christianity, 
564. Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, Ch. 'Zweck.' 



EXISTENCE OF GOD A FIKST TRUTH. 21 

III. Contents of this Intuition. 

1. In this fundamental knowledge that God is, it is necessarily implied 
that to some extent men know intuitively ivhat God is, namely, 

(a) A power above them upon which they are dependent. 

(6) A perfection which imposes law upon their moral natures. 

(c) A personality which they may recognize in prayer and worship. 

It is to be remembered, however, that the loss of love to God has greatly 
obscured this primitive knowledge, so that the revelation of nature and the 
Scriptures is needed to awaken, confirm and enlarge it, and the special work 
of the Spirit of Christ to make it the knowledge of friendship and com- 
munion. 

Calderwood, Moral Philosophy, 232. Lowndes, Philos. of Primary 
Beliefs, 108-112. 

2. The Scriptures, therefore, do not attempt to prove the existence of 
God, but on the other hand, both assume and declare that the knowledge 
that God is, is universal. (Eom. 1: 19-21, 28, 32 ; 2: 15.) God has inlaid 
the evidence of this fundamental truth in the very nature of man, so that 
nowhere is he without a witness. The preacher may confidently follow the 
example of Scripture by assuming it. But he must also explicitly declare 
it, as the Scripture does. "For the invisible things of him from the creation 
of the world are clearly seen " (natiopd-ai) ; but then — and this forms the 
transition to our next division of the subject — they are "understood by the 
tilings that are made" (rolg irotffiaaiv voov/ueva, Rom. 1: 20). 

Alf ord and Wordsworth on Rom. 1 : 20. Schmid, Biblische Theologie 
des N. T., 486. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, 1: 62. 



CHAPTER II. 

CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCES OF GOD'S EXISTENCE. 

Although the knowledge of God's existence is intuitive, it may be con- 
firmed and explicated by arguments drawn from the actual universe and 
from the abstract ideas of the human mind. 

Remark 1. These arguments are probable, not demonstrative. For this 
reason they supplement each other, and constitute a series of evidences 
which is cumulative in its nature. Though taken singly, none of them can 
be considered absolutely decisive, they together furnish a corroboration of 
our primitive conviction of God's existence, which is of great practical value, 
and is in itself sufficient to bind the moral action of men. 

Butler, Analogy, Introduction, Bonn's El., 72. Andrew Fuller, Part 
of System of Divinity, 4 : 283. Dove, Logic of Christian Faith, 24. 
Bacon, Essay on Atheism. Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 221-223. 

Remark 2. A consideration of these arguments may also serve to expli- 
cate the contents of an intuition which has remained obscure and only half 
conscious for lack of reflection. The arguments indeed are the efforts of 
the mind that already has a conviction of God's existence, to give to itself 
a formal account of its belief. An exact estimate of their logical value and 
of their relation to the intuition Avhich they seek to express in syllogistic 
form, is essential to any proper refutation of the prevalent atheistic and 
pantheistic reasoning. 

Mtzsch, Christian Doctrine, Translation, 140. Ebrard Dogmatik, 1: 119, 
120. Fisher, Essays on Supernatural Origin of Christianity, 572, 573. 
Van Oosterzee, 238, 241. 

Remark 3. The arguments for the divine existence may be reduced to 
four, namely : I. The Cosmological ; II. The Teleological ; IIJ. The 
Moral; and IV. The Ontological. We shall examine these in order, seeking 
first to determine the precise conclusions to which they respectively lead, 
and then to ascertain in what manner the four may be combined. 

I. The CosMonoGicAii Akgument. 

This is not properly an argument from effect to cause ; for the proposi- 
tion that every effect must have a cause is simply identical, and means only 
that every caused event must have a cause. It is rather an argument from 
the contingent to the necessary, and may be accurately stated as follows : 

Every tiring begun, whether substantial or phenomenal, owes its existence 
to some producing cause outside of itself. The universe is a thing begun, 



THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. 23 

and owes its existence to a cause outside of itself which is equal to its pro- 
duction. This mighty cause must be God. 

Kant, Critique of Pare Reason, 370, Bonn's Translation. Gillespie, 

Necessary Existence of God, 3: 34-44. Bibliotheca Sacra, 1849: 613; 

and 1850: 613. Porter, Human Intellect, 570. Herbert Spencer, First 

Principles, 93. 

1. The defects of this argument. 

A. It is difficult to show that the universe, so far as its substance is con- 
cerned, has had a beginning. Many philosophers in Christian lands, and 
the prevailing opinion of ante-christian times, have held matter to be eternal. 

Hume, Philosophical Works, 2: 411, sq. Martineau, Essays, 1 : 206. 
McCash, Intuitions, 225-241. Calderwood, Philosophy of Infinite, 61. 
Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 49, 195; Habit and Intelligence, 
1: 55-67. 

B. Granting that the universe, so far as its phenomena are concerned, 
has had a beginning, it is difficult to show that any other cause is required 
than a cause within itself such as the pantheist supposes. 

C. Granting that the universe must have had a cause outside of itself, it 
is difficult to show that this cause has not itself been caused, i. e. , consists 
of an infinite series of dependent causes. 

New Englander, Jan., 1874: 75. Alexander, Moral Science, 221. 
Whately, Logic, 270. Spencer, First Principles, 37. Calderwood, 
Moral Phil., 225. 

D. Granting that the cause of the universe has not itself been caused, it 
is impossible to show that tliis cause is not finite like the universe itself. 

2. The value of the Cosmological argument, then, is simply this, — it 
proves the existence of some cause of the universe indefinitely great. When 
we go beyond this and ask whether this cause is a cause of being, or merely 
a cause of change to the universe ; whether it is a cause apart from the uni- 
verse, or one with it ; whether it is an eternal cause, or a cause dependent 
upon some other cause ; whether it is intelligent or unintelligent, infinite or 
finite, one or many, — this argument cannot assure us. 

II. The Teleological Argument. 

This is not properly an argument from design to a designer; for that 
design implies a designer is simply an identical proposition. It may be 
more correctly stated as follows : 

Order and useful collocation pervading a system prove the existence of a 
contriving intelligence which is the author of this order and useful colloca- 
tion. Since order and useful collocation pervade the universe, a mighty 
contriving intelligence must exist, and this intelligence must be God. 

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bonn's Translation, 381. Bibliotheca 
Sacra, Oct., 1867, 625. 

1. Further explanations. 

A. The major premise expresses a primitive conviction. It is not inval- 
idated by the objections : 



24 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 

(a) That order and useful collocation may exist without being purposed ; 
for we are compelled by our very mental constitution to deny this in all 
cases where the order and collocation pervade a system. 

(6) That order and useful collocation may result from the mere operation 
of physical forces and laws ; for the operation of these forces and laws does 
not exclude but implies an originating and superintending intelligence. 

Sir Wm. Hamilton, Metaphysics, 22. Bowne, Eeview of H. Spencer, 
231-247. Huxley, Critiques and Addresses, 274, 275. Martineau, 
Essays, 1 : 144. Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 208. Porter, 
Human Intellect, 592-618. 

B. The minor premise expresses a working principle of all science, 
namely, that all things have their uses, that order pervades the universe 
and that the methods of nature are rational methods. 

Evidences of this appear, in the correlation of the chemical elements 
to each other ; in the fitness of the inanimate world to be the basis and 
support of life; in the typical forms and unity of plan apparent in the 
organic creation ; in the existence and cooperation of natural laws ; in 
cosmical order and compensations. 

Bowne, Eeview of H. Spencer, 113, 115, 224-230. Whewell, Hist. 
Inductive Sciences, 2 : 489-491. Tyndall, Fragments of Science, 153. 
Tulloch, Theism, 116, 120. Leconte, Beligion and Science, Lectures 
2 and 3. McCosh, Typical Forms, 81, 420. Agassiz, Essay on Classi- 
fication, 9, 10. Bib. Sac, 1849: 626; 1850: 613. 

This minor premise is not invalidated by the objections: 
(a)- That we frequently misunderstand the end actually subserved by nat- 
ural events and objects ; for the principle is not that we necessarily know 
the actual end, but that we necessarily believe that there is some end in 
every case of systematic order and collocation. 

(6) That the order of the universe is manifestly imperfect ; for this, if 
granted, would argue, not absence of contrivance, but some special reason 
for imperfection either in the limitations of the contriving intelligence itself, 
or in the nature of the end sought (as, for example, correspondence with 
the moral state and probation of sinners). 

Bowne, Bsview of H. Spencer, 264-265. McCosh, Christianity and 
Positivism, 82 sq. Martineau's Essays, 1 : 50. Porter, Human Intel- 
lect, 599. J. S. Mill, Essays on Beligion, chap. Nature. 

2. Defects of the argument. These attach not to the premises, but to 
the conclusion sought to be drawn therefrom. 

A. The argument cannot prove a personal God. The order and useful 
collocations of the universe may be only the changing phenomena of an im- 
personal and necessary intelligence such as pantheism supposes. 

Hopkins, Miscellanies, 18-36. Fisher, Essays on Supernatural Origin 
of Christianity, 576-578. Calderwood, Moral Philosophy, 226. Bitter, 
Hist. Ancient Philosophy, Book 9, ch. 6. Foundations of our Faith, 38. 
Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 215 ; Habit and Intelligence, 2 : 6, 



THE MORAL ARGUMENT. 25 

B. It cannot prove the unity of God. The collocations and order of the 
universe may be the result of oneness of counsel, instead of oneness of 
essence, in the contriving intelligence. 

C. It cannot prove an eternal God, since fitness in God would argue 
that he was himself designed. 

D. It cannot prove an infinite God, since all marks of order and colloca- 
tion within our observation are simply finite. 

3. The value of the argument is simply this : It proves from certain 
useful collocations and instances of order which have clearly had a begin- 
ning, or in other words, from the present harmony of the universe, that 
there exists an intelligence adequate to its contrivance. But whether this 
intelligence is creator or only fashioner, personal or impersonal, one or 
many, finite or infinite, eternal or owing its being to another, this argument 
cannot assure us. 

In it, however, we take a step forward. The causative power which we 
have proved by the cosmological argument has now become an intelligent 
power. 

Bib. Sac. 1849: 634. Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 216. 

* 

III. The Moral Argument. 

This is an argument from the mental and moral constitution of man to 
the existence of a divine Author, Lawgiver, and End. The argument is a 
complex one and may be divided into three parts. 

1. Man's intellectual and moral nature must have had for their author 
an intellectual and moral being. The elements of the proof are as follows : 

A. Man, as an intellectual and moral being, has had a beginning upon 
the planet. 

B. Material and unconscious forces do not afford a sufficient cause for 
man's reason, conscience and free will. 

Thompson, Christian Theism, 75. Locke, Essay, Book 4, chap. 10. 

C. Man as an effect can be referred only to a cause possessing self-con- 
sciousness and a moral nature, in other words, personality. 

Julius Miiller, Doctrine of Sin, 1 : 76 sq. 

2. Man's moral nature proves the existence of a holy Lawgiver and 
Judge. The elements of the proof are : 

A. Conscience recognizes the existence of a moral law which has supreme 
authority. 

B. Known violations of this moral law are followed by feelings of ill 
desert and fears of judgment. 

C. This moral law, since it is not self-imposed, and these threats of judg- 
ment, since they are not self-executing, respectively argue the existence of 
a holy will that has imposed the law, and of a punitive power that will 
execute the threats of the moral nature. 

Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 218 sq. Kant, Critique of Pure 
Beason, 359-387. Porter, Human Intellect, 524. 



26 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 

3. Man's emotional and voluntary nature proves the existence of a Being 
who can furnish in himself a satisfying object of human affection and an end 
which will call forth man's highest activities and ensure his highest progress. 

Only a Being of power, wisdom, holiness and goodness, and all these 
indefinitely greater than any that we know upon the earth, can meet this 
demand of the human soul. Such a Being must exist. Otherwise man's 
greatest need would be unsupplied and belief in a lie be more productive of 
virtue than belief in the truth. 

Augustine, Confessions, 1 : 1. Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 370. 
Tyndall, Belfast Address. 

4. The defects of the moral argument are : 

A. It cannot prove a creator of the material universe. 

B. It cannot prove the infinity of God, since man from whom we argue 
is finite. 

C. It cannot prove the mercy of God. But, 

5. The value of the argument is, that it assures us of the existence of a 
personal Being, who rules us in righteousness, and who is the proper object 
of supreme affection and service. 

But whether this Being is the original creator of all things, or merely the 
author of our existence, whether he is infinite or finite, whether he is a 
Being of simple righteousness or also of mercy, this argument cannot assure 
us. 

Among the arguments for the existence of God, however, we assign to 
this the chief place, since it adds to the ideas of causative power (which we 
derived from the cosmological argument) and of contriving intelligence 
(which we derived from the teleological argument), the far wider ideas of 
personality and righteous lordship. 

Dove, Logic of Christian Faith, 211-236, 261-299. 

IV. The ONTonoGiCAL Aegument. 

This argument infers the existence of God from the abstract and neces- 
sary ideas of the human mind. It has three forms: 

1. That of Samuel Clarke. Space and time are attributes of substance 
or being. But space and time are respectively infinite and eternal. There 
must therefore be an infinite and eternal substance or Being to whom these 
attributes belong. 

Gillespie states the argument somewhat differently. Space and time are 
modes of existence. But space and time are respectively infinite and eternal. 
There must therefore be an infinite and eternal Being who subsists in these 
modes. But we reply: 

Space and time are neither attributes of substance nor modes of existence. 
The argument, if valid, would prove that God is not mind but matter, for 
that could not be mind but only matter, of which space and time were 
either attributes or modes. 

Samuel Clarke, Works, 2: 521. Gillespie, Necessary Existence of God. 

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 364. Dove, Logic of the Christian 

Faith, 127. Calderwood, Moral Philosophy, 226. Blunt, Dictionary, 

740. Porter, Human Intellect, 567. 

2. That of Descartes. We have the idea of an mfinite and perfect Being. 



THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. 27 

This idea cannot be derived from imperfect and finite things. There must 

therefore be an infinite and perfect Being who is its cause. 

But we reply that this argument confounds the idea of the infinite with 

an infinite idea. Man's idea of the infinite is not infinite but finite, and 

from a finite effect we cannot argue an infinite cause. 

Descartes, Meditation 3. Blunt, Dictionary of Theology, Art. Theism, 
739. Bibliotheca Sacra, 1849: 637. Saisset, Pantheism, 1: 54. 

3. That of Anselm. We have the idea of an absolutely perfect Being.- 
Bat existence is an attribute of perfection. An absolutely perfect Being 
must therefore exist. 

But we reply that this argument confounds ideal existence with real exist- 
ence. Our ideas are not the measure of external reality. 

Ansehn, Proslogion, 2; translated in Bib. Sac, 1851: 529, 699. Shedd, 
History of Doctrine, 1 : 231. Kant, Critique, 368. Thompson, Chris- 
tian Theism, 171. Fisher, Essays, 574. Dove, Logic of the Christian 
Faith, 146. 

Although this last must be considered the most perfect form of the onto- 
logical argument, it is evident that it conducts us only to an ideal conclusion, 
not to real existence. In common with the two preceding forms of the 
argument, moreover, it tacitly assumes as already existing hi the human 
mind, that very knowledge of God's existence which it would derive from 
logical demonstration. It has value therefore, simply as showing what God 
must be if he exists at all. 

But the existence of a I^eing indefinitely great, a personal Cause, Con- 
triver and Lawgiver, has been proved by the preceding arguments ; for the 
law of parsimony requires us to apply the conclusions of the first three 
arguments to one Being, and not to many. To this one Being we may 
now ascribe the infinity and perfection, the idea of which lies at the basis of 
the ontological argument — ascribe them, not because they are demonstrably 
his, but because our mental constitution will not allow us to think other- 
wise. Thus clothing him with all perfections which the human mind can 
conceive, and these in illimitable fulness, we have one whom we may justly 
call God. 

As a logical process this is indeed defective, since all logic as well as all 
observation depends for its validity upon the presupposed existence of God, 
and since this particular process, even granting the validity of logic in general, 
does not warrant the conclusion that God exists, except upon a second 
assumption that our abstract ideas of hifinity and perfection are to be applied 
to the Being to whom argument has actually conducted us. 

But although both ends of the logical bridge are confessedly wanting, 
the process may serve and does serve a more useful purpose than that of 
mere demonstration, namely, that of awakening, confirming and explicating 
a conviction which, though the most fundamental of all, may yet have been 
partially slumbering for lack of thought. 

Cudworth, Intellectual System of the Universe, 3: 42. Dove, Logic of 
the Christian Faith, 241-261. Calderwood, Philosophy of the Infinite, 
150 sq. Calderwood, Moral Philosophy, 226. Fisher, Essays on the 
Supernatural Origin of Christianity, 572. 



CHAPTER III. 

ERRONEOUS EXPLANATIONS OF THE PACTS. 

Any correct explanation of the universe must postulate an intuitive knowl- 
edge of the existence of the external world, of self, and of God. The desire 
for scientific unity, however, has induced attempts to resolve these three 
factors into one, and "according as one or another of the three has been 
regarded as the all-inclusive principle, the result has been Materialism, 
Idealism, or Pantheism. 

I. Materialism. 

Materialism is that method of thought which gives priority to matter 
rather than to mind in its explanations of the universe. Upon this view, 
material atoms constitute the ultimate and fundamental reality of which 
all things rational and irrational are but combinations and phenomena. 
Force is regarded as a universal and inseparable property of matter. 

The element of truth in materialism is the reality of second causes. Its 
error is in mistaking these second causes for first causes, and in supposing 
them able to account for their own existence, and for the existence of the 
universe. 

Herzog, Encyclopaedic, Art. Materialism. Janet, Materialism. Fabri, 
Materialismus. 

"We object to this system: 

1. That in knowing matter, the mind necessarily judges itself to be a 
substance different in kind and higher in rank than the matter which it 
knows. 

2. Since the mind's attributes of continuous identity, self-activity, unre- 
latedness to space, are different in kind and higher in rank than the attributes 
of matter, it is rational to conclude that the substance underlying mental 
phenomena is a substance different in kind and higher in rank than that 
which underlies material phenomena. 

Hopkins, Study of Man, 53-56. McCosh, Intuitions, 140-145. Theolog. 
Eclectic, YI : 555. Hickok, Rational Cosmology, 403. Ulrici, Leib 
und Seele, 688-725 ; and synopsis in Bap. Quar. , July, 1873 : 380. 
Porter, Human Intellect, 22 sq. Appleton, Works, 1 : 151-154. 
McCosh, Div. Gov't., 75-94. Calderwood, Moral Philosophy, 235. 
Morell, Hist. Philosophy, 318-334. 

3. This common judgment that mind and matter are distinct substances 
must be regarded as conclusive, until it is scientifically demonstrated that 
mind is material in its origin and nature. But all attempts to explain the 
psychical from the physical, or the organic from the inorganic, are acknowl- 



MATERIALISTIC IDEALISM. 29 

edged failures. The most that can be claimed is, that psychical are always 
-accompanied by physical changes, and that the inorganic is the basis and 
support of the organic. 

Bain, Mind and Body, 131. British Quarterly, Jan., 1874: Art. 

Mind and the Science of Energy. Spencer, Principles of Psychology, 

1 : 140. Beview of Spencer's Psychology in New Englander, July, 1873. 

Talbot in Bap. Quarterly, Jan., 1871: 1. McCosh, Intuitions, 145. 

4. The materialistic theory, denying as it does the priority of spirit, can 
furnish no sufficient cause of the existing universe, with its personal intelli- 
gences, intuitive ideas, beliefs in God and immortality. 

Buchanan, Modern Atheism, 247, 248. McCosh in International Beview, 
Jan., 1875. Contemporary Beview, Jan., 1875: Art. Man Transcorporal. 

II. Materialistic Idealism. 

Idealism proper is that method of thought which regards all knowledge 
as conversant only with affections of the percipient mind. 

Its element of truth is the fact that these affections of the percipient 
mind are the conditions of our knowledge. Its error is in denying that 
through these and in these we know that which exists independently of our 
consciousness. 

The idealism of the present day is mainly a materialistic idealism. It 
defines matter and mind alike in terms of sensation, and regards both as 
opposite sides or successive manifestations of one underlying and unknow- 
able force. 

Porter, Human Intellect, 129, 232. Fiske, Cosmic Philosophy, 75, 
2 : 80. Martineau's Essays, 1 : 63, 265. Bap. Quarterly, 1871: 1. Mill, 
Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton, 1 : 234^250. Morell, Hist. Philoso- 
phy, 318-334. Contemporary Beview, Oct., 1872: Art. on Huxley. 
Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 13-15 ; 29-35 ; 42-52. 

We object to this view. 

1. That its definition of matter as a permanent possibility of sensation, 
contradicts our intuitive judgment that in knowing the phenomena of matter 
we have direct knowledge of substance as underlying phenomena, as distinct 
from our sensations, and as external to the mind which experiences these 
sensations. 

2. That its definition of mind as a series of sensations aware of itself, 
contradicts our intuitive judgment that in knowing the phenomena of mind 
we have direct knowledge of a spiritual substance of which these phenomena 
are manifestations, which retains its identity independently of our con- 
sciousness, and which, in its knowing, instead of being the passive recipient 
of impressions from without, always acts from within by a power of its own. 

3. That in so far as this theory regards mind as the obverse side of mat- 
ter or as a later and higher development from matter, the mere reference of 
both mind and matter to an underlying force, does not save the theory from 
any of the difficulties of pure materialism already mentioned ; since in this 
case equally with that, force is regarded as purely physical and the priority 
of spirit is denied. 

4. That hi so far as this theory holds the underlying force of which matter 



30 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 

and mind are manifestations, to be in any sense intelligent or voluntary, it 
leads to the conclusion that second causes, whether material or spiritual, 
have no proper existence, and that there is but one agent in the universe — a 
conclusion which involves all the difficulties of pantheism. 

Porter, Human Intellect, 584-588. Martineau's Essays, 1 : 121. 

III. Pantheism. 

Pantheism is that method of thought which conceives of the universe as 
the development of one intelligent yet impersonal substance which reaches 
consciousness only in man. It therefore identifies God with the totality of 
things. 

The element of truth in pantheism is the immanence of God in the uni- 
verse ; its error is in denying God's transcendence. 

We object to this system: 

1. That its idea of God is self -contradictory, since it makes him infinite, 
yet consisting only of the finite ; absolute, yet existing in necessary relation to 
the universe ; supreme, yet shut up to a process of self-evolution and depend- 
ent for self-consciousness on man ; indeterminate, yet the cause of all that is. 

Saisset, Pantheism, 1 : 148. Calderwood, Moral Philosophy, 237, 215. 

2. Its assumed unity of substance is not only without proof, but directly 
contradicts our intuitive judgments. These testify that we are not parts 
and particles of God, but distinct personal subsistences. 

Fisher, Essays on Sup. Orig. of Christianity, 539. Martineau, Essays, 
1 : 158. 

3. It assigns no sufficient cause for that fact of the universe which is 
highest in rank and therefore most needs explanation, namely, the existence 
of personal intelligences. A substance which is itself unconscious and 
under the law of necessity, cannot produce beings who are self-conscious 
and free. 

Gess in Foundations of our Faith, 27-45. McCosh, Intuitions, 215, 393. 

4. It therefore contradicts the affirmations of our moral and religious 
natures by denying man's freedom and responsibility ; by making God to 
include hi himself all evil as well as all good ; and by precluding all prayer, 
worship and hope of immortality. 

Bib. Sac, Oct., 1867: 603-615. Dix, Pantheism, Introduction, 12. 
Dove, Logic of the Christian Faith, 118. Hodge, Systematic Theology, 
1 : 299-334. Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 202. Bayne's Chris- 
tian Life, Social and Individual, 21-53. 

5. Our intuitive conviction of the existence of a God of absolute perfec- 
tion, compels us to conceive of God as possessed of every highest quality 
and attribute of men, and therefore especially of that which constitutes the 
chief dignity of the human spirit, its personality. 

British Quarterly, January, 1874, 32, note. 



PART III. 

THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD. 



CHAPTER I. 

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 

I. Reasons a priori for expecting a revelation from God. 

1. Needs of man's nature. Man's intellectual and moral nature requires, 
in order to preserve it from constant deterioration, and to ensure its moral 
growth and progress, an authoritative and helpful revelation of religious 
truth, of a higher and completer sort than any to which, in its present state 
of sin, it can attain by the use of its unaided powers. The proof of this 
proposition is partly psychological and partly historical. 

A. Psychological proof. 

(a) Neither reason nor intuition throw light upon certain religious ques- 
tions whose solution is of the utmost importance to us. 

Bremen Lectures, 72, 73. Plato, Laws, 9 : 854. 

(b) Even the truth to which we may arrive by our natural powers, needs 
divine confirmation and authority when it addresses minds and wills per- 
verted by sin. 

Curtis, Human Element in Inspiration, 250. Emerson, Essays, 2 : 41. 
Murphy, Scientific Bases, 172. 

(c) To break this power of sin and to furnish encouragement to moral 
effort, we need a special revelation of the merciful and helpful aspect of the 
divine nature. 

B. Historical proof. 

(a) The knowledge of moral and religious truth possessed by nations and 
ages in which special revelation is unknown, is grossly and increasingly 
imperfect. 

(6) Man's actual condition in ante-christian times and in modern heathen 
lands, is that of extreme moral depravity. 

(c) With this depravity is found a general conviction of moral helpless- 
ness, and on the part of some nobler natures, a longing after and hope of 
aid from above. 

Peabody, Christianity the Religion of Nature, 35. 

2. Presumption of supply. What we know of God by nature, affords 
ground for hope that these wants of our intellectual and moral being will be 
met by a corresponding supply in the shape of a special divine revelation. 



32 SCRIPTURE A REVELATION FROM GOD. 

We argue this : 

A. From our necessary conviction of God's wisdom. Having made man 
a spiritual being, for spiritual ends, it may be hoped that he will furnish the 
means needed to secure these ends. 

B. From the actual, though incomplete, revelation already given in 
nature. Since God has actually undertaken to make himself known to men, 
we may hope that he will finish the work he has begun. 

C. From the general connection of want and supply. The higher our 
needs, the more intricate and ingenious are in general the contrivances for 
meeting them. We may hope therefore that the highest want will be all 
the more surely met. 

D. From analogies of nature and history. Signs of reparative goodness 
in nature and of forbearance in providential dealings lead us to hope that 
while justice is executed, God may still make known some way of restora- 
tion for sinners. (Rom. 3 : 25.) 

II. Maeks of the revelation man may expect. 

1. As to its character. We may expect it not to contradict, but to con- 
firm and enlarge, the knowledge of God which we derive from nature, 
while it remedies the defects of natural religion, and throws light upon its* 
problems. 

2. As to its method. We may expect it to follow God's methods of pro- 
cedure in other communications of truth, as for example: 

A. That of continuous historical development, — that it will be given in 
gerni to early ages, and will be more fully unfolded as the race is prepared 
to receive it. 

Rogers, Superhuman Origin of the Bible, 374^384. Essays and Reviews, 
Sermon by Dr. Temple on Education of the World. Walker, Phi- 
losophy of the Plan of Salvation. 

B. That of original delivery to a single nation and to single persons in 
that nation, that it may through tliem be communicated to mankind. 

British Quarterly, January, 1874: Art. Inductive Theology. 

C. That of preservation in written and accessible documents handed 
down from those to whom the revelation is first communicated. 

Eclipse of Faith, chapters on book-revelation, 73-96 ; 281-304. 

3. As to its attestation. We may expect that this revelation will be 
accompanied by evidence that its author is the same being whom we have 
previously recognized as God of nature. This evidence must constitute, 

A. A manifestation of God himself ; 

B. In the outward as well as the inward world ; 

C. Such as only God's power or knowledge can make ; and, 

D. Such as cannot be counterfeited by the evil or mistaken by the candid 
soul. In short, we may expect God to attest by miracles and by prophecy, 
the divine mission and authority of those to whom he communicates a reve- 
lation. 

But in order that our positive proof of a divine revelation may not be 
embarrassed by the suspicion that the miraculous and prophetic elements in 



MIRACLES AS ATTESTING REVELATION". 33 

the Scripture history create a presumption against its credibility, it will be 
desirable to take up at this point, the general subjects of miracles and 
prophecy. 

III. MlRACLES AS ATTESTING A DIVINE REVELATION. 

1. Definition of miracle. A miracle is an event palpable to the senses, 
produced for a religious purpose by the immediate agency of God; an 
event therefore, which though not contravening any law of nature, the laws 
of nature, if fully known, would not be competent to explain. 

Mozley, Miracles. Alexander, Christ and Christianity, 302. Hop- 
kins ; Sermon on Prayer-guage, 10; Outline Study of Man, 258, 259. 
Murphy, Scientific Bases, 147-167. Babbage, Ninth Bridgewater 
Treatise, Chap. VIII. Hovey, Miracles of Christ, Introduction. 
Trench, Miracles, Introduction. 
This definition corrects several erroneous conceptions of the miracle : 

A. A miracle is not a suspension or violation of natural law ; since natural 
law is in operation at the time of the miracle just as much as before. 

B. A miracle is not a sudden product of natural agencies — a product 
merely foreseen by him who appears to work it ; it is the effect of a will 
outside of nature. 

C. A miracle is not an event without a cause, since it has for its cause a 
direct volition of God. 

D. A miracle is not an irrational or capricious act of God, but an act of 
wisdom performed in accordance with the immutable laws of his being, so 
that in the same circumstances the same course would be again pursued. 

E. A miracle is not contrary to experience, since it is not contrary to 
experience for a new cause to be followed by a new effect. 

F. A miracle is not a matter of internal experience, like regeneration or 
illumination, but is an event palpable to the senses, which may serve as an 
objective proof to all, that the worker of it is divinely commissioned as a 
religious teacher. 

Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, 333-366. Smith's Diet, of the 
Bible, Art. Miracles. 

2. Possibility of miracles. An event in nature may be caused by an 
agent outside of and above nature. This is evident from the following con- 
siderations : 

A. Lower forces and laws in nature are frequently counteracted and 
transcended by the higher (as mechanical forces and laws by chemical, and 
chemical by vital), while yet the lower forces and laws are not suspended or 
annihilated, but are merged in the higher, and made to assist in accomplish- 
ing purposes to which they are altogether unequal when left to themselves. 

Murphy, Habit and Intelligence, 1 : 88. 

B. The human will acts upon its physical organism and so upon nature, 
and produces results which nature left to itself never could accomplish, 
while yet no law of nature is suspended or violated. Gravitation still ope- 
rates upon the axe, even while man holds it at the surface of the water. 
(2K.6: 5-7.) 

Aids to Faith, Essay on Miracles, 26, 27. Fisher, Essays, 471. Ham- 
ilton, Autology, 685-690. 3 



34 SCRIPTURE A REVELATION FROM GOD. 

C. What the human will, considered as a supernatural force, and what 
the chemical and vital forces of nature itself, are demonstrably able to 
accomplish, cannot be regarded as beyond the power of God, so long as 
God dwells in and controls the universe. In other words, if God be possible, 
miracles are possible. The contrary can be maintained, only upon princi- 
ples of atheism or pantheism. 

3. Probability of miracles. 

A. We acknowledge that so long as we confine our attention to nature, 
there is a presumption against miracles. Experience testifies to the uni- 
formity of natural law. A general uniformity is needful in order to make 
possible a rational calculation of the future, and a proper ordering of life. 

F. W. Farrar, Witness of History to Christ, 3-45. Modern Scepti- 
cism, 1 : 179-227. Chalmers, Christian Eevelation, 1 : 47. 

B. But we deny that this uniformity is absolute and universal. 

(a) It is not a truth of reason that can have no exceptions, like the axiom 
that a whole is greater than its parts. 

Mozley, Miracles, 26. Huxley, Lay Sermons, 158. 

(b) Experience could not warrant a belief in absolute and universal 
uniformity, unless experience were identical with absolute and universal 
knowledge. On the other hand, 

(c) We know, from geology, that there have been breaks in this uni- 
formity, such as the introduction of vegetable, animal and human life, 
which cannot be accounted for except by the coming down upon nature of 
a supernatural power. 

C. Since the inworking of the moral law into the constitution and course 
of nature, shows that nature exists not for itself but for the contemplation 
and use of moral beings, it is probable that the God of nature will produce 
effects aside from those of natural law, whenever there are sufficiently im- 
portant moral ends to be served thereby. 

D. The existence of moral disorder consequent upon the free acts of 
man's will, therefore, changes the presumption against miracles into a pre- 
sumption in their favor. The non-appearance of miracles, in this case, 
would be the greatest of miracles. 

4. The amount of testimony necessary to prove a miracle — is no greater 
than that which is requisite to prove the occurrence of any other unusual 
but confessedly possible event. 

Hume, indeed, argued that a miracle is so contradictory of all human 
experience that it is more reasonable to believe any amount of testimony 
false than to believe a miracle to be true. 

Hume, Philosophical Works, 4: 124-150. Bib. Sac, Oct., 1867: 615. 
The argument is fallacious, because: 

A. It is chargeable with a petitio principii, in making our own personal 
experience the measure of all human experience. The same principle would 
make the proof of any absolutely new fact impossible. Even though God 
should work a miracle, he could never prove it. 
John Stuart Mill, Essays on Theism, 216-241. 



MIRACLES AS ATTESTING REVELATION". 35 

. B. It involves a self-contradiction, since it seeks to overthrow our faith 
in human testimony by adducing to the contrary the general experience of 
men, of which we know only from testimony. This general experience 
moreover is merely negative, and cannot neutralize that which is positive, 
except upon principles which would invalidate all testimony whatever. 

C. It requires belief in a greater wonder than those which it would 
escape. That multitudes of intelligent and honest men should against all 
their interests unite in deliberate and persistent falsehood under the circum- 
stances narrated in the New Testament record, involves a change in the 
sequences of nature far more incredible than the miracles of Christ and 
his apostles. 

Chalmers, Christian Eev., 3: 70. Hume, Phil. Works, 4: 146. Starkie, 
Evidence, 739. 

5. Evidential force of miracles. 

A. Miracles are the natural accompaniments and attestations of new 
communications from God. The great epochs of miracles — represented by 
Moses, the prophets, the first and second comings of Christ — are coincident 
with the great epochs of revelation. Miracles serve to draw attention to 
new truth, and cease when this truth has gained currency and foothold. 

B. Miracles, however, certify to the truth of doctrine, not directly, but 
indirectly. Otherwise, a new miracle must needs accompany each new 
doctrine taught. Miracles primarily and directly certify to the divine com- 
mission and authority of a religious teacher, and therefore warrant accept- 
ance of Ms doctrines and obedience to his commands as the doctrines and 
commands of God, whether these be communicated at intervals or all 
together, orally or in written documents. 

C. Miracles therefore do not stand alone as evidences. Power alone 
cannot prove a divine commission. Purity of life and doctrine must go 
with the miracles to assure us that a religious teacher has come from God. 
The miracles and the doctrine in this manner mutually support each other 
and form parts of one whole. The internal evidence may have greater 
power over certain minds and over certain ages than the external. Still it 
remains true that: 

D. The Christian miracles do not lose their value as evidences in the 
process of ages. The loftier the structure of Christian life and doctrine, 
the greater need that its foundation be secure. The authority of Christ as a 
teacher of supernatural truth rests upon his miracles and specially upon the 
miracle of his resurrection. That one miracle to which the church looks 
back as the source of her life, carries with it irresistibly all the other mira- 
cles of the Scripture record ; upon this one we may safely rest the proof 
that the Scriptures are an authoritative revelation from God. 

Alexander, Christ and Christianity, 158-224. Mill, Theism, 216. Auber- 
len, Divine Revelation, 56. 

6. Counterfeit miracles. 

Since only an act directly wrought by God can properly be called a mira- 
•cle, it follows that surprising events brought about by evil spirits or by men, 
through the use of natural agencies beyond our knowledge, are not entitled 



36 SCRIPTURE A REVELATION FROM GOD. 

to this appellation. The Scriptures recognize the existence of such, but 
denominate them "lying wonders;" (2 Thess. 2 : 9). 

These counterfeit miracles in various ages argue that the belief in mira- 
cles is natural to the race, and that somewhere there must exist the true. 
They serve to show that not all supernatural occurrences are divine, and to 
impress upon us the necessity of careful examination before we accept 
them as divine. False miracles may commonly be distinguished from 
the true by : 

A. Their accompaniments of immoral conduct or of doctrine contradic- 
tory to truth already revealed ; as in modern spiritualism. 

B. Their internal characteristics of inanity or extravagance; as in the 
liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius, or the miracles of the Apocry- 
phal New Testament. 

0. The insufficiency of the object which they are designed to further ; as 
in the case of Apollonius of Tyana, or of the miracles said to accompany the 
publication of the doctrine of the immaculate conception. 

D. Their lack of substantiating evidence ; as in mediaeval miracles, so 
seldom attested by contemporary and disinterested witnesses. 

Mozley, Miracles, 15, 161. F. W. Farrar, Witness of History to Christ, 
72. A. S. Farrar, Science and Theology, 208. Tholuck, Yermischte 
Schriften, 1:27. Hodge, Syst. Theol., 1:630. Henderson, Inspira- 
tion, 443-490. 

IV. Prophecy as attesting a divine revelation. 

We here consider prophecy in its narrow sense of mere prediction. 

1. Definition. Prophecy is the foretelling of future events by virtue of 
direct communication from God — a foretelling, therefore, which though not 
contravening any laws of the human mind, those laws, if fully known, would 
not be sufficient to explain. 

Payne Smith, Prophecy a Preparation for Christ. Alexander, Christ 
and Christianity, 225. Newton on Prophecy. Fairbairn on Prophecy. 
Farrar, Science and Theology, 106. 

2. Relation of prophecy to miracles. 

Miracles are attestations of revelation proceeding from divine power; 
prophecy is an attestation of revelation proceeding from divine knowledge. 
Only God can know the contingencies of the future. The possibility and 
probability of prophecy may be argued upon the same grounds upon which 
we argue the possibility and probability of miracles. 
Wardlaw, Systematic Theology, 1 : 347. 

3. Requirements in prophecy, considered as an evidence of revelation, 
(a) The utterance must be distant from the event. 

(6) Nothing must exist to suggest the event to merely natural prescience. 

(c) The utterance must be free from ambiguity. 

(d) Yet it must not be so precise as to secure its own fulfilment. 

(e) It must be followed in due time by the event predicted. 

4. General features of prophecy in the Scriptures. 

(a) Its vast amount ; occupying a large portion of the Bible from Genesis 
to Bevelation, and extending over a period of four thousand years. 



7. On the double sense of prophecy. 

Certain prophecies apparently contain a fulness of meaning which is not 
exhausted by the event to which they most obviously and literally refer. A 
prophecy which had a partial fulfilment, at a time not remote from its utter- 
ance, may find its chief fulfilment in an event far distant. 

So, too, prophecies which have already had a partial fulfilment may have 
whole cycles of fulfilment yet before them; (Is. 7: 14-16; cf. 9: 6, 7, and 
Matt. 1: 22, 23. Matt. 24 and 25, especially 24: 34, and 25: 31). 

8. Purpose of prophecy — so far as it is yet unfulfilled. This is: 
(a) Not to enable us to map out the details of the future; but rather 
(6) To give general assurance of God's power and foreseeing wisdom, and 

of the certainty of his triumph; and 

(c) To furnish, after fulfilment, the proof that God saw the end from the 
beginning; (Dan. 12: 8, 9. 1 Pet. 1: 11. 2 Pet. 1: 20). 

9. Evidential force of prophecy — so far as it is fulfilled. 
Prophecy, like miracles, does not stand alone as evidence of the divine 

commission of the Scripture writers and teachers. It is simply a corrobora- 
tive attestation, which unites with miracles to prove that a religious teacher 
has come from God and speaks with divine authority. 

We cannot, however, dispense with this portion of the evidences, — for 
unless the death and resurrection of Christ are events foreknown and fore- 
told by himself as well as by the ancient prophets, we lose one main proof 
of his authority as a teacher sent from God. 



HHKe. 



PRINCIPLES OF HISTORICAL EVIDENCE. 37 

(6) Its unity in diversity ; finding its central point in Christ (Eev. 19 : 10), 
and excluding all possibility of human fabrication. 

(c) Its actual fulfilment as regards many of its predictions, — while all 
attempts have failed to show that any single one of these predictions has 
been falsified by the event. 

5. Different kinds of prophecy . 

(a) Direct predictions of events ; as in Old Testament prophecies of Christ 
and of the fate of the Jewish nation. 

(6) General prophecy of the kingdom in the Old Testament, and by Christ 
himself in the New. 

(c) Historical types in the nation and in individuals, as Jonah and David. 

(d) Prefigurations of the future in rites and ordinances ; as in sacrifice, 
circumcision and the passover. 

6. Special prophecies uttered by Christ, 
(a) As to his own death and resurrection. 

(6) As to events occurring between his death and the destruction of Jeru- 
salem; (multitudes of impostors; wars and rumors of wars; famine and 
pestilence). 

(c) As to the destruction of Jerusalem and the Jewish polity ; (Jerusalem 
compassed with armies ; abomination of desolation in the holy plac'e ; flight 
of Christians ; misery ; massacre ; dispersion). 

(d) As to the world-wide diffusion of his gospel ; (the Bible already the 
most widely circulated book in the world). 

Having thus removed the, presumption originally existing against miracles 
and prophecy, we may now consider the ordinary laws of evidence and 
determine the rules to be followed in estimating the weight of the Scrip- 
ture testimony. 

Y. Principles of historical evidence applicable to the proof of 
a divine revelation ; — (mainly derived from Greenleaf , Testimony of the 
Evangelists, and from Starkie on Evidence). 

1. As, to documentary evidence. 

A. Documents apparently ancient, not bearing upon their face the marks 
of forgery, and found in proper custody, are presumed to be genuine until 
sufficient evidence is brought to the contrary. The New Testament docu- 
ments, since they are found in the custody of the chtu'ch, their natural and 
legitimate depository, must by this rule be presumed to be genuine. 

Starkie on Evidence, 480 sq. Chalmers, Christian Revelation, Works, 
3 : 147-171. 

B. Copies of ancient documents, made by those most interested in their 
faithfulness, are presumed to correspond with the originals, even although 
those originals no longer exist. Since it was the churches interest to have 
faithful copies, the burden of proof rests upon the objector to the Christian 
documents. 

C. In determining matters of fact after the lapse of considerable time, 
documentary evidence is to be allowed greater weight than oral testimony. 
Neither memory nor tradition can long be trusted to give absolutely correct 
accounts of particular facts. The New Testament documents, therefore, 



38 SCRIPTURE A REVELATION" FROM GOD. 

are of greater weight in evidence than tradition would be, even if only 
thirty years had elapsed since the death of the actors in the scenes they 
relate. 

Starkie on Evidence, 51, 730. 
2. As to testimony in general. 

A. In questions as to matters of fact, the proper inquiry is not whether 
it is possible that the testimony may be false, but whether there is sufficient 
probability that it is true. It is unfair, therefore, to allow our examina- 
tion of the Scripture witnesses to be prejudiced by suspicion, merely 
because their story is a sacred one. 

B. A proposition of fact is proved when its truth is established by com- 
petent and satisfactory evidence. By competent evidence is meant such 
evidence as the nature of the thing to be proved admits. By satisfactory 
evidence is meant that amount of proof which ordinarily satisfies an unprej- 
udiced mind beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Scripture facts are therefore proved, when they are established by that 
kind and degree of evidence which would in the affairs of ordinary life sat- 
isfy the mind and conscience of a common man. When we have this kind 
and degree of evidence, it is unreasonable to require more. 

C. In the absence of circumstances which generate suspicion, every wit- 
ness is to be presumed credible, until the contrary is shown ; the burden of 
impeaching his testimony lying upon the objector. The principle which 
leads men to give true witness to facts is stronger than that which leads 
them to give false witness. 

It is therefore unjust to compel the Christian to establish the credibility 
of his witnesses before proceeding to adduce their testimony, and it is 
equally unjust to allow the uncorroborated testimony of a profane writer to 
outweigh that of a Christian writer. 

D. "The credit due to the testimony of Avitnesses depends upon : first, 
their ability ; secondly, their honesty ; thirdly, their number and the con- 
sistency of their testimony; fourthly, the conformity of their testimony 
with experience ; and fifthly, the coincidence of their testimony with col- 
lateral circumstances." We confidently submit the New Testament wit- 
nesses to each and all of these tests. 

Starkie on Evidence, 726. 



CHAPTER II. 

POSITIVE PROOFS THAT THE SCRIPTURES ARE A DIVINE 
REVELATION. 

I. The genuineness of the Cheistian documents, or proof that the 
books of the Old and New Testaments were written at the age and by the 
men or class of men to whom they are ascribed. 

1. Genuineness of the books of the New Testament 

A. All of these books, with the possible exception of 2 Peter, Jude, and 
2 and 3 Jolm, are quoted or alluded to by a continuous succession of writers 
reaching back from the present day to the age of the apostles. 

(a) Irenseus (120-200) mentions and quotes the four gospels by name, and 
among them the gospel according to John; — "afterwards John, the disciple 
of the Lord, who also leaned upon his breast, he likewise published a gospel, 
while he dwelt in Ephesus, in Asia." And Irenseus was the disciple and 
friend of Poly carp (80-165), who was himself a personal acquaintance of the 
Ajmstle John. The testimony of Irenseus is virtually the evidence of Poly- 
carp, the contemporary and friend of the apostle, that each of the gospels 
was written by the person whose name it bears. 

(6) Justin Martyr (100-170) speaks of 'memoirs (dnofivrf/iovevjuaTa) of 
Jesus Christ,' and his quotations, though sometimes made from memory, 
are evidently cited from our gosj^els. 

(c) Papias (80-164), whom Irenaeus calls a 'hearer of John,' testifies that 
Matthew "wrote in the Hebrew dialect the sacred oracles {ra \6yid)" and 
that "Mark, the interpreter of Peter, wrote after Peter {yarEpoo UerpcS) or 
under Peter's direction, an unsystematic account (ov rd^ei) " of the same 
events and discourses. 

(d) The Apostolic Fathers, Clemens Romanus (died 101), Ignatius of 
Antioch (martyred 115), and Polycarp (80-165), companions and friends of 
the apostles, have left to us hi their writings over one hundred quotations 
or allusions to the New Testament Avritings, and among these every book, 
except the four minor epistles above mentioned, is represented. 

(e) In the Acts of the Apostles, universally attributed to Luke, we have 
an allusion to 'the former treatise,' or the gospel by the same author, 
which must, therefore, have been written before the end of Paul's first impris- 
onment at Rome, and probably with the help and sanction of that apostle. 

Although these are single testimonies, we must remember that they are 
the testimonies of the chief men of the churches of their day, and that they 
express the opinion of the churches themselves. "Like banners of a hid- 



40 SCRIPTURE A REVELATION" EROM GOD. 

den army or peaks of a distant mountain range, they represent and are sus- 
tained by compact, continuous bodies below." 

Bleek, Introduction to the New Testament. Westcott, History of the 
New Testament Canon. McClintock and Strong's Encyclopaedia, 1 : 
315-317. Apostolic Fathers, in Ante-Nicene Library of T. & T. Clark. 
Smith's Bible Dictionary, Art. Canon of the N. T. Boston Lectures 
for 1871, Essay by Prof. Thayer, 324 Norton, Genuineness of the 
Gospels. Alexander, McHvaine, Chalmers, Dodge, Peabody, Evi- 
dences. Rawlinson, Historical Evidences, Lect. 6, 7, 8. 

B. There is satisfactory evidence that all the books of the New Testa- 
ment, with the possible exception of 2 Peter, Jude, and 2 and 3 John, 
were written before the close of the first century ; and all, with the single 
exception of 2 Peter, were received as genuine before the year 170. 

(a) Tertullian (160-230) appeals to the 'New Testament' as made up of 
the ' gospels ' and ' apostles. ' He vouches for the genuineness of the f our 
gospels, the Acts, 1 Peter, 1 John, thirteen epistles of Paul, and the Apoc- 
alypse ; in short, to twenty-one of the twenty-seven books of our canon. 

(6) The Muratorian Fragment in the West and the Peshito in the East 
(having a common date of about 170), in their catalogues of the New Testa- 
ment writings mutually complement each other's slight deficiencies, and 
together witness to the fact that at that time every book of our present New 
Testament, with the exception of 2 Peter, was received as genuine. 

(c) The canon of Marcion (140) though rejecting all the gospels but that 
of Luke, and all of the epistles but ten of Paul's, shows, nevertheless, that 
at that early day ' ' apostolic writings were regarded as a complete original 
rule of doctrine. " Even Marcion, moreover, does not deny the genuineness 
of those writings which for doctrinal reasons he rejects. 

Westcott, Art. Canon in Smith's Bible Dictionary, and History of N. 
T. Canon. British Quarterly Beview, Oct., 1872 : 216. Fisher, Genu- 
ineness of the Fourth Gospel, in Essays on the Supernat. Orig. of 
Christianity, 33. 

C. There is sufficient evidence that the early churches took every care to 
assure themselves of the genuineness of the New Testament writings before 
they accepted them. 

McHvaine, Evidences of Christianity, 92. Lardner, Works, 2 : 304, 305. 

D. The style of the New Testament writings and their complete corres- 
pondence with all we know of the lands and times in which they profess to 
have been written, afford convincing proof of their genuineness. 

Blunt's Scriptural Coincidences, 244-354. 

E. The existence and general acceptance of the books of the New Testa- 
ment at the end of the second century, cannot be accounted for upon any 
other hypothesis than that of their genuineness. If forgeries, they could 
not have secured general circulation, since the church at large could neither 
have been deceived as to their previous non-existence, nor have been 
induced unanimously to pretend that they were ancient documents. 

Alexander, Christ and Christianity, 23-37. 



GENUINENESS OF THE CHRISTIAN DOCUMENTS. 41 

F. As to 2 Peter, Jude, and 2 and 3 John, the epistles most fre- 
quently held to be spurious, we may say, that although we have no conclu- 
sive external evidence earlier than A. D. 170, and in the case of 2 Peter, 
none earlier than A. T>. 230-250, we may fairly urge in favor of their genu- 
ineness, not only their internal characteristics of literary style and moral 
value, but also the general acceptance of them all since the third century, 
and the presumption that divine providence, presiding over the growth of 
the canon, would not suffer spurious material to be mingled with the true. 

Alf ord on 2 Peter, 4 : Prolegomena, 157. Westcott on Canon, Smith's 
Bib. Diet., 1: 370. 

G. Rationalistic Theories as to the origin of the gospels. These are 
attempts to eliminate the miraculous element from the New Testament 
records, and to reconstruct the sacred history upon principles of naturalism. 

Against them we urge the general objection that they are unscientific in 
their principle and method. To set out in an examination of the New 
Testament documents with the assumption that all history is a mere natural 
development, and that miracles are therefore impossible, is to make history 
a matter not of testimony, but of a priori speculation. It indeed renders 
any history of Christ and his apostles impossible, since the witnesses whose 
testimony with regard to miracles is discredited, can no longer be consid- 
ered worthy of credence in their accounts of Christ's life or doctrine. 

Three of these theories only require special notice : 

1st. The Myth-theory of Strauss. 

According to this view, the gospels are crystallizations into story of 
Messianic ideas which had for several generations filled the minds of imag- 
inative men in Palestine. The myth is a narrative in which such ideas are 
unconsciously clothed, and from which the element of intentional and delib- 
erate deception is absent. 

We object to this view that: 

(a) The time between the death of Christ and the publication of the 
gospels was far too short for the growth and consolidation of such mythical 
histories. Myths, on the contrary, are the slow growth of centuries. 

(b) The first century was not a century when such formation of myths 
was possible. Instead of being a credulous and imaginative age, it was an 
age of historical inquiry and of Sadduceeism in matters of religion. 

(c) The gospels cannot be a mythical outgrowth of Jewish ideas and 
expectations, because in their main features they run directly counter to 
these ideas and expectations. The sullen and exclusive nationalism of the 
Jews could not have given rise to a gospel for all nations, nor their expec- 
tations of a temporal monarch have led to the story of a suffering Messiah. 

(d) The belief and propagation of such myths is inconsistent with what 
we know of the sober characters and self-sacrificing lives of the apostles. 

(e) The mythical theory cannot account for the acceptance of the gospels 
among the Gentiles, who had none of these Jewish ideas and expectations. 



42 SCRIPTURE A REVELATION" FROM GOD. 

(/) It cannot explain Christianity itself, with its belief in Christ's cruci- 
fixion and resurrection, and the ordinances which commemorate these facts. 
Strauss, Life of Jesus ; New Life of Jesus ; The Old Faith and the New. 
Eogers, Superhuman Origin of Bible, 61. F. W. Farrar, Witness of' 
History to Christ, 49-88. Bayne, Beview of Strauss's New Life, 
in Theol. Eclectic, 4 : 74. Bow, in Lectures on Modern Scepticism, 
305-360. Bibliotheca Sacra, Oct., 1871: Art. by Prof. W. A. Stevens. 
Burgess, Antiquity and Unity of Man, 263, 264. Curtis on Inspira- 
tion, 62-67. Alexander, Christ and Christianity, 92-126. 

2nd. The Tendency-theory of Baur. 

This maintains that the gospels originated in the latter half of the second 
century, and were written under assumed names as a means of reconciling 
opposing Jewish and Gentile tendencies in the church. 

We object to this view that: 

(a) The destructive criticism to which it subjects the gospels, if applied 
to secular documents, would deprive us of any certain knowledge of the 
past, and render all history impossible. 

(6) The antagonistic doctrinal tendencies which it professes to find 
in the several gospels, are more satisfactorily explained as varied but con- 
sistent aspects of the one system of truth held by all the apostles. 

(c) It is incredible that productions of such literary power and lofty 
religious teaching as the gospels, should have sprung up in the latter half 
of the second century, or that so springing up, they should have been pub- 
lished under assumed names and for covert ends. 

(d) The theory requires us to believe in a moral anomaly, namely, that 
a faithful disciple of Christ in the second century could be guilty of fabri- 
cating a life of his master, and of claiming authority for it on the ground 
that the author had been a companion of Christ or his apostles. 

(e) This theory cannot account for the universal acceptance of the gos- 
pels at the end of the second century among Aviclely separated communities, 
where reverence for writings of the apostles was a mark of orthodoxy, and 
where the Gnostic heresies Avould have made new documents instantly liable 
to suspicion and searching examination. 

(/) The acknowledgment by Baur that the epistles to the Bomans, 
Galatians, and Corinthians were written by Paul in the first century, is 
fatal to his theory, since these epistles testify not only to miracles at the 
period at which they were written, but to the main events of Jesus' life, and 
to the miracle of his resurrection, as facts already long acknowledged in the 
christian church. 

Baur, Die kanonischen Evangelien. Theol. Eclectic, 5: 1-42. Farrar, 
Critical History of Free Thought, 277, 278. Clarke, translation of 
Hase's Life of Jesus, 34-36. F. W. Farrar, Witness of History to 
Christ, 61. Herzog, Encyclopsedie, 20: 762, Art. Baur und die Tiibinger 
Schule. Auberlen, Divine Bevelation. Bib. Sac, 19: 75. Super- 
natural Beligion ; and answers thereto in Westcott, Hist. N. T. Canon, 
4th ed., Introd. ; Lightfoot, Contemporary Bev. , Dec, 1874, and Jan., 
1875. 



CREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURE WRITERS. 43 

3rd. The Romance-theory of Renan. 

This theory admits a basis of truth in the gospels, but holds that the facts 
of Jesus' life were so sublimated by enthusiasm and so overlaid with pious 
fraud, that the gospels in their present form cannot be accepted as genuine 
— in short, the gospels are to be regarded as historical romances which have 
only a foundation in fact. 

To this view we object that; 

(a) It involves an arbitrary and partial treatment of the Christian docu- 
ments. The claim that one writer not only borrowed from others, but 
interpolated ad libitum, is contradicted by the essential agreement of the 
manuscripts as quoted by the fathers, and as now extant. 

(6) It attributes to Christ and to the apostles an alternate fervor of 
romantic enthusiasm and a false pretense of miraculous power, which are 
utterly irreconcilable with the manifest sobriety and holiness of their lives 
and teachings. 

(c) It fails to account for the power and progress of the gospel as a sys- 
tem directly opposed to men's natural tastes and prepossessions — substituting 
truth for romance, and law for impulse. 

Renan, Life of Jesus. Pressense*, Examination of Renan in Theol. 
Eclectic, 1: 199. Uhlhorn, Modern Representations of the Life of 
Jesus, 1-33. Bib. Sac, 22: 207; 23: 353, 529. 

2. Genuineness of the books of the Old Testament. We show this: 

A. From the witness of 'the New Testament, in which all but six books 
of the Old Testament are either quoted or alluded to as genuine. 

B. From the testimony of Jewish authorities ancient and modern, who 
declare the same books to be sacred, and only the same books, that are now 
comprised in our Old Testament Scriptures. 

C. From the testimony of the Septuagint translation, dating from the 
first half of the third century, or from 280 to 180 B. C. 

D. From the testimony of the Samaritan Pentateuch, dating from the 
time of the exile, or 600 B. C. 

Smith's Bible Dictionary, Art. Samaritan Pentateuch. Leathes, Struc- 
ture of the O. T., 1-41. 

E. From indications that the books of the Old Testament were collected 
by competent authority so early as the time of Ezra, and were thenceforth 
preserved with the utmost care. 

Bib. Sac, 1863: pp. 381, 660, 799. Smith's Bible Dictionary, Art. 
Pentateuch. Theological Eclectic, 6: 215. 

F. From the impossibility, on any hypothesis of forgery, of accounting 
for the internal characteristics of works which combine so manifest antiquity 
with a moral and religious teaching so sublime. 

II. Credibility of the writers of the Scriptures. 

We shall attempt to prove this only of the writers of the gospels ; for if 
they are credible witnesses, the credibility of the Old Testament to which 
they bore testimony follows as a matter of course. 



44 SCRIPTUKE A REVELATION FROM GOD. 

1. They are able or competent witnesses, — that is, they possessed actual 
knowledge with regard to the facts they professed to relate. 

(a) They had opportunities of observation and inquiry. 

(6) They were men of sobriety and discernment, and could not have 
been themselves deceived. 

(c) Their circumstances were such as to impress deeply upon their minds 
the events of which they were witnesses. 

2. They are honest witnesses. This is evident when we consider that : 
(a) Their testimony imperilled all their worldly interests. 

(6) The moral elevation of their writings and their manifest reverence 
for truth and constant inculcation of it, show that they were not wilful 
deceivers, but good men. 

(c) There are minor indications of the honesty of these writers, in the 
circumstantiality of their story ; in the absence of any expectation that their 
narratives would be questioned ; in their freedom from all disposition to 
screen themselves or the apostles from censure. 

3. The writings of the evangelists mutually support each other. We 
argue their credibility upon the ground of their number, and of the consistency 
of their testimony. "While there is enough of discrepancy to show that 
there has been no collusion between them, there is concurrence enough to 
make the falsehood of them all infinitely improbable. 

Four points under this head deserve mention: . 

(a) The evangelists are independent witnesses. This is sufficiently shown 
by the futility of the attempts to prove that either of them has abridged 
or transcribed another. 

(6) The discrepancies between them are none of them irreconcilable 
with the truth of the recorded facts, but only present those facts in new 
lights, or with additional detail. 

(c) That these witnesses were friends of Christ does not lessen the value 
of their united testimony, since they followed Christ only because they 
were convinced that these facts were true. 

(d) While one witness to the facts of Christianity might establish its 
truth, the combined evidence of four witnesses gives us a warrant for faith 
in the facts of the gospels such as we possess for no other facts in ancient 
history whatsoever. The same rule which would refuse belief in the events 
recorded in the gospels, "would throw doubt on any event in history." 

Ebrard, Wissenschaftliche Kritik der evang. Geschichte. Haley, Ex- 
amination of Alleged Discrepancies. Whately, Historic Doubts as to 
Napoleon Bonaparte. 

4. The conformity of the gospel testimony with experience. 

We have already shown that, granting the fact of sin and the need of an 
attested revelation from God, miracles can furnish no presumption against 
the testimony of those who record such a revelation, but as essentially 
belonging to such a revelation, miracles may be proved by the same kind and 
degree of evidence as is required in proof of any other extraordinary facts. 

We may assert, then, that in the New Testament histories there is no 
record of facts contrary to experience, but only a record of facts not wit- 



SUPERNATURAL CHARACTER OF SCRIPTURE TEACHING. 45 

nessed in ordinary experience — of facts, therefore, in which we may believe, 
if the evidence in other respects is sufficient. 

5. Coincidence of their testimony with collateral facts and circum- 
stances. 

Under this head we may refer to : 

(«) The numberless correspondences between the narratives of the evan- 
gelists and contemporary secular history. 

(6) The failure of every attempt thus far to show that the sacred history 
is contradicted by any single fact derived from other reliable sources. 

(c) ' The infinite improbability that this minute and complete harmony 
should ever have been secured' in fictitious narratives. 

6. Conclusion from the argument for the credibility of the writers of 
the gospels. 

These writers having been proved to be credible witnesses, then- narra- 
tives, including the accounts of the miracles and prophecies of Christ and 
his apostles, must be accepted as true. But God would not work miracles 
or reveal the future to attest the claims of false teachers. Christ and his 
apostles must therefore have been what they claimed to be, teachers sent 
from God, and their doctrine must be what they claimed it to be, a revela- 
tion from God to men. 

III. The supernatural character of the Scripture teaching. 
1. Scripture teaching in general. 

A. The Bible is the work of one mind. 

( a) In spite of its variety of authorship, and the vast separation of its 
writers from one another in point of time, there is a unity of subject, spirit, 
and aim throughout the whole. 

(6) Not one moral or religious utterance of all these writers has been 
contradicted or superseded by the utterances of those who have come later, 
but all together constitute a consistent system. 

(c) Each of these writings, whether early or late, has represented moral 
and religious ideas greatly in advance of the age in which it has appeared, 
and these ideas still lead the world. 

(d) It is impossible to account for this unity without supposing such a 
supernatural suggestion and control, that the Bible while in its various 
parts written by human agents, is yet equally the work of a superhuman 
intelligence. 

Garbett, God's Word Written, 3-56. Luthardt, Saving Truths, 210. 
Lee on Inspiration, 26-32. Bogers, Supernatural Origin of the Bible, 
155-181. W. L. Alexander, Connection and Harmony of O. T. and N. T. 
Leathes, Structure of the O. T. 

B. This one mind that made the Bible is the same mind that made the 
soul, for the Bible is divinely adapted to the soul. 

(a) It shows complete acquaintance with the soul. 

(6) It judges the soul — contradicting its passions, revealing its guilt and 
humbling its pride. 

(c) It meets the deepest needs of the soul — by solutions of its problems, 
disclosures of God's character, presentations of the way of pardon, consola- 
tions and promises for life and death. 



46 SCRIPTURE A REVELATION' FROM GOD. 

(d) Yet it is silent upon many questions for which writings of merely- 
human origin seek first to provide solutions. 

(e) There are infinite depths and inexhaustible reaches of meaning in 
Scripture, which difference it from all other books, and which compel us to 
believe that its author must be divine. 

2. Moral system of the New Testament. 

The perfection of this system is generally conceded. All will admit that 
it greatly surpasses any other system known among men. Among its dis- 
tinguishing characteristics may be mentioned : 

A. Its comprehensiveness, — including all human duties in its code, even 
those most generally misunderstood and neglected, while it permits no vice 
whatsoever. 

B. Its spirituality, — accepting no merely external conformity to right 
precepts, but judging all action by the thoughts and motives from which it 
springs. 

0. Its simplicity, — inculcating principles rather than imposing rules ; 
reducing these principles to an organic system ; and connecting this system 
with religion by summing up all human duty in the one command of love 
to God and man. 

D. Its practicality, — exemplifying its precepts in the life of Jesus 
Christ; and while it declares man's depravity and inability in his own 
strength to keep the law, furnishing motives to obedience, and divine aid 
to make this obedience possible. 

We may justly argue that a moral system so pure and perfect, since it 
surpasses all human powers of invention and runs counter to men's natural 
tastes and passions, must have had a supernatural, and if a supernatural, 
then a divine origin. 

Curtis, on Inspiration, 288. Farrar, Witness of History to Christ, 134 ; 
Seekers after God, 181, 182, 320. Blackie, Four Phases of Morals. 
Garbett, Dogmatic Faith. Wuttke, Christian Ethics. 

3. The person and character of Christ. 

A. The conception of Christ's person as presenting Deity and humanity 
indissolubly united, and the conception of Christ's character, with its fault- 
less and all-comprehending excellence, cannot be accounted for upon any 
other hypothesis than that they were historical realities. 

F. W. Farrar, Witness of History to Christ. Bushnell, Nature and the 

Supernatural, 276-332. Alexander, Christ and Christianity, 129-157. 

Ullmann, Sinlessness of Jesus. Schaff, Person of Christ. 

(a) No sources can be assigned from which the evangelists coidd have 

derived such a conception. The Hindoo avatars were only temporary 

unions of deity with humanity. The Greeks had men half-deified, but no 

unions of God and man. The monotheism of the Jews found the person of 

Christ a perpetual stumbling-block. The Essenes were in principle more 

opposed to Christianity than the Babbinists. 

Dorner, Hist. Doct. Person of Christ, Introduction. On the Essenes, 
see Herzog, Encyclopsedie, Art. Essener ; Pressense, Jesus Christ, 
Life, Times and Work, 84^87. 



SUPERNATURAL CHARACTER OF SCRIPTURE TEACHING. 47 

(b) No mere human genius, and much less the genius of Jewish fisher- 
men, could have originated this conception. Bad men invent only such 
characters as they sympathize with. But Christ's character condemns bad- 
ness. Such a portrait could not have been drawn without supernatural aid. 
But such aid would not have been given to fabrication. The conception 
can be explained only by granting that Christ's person and character were 
historical realities. 

B. The acceptance and belief in the New Testament descriptions of Jesus 
Christ cannot be accounted for except upon the ground that the person and 
character described had an actual existence. 

(a) If these descriptions were false, there were witnesses still living who 
had known Christ and who would have contradicted them. 

(J>) There was no motive to induce acceptance of such false accounts, 
but every motive to the contrary. 

(c) The success of such falsehoods could be explained only by super- 
natural aid, but God would never have thus aided falsehood. This person 
and character therefore must have been not fictitious but real ; and if real, 
then Christ's words are true, and the system of which his person and char- 
acter are a part, is a revelation from God. 

4. The testimony of Christ to himself — as being a messenger from God 
and as being one with God. 

Only one personage in history has claimed to teach absolute truth, to be 
one with God, and to attest his divine mission by works such as only God 
could perform. 

This testimony cannot be accounted for upon the hypothesis : 

A. That Jesus was an intentional deceiver ; for, 

(a) The perfectly consistent holiness of his life ; 

(b) The unwavering confidence with which he challenged investigation 
of his claims, and staked all upon the result ; 

(c) The vast improbability of a lifelong lie, in the avowed interests of 
truth; and 

(d) The impossibility that deception should have wrought such blessing 
to the world, — all show that Jesus was no conscious impostor. 

Nor can Jesus' testimony to himself be explained upon the hypothesis : 

B. That he was self-deceived ; for this would argue : 

(a) A weakness and folly which amount to positive insanity. But his 
whole character and life exhibit a calmness, dignity, equipoise, insight, 
self-mastery, utterly inconsistent with such a theory. 

Theol. Eclectic, 4 : 137, Art. Character of Jesus Christ. Bogers, Super- 
human Origin of Bible, 39. 

Or it would argue : 

(6) A self -ignorance and self-exaggeration which could spring only from 
the deepest moral perversion. But the absolute purity of his conscience, 
the humility of his spirit, the self-denying beneficence of his life, show this 
hypothesis to be incredible. 



48 SCRIPTURE A REVELATION" FROM GOD. 

If Jesus then cannot be charged with either mental or moral unsound- 
ness, his testimony must be true and he himself must be one with God and 
the revealer of God to men. 

Liddon, Our Lord's Divinity, 153. Young, Christ of History. J. S. 

Mill, Essays on Beligion, 253. Fisher, Essays, 515-538. 

IV. THE HISTOKICAIi results of the propagation of scripture doc- 
trine. 

1. The rapid progress of the gospel in the first centuries of our era 
shows its divine origin. 

A. That Paganism should have been in three centuries supplanted by 
Christianity, is an acknowledged wonder of history. 

B. The wonder is the greater when we consider the obstacles to its 
progress: 

(a) The scepticism of the cultivated classes; 

(&) The prejudice and hatred of the common people; 

(c) The persecutions set on foot by government. 

C. The wonder becomes yet greater when we consider the insufficiency 
of the means used to secure this progress : 

(a) The proclaimers of the gospel were in general unlearned men, 
belonging to a despised nation. 

(6) The gospel which they proclaimed was a gospel of salvation through 
faith in a Jew who had been put to an ignominious death. 

(c) This gospel was one which excited natural repugnance, by humbling 
men's pride, striking at the root of their sins and demanding a life of labor 
and self-sacrifice. 

(d) The gospel, moreover, was an exclusive one, suffering no rival and 
declaring itself to be the imiversal and only religion. 

Gibbon, Dec. and Fall of Bom. Ertip., 1: ch. 15. Perrone, Prelec- 
tiones Theologicae, 1 : 133. 

D. The progress of a religion so unprepossessing and imcompromising 
to outward acceptance and dominion, within the space of three hundred years, 
cannot be explained without supposing that divine power attended its pro- 
mulgation, and therefore that the gospel is a revelation from God. 

F. W. Farrar, Witness of History to Christ, 91. 

2. The beneficent influence of the Scripture doctrines and precepts 
wherever they have had sway, shows their divine origin. Notice: 

A. Their influence upon civilization in general, securing a recognition 
of principles which heathenism ignored, as for example: 

(a) The importance of the individual; 

(6) The law of mutual love; 

(c) The sacredness of human life; 

(d) The docrine of internal holiness; 

(e) The sanctity of home; 

(/) Monogamy, and the religious equality of the sexes; 
(g) Identification of belief and practice. 

Quoted from Garbett, Dogmatic Faith, 177-186. 



HISTORICAL RESULTS OF ITS PROPAGATION. 49 

The continued corruption of "heathen lands shows that this change is not 
due to any laws of merely natural progress. The confessions of ancient 
writers show that it is not due to philosophy. Its only explanation is that 
the gospel is the power of God. 

B. Their influence upon individual character and happiness, wherever 
they have been tested in practice. This influence is seen: 

(a) In the moral transformations they have wrought ; as in the case of 
Paul the apostle, and of persons in every Christian community. 

(6) In the self-denying labors for human welfare to which they have led; 
as in the cases of Wilberf orce and Judson. 

(c) In the hopes they have inspired in time of soitoav and death. 

These beneficent fruits cannot have their source in merely natural causes 
apart from the truth and divinity of the Scriptures; for in that case the 
contrary beliefs should be accompanied by the same blessings. But since 
we find these blessings only in connection with Christian teaching, we may 
justly consider this as their cause. This teaching must then be true, and 
the Scriptures must be a divine revelation. Else God has made a lie to be 
the greatest blessing to the race. 



CHAPTER III. 

INSPIRATION OF THE SCRIPTURES. 

I. Definition of Inspiration. 

By the inspiration of the Scriptures, we mean that special divine influence 
upon the minds of the Scripture writers, in virtue of which their produc- 
tions, apart from errors of transcription, and when rightly interpreted, 
together constitute an infallible and sufficient rule of faith and practice. 
For works on the general subject of Inspiration, see Lee, Henderson, 
Bannermaun, Jamieson, McNaught. Garbett, God's Word Written. 
Aids to Faith, Essay on Inspiration. Also, Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 
1: 205. Westcott, Int. to Study of the Gospels, 27-65. Bib. Sac, 
1: 97; 4: 154; 12: 217; 15: 29, 314; 25: 192-198. Also, Dr. 
Barrows, in Bib. Sac, 1867: 593; 1872: 428. Farrar, Science in 
Theology, 208. 

(a) Inspiration is therefore to be defined not by its method but by its 
result. It is a general term including all those kinds and degrees of the 
Holy Spirit's influence which were brought to bear upon the minds of the 
Scripture writers, in order to secure the putting into permanent and written 
form of the truth best adapted to man's moral and religious needs. 

(6) Inspiration may often include revelation, or the direct communica- 
tion from God of truth to which man could not attain by his unaided 
powers. It may include illumination or the quickening of man's cognitive 
powers to understand truth already revealed. Inspiration however does 
not necessarily and always include either revelation or illumination. It is 
simply the divine influence which secures a correct transmission of the 
truth to the future, and according to the nature of the truth to be trans- 
mitted, it may be only an inspiration of superintendence, or it may be also 
and at the same time, an inspiration of illumination or revelation. 

(c) It is not denied but affirmed, that inspiration may qualify for oral 
utterance of infallible truth, or for wise leadership and daring deeds. We 
are now concerned with inspiration, however, only as it pertains to the 
authorship of Scripture. 

Henderson, Inspiration, 58. 

II. Proof of Inspiration. 

1. Since we have shown that God has made a revelation of himself to 
man, the presumption becomes doubly strong that he will not trust this 
revelation to human tradition and misrepresentation, but will also provide 
a correct and authoritative record of it. 

2. Jesus, who has been proved to be not only a credible witness, but a 
messenger from God, vouches for the inspiration of the Old Testament, by 



THEORIES OF INSPIRATION. 5L 

quoting it with the formula: "it is written ;" by declaring that "not one 
jot or tittle of it shall fail;" and by calling it "the word of God which 
cannot be broken," and in which we "have eternal life." (Matt. 4: 4, 6, 7; 
5: 17 ; 11: 10. Mark 14: 27. Luke 4: 4-12 ; 11: 49. John 5: 39 ; 10: 35). 
Henderson, Inspiration, 254. 

3. Jesus commissioned his disciples as teachers, and promised them in 
their teaching a supernatural aid of the Holy Spirit, similar to that which 
was granted to the Old Testament prophets. (Mat. 10: 7, 19; 28: 19, 20. 
Luke -24: 49. John 14: 26 ; 15: 27 ; 16: 13 ; 17: 8 ; 20: 21, 22. Acts 1: 4. 
Cf. Ex. 3: 12. Is. 44: 3. Jer. 1: 5-8. Ez. 2 and 3. Joel 2: 28). 

Henderson, Inspiration, 247, 248. 

4. The apostles claim to have received this promised Spirit, and under 
his influence to speak with divine authority, putting their writings upon a 
level with the Old Testament Scriptm-es. We have not only direct state- 
ments that both the matter and the form of their teaching were directed by 
the Holy Spirit, but we have indirect evidence that this was the case in the 
tone of authority which pervades their addresses and epistles. (Statements : 
1. Cor. 2:10-13; 11:23; 12:8; 14: 37, 38. Gal. 1: 12. 1 Thess. 4: 8. 
2 Tim. 3: 16; cf. Ex. 7: 1; 4: 14-16. 1 Pet. 1: 11, 12. 2 Pet. 1 : 21 ; 
3: 2, 16. Implications: 1 Cor. 5: 3-5. Gal. 1:1. 1 John 5: 10, 11). 

Kahnis, Dogmatik, 3 : 122. Henderson on Inspiration, 34, 234. Conant, 
Genesis, Introd. xiii, note. 

III. Theories of Inspiration. 

1. The Intuition-theory \ 

This holds that inspiration is but a higher development of that natural 
insight into truth which all men possess to some degree ; a mode of intelli- 
gence in matters of morals and religion which gives rise to sacred books, as 
a corresponding mode of intelligence in matters of secular truth gives rise 
to great works of philosophy or art. 

We object to this theory: 

(a) That it involves a self-contradiction ; — if it were true, one man would 
be inspired to utter what a second is inspired to pronounce false. The 
Vedas, the Koran and the Bible cannot be inspired to contradict each other. 

(6) That it makes moral and religious truth to be a purely subjective 
thing — a matter of private opinion — having no objective reality independently 
of men's opinions regarding it. 

(c) That it logically involves the denial of a personal God who is truth 
and reveals truth, and so makes man to be the highest intelligence in the 
universe. 

(d) That it explains inspiration only by denying its existence; since, if 
there be no personal God, inspiration is but a figure of speech for a purely 
natural fact. 

Morell, Philosophy of Keligion, 127-179. F. W. Newman, Phases of 
Faith. Theodore Parker, Discourses of Religion; Experiences as a 
Minister. Henderson, Inspiration, 443-469, 481-490. Rogers, Eclipse 
of Faith, 73 sq. and 283 sq. 



52 SCRIPTURE A REVELATION FROM GOJ). 

2. The Illumination-theory. 

This regards inspiration as merely an intensifying and elevating of the 
religious perceptions of the Christian, the same in kind, though greater in 
degree, than the illumination of every believer by the Holy Spirit. It 
holds not that the Bible is, but that it contains, the word of God, and that 
not the writings but only the writers were inspired. 

We object to this theory that: 

(a) It is insufficient to account for the facts. Since the illumination of 
the Holy Spirit gives us no new truth, but only a vivid apprehension of the 
truth already revealed, the original communication of this truth must have 
required a work of the Spirit different not in degree but in kind. 

(6) Such illumination could not secure the Scripture writers from fre- 
quent and grievous error. The spiritual perception of the Christian is 
always rendered to some extent imperfect and deceptive by remaining 
depravity. The subjective element so predominates in this theory, that no 
part of the Scriptures can be absolutely depended on. 

(c) An inspiration of this sort, therefore, still leaves us destitute of any 
authoritative standard of truth and duty. An additional revelation would, 
upon this theory, still be needed to tell us what parts of that which we have 
are true and binding. 

(d) Since no such additional revelation is given us, the individual reason 
must determine what parts of Scripture it is to receive, and what to reject. 
The theory in effect makes reason and not the Scriptures the ultimate 
authority in morals and religion. 

Herzog, Encyclopsedie, Art. Inspiration by Tholuck. Noyes, Theo- 
logical Essays, Essay by Tholuck. Coleridge, Confessions of an 
Inquiring Spirit, Works, 5: 569. F. W. Robertson, Sermon I; Life 
and Letters, 1 : 270. Curtis, Human Element in Inspiration. Farrar, 
Critical History of Free Thought, 473. Aids to Faith, 343. On 
Swedenborg, see Pond, Swedenborg and his Doctrine ; Hours with 
the Mystics, 2: 230 ; Mohler, Symbolism, 436-466 ; and New Englander, 
Jan. 1874: 195. 

3. The Dictation-theory, 

This theory holds that inspiration consisted in such a possession of the 
minds and bodies of the Scripture writers by the Holy Spirit, that they 
became passive instruments or amanuenses — pens, not penmen, of God. 

Of this view we may remark : 

(a) That it rests upon a partial induction of Scripture facts, — unwarrant- 
ably assuming that occasional instances of direct dictation reveal the 
invariable method of God's communications of truth to the writers of the 
Bible. 

(6) That it cannot account for the manifestly human element in the 
Scriptures. There are peculiarities of style which distinguish the produc- 
tions of each writer from those of every other, and there are variations in 
accounts of the same transaction which are inconsistent with the theory of 
a solely divine authorship. 



DIVINE AND HUMAN ELEMENTS IN INSPIRATION. 53 

(c) It is inconsistent with a wise economy of means, to suppose that the 
Scripture writers should have had dictated to them what they knew already, 
or what they could inform themselves of by the use of their natural powers. 

(d) It contradicts what we know of the law of God's working in the soul. 
The higher and nobler God's communications, the more fully is man in 
possession and use of his own faculties. We cannot suppose that this 
highest work of man under the influence of the Spirit was purely mechanical. 

Quenstedt, Theol. Didaci, 1: 76. Hooker, Works, 2: 383. Gaussen, 
Theopneusty. Haldane, Inspiration of the Old and New Testament. 
Henderson, Inspiration, 333, 349. 

4. The Dynamical theory. 

The true view holds in opposition to the first of these theories, that 
inspiration is not a natural but a supernatural fact, and that it is the imme- 
diate work of a personal God in the soul of man. 

It holds in opposition to the second, that inspiration belongs not only to 
the men who wrote the Scriptures, but to the Scriptures which they wrote, 
and to every part of them, so that they are in every part the word of God. 

It holds in opposition to the third theory, that the Scriptures contain a 
human as Avell as a divine element, so that while they constitute a body of 
infallible truth, this truth is shaped in human moulds and adapted to 
ordinary human intelligence. 

In short, inspiration is neither natural, partial, nor mechanical, but 
supernatural, plenary and dynamical. Further explanations will be grouped 
under the following head: 

IV. The union of the divine and human elements in Inspiration. 

1. The Scriptures are the production equally of God and of man, and 
therefore are never to be regarded as merely human or merely divine. 

The mystery of inspiration consists in neither of these terms separately, 
but in the union of the two. Of this however there are analogies in the 
interpenetration of human powers by the divine efficiency in regeneration 
and sanctification, and in the union of the divine and human natures in the 
person of Jesus Christ. 

2. This union of the divine and human agencies in inspiration is not to 
be conceived of as one of external impartation and reception. 

On the other hand those whom God raised up and providentially 
qualified to do this work, when inspired, spoke and wrote the words of God, 
not as from without but as from within, and that not passively, but in the 
most conscious possession and the most exalted exercise of their own powers 
of intellect, emotion and will. 

3. Inspiration did not therefore remove, but rather pressed into its own 
service all the personal peculiarities of the writers, together with their 
defects of culture and literary style. 

Every imperfection not inconsistent with truth in a human composition, 
may exist in inspired Scripture. The Bible is God's word, hi the sense 
that it presents to us divine truth in human forms, and is a revelation not for 
a select class but for the common mind. Rightly understood, this very 
humanity of tjie Bible is a proof of its divinity. 



54 SCRIPTURE A REVELATION FROM GOD. 

4. Inspiration went no further than to secure an infallible transmission 
by the sacred writers of the special truth which they were commissioned 
to deliver. 

Inspiration was not omniscience. It was liolvrpoiraq (Heb. 1: 1), — a 
bestowment of various kinds and degrees of knowledge and aid according 
to need — sometimes suggesting new truth, sometimes presiding over the 
collection of preexisting material, though always guarding from error in the 
final elaboration. 

As inspiration was not omniscience, so it was not complete sanctification. 
It involved neither personal hifallibility nor entire freedom from sin. 
Henderson, Inspiration, 114. 

5. Inspiration did not always or even generally involve a direct com- 
munication to the Scripture writers, of the words they wrote. 

Thought is possible without words and in the order of nature precedes 
words. The Scripture writers appear to have been so influenced by the 
Holy Spirit that they perceived and felt even the new truths they were to 
publish, as discoveries of their own minds, and were left to the action of 
their own minds, in the expression of these truths, with the single 
exception that they were supernaturally held back from the selection of 
wrong words, and when needful were provided with right ones. Inspira- 
tion is therefore verbal as to its result, but not verbal as to its method. 
Henderson, Inspiration, 102. Bib. Sac, 1872: 428, 640. 

6. Yet the all-pervading inspiration of the Scriptures, notwithstanding 
the ever-present human element, constitutes these various writings an 
organic whole. 

Smce the Bible is in all its parts the work of God, each part is to be judged 
not by itself alone, but in its connection with every other part. The Scriptures 
are not to be interpreted as so many merely human productions by different 
authors, but as also the work of one divine mind. Seemingly trivial things 
are to be explained from their connection with the whole. One history is 
to be built up from the several accounts of the life of Christ. One doctrine 
must supplement another. The Old Testament is part of a progressive 
system, whose culmination and key is to be found in the New. The central 
subject and thought which binds all parts of the Bible together and in the 
light of which they are to be interpreted,, is the person and work of Jesus 
Christ. 

Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1 : 40. Bernard, Progress of Doctrine in the N. T. 

Stanley Leathes, Structure of the Old Testament. Rainy, Delivery 

and Development of Doctrine. 

V. Objections to the doctrine op Inspiration. 

In connection with a divine-human work like the Bible, insoluble diffi- 
culties may be expected to present themselves. So long, however, as its 
inspiration is sustained by competent and sufficient evidence, these difficulties 
cannot justly prevent our full acceptance of the doctrine, any more than 
disorder and mystery in nature warrant us in setting aside the proofs of its 
divine authorship. These difficulties are lessened with time ; some have 



OBJECTIONS TO INSPIRATION. 55 

already disappeared ; many may be due to ignorance and may be removed 
hereafter ; those which are permanent may be intended to stimulate inquiry 
and to discipline faith. 

It is noticeable that the common objections to inspiration are urged not 
so much against the religious teaching of the Scriptures, as against certain 
errors in secular matters, which are supposed to be interwoven with it. But 
if these were proved to be errors indeed, it would not necessarily overthrow 
the doctrine of inspiration ; it would only compel us to give a larger place 
to the human element in the composition of the Scriptures, and to regard 
them more exclusively as a text-book of religion. As a rule of religious 
faith and practice, they might still be the infallible word of God. 

But we deny that such errors have as yet been proved to exist. While 
we are never to forget that the Bible is to be judged as a book whose one 
great aim is man's rescue from sin and reconciliation to God, we still hold 
that it is, not only in religious respects, but in all respects, a record of 
substantial truth. This will more fully appear from an examination of the 
objections in detail. 

Luthardt, Saving Truths, 205. 

1. Errors in matters of Science. 
Upon this objection we remark: 

(a) We do not admit the existence of scientific error in the scripture. 
What is charged as such is simply truth presented in popular and impressive 
forms. 

The common mind receives a more correct idea of unfamiliar facts when 
these are narrated in phenomenal language and in summary form, than 
when they are described in the abstract terms and in the exact detail of 
science ; (Joshua 10 : 12, 13. Ps. 78 : 69). 

(b) It is not necessary to a proper view of inspiration to suppose that 
the human authors of Scripture had in mind the proper scientific interpre- 
tation of the natural events they recorded. 

It is enough that this was in the mind of the inspiring Spirit. Through 
the comparatively narrow conceptions and inadequate language of the 
Scripture writers, the Spirit of inspiration may have secured the expression 
of the truth in such germinal form as to be intelligible to the times in 
which it was first published, and yet capable of indefinite expansion as 
science should advance; (Genesis 1., and 7: 19). 

(c) It may safely be said that science has not yet shown any fairly 
interpreted passage of Scripture to be untrue. 

In the miniature picture of creation in the first chapter of Genesis, and in 
its power of adjusting itself to every advance of scientific investigation, we 
have a strong proof of inspiration. 

With regard to the antiquity of the race, we may say that owing to the 
differences of reading between the Septuagint and the Hebrew, there is 
room for doubt whether either of the received chronologies can be con- 
, sidered as having the sanction of inspiration. If science should prove the 
existence of man upon the earth at a period preceding the dates hitherto 



56 SCRIPTURE A REVELATION" FROM GOD. 

assigned, no statement of the Scriptures would necessarily be proved false. 

But such antiquity cannot as yet be considered a matter of demonstration. 
Guyot, in Bib. Sac, 1855: 324. Dana, Manual of Geology, 741-746. 
Taylor Lewis, Six Days of Creation. Hugh Miller, Testimony of the 
Bocks. Conant, Genesis, Introduction. British Quarterly, Jan., 1874. 
Leconte, Beligion and Science, 270. Burgess, Antiquity and Unity of 
the Bace. Nisbet, Baptist Quarterly, 1871 : 460. Bogers, Super- 
human Origin of the Bible, 445 sq. Faith and Free Thought, 133. 

2. Errors in matters of History. 
To this objection we reply: 

(a) What are charged as such, are often mere mistakes in transcription, 
and have no force as arguments against inspiration, unless it can first be 
shown that inspired documents are by the very fact of their inspiration 
exempt from the operation of those laws which affect the transmission of 
other ancient documents; (2 Chron. 13: 3. Acts 7: 16). 

(6) Other so-called errors are to be explained as a permissible use of 
round numbers, which cannot be denied to the sacred writers except upon 
the principle that mathematical accuracy was more important than the 
general impression to be secured by the narrative; (Num. 25: 9 ; cf . 1 Cor. 
10: 8). 

(c) Diversities of statement in accounts of the same event, so long as 
they touch no substantial truth, may be due to the meagreness of the 
narrative, and might be fully explained if some single fact now unrecorded 
were only known. To explain these apparent discrepancies would not only 
be beside the purpose of the record, but would destroy one valuable 
evidence of the independence of the several writers or witnesses ; (Mat. 20: 
30; cf. Luke 18: 35. Mat. 5: 1 ; cf. Luke 6: 17). 

(d) Every advance in historical and arcli£eological discovery goes to 
sustain the correctness of the Scripture narratives, while the objector may 
be confidently challenged to point out a single statement really belonging 
to the inspired record, which has been proved to be false. 

On Christ's last Passover, see Bobinson, Harmony, 212. On Cyrenius, 
see Pres. Woolsey, Art. in New Englander, 1870. On Genealogies, see 
Lord Hervey, Genealogies of our Lord; and Art. in Smith's Bible 
Dictionary. Also, on the general subject, see Bawlinson, Historical 
Evidences; and Christianity and Modern Scepticism, 1: 265. Haley, 
Alleged Discrepancies. 

3. Errors in Morality. 

(a) What are charged as such are sometimes evil acts and words of good 
men — acts and words not sanctioned by God. These are narrated by the 
inspired writers as simple matters of history, and subsequent results or the 
story itself is left to point the moral of the tale; (Noah's drunkenness; Lot's 
incest ; Jacob's falsehood ; David's adultery ; Peter's denial). 

Lee, Inspiration, 265, note. 

(b) Where evil acts appear at first sight to be sanctioned, it is frequently 
some right intent or accompanying virtue, rather than the act itself, upon 
which commendation is bestowed ; (as Bahab's faith, not her duplicity ; 
Jael's patriotism, not her treachery). 



OBJECTIONS TO INSPIRATION. 57 

(c) Certain commands and deeds are sanctioned as relatively just — 
expressions of justice such as the age could comprehend, and are to be judged 
as parts of a progressively unfolding system of morality, whose key and 
culmination we have in Jesus Christ ; (as Moses' permission of divorce and 
retaliation; Deut. 24 : 1 ; Ex. 21: 24; cf. Mat. 5:31-39; 19:8. See also 
2 K. 1: 10-12; cf. Luke 9: 52-56). 

Peabody, Christianity the Religion of Nature, 45. 

(d) God's righteous sovereignty affords the key to other events. He has 
the right to do what he will with his own, and to punish the transgressor 
when and where he will. And he may justly make men the foretellers or 
executioners of his purposes ; (as in the destruction of the Canaanites, and 
in the imprecatory Psalms). 

Dr. Thos. Arnold, Essay on Right Interpretation of Scripture. Cowles, 
Com. on Psalm 137. Bib. Sac, 1862: 165. 

(e) Other apparent immoralities are due to unwarranted interpretations. 
Symbol is sometimes taken for literal fact (as in Hosea 1 : 2, 3) ; the lan- 
guage of irony is understood as sober affirmation (as in 2. K. 6: 19); the 
glow and freedom of Oriental description are judged by the unimpassioned 
style of western literature (as in Canticles). 

Butler's Analogy, Part 2, Chap. 3. Rogers' Eclipse of Faith. Perowne 
on Psalms, Introduction, 61. Essay on Moral Difficulties of O. T., in 
Faith and Free Thought, Lectures by Ch'n Ev. Soc, 2 : 173. 

4. Errors of Reasoning. 

{a) What are charged as such are generally to be explained as valid 
argument expressed in highly condensed form. The appearance of error 
may be due to the suppression of one or more links in the reasoning. 

(6) Where we cannot see the propriety of the conclusions drawn from 
given premises, there is greater reason to attribute our failure to ignorance 
of divine logic on our part than to accommodation or ad hominem arguments 
on the part of the Scripture writers. 

(c) The adoption of Jewish methods of reasoning, where it could be 
proved, would not indicate error on the part of the Scripture writers, but 
rather an inspired sanction of the method as applied to that particular case ; 
(Gal. 3: 16. Heb. 7: 9, 10). 

5. Errors in quoting or interpreting the Old Testament 

(a) What are charged as such are commonly interpretations of the mean- 
ing of the original Scripture by the same Spirit who first inspired it. 

(b) Where an apparently false translation is quoted from the Septuagint, 
the sanction of inspiration is given to it, as expressing a part at least of the 
fulness of meaning contained in the divine original — a fulness of meaning 
which two varying translations do not in some cases exhaust ; (Ps. 40: 6, 8 ; 
cf. Heb. 10: 5-7). 

(c) The freedom of these inspired interpretations, however, does not 
warrant us in like freedom of interpretation in the case of other passages 
whose meaning has not been authoritatively made known. 



58 SCRIPTURE A REVELATION EKOM GOD. 

6. Errors in Prophecy. 

(a) What are charged as such may frequently be explained by remem- 
bering that much of prophecy is unfulfilled ; (as in the book of Revelation). 

(6) The personal surmises of the prophets as to the meaning of the 
prophecies they recorded, may have been incorrect, while yet the prophecies 
themselves are inspired ; (1 Pet. 1 : 10-11). 

(c) The prophet's earlier utterances are not to be severed from the later 
utterances which elucidate them, nor from the whole revelation of which 
they form a part. It is unjust to forbid the prophet to explain his own 
meaning; (1 Thess. 4: 15-17; 5: 2, 3; cf. 2. Thess. 2: 1-6). 

(d) The character of prophecy as a rough general sketch of the future, in 
highly figurative language, and without historical perspective, renders it 
peculiarly probable that what at first sight seem to be errors, are due to a 
misinterpretation on our part, which confounds the drapery with the 
substance, or applies its language to events to which it had no reference. 

7. Certain books unworthy of a place in inspired Scripture. 

{a) This charge may be shown, in each single case, to rest upon a mis- 
apprehension of the aim and method of the book, and its connection with 
the remainder of the Bible, together with a narroAvness of nature or of 
doctrinal view, which prevents the critic from appreciating the wants of the 
peculiar class of men to which the book is especially serviceable. 

(6) The testimony of church history and of general Christian experience 
to the profitableness and divinity of the disputed books, is of greater weight 
than the personal impressions of the few who criticise them. 

(c) Such testimony can be adduced in favor of the value of each one of 
the books to which exception is taken ; (as Esther, Job, Song of Solomon, 
Ecclesiastes, James, Revelation). 

8. Portions of the Scripture books written by others than the persons 
to whom they are ascribed. 

The objection rests upon a misunderstanding of the nature and object of 
inspiration. It may be removed by considering that: 

(a) In the case of books made up from preexisting documents, inspiration 
simply preserved the compilers of them from selecting inadequate or false 
material. The fact of such compilation does not impugn their truthfulness 
or value ; ( Genesis and Chronicles). 

(6) In the case of additions to Scripture books by later writers, it is 
reasonable to suppose that the additions, as well as the originals, were made 
by inspiration, and no essential truth is sacrificed by allowing the whole to 
go under the name of the chief author ; (Deuteronomy, and perhaps Isaiah). 

(c) It is unjust to deny to inspired Scripture the right exercised by all 
historians, of introducing certain documents and sayings as simply historical, 
while their complete truthfulness is neither vouched for nor denied ; (as the 
letter of Claudias Lysias in Acts 23 : 26-30). 

9. Sceptical or fictitious Narratives. 

(a) Descriptions of human experience may be embraced in Scripture, 
not as models for imitation, but as illustrations of the doubts, struggles, and 
needs of the soul. 



SCRIPTURE A REVELATION FROM GOD. 59 

111 these cases, inspiration may vouch, not for the correctness of the views 
expressed by those who thus describe their mental history, but only for the 
correspondence of the description with actual fact, and for its usefulness as 
indirectly teaching important moral lessons; (Ecclesiastes). 

(b) Moral truth may be put by Scriptirce writers into parabolic or 
dramatic form, and the sayings of Satan and of perverse men may form 
parts of such a production. 

In such cases, inspiration may vouch, not for the historical truth, much 
less for the moral truth of each separate statement, but only for the cor- 
respondence of the whole with ideal fact ; in other words, inspiration may 
guarantee that the story is true to nature, and is valuable as conveying 
divine instruction ; (Book of Job; Parable of the Prodigal Son). 

(c) In none of these cases ought the difficulty of distinguishing man's 
words from God's words, or ideal truth from actual truth, to prevent our 
acceptance of the fact of inspiration, for in this very variety of the Bible, 
with the stimulus it gives to inquiry, and yet the general plainness of its 
lessons, we have the very characteristics we should expect in a book whose 
authorship was divine. 

10. Acknowledgment of the non-inspiration of Scripture teachers 
and their writings,. 

This charge rests mainly upon the misinterpretation of two particular 
passages : 

(a) Acts 23: 5, ("I wist not, brethren, that he was the high priest"), 
may be explained either as 'the language of indignant irony : "I would not 
recognize such a man as high priest ; " or more naturally, as an actual con- 
fession of personal ignorance and fallibility, which does not affect the 
inspiration of any of Paul's final teachings or writings. 

(6) 1 Cor. 7: 10, 12, ("I not the Lord; not I, but the Lord"). Here 
the contrast is, not between the apostle inspired and the apostle uninspired, 
but between the apostle's words and an actual saying of our Lord, as in 
Matt. 5 : 32 ; 19 : 3-10 ; Mark 10 : 11 ; Luke 16 : 18 ; (Stanley on Corinthians). 

The expressions may be paraphrased: — "With regard to this matter no 
express command was given by Christ before his ascension. As one inspired 
by Christ, however, I give you my command." 



PART IV. 

THE NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 

In contemplating the words and acts of God, as in contemplating the 
words and acts of individual men, we are compelled to assign uniform and 
permanent effects to uniform and permanent causes. Holy acts and words, 
we argue, must have their source in a principle of holiness ; truthful acts 
and words in a settled proclivity to truth ; benevolent acts and words in a 
benevolent disposition. 

Moreover, these permanent and uniform sources of expression and action 
to which we have applied the terms principle, proclivity, disposition, since 
they exist harmoniously in the same person, must themselves inhere, and 
rind their unity, in an underlying spiritual substance or reality of which 
they are the inseparable characteristics and partial manifestations. 

Thus we are led naturally from the works to the attributes, and from the 
attributes to the essence of God. 

I. Definition of the tebm Attributes. 

The attributes of God are those distinguishing characteristics of the divine 
nature which are inseparable from the idea of God and which constitute the 
basis and ground for his various manifestations to his creatures. 

We call them attributes because we are compelled to attribute them to 
God as fundamental qualities or powers of his being, in order to give 
rational account of certain constant facts in God's self -revelations. 

Shedd, History of Doctrine, 1 : 240. Kahnis, Dogmatik, 3 : 172-188. 

II. Relation of the divine Attributes to the divine Essence. 

1. The attributes have an objective existence. They are not mere 
names for human conceptions of God — conceptions which have their only 
ground in the imperfection of the finite mind. They are qualities object- 
ively distinguishable from the divine essence and from each other. 

The nominalistic notion that God is a being of absolute simplicity, and 
that in his nature there is no internal distinction of qualities or powers, 
tends directly to pantheism ; denies all reality to the divine perfections ; or 
if these in any sense still exist, precludes all knowledge of them on the part 
of finite beings. To say that knowledge and power, eternity and holiness, 
are identical with the essence of God and with each other, is to deny that 
we can know God at all. 



METHODS OF DETERMINING THE ATTRIBUTES. 61 

The Scripture declarations of the possibility of knowing God, together 
with the manifestation of distinct attributes of his nature, are conclusive 
against tliis false notion of the divine simplicity ; ( Jer. 9 : 23, 24. John 
17 : 3. Ps. 85 : 10, 11). 

Julius Muller, Doctrine of Sin, 2 : 116 sq. Schweizer, Glaubenslehre, 
1 : 229-235. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1 : 43. Martensen, 
Dogmatics, 91.' 

2. The attributes inhere in the divine essence. They are not separate 
existences. They are attributes of God. 

While we oppose the nominalistic view which holds them to be mere 
names with which, by the necessity of our thinking, we clothe the one sim- 
ple divine essence, we need equally to avoid the opposite realistic extreme 
of making them separate parts of a composite God. 

We cannot conceive of attributes except as belonging to an underlying 
essence which furnishes their ground of unity. In representing God as a 
compound of attributes, realism endangers the living unity of the Godhead. 
Luthardt, Compendium der Dogmatik, 70. 

3. The attributes belong to the divine essence as such. They are to be 
distinguished from those other powers or relations which do not appertain 
to the divine essence universally. 

The personal distinctions (proprietates) in the nature of the one God are 
not to be denominated attributes, since each of these personal distinctions 
belongs not to the divine^ essence as such and iiniversally, but only to the 
particular person of the Trinity who bears its name, while on the contrary 
all of the attributes belong to each of the persons. 

The relations which God sustains to the world (predicata), moreover — 
such as creation, preservation, government — are not to be denominated 
attributes, since these are accidental, not necessary or inseparable from the 
idea of God. God would be God, if he had never created. 

4. The attributes manifest the divine essence. The essence is revealed 
only through the attribues. Apart from its attributes it is unknown and 
unknowable. 

But though we can know God ouly as he reveals to us his attributes, we 
do, notwithstanding, in knowing these attributes, know the being to whom 
these attributes belong. That this knowledge is partial does not prevent its 
corresponding, so far as it goes, to objective reality in the nature of God. 

All God's revelations are therefore revelations of himself in and through 
his attributes. Our aim must therefore be to determine from God's works 
and words what qualities, dispositions, determinations, powers of Iris other- 
wise unseen and unsearchable essence, he has actually made known to us, 
or in other words, what are the revealed attributes of God. 

III. Methods of determining the divine Attributes. 

We have seen that the existence of God is a first truth. It is presupposed 
in all human thinking and is more or less consciously recognized by all men. 

This intuitive knowledge of God we have seen to be corroborated and 
exiDlicated by arguments drawn from nature and from mind. Reason leads 



.62 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

us to a causative and personal Intelligence upon whom we depend. This 
Being of infinite greatness we clothe, by a necessity of our thinking, with all 
the attributes of perfection. 

The two great methods of determining what these attributes are, are the 
rational and the Biblical. 

1. The Rational method. This is threefold : 

A. The via negationis, which consists in denying to God all imperfec- 
tions observed in created beings ; 

B. The via enrinentias, which consists in attributing to God in infinite 
degree all the perfections found in creatures ; and 

C. The via causalitatis, which consists in predicating of God those attri- 
butes which are required in him to explain the world of nature and of 
mind. 

Kahnis, Dogmatik, 3 : 181. 

This rational method explains God's nature from that of his creation, 
whereas the creation itself can be fully explained only from the nature of 
God. 

Though the method is valuable, it has insirperable limitations and its 
place is a siibordinate one. While we use it continually to confirm and sup- 
plement results otherwise obtained, our chief means of determining the 
divine attributes must be: 

2. The Biblical method. This is simply the inductive method applied 
to the facts with regard to God revealed in the Scriptures. Now that we 
have proved the Scriptures to be a revelation from God, inspired in every 
part, we may properly look to them as decisive authority with regard to 
God's attributes. 

IV. Classification of the Attributes. 

The attributes may be divided into two great classes : Absolute or Im- 
manent, and Relative or Transitive. 

By Absolute or Immanent Attributes we mean attributes which respect 
the inner being of God, which are involved in God's relations to himself, 
and which belong to his nature independently of his connection with the 
universe. 

By Relative or Transitive Attributes we mean attributes which respect 
the outward revelation of God's being, which are involved in God's relations 
to the creation, and which are exercised in consequence of the existence of 
the universe and its dependence upon him. 

Under the head of Absolute or Immanent Attributes we make a twofold 
division into Spirituality, with the attributes therein involved, namely, Holi- 
ness, Love and Truth; and Infinity, with the attributes therein involved, 
namely, Self -existence, Immutability and Unity. 

Under the head of Relative or Transitive Attributes we make a threefold 
division, according to the order of their revelation into Attributes having rela- 
tion to Time and Space, as Eternity and Immensity ; Attributes having rela- 
tion to Creation, as Omnipresence, Omniscience and Omnipotence ; and Attri- 
butes having relation to Moral Beings, as Justice or Transitive Holiness ; 
and Goodness and Mercy, or Transitive Love. 



ABSOLUTE OR IMMANENT ATTRIBUTES. 63 

This classification may be better understood from the following schedule : 

1. Absolute or Immanent Attributes : 

( (a) Holiness, 

A. Spirituality, mvolving < (b) Loye, 

( (c) Truth. 

( (a) Self-existence, 

B. Infinity , inyolying } (6) Immutability, 

( (c) Unity. 

2. Relative or Transitive Attributes : 

, „ ( (a) Eternity, 

A. Eelated to Tune and Space ] )' T V, 

( (o) Immensity. 

i (a) Omnipresence, 

B. Related to Creation J (6) Omniscience, 

( (c) Omnipotence. 

( (a) Justice, or Transitive Holiness, 

C. Related to Moral Beings ) (b) Goodness and Mercy, or Transitive 

I Love. 

On classification of attributes, see Luthardt, Compendium, 71. Rothe, 
Dogmatik, 71. Kahnis, Dogmatik, 3 : 162. Thomasius, Christi Per- 
son und Werk, 1 : 47, 52, 136. On the general subject, see Charnock, 
Attributes. 

V. Absolute oe Immanent Atteebetes. 

First Division. — Spirituality, and Attributes therein involved. 

In calling spirituality an attribute of God, we mean not that we are justi- 
fied in applying to the divine nature the adjective "spiritual," but that the 
substantive "spirit" describes that nature; (John 4: 24. Rom. 1: 20. 
1 Tim. 1 : 17. Col. 1 : 15). This implies : 

A. Negatively, that, 

(a) God is not matter. Spirit is not a refined form of matter, but an 
immaterial substance, invisible, uncompounded, indestructible. 

(6) God is not dependent upon matter. It cannot be shown that the 
human mind, in any other state than the present, is dependent for con- 
sciousness upon its connection with a physical organism. Much less is it 
true that God is dependent upon the material universe as his sensorium. 

God is not only spirit, but he is pure spirit. He is not only not matter, 
but he has no necessary connection with matter. 

Those passages of Scripture which seem to ascribe to God the possession 
of bodily parts and organs, as eyes and hands, are to be regarded as anthro- 
pomorphic and symbolic. 

When God is spoken of as appearing to the patriarchs and walking with 
them, the passages are to be explained as referring to God's temporary man- 
ifestations of himself in human form — manifestations which prefigured the 
final tabernacling of the Son of God in human flesh. 

Side by side with these anthropomorphic expressions and manifestations, 
moreover, were specific declarations which repressed any materializing con- 
ceptions of God ; as for example, that heaven was his throne and the earth 



64 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

his footstool (Is. 66: 1), and that the heaven of heavens could not contain 
him (1K.8: 27). 

B. Positively, that : 

(a) God is life, or living essence ; (Jer. 10 : 10). 

(b) That God is personality, or personal existence — with its two constitu- 
ent powers or manifestations, self-consciousness and self-determination; 
(1 Cor. 2 : 10 ; Eph. 3 : 11). 

British Quarterly Review, Jan., 1874: 32. 

Of the attributes involved in spirituality we mention : 

1. Holiness. 

Holiness is self -affirming purity. In virtue of this attribute of his nature, 
God eternally loves and wills his own moral excellence ; (Is. 6:3; Rev. 4 : 8). 

Holiness, therefore, is not to be conceived of : 

(a) As a mere quality of the divine substance ; for none of God's moral 
attributes are passive, but all are penetrated and pervaded by will. God is 
holy, in that his own purity is the supreme object of his regard and mainten- 
ance. 

Thomasius, Christi Person unci Werk, 1 : 141. 

(6) Nor as being God's self-love, in the sense of supreme regard for his 
own interest and happiness. It is rather God's infinite moral excellence 
affirming and asserting itself as the highest possible motive and end. 

Buddeus, Theologia Dogmatica, 2 : 1 : 36. Per contra, see Thomasius, 

Christi Person und Werk, 1 : 137. 

(c) Nor as being identical with, or a manifestation of, love ; for holiness, 
the self-affirming attribute, can in no way be resolved into love, the self- 
communicating. 

Hovey, God with Us, 187-221. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2: 80-82. 
Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1 : 154, 155. 

(d) Nor as a complex term designating the aggregate of the divine per- 
fections ; since the notion of holiness is, both in Scripture and in Christian 
experience, perfectly simple and distinct from that of other attributes. 

Nitzsch, System of Christ. Doct., Trans., 166. Dick, Theology, 1 : 275. 
Wardlaw, Theology, 1 : 618-634. 

(e) Nor as purity demanding purity from creatures; for this includes 
the transitive attribute of justice, which is indeed the manifestation and 
expression of the immanent attribute of holiness, but is not to be conf ounded 
with it. 

Quenstedt, Theol., 8 : 1 : 34. Tholuck on Romans, 5th Ed., 151. 
Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1 : 137. 

2. Love. 

By love we mean that attribute of the divine nature in virtue of which 
God is eternally moved to self-communication ; (1 John 4 : 8). 

(a) The immanent love of God is not to be confounded with goodness 
and mercy toward creatures. These are its manifestations and are to be 
denominated transitive love. 

Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1 : 138, 139. 



ABSOLUTE OR IMMANENT ATTRIBUTES. 65 

(6) The immanent love of God, therefore, requires and finds a personal 
object in the image of his own infinite perfections. It is to be understood 
only in the light of the doctrine of the Trinity ; (John 17 : 24). 

(c) The immanent love of God constitutes a ground of the divine bless- 
edness. Since there is an infinite and perfect object of love as well as of 
knowledge and will, in God's own nature, the existence of the universe is 
not necessary to his serenity and joy ; (1 Tim. 1 : 11 ; 6 : 15. Eph. 4 : 30. 
Gen. 6:6; 22 : 16. Is. 63 : 9). 

Martensen, Christian Dogmatics, 101. Shedd, Essays and Addresses, 
279. Thomasius, 1 : 156. 

3. Truth. 

By this we mean that attribute of the divine nature in virtue of which 
God's being and God's knowledge eternally conform to each other ; (1 John 
5 : 20, -yivcjonojuei' rbv a/.rjx^ivov. John 17 : 3, rbv jiovov a?i7]&ivdv fiebv. 14 : 6 elpi ?} 
alrr&eia\ cf. 1 Cor. 2: 11). 

Thomasius, 1 : 137. Gerhard, Loc. II, 152. Kahnis, 3 : 193 ; also 

2 : 272, 279. 

{a) The immanent truth of God is to be distinguished from that veracity 
and faithfulness which partially manifest it to creatures ; (Ps. 31 : 5). 

(b) All truth among men, whether mathematical, moral or religious, is 
to be regarded as having its foundation in this immanent truth of the divine 
nature, and as disclosing facts hi the being of God. 

(c) This attribute, therefore, constitutes the principle and guarantee of 
all revelation, while it shows the possibility of an eternal divine self-con- 
templation apart from and before all creation. 

Second Division. — Infinity, and Attributes therein involved. 

By infinity we mean not that the divine nature has no known limits or 
bounds, but that it has no limits or bounds ; (Ps. 145 : 3. Job. 11 : 7). 
That which has simply no known limits, is the indefinite. In explanation 
of this term we may notice : 

(a) That the infinity of God is not a negative but a positive idea. It 
does not take its rise from an impotence of thought, but is an intuitive con- 
viction, which constitutes the basis of all other knowledge. 

(6) That the infinity of God does not involve his identity with ' the all ' 
or the sum of existence, nor prevent the coexistence of derived and finite 
beings to which he bears relation. 

Infinity implies simply that God exists in no necessary relation to finite 
things or beings, and that whatever limitation of the divine nature results 
from their existence is, on the part of God, a self -limitation ; (Ps. 113 : 5, 6). 

(c) That the infinity of God is to be conceived of as intensive rather 
than as extensive. We do not attribute to him infinite extension, but rather 
infinite energy of spiritual life. 

That which acts up to the measure of its power is simply natural and phy- 
sical force. Man rises above nature by virtue of his reserves of power. 
But in God the reserve is infinite. There is a transcendent element in him 
which no self -revelation exhausts, whether creation or redemption, whether 
- 5 



66 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

law or promise ; (Mai. 2 : 15. Acts 7 : 2. Ex. 33 : 18. Matt, 6 : 13. Is. 6 : 3. 
1 Pet. 4 : 14. Heb. 1 : 3. Ps. 19 : 1. Eom. 1 : 23 ; 9 : 23. Rev. 21 : 23). 
Porter, Human Intellect, 647-662. 

Of the attributes involved in infinity we mention : 

1. Self -existence. 

This is implied in the names ' Jehovah, ' ' I am ' (Ex. 3:14; 6:3), and in 
declarations that God is the inexhaustible source of life ; (Ps. 36 : 9. Rom. 
11 : 36). 

By self-existence we mean : 

(a) That God is causa sui, having the ground of his existence in himself. 

Every being must have the ground of its existence either in, or out of 
itself. We have the ground of our existence outside of us. God is not 
thus dependent. He is 'a se '; hence we speak of the aseity of God. But 
lest this by itself should be misconstrued, we add, 

( c) That God exists by necessity of his own being. 

It is God's will to exist indeed, but God's will is the expression of his 
nature. It is his nature to be. Hence the existence of God is not a con- 
tingent but a necessary existence. It is grounded not in his volitions, but 
in his nature. 

Julius Muller, Doctrine of Sin, 2; 126. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2: 63. 

2. Immutability. 

By this we mean that the nature, attributes, and will of God are exempt 
from all change ; (Ps. 102 : 27. Mai. 3 : 6. James 1 : 17). 

Reason teaches tha/t no change is possible in God, whether of increase or 
decrease, progress or deterioration, contraction or development. All change 
must be to better or worse. But God is absolute perfection, and no change 
to better is possible. Change to worse would be equally inconsistent with 
perfection. No cause for such change exists either outside of God or in 
God liimself . 

Spenser, Faerie Queen, Cantos of Mutability, 8: 2. 

The passages of Scripture which seem at first sight to ascribe change to 
God, are to be explained in one of two ways: 

(a) As anthropomorphic representations of the revelation of God's 
unchanging attributes in the changing circumstances and varying moral 
conditions of creatures; (Gen. 6: 6; cf. Num. 23: 19, and 1 Sam. 15: 11, 29. 
Jonah 3: 4, 10). 

(b) As describing executions in time, of purposes eternally existing in 
the mind of God. 

Immutability must not be confounded with immobility. This would 
deny all those imperative volitions on the part of God by which he enters 
into history. The Scriptures assure us that creation, miracles, incarnation, 
regeneration, are immediate acts of God. Immutability is consistent with 
constant activity and perfect freedom; (John 5: 17. Job 23: 13, 14. Gen. 
8:1). 

£. Unity. 

By this we mean: 

(a) That the divine nature is undivided and undivisible ; and 



RELATIVE OR TRANSITIVE ATTRIBUTES. 67 

(b) That there is but one infinite and perfect Spirit; (Deut. 6: 4. John 
17: 3. Is. 44: 6. 1 Cor. 8: 4-6. Gal. 3: 20. Eph. 4: 6. 1 Tim. 2: 5.) 

Against polytheism, dualism and tritheism, we may urge that the notion 
of two or more Gods is self-contradictory ; since each limits the other and 
destroys his Godhead. In the nature of things, infinity and absolute 
perfection are possible only to one. It is unphilosophical moreover, to 
assume the existence of two or more Gods when one will explain all the 
facts. • 

The unity of God is, however, in no way inconsistent with the doctrine 
of the Trinity, for while this doctrine holds to the existence of hypostatical 
distinctions in the divine nature, it also holds that this divine nature is 
numerically and eternally one. 

On the origin of polytheism, see Biblical Eepository, 2: 84, 246, 441. 

VI. Relative or Transitive Attributes. 

First Division. — Attributes having relation to Time and Space. 

1. Eternity. 

By this we mean that God's nature: 

(a) Is without beginning or end ; 

{b) Is free from all succession of time ; and 

(c) Contains in itself the cause of time; (Ps. 90: 2; 102: 27. Is. 41: 4. 
1 Tim. 1: 17; 6: 16. Rev. 1: 8. 1 Cor. 2: 7. Eph. 1: 4). 

Porter, Human Intellect, 564-566. 

Eternity is infinity in its relation to time. It implies that God's nature 
is not subject to the law of time. God is not in time, but time is hi God. 
Although there is logical succession in God's thoughts, there is no chrono- 
logical succession. 

Yet we are far from saying that time, now that it exists, has no objective 
reality to God. To him, past, present, and future are "one eternal now," 
not in the sense that there is no distinction between them, but only in the 
sense that he sees past and future as vividly as the present. With creation 
time began, and since the successions of history are veritable successions, 
he who sees according to truth must recognize them. 

Murphy, Scientific Bases, 90. Reid, Intellectual Powers, Essay 3, 
chap. 2. New Englander, April, 1875 : Art. The Metaphysical Idea of 
Eternity. 

2. Immensity. 

By this we mean that God's nature : 
{a) Is without extension ; 

(b) Is subject to no limitations of space ; and 

(c) Contains hi itself the cause of space ; (1 K. 8: 27). 

Immensity is infinity in its relation to space. God's nature is not subject 
to the law of space. God is not in space, but space is in God. 

Yet space has an objective reality to God. With creation, space began 
to be, and since God sees according to truth, he recognizes relations of 
space in his creation. 

Reid, Intellectual Powers, Essay 2, ch. 9. Porter, Human Intellect, 
662. - 



68 NATURE DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

Second Division. — Attributes having relation to Creation. 

1. Omnipresence. 

By this we mean that God, in the totality of his essence, without diffusion 
or expansion, multiplication or division, penetrates and fills the universe in 
all its parts; (Ps. 139, 7 sq. Jer. 23: 23, 24. Acts 17: 27). 

In explanation of this attribute we may say: 

(a) God's omnipresence is not potential but essential. 

We reject the Socinian representation that God's essence is in heaven, 
only his power on earth. When God is said to dwell in the heavens (Ps. 
123: 1 ; 113: 5. Is. 57: 15), we are to understand the language either as a 
symbolic expression of his exaltation above earthly things, or as a declaration 
that his most special and glorious self -manifestations are to the spirits of 
heaven. 

(6) God's omnipresence is not the presence of a part but of the whole of 
God in every place. 

This follows from the conception of God as incorporeal. We reject the 
materialistic representation that God is composed of material elements 
which can be divided or sundered. There is no multiplication or diffusion 
of his substance to correspond with the parts of his dominions. The one 
essence of God is present at the same moment in all ; (1 K. 8: 27). 

(c) God's omnipresence is not necessary but free. 

We reject the pantheistic notion that God is bound to the universe as the 
universe is bound to God. God is immanent in the universe not by com- 
pulsion, but by the free act of his own will, and this immanence is qualified 
by his transcendence. 

2. Omniscience. 

By this we mean God's perfect and eternal knowledge of all things which 
are objects of knowledge, whether they be actual or possible, past, present 
or future; (Ps. 147: 4. Mat. 10: 29. Ps. 33: 13-15. Prov. 15: 3. 1 John 
3: 20. Acts 15: 8. Heb. 4: 13. Ps. 139: 2. Mat. 6: 8; 10 : 30. Is. 46: 
9, 10. Mai. 3: 16. Acts 15: 18. 1 Cor. 2: 7; Ps. 139: 6. Bom. 11: 13). 

(a) The omniscience of God may be argued from his omnipresence as 
well as from his truth or self-knowledge, in which the plan of creation has 
its eternal ground. 

(6) As free from all imperfections, God's knowledge is: 

(b 1 ) Immediate, — as distinguished from the knowledge that comes 
through sense or imagination ; 

(b 2 ) Simultaneous, — as not acquired by successive observations, or built 
up by processes of reasoning ; 

(b 3 ) Distinct, — as free from all vagueness or confusion ; 

(6 4 ) True, — as perfectly corresponding to the reality of things ; 

(If) Eternal, — as comprehended in one timeless act of the divine mind. 

(c) Since God knows tilings as they are, he knows the necessary 
sequences of his creation as necessary, the free acts of his creatures as free, 
the ideally possible as ideally possible; (1 Sam. 23: 11, 12, Matt. 11 : 21). 

(d) The fact that there is nothing in the present condition of things 
from which the future actions of free creatures necessarily follow by natural 



RELATIVE OR TRANSITIVE ATTRIBUTES. 69 

law, does not prevent God from foreseeing such actions, since his knowledge 
is not mediate but immediate. 

Hill, Divinity, 517. 

(e) Prescience is not itself causative. It is not to be confounded with 
the predetermining will of God. Free actions do not take place because 
they are foreseen, but they are foreseen because they are to take place. 

(/) _ Omniscience embraces the actual and the possible, but it does not 
embrace the self-contradictory and impossible, because these are not objects 
of knowledge. 

(g) Omniscience, as qualified by holy will, is in Scripture denominated 
'wisdom.' In virtue of his wisdom God chooses the highest ends, and uses 
the fittest means to accomplish them; (Ps. 104: 24. Job 12: 13. Rom. 11: 
33, 34. Eph. 3: 10). 

3. Omnipotence. 

By this we mean the power of God to do all things which are objects of 
power, whether with or without the use of means; (2 Cor. 6: 18. Gen. 1: 
1-3. Is. 44: 24. Heb. 1: 3. 2 Cor. 4: 6. Eph. 1: 19; 3: 20. Matt. 3: 9. 
Rom. 4 : 17. Ps. 115 : 3. Eph. 1 : 11. Gen. 18 : 14. Luke 1 : 37. Matt. 
19 : 26). 

(a) Omnipotence does not imply power to do that which is not an object 
of power; as for example, that which is self-contradictory, or contradictory 
to the nature of God. 

(6) Omnipotence does not imply the exercise of all his power on the 
part of God. He has power over his power ; in other words, his power is 
under the control of wise and holy will. God can do all he will, but 
he will not do all he can. Else his power is mere force necessarily acting, 
and God is the slave of his own omnipotence ; (Job. 26 : 14). 

Rogers, Super. Orig. of the Bible, .10. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2 : 
62-66. 

(c) Omnipotence in God does not exclude but implies the power of self- 
liroitation. Since all such limitation is free, proceeding from neither exter- 
nal nor internal compulsion, it is the act and manifestation of God's power. 
Human freedom is not rendered impossible by the divine omnipotence, but 
exists by virtue of it. It is an act of omnipotence that God humbles him- 
self to the taking of human flesh in the person of Jesus Christ. 

Third Division. — Attributes having relation to Moral Beings. 

1. Justice. 

By this we mean that principle of the divine nature which demands in all 
moral creatures conformity to the moral perfection of God, and which 
rewards or punishes them accoiTling to their moral character ; (Matt. 5 : 48. 
1 Pet. 1 : 16. Gen. 18 : 25. Ps. 7 : 9-12. Rom. 2:6. 2 Cor. 5 : 10). 
Cremer, N. T. Lexicon, on cikciwc. 

(a) Justice (or righteousness, with which it is synonymous) is to be 
viewed simply as transitive holiness, or holiness in its relations to moral 
beings. 

Hence justice cannot be merely a manifestation of benevolence or God's 
disposition" to secure the highest happiness of his creatures. Nor can it be 



70 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

grounded in the nature of things, considered as something apart from and 
above God. 

(b) The divine justice, in its actual exercise, has been divided into two 
kinds: 

(b 1 ) Legislative, — as it imposes law in conscience or in Scripture. 

(6 2 ) Judicial (or distributive), — as it bestows the rewards or executes the 
penalties of law. 

We may accept this division, provided we remember that neither legisla- 
tive nor judical justice are matters of mere arbitrary will. Both are revela- 
tions of the inmost nature of God in the form of moral requirement. 

2. Goodness and Mercy. 

By these we mean the transitive love of God in its twofold relation to the 
unfallen and to the fallen portions of his creatures ; (Tit. 3 : 4, tytlav&putria. 
Rom. 2 : 4, goodness of God). 

(a) Goodness is the eternal principle of God's nature which leads Mm to 
communicate of his own life and blessedness to those who are like Mm in 
moral character ; (2 Pet. 1 : 3-4). 

(b) Mercy is the eternal principle of God's nature which leads him to 
seek the temporal good and eternal salvation of those who have opposed 
themselves to his will, even at the cost of infinite self-sacrifice ; (Matt. 5 : 45). 
Goodness, therefore, is nearly identical with the love of complacency, spoken 
of by the old theologians ; mercy, with the love of benevolence ; (1 Pet. 
4: 19). 

VII. Concluding Remarks. 

1. Each of the Attributes qualified by all the others. 

None are to be conceived of as exercised separately from the rest. God's 
love is immutable, wise, holy. Infinity belongs to God's knowledge, power, 
justice. 

2. Holiness the fundamental Attribute. 
This is evident : 

(a) From Scripture, — in which God's holiness is not only most constantly 
and powerfully pressed upon the attention of man, but is declared to be the 
chief subject of rejoicing and adoration in heaven ; (Heb. 12 : 14. Is. 6 : 3. 
Rev. 4 : 8). 

(b) From our own moral constitution, — in which conscience asserts its 
supremacy over every other impulse and affection of our nature. As we 
may be kind, but must be righteous, so God, in whose image we are made, 
may be merciful, but must be holy. 

Bishop Butler's Sermons upon Human Nature, Bohn's ed., 385-414. 

(c) From the actual dealings of God, — in which holiness conditions and 
limits the exercise of other attributes. 

Thus, for example, in Christ's redeeming work, though love makes the 
atonement, it is violated holiness that requires it ; and in the eternal pun- 
ishment of the wicked, the demand of holiness for self-vindication over- 
bears the pleading of love for the sufferers. 

Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 280, 291, 292. Also Sermons to the 
Natural Man: sermon on "Mercy optional with God." 



CONCLUDING REMARKS. 71 

3. The Reconciliation of Justice and Mercy. 

Since these attributes are both exercised toward sinners of the human race, 
the otherwise inevitable antagonism between them is removed only by the 
atoning death of the God-man. Their opposing claims do not impair the 
divine blessedness, because the reconciliation exists in the eternal counsels 
of God. Christ is "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world;" 
Rev. 13 : 8). 

Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 277, 279. 

4. The Holiness of God the Ground of Moral Obligation. 

A. Erroneous views. 

The ground of moral obligation is not: 

(a) In power, — whether 

(a 1 ) Of civil law (Hobbes, Gassendi); or 
(a 2 ) Of divine will (Occam, Descartes). 

We are not bound to obey either of these except upon the ground that 
they are right. 

(b) Not in utility, — whether 

(6 1 ) Our own happiness or advantage, present or eternal (Paley) ; for 
supreme regard for our own interest is not virtuous ; or 

(b 2 ) The greatest happiness or advantage of others (Edwards); for we 
judge conduct to be useful because it is right, — not right because it is useful. 

(c) Not in the nature of things (Price); whether by this we mean their 
(c 1 ) Fitness (Clarke) ; 

(c 2 ) Truth (Wollaston); 
(c 3 ) Order (Jounroy;; 
(c 4 ) Relations (Wayland); 
(c 5 ) Worthiness (Hickok); or 

(c 6 ) Abstract right (Haven and Alexander) ; for this nature of things is 
not ultimate but has its ground in the nature of God. 

B. The Scripture view. 

According to the Scriptures, the ground of moral obligation is the holi- 
ness of God, or the moral perfection of the divine nature, conformity to 
which is the law of our moral being; (Chalmers, Calderwood, Wuttke). 
We show this : 

(a) From the command : " Be ye holy," where the ground of obligation 
assigned is simply and only : " for I am holy;" (1 Pet. 1 : 16). 

(b) From the nature of the love in which the whole law is summed up. 
This is not regard for abstract right or the happiness of being, much less 
for one's own interest, but regard for God as the fountain and standard of 
moral excellence. 

(c) From the example of Christ, whose life was essentially an exhibition 
of supreme regard for God and supreme devotion to his holy will. 

For classifications of the different systems of morals, see Chalmers, 
Moral Philosophy ; Calderwood, Moral Philosophy ; Wuttke, Chris- 
tian Ethics ; Alexander, Moral Ssience, 159-198 ; Hickok, Moral Sci- 
ence, 27-34; Haven, Moral Philosophy, 27-50; Hopkins, Law of Love, 
7-28. Wayland, Moral Science. Fairchild, Moral Philosophy. Butler, 
Nature of Virtue in Works, Bonn's ee. , 334. 



CHAPTER IT. 

DOCTBINE OF THE TBIN1TY. 

In the nature of the one God there are three eternal distinctions which 
are represented to us under the figure of persons. This tripersonality of 
the Godhead is exclusively a truth of revelation. It is clearly, though not 
formally, made known in the New Testament, and intimations of it may be 
found in the Old. 

Twesten, Dogmatik; and translation in Bib. Sac, 3: 502. Ebrard, Dog- 

matik, 1 : 145-199. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1 : 57-135. 

Kahnis, Dogmatik, 3: 203-229. Shedd, History of Doctrine, 1: 246-385. 

Farrar, Science and Theology, 138. Norton, Statement of Reasons. 

Schaff, Mcene Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, in Theol. Eclectic, 4 : 209. 

I. In Scbiptuke theee ake Thkee who ake recognized as God. 
1. Proofs from the New Testament. 

A. The Father is recognized as God ; (John 6: 27. James 3:9. 1 Pet. 
1:2). 

B. Jesus Christ is recognized as God. 

Shedd, History of Doctrine, 1 : 262. Liddon, Bampton Lectures on 
our Lord's Divinity, 207. Hovey, God with Us, 20. Thomasius, 1 : 
61-64. 

(a) He is expressly called God. 

In John 1 : 1, Qebg rjv 6 ?i6yog, the absence of the article shows Qebr to be the 
predicate ; (cf . 4 : 24, irvevfia 6 Qeoc). This predicate precedes the verb by 
way of emphasis, to indicate progress in the thought =' the Logos was not 
only with God, but was God ' ; (see Meyer and Luthardt, Com. in loco. ) 

In Rom. 9: 5, the clause 6 tov sirl tt&vtov Qebg evAoyrftbg cannot be translated 
* blessed be the God over all,' for " wv is superfluous if the clause is a dox- 
ology ; ev/ioy?jTbg precedes the name of God in a doxology, but follows it, as 
here, in a description ;" (Hovey). The clause, therefore, can justly be 
interpreted only as a description of the higher nature of the Christ who had 
just been said, rb Kara capita, or according to his lower nature, to have had 
his origin from Israel ; (see Tholuck, Com. in loco). 

In Titus 2 : 13, errKpavecav rqg oo^tjc tov /jeya/.ov Qeov teal acorijpog ?}fj.ov 'Itjoov 
XpicTov we regard (with Ellicott) as "a direct, definite and even studied 
declaration of Christ's divinity " = ' the glorious appearing of our great God 
and Savior, Jesus Christ.' 'IftirtQaveia is a term applied specially to the Son 
and never to the Father, and fj.eyaA.ov is uncalled for, if used of the Father, 
but peculiarly appropriate if used of Christ. Upon the same principles we 
must interpret the similar text 2 Pet. 1:1; (see Huther, in Meyer's Com.). 



THREE RECOGNIZED AS GOD. 73 

La 1 John 5 : 20, — ea/uev kv ~Q a?w3-ivti, ev rw vl(J avrov 'Irjcov XpiarcJ. ovrog 
io-Lv 6 ahi&ivbg Qebg, — "it would be a flat repetition, after the Father had been 
twice called 6 aAz/tiivbg, to say now again : ' this is 6 aty&ivdg Qebg: Our being 
in God has its basis in Christ his Son, and this also makes it more natural 
that ovrog should be referred to vi<5. But ought not 6 afoj&tvbg then to be 
without the article (as in John 1 : 1, Qebg r t v 6 loyog) ? No, for it is John's 
purpose hi 1 John 5 : 20 to say, not what Christ is, but who he is. In 
declaring what one is, the predicate must have no article ; in declaring who 
one is, the predicate must have the article. St. John here says that this 
Son, on whom our being in the true God rests, is this true God himself ;" 
(see Ebrard, Com. in loco). 

Other passages might be here adduced, as John 20: 28, 'My Lord and 
my God ' ; Col. 2 : 9, 'In him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead 
bodily ' ; Phil. 2:6,' Being in the form of God ' ; but we prefer to consider 
these under other heads as indirectly proving Christ's divinity. 

Still other passages once relied upon as direct statements of the doctrine 
must be given up for textual reasons. Such are Acts 20 : 28, where the 
correct reading is in all probability not kKKlrjoiav rov Qeov, but ennfa/oiav rov 
Kvpiov,—(ko a c d e Tregelles and Teschendorf ; b and K however have rov 
Qeov) ; and 1 Tim. 3,: 16, where 6g is unquestionably to be substituted for 
Qebg. Bat even here e<pavep6&q intimates preexistence. 

It is sometimes objected that the ascription of the name God to Christ 
proves nothing as to his absolute deity, since angels and even human 
judges are called gods, as representing God's authority and executing his 
will ; (Ex. 4 : 16 ; 7: 1 ; 22 : 28. Ps. 82 : 5, 6, 7. cf . John 10 : 34-36. Heb. 
1: 6). 

But we reply that while it is true that the name is sometimes so applied, 
it is always with adjuncts and in connections, which leave no doubt of its 
figurative and secondary meaning. When the name is applied to Christ 
however, it is, on the contrary, with adjuncts and in connections which leave 
no doubt that it signifies absolute Godhead ; (Ps. 82 : 6 ; cf . 7 ; 97 : 7 ; cf . 
Heb. 1 : 6). 

Dick, Lectures on Theology, 1: 314. Liddon, Our Lord's Divinity, 
10. Annotated Paragraph Bible on Heb. 1: 6; Ps. 97: 7; John 
10: 34, 36. 

(b) Old Testament descriptions of God are applied to him ; (Matt. 3:3; 
cf . Is. 40 : 3. John 12 : 40, 41 ; cf. Is. 6 : 1. Eph. 4 : 8 ; cf . Ps. 68 : 18. 
Heb. 1:6; cf . Ps. 97 : 7. Heb. 1:8; cf . Ps. 45 : 6, 7. Heb. 1 : 10-12 ; cf . 
Ps. 102: 25. Heb. 1 : 13 ; cf. Ps. 110: 1). 

This application to Christ of titles and names exclusively appropriated to 
God, is inexplicable, if Christ was not regarded as being himself God. The 
peculiar awe with which the term Jehovah was set apart by a nation of 
strenuous monotheists, as the sacred and incommunicable name of the one 
self-existent and covenant-keeping God, forbids the belief that the jScrip- 
ture waiters could have used it as the designation of a subordinate and 
created being. 

Liddon, Our Lord's Divinity, 93. 



74 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

( c ) He possesses the attributes of God : 

(c 1 ) Holiness ; (Luke 1 : 35. John 6: 69. Heb. 7 : 26). 

(c 2 ) Love; (1 John 3: 16). 

(c 3 ) Truth; ( John 1 : 14; 14: 6. 1 John 5: 20. Eev. 3: 7). 

(c 4 ) Self-existence; (John 1: 4; 5: 26; 10: 18. Heb. 7: 16). 

(c 5 ) Immutability ; (Heb. 13 : 8). 

(c 6 ) Eternity; (John 1: 1; cf. Gen. 1: 1. John 8: 58. Col. 1: 17. Heb. 
1: 11. Eev. 1: 8, 11). 

(c 7 ) Omnipresence; (Matt. 28: 20. Eph. 1: 23). 

(c 8 ) Omniscience; (Matt. 9: 4. John 2 : 24, 25; 16: 30; 21: 17. 1 Cor. 
4:5. Col. 2:3). 

(c 9 ) Omnipotence; (John 10': 28-30. Matt. 28: 18. Eev. 1: 8). 

All these attributes are ascribed to Christ in connections which show that 
they are used in no secondary sense, nor in any sense predicable of a 
creature. 

(d) The works of God are ascribed to him. We do not here speak of 
miracles, which may be wrought by communicated power ; but of such 
works as the 

(d 1 ) Creation of the world; (John 1: 3. 1 Cor. 8: 6. Col. 1: 16. Heb. 
1: 2, 10). 

(d 2 ) Upholding all things; (Col. 1: 17. Heb. 1: 3; 2 : 10; cf. Eom. 11: 36. 
1 Cor. 8: 6). 

{d s ) Eaisingthe dead and judging the world; (Matt. 25: 31. John 5: 21, 
28, 29). 

Power to perform these works cannot be delegated. Christ's work in the 
world as Eevealer of God and Eedeemer from sin, is also to the believer, a 
proof of his divinity. "We do not here urge this argument, for the reason that 
opponents of the doctrine in question, having low views of the nature of 
that work, assume that it could have been wrought, as they believe that 
Jesus' miracles were wrought, by communicated power. 

Liddon, Our Lord's Divinity, 153. Per contra, see Examination of 
Liddon's Bampton Lectures, 72. 

(e) He receives honor and worship due only to God; (John 5 : 23; 20 : 28. 
Acts 1: 24; 7: 59; cf. Luke 23: 46. Eom. 10: 13; cf. Gen. 4: 26. 1 Cor. 
1: 2; 11: 24, 25. Heb. 1: 6-8. Eev. 5: 12-14. Phil. 2: 10, 11). 

The exclamation of Thomas (John 20: 28) cannot be interpreted as a 
sudden appeal to God in surprise and admiration, without charging the 
apostle with profanity. Nor can it be considered a mere exhibition of over- 
wrought enthusiasm, since it was accepted by Christ. As addressed directly 
to Christ, and as unrebuked by Christ, it can be regarded only as a just 
acknowledgment on the part of Thomas, that Christ was his Lord and his 
God. 

Liddon, Our Lord's Divinity, 266, 366. 

(/) His name is associated with that of God upon a footing of equality. 
We do not here allude to 1 John 5 : 7 — for this is unquestionably spurious — 
but to 

{f 1 ) The formula of baptism ; (Mat. 28: 19). 

(,/ 2 ) The apostolic benedictions; (1 Cor. 1: 3. 2 Cor. 13: 14). 



THREE RECOGNIZED AS GOD. 75 

(/ 3 ) Those passages in which eternal life is said to be dependent equally 
upon Christ and upon God; (John 17: 3. Mat. 11: 27). 

(g) Equality with God is expressly claimed. 

Here we may refer to Jesus' testimony to himself, already treated of 
among the proofs of the supernatural character of the Scripture teaching. 
Equality with God is not only claimed for himself by Jesus, but it is claimed 
for him by his apostles; (John 5: 17-20. Phil. 2: 6). 

(h) Further proofs of the deity of Christ may be found : 

(h l ) In the application to him of the phrases: 'Son of God,' 'Image of 
God'; (Mat. 26: 63, 64. Col. 1: 15. Heb. 1:3). 

(7r) In the declarations of his oneness with God; (John 10: 30; 14: 19; 
17: 11, 22). 

(h 2 ) ~bi the attribution to him of the fulness of the Godhead; (Col. 2: 9; 
cf. 1: 19. John 16: 15; 17: 10). 

These proofs of Christ's deity from Scripture are corroborated by Christian 
experience. 

Although this experience cannot be regarded as an independent witness 
to Jesus' claims, since it only tests the truth already made known in the 
Bible, still the irresistible impulse of every person whom Christ has saved, 
to lift his Redeemer to the highest place, and bow before him in the lowliest 
worship, is strong evidence that only that interpretation of Scripture 
passages can be true which recognizes Christ's absolute Godhead. 

It is the church's consciousness of her Lord's divinity, indeed, and not 
mere speculation upon the relations of Father, Son and Holy Ghost, that 
has compelled the formulation of the Scripture doctrine of the Trinity. 

In contemplating passages apparently inconsistent with those now cited, 
in that they impute weakness and ignorance to Christ, we are to remember: 

First, that our Lord was truly man as well as truly God, and that this 
ignorance or weakness may be predicated of his human nature alone ; and 

Secondly, that the divine nature itself was in some way limited and 
humbled during our Savior's earthly life, and that these passages may 
describe him as he was in his estate of humiliation, rather than in his 
original and present glory; (Mark 13: 32. John 4:6; 10: 29; 14: 28. 1 Cor. 
15: 28). 

She3d, History of Doctrine, 1: 351. Liddon, Our Lord's Divinity, 127, 
458. Per contra, see Examination of Liddon, 252, 294. 

C. The Holy Spirit is recognized as God. 

Parker, The Paraclete. Walker, Doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Hare, 
Mission of the Comforter. Cardinal Manning, Temporal Mission of 
the Holy Ghost. 

(a) He is spoken of as God ; (Acts 5 : 3, 4. 1 Cor. 6 : 19 ; cf. 3 : 16 ; 
12 : 6, 11). 

(6) The attributes of God are ascribed to him : 
. (6 1 ) Omniscience; (1 Cor. 2: 10. 1 Pet. 1: 11). 
(6 2 ) Omnipotence; (1 Cor. 12: 8-13). 



76 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

(c) He does the works of God, — such as creation, regeneration, resurrec- 
tion; (Gen. 1: 2. Mat, 12 : 28. John 3 : 6; 16 : 8. Rom. 8 : 11). 

(d) He receives honor due only to God; (1 Cor. 3 : 16. Mat. 12 : 31). 

(e) He is associated with God upon a footing of equality, both in 
(e 1 ) The formula of baptism (Mat. 28: 19); and in 

(e 2 ) The apostolic benedictions; (2 Cor. 13: 14; cf. 1 Pet. 1: 2). 

Since spirit is nothing less than the inmost principle of life, the Spirit of 
God must be himself God. Christian consciousness, moreover, expressed 
as it is in the hymns and prayers of the church, furnishes an argument for 
the deity of the Holy Spirit, similar to that for the deity of Christ. 

Passages like John 7: 39 (oviru yap Jp Uvevfia ayiov), are to be interpreted in 
the light of other Scriptures which assert the agency of the Spirit under the 
old dispensation (Ps. 51: 11), and which describe his peculiar office under 
the New; (John 16 : 14, 15). John 7: 39 simply declares that the Spirit could 
not fulfil his office as Revealer of Christ, until the atoning work of Christ 
himself should be accomplished; (John 16 : 7). 

Dick, Lectures on Theology, 1: 341-350. 

2. Intimations of the Old Testament. 

The passages which seem to show that even in the Old Testament there 
are three who are implicitly recognized as God, may be classed under four 
heads : 

A. Passages which seem to teach plurality of some sort in the Godhead. 

(a) The plural noun DTi 1 ?*? is employed, and that with a plural verb — a 
use remarkable, when we consider that the singular hx was also in existence; 
(Gen. 20: 13; 35: 7). 

(b) God uses plural pronouns in speaking of himself; (Gen. 1: 26; 3 : 22; 
11: 7. Is. 6 : 8). 

(c) Jehovah distinguishes himself from Jehovah; (Gen. 19: 24. Hos. 1: 7). 

(d) A Son is ascribed to Jehovah; (Ps. 2: 7. Prov. 30: 4. Dan. 3: 25). 

(e) The Spirit of God is distinguished from God; (Gen. 1: 1, 2. Ps. 
33: 6. Is. 48: 16; 63: 1-10). 

(/) We have a threefold ascription and a threefold benediction; (Is. 6: 3. 
Num. 6 : 24r-26). 

The fact that D'ribx is sometimes used in a narrower sense as applicable 
to the Son (Ps. 45: 6 ; cf. Heb. 1: 8), need not prevent us from believing 
that the term was originally chosen as containing an allusion to a certain 
plurality in the divine nature. Nor is it sufficient to call this plural a simple 
'pluralis majestaticus; ' since it is easier to derive this common figure from 
divine usage, than to derive the divine usage from this common figure — 
especially when we consider the constant tendency of Israel to polytheism. 

Conant, Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, 198. Green, Hebrew Grammar, 
306. Girdlestone, O. T. Synonyms, 38, 53. Alexander on Psalm 11 : 7 ; 
29: 1; 58: 12. But see Ps. 45 : 6, 7; cf. Heb. 1: 8. 



THREE RECOGNIZED AS GOD. 7? 

B. Passages relating to the Angel of Jehovah. 

(a) The angel of Jehovah identities himself with Jehovah ; (Gen. 22: 11, 
16; 31:11-13). 

(b) He is identified with Jehovah by others ; (Gen. 16: 9, 13 ; 48: 16). 

(c) He accepts worship due only to God ; (Ex. 3 : 1-6. Judges 13 : 
21-23). 

Though the phrase ' angel of Jehovah ' is sometimes used in the later Scrip- 
tures to denote a merely human messenger or created angel (Haggai 1 : 13. 
Matt. 1 : 20. Acts 8 : 26 ; 12 : 7), it seems in the Old Testament, with hardly 
more than the single exception just mentioned (Haggai 1 : 13), to designate 
the preincarnate Logos, whose manifestations in angelic or human form 
foreshadowed his final coming in the flesh ; (Gen. 18 : 2, 13. Dan. 3 : 25, 28). 
Hengstenberg, Christology, 1 : 107-123. J. Pye Smith, Scripture Tes- 
timony to the Messiah. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, 1 : 329, 378. Kurtz, 
History of Old Covenant, 1 : 181. 

C. The descriptions of the divine Wisdom and "Word. 

(a) Wisdom is represented as distinct from God, and as eternally exist- 
ing with God ; (Prov. 8 : 1 ; cf. Matt. 11 : 19 ; Luke 11 : 49. Prov. 8 : 22, 
30 ; cf. 3 : 19). 

(6) The Word of God is distinguished from God, as executor of his will 
from everlasting; (Ps. 107 : 20; 119: 89 ; cf. Prov. 8: 23. Ps. 147: 15-18). 

It must be acknowledged that hi none of these descriptions is the idea of 
personality clearly developed. Still less is it true that John the apostle 
derived his doctrine of the Logos from the interpretations of these descrip- 
tions, in Philo Judaeus. John's doctrine (John 1 : 1-18) is radically differ- 
ent from the Alexandrian Logos-idea of Philo. 

This last is a Platonizing speculation upon the mediating principle 
between God and the world. Philo seems, indeed, at times, to verge 
towards a recognition of personality in the Logos. But John is the first 
to present to us a consistent view of this personality, to identify the Logos 
with the Messiah, and to distinguish the Word from the Spirit of God. 

Dorner, Hist. Doct. Person of Christ, 1 : 13-45. Cudworth, Intellec- 
tual System, 2 : 320-333. Pressense, Life of Jesus Christ, 83. Hagen- 
bach, Hist. Doct., 1 : 114-117. Liddon, Our Lord's Divinity, 59-71. 

D. Descriptions of the Messiah. 

(a) He is one with Jehovah ; (Is. 9 : 6. Micah 5 : 2). 

(b) Yet he is in some sense distinct from Jehovah ; (Ps. 45 : 6, 7. Mai. 
3: 1). 

It is to be remembered in considering this, as well as other classes of pas- 
sages previously cited, that no Jewish writer before Christ's coming had 
succeeded in constructing from them a doctrine of the Trinity. Only to 
those who bring to them the light of New Testament revelation, do they 
show their real meaning. 

Our general conclusion with regard to the Old Testament intimations 
must therefore be, that while they do not by themselves furnish a sufficient 
basis for the doctrine of the Trinity, they contain the germ of it, and may 
be used in confirmation of it, when its truth is substantially proved from 
the New Testament. 



78 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

II. These Three are so described in Scripture that we are com- 
pelled to conceive of them as distinct Persons. 

1. The Father and the Son are persons distinct from each other. 

(a) Christ distinguishes the Father from himself as ' another ;' (John 5 : 
32, 37). 

(b) The Father and the Son are distinguished as the begetter and the 
begotten ; (Ps. 2 : 7. John 1 : 14, 18 ; 3 : 16). 

(c) The Father and the Son are distinguished as the sender and the sent ; 
(John 10 : 36. Gal. 4 : 4). 

2. The Father and the Son are persons distinct from the Spirit. 

(a) Jesus distinguishes the Spirit from himself and from the Father ; 
(John 14 : 16, 17). 

(6) The Spirit proceeds from the Father ; (John 15 : 26). 

(c) The Spirit is sent by the Father and by the Son ; (John 14 : 26 ; 15: 26). 

3. The Holy Spirit is a person. 

A. Designations proper to personality are given to him : 

(a) The masculine pronoun enelvoc, though Uvevjua is neuter ; (John 16 : 14). 

(b) The name napd/owy-o^, which cannot be translated by 'comfort,' or 
be taken as the name of any abstract influence ; (John 16 : 7, ' The Com- 
forter.') 

The Comforter, Instructor, Patron, Guide, Advocate, whom this term 
brings before us, must be a person. This is evident from its application to 
Christ in 1 John 2: 1 ; ('we have an advocate — Hapa.K?^rov — with the Father, 
even Jesus Christ the righteous'). 

B. His name is mentioned in immediate connection with other persons 
and in such a way as to imply his own personality : 

(a) In connection with Christians; (Acts 15: 28). 

(6) In connection with Christ; (John 16: 14; cf. 17: 4). 

(c) In connection with the Father and the Son; (Matt. 28: 19. 2 Cor. 13, 
14. Jude20, 21. 1 Pet. 1: 2). 

These passages make it plain that if the Father and the Son are persons, 
the Spirit must be a person also. 

C. He performs acts proper only to personality ; (Gen. 1 : 2 ; 6 : 3. Luke 
12: 12. John 3: 5; 16: 8-13. Acts 2: 4; 8: 29; 10- 19; 13: 2; 16: 7. Eom. 8: 
26; 15: 19. 1 Cor. 2: 11 ; 12 : 8. 2 Pet. 1 : 21). 

That which searches, knows, speaks, testifies, reveals, convinces, com- 
mands, strives, moves, helps, guides, creates, recreates, sanctifies, inspires, 
makes intercession, orders the affairs of the church, performs miracles, 
raises the dead — cannot be a mere power, influence, efflux, or attribute of 
God, but must be a person. 

D. He is affected as a person by the acts of others ; (Is. 63 : 10. Matt. 
12 : 31. Acts 5:4; 7 : 51. Eph. 4 : 30). 

That which can be thus resisted, grieved, vexed, blasphemed, must be a 
person ; for only a person can perceive insult and be offended. 

The blasphemy against the Holy Ghost cannot be merely blasphemy 
against a power or attribute of God, — since in that case blasphemy against 
God would be a less crime than blasphemy against his power. That against 
which the unpardonable sin can be committed must be a person. 



THIS TRIPERSONALITY IMMANENT AND ETERNAL. 7i> 

E. He manifests himself in visible form as distinct from the Father and 
the Son, yet in direct connection with personal acts performed by them ; 
(Matt. 3: 16, 17 — 'descending as a dove'). 

F. This ascription to the Spirit, of a personal subsistence distinct from 
that of the Father and of the Son cannot be explained as personification ; for : 

(a) This would be to interpret sober prose by the canons of poetry. 
Such sustained personification is contrary to the genius of even Hebrew 
poetry, .in which Wisdom itself is most naturally interpreted as designating 
a personal existence. 

(6) Such an interpretation would render a multitude of passages either 
tautological, meaningless, or absurd, — as can be easily seen by substituting 
for the name Holy Ghost, the terms which are wrongly held to be its equiv- 
alents — such as the power, or influence, or efflux, or attribute of God ; (Acts 
10 : 38. Eom. 15 : 13, 19. 1 Cor. 2 : 4). 

III. This Tripersonality of the Divine Natuee is not merely. 

ECONOMIC AND TEMPORAL, BUT IS IMMANENT AND ETERNAL. 

1. Scripture proof that these distinctions of personality are eternal, 
(a) From those passages which speak of the existence of the Word from 

eternity with the Father; (John 1: 1, 2; cf. Phil. 2:6; Gen. 1: 1). 

(6) From Christ's own declarations of his preexistence; (John 8 : 56). 

(c) From passages implying intercourse between the Father and the 
Son before the foundation of the world; (John 17: 5, 24). 

(d) From passages asserting the creation of the world by Christ; (John 
1:3. 1 Cor. 8:6. Col. 1: 16, 17. Heb. 1: 2-10). 

(e) From passages asserting or implying the eternity of the Holy Spirit; 
(Gen. 1: 2. Ps. 33: 6. Heb. 9: 14). 

2. Errors refuted by the foregoing passages. 
A. The Sabellian. 

Sabellius (of Ptolemais in Pentapolis, 250-260) held that Father, Son, and 
Holy Ghost are mere developments or revelations to creatures, in time, of 
the otherwise concealed Godhead — developments which, since creatures 
will always exist, are not transitory, but which at the same time are not 
eternal a parte ante. 

God as united to the creation is Father; God as united to Jesus Christ is 
Son; God as united to the church is Holy Spirit. The Trinity of Sabellius 
is therefore an economic and not an immanent Trinity — a Trinity of forms 
or manifestations, but not a necessary and eternal Trinity in the divine 
nature. 

Moses Stuart, Translation of Schleiermacher's Interpretation of Sabel- 
lius, in Bib. Eepository, 6 : 1-116. Similar doctrine in Bushnell, God 
in Christ, and Christ in Theology. 

Some have interpreted Sabellius as denying that the Trinity is eternal a 
parte post as well as a parte ante, and as holding that when the purpose of 
these temporary manifestations is accomplished the Triad is resolved into 



80 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

the Monad. This view easily merges in another, which makes the persons 

of the Trinity mere names for the ever-shifting phases of the divine activity. 

Shedd, History of Doctrine, 1: 259. Dorner, History Doct. Person of 

Christ, 2 : 152-169. Baur, Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit, 1 : 256-305. 

Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1: 83. 

It is evident that this theory, in whatever form it may be held, is far from 
satisfying the demands of Scripture. That speaks of the second person of 
the Trinity as existing and acting before the birth of Jesus Christ, and of 
the Holy Sioiiit as existing and acting before the formation of the church. 
Both have a personal existence eternal in the past, as well as in the future, 
— which this theory expressly denies. 

B. The Arian. 

Alius (of Alexandria; condemned by council of Mce, 325) held that the 
Father is the only divine being absolutely without beginning; the Son and 
the Holy Spirit, through whom God creates and recreates, having been 
themselves created out of nothing before the world was; and Christ being 
called God, because he is next in rank to God, and is endowed by God with 
divine power to create. 

Blunt, Dictionary of Heretical Sects, Art. Alius. Guericke, History 
of Doctrine, 1: 313, 319. 

The followers of Alius have differed as to the precise rank and claims of 
Christ. "While Socinus held with Alius that worship of Christ was obliga- 
tory, the later Unitarians have perceived the impropriety of worshipping 
even the highest of created beings, and have constantly tended to a view of 
the Redeemer which regards him as a mere man, standing in a peculiarly 
intimate relation to God. 

It is evident that the theory of Alius does not satisfy the demands of 
Scripture. A created God, a God whose existence had a beginning and 
therefore may come to an end, a God made of a substance which once was 
not, and therefore a substance different from that of the Father, is not God 
but a finite creature. But the Scriptures speak of Christ as being in the 
beginning God, with God, and equal with God. 

IV. This Tripersonaxtty is not Tritheism; foe while there are 
three Hypo static An Distinctions, or Modes of Subsisting, there is but 
one Essence common to them all. 

1. The term ' person ' only aiDproximately represents the truth. Although 
this word, more nearly than any other single word, expresses the concep- 
tion which the Scriptures give us of the relation between the Father, the 
Son and the Holy Spirit, it is not itself used in this connection in Scripture, 
and we employ it in a qualified sense, not in the ordinary sense in which we 
apply the term 'person' to Peter, Paul, and John. The necessary quali- 
fication is, that : 

2. While three persons among men have only a specific unity of nature 
or essence (that is, have the same species of nature or essence), the persons 
of the Godhead have a numerical unity of nature or essence (that is, have 



EQUALITY OF THE PERSONS OF THE TRINITY. 81 

the same nature or essence). The undivided essence of the Godhead 
belongs equally to each of the persons, — Father, Son, and Holy Ghost each 
and alike possesses all the substance and all the attributes of deity. 

The plurality of the Godhead, therefore, is not a plurality of essence, but 
a plurality of hypostatical or personal distinctions. God is not three and 
one, but three in one. The one indivisible essence has three modes of 
subsistence. This oneness of essence explains the fact that, 

3. While Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct subsistences, as 
respects their personality, there is an intercommunion of persons and an 
immanence of one divine person in another, which permits the peculiar 
work of one to be ascribed, with a single limitation, to either of the others, 
and the manifestation of one to be recognized in the manifestation of 
another. 

The limitation is simply this, that although the Son is sent by the Father, 
and the Spirit by the Father and the Son, it cannot be said vice versa that 
the Father is sent either by the Son or by the Spirit. The Scripture repre- 
sentations of this intercommunion prevent us from conceiving of the 
distinctions called Father, Son and Holy Spirit, as involving separation 
between them; (Gen. 1: 1, 2; cf. Heb. 1: 2. John 1: 18; 5: 17, 19; 10: 28- 
30; 14: 9, 18, 26; 17: 21. 2 Cor. 5: 19. Titus 2 : 10. Jude 1. Heb. 
12: 23; cf. John 5 : 22. 1 Cor. 8: 6. Eph. 4: 6). 

Hagenbach, on the Athanasian creed, so-called, Hist. Doct. 1: 270. 

V. The names Fathee, £?on, and Holy Ghost, as designating not 
the Essence but the eternal Distinctions of the Godhead, are used 
in a special sense, from which all notion of inequality between 
the Persons of the Trinity is excluded. 

In explanation notice that : 

1. These titles belong to the Persons. 

A. The Father is not God as such; for God is not only Father but also 
Son and Holy Ghost. The term 'Father' designates that hypostatical 
distinction in the divine nature, in virtue of which God is related to the Son, 
and through the Son and the Spirit to the church and the world. 

As author of the believer's spiritual as well as natural life, God is doubly 
his Father; but this relation which God sustains to creatures is not the 
ground of his title. God is Father primarily in virtue of the relation which 
he sustains to the eternal Son; — only as we are spiritually united to Jesus 
Christ do we become children of God; (Gal. 3 : 26; 4 : 4-6). 

B. The Son is not God as such; for God is not only Son, but Father 
and Holy Spirit. ' The Son ' designates that distinction in virtue of which 
God is related to the Father, is sent by the Father to redeem the world, and 
with the Father sends the Holy Spirit. 

C. The Holy Spirit is not God as such ; for God is not only Holy Spirit, 
but also Father and Son. ' The Holy Spirit ' designates that distinction in 
virtue of which God is related to the Father and the Son, and is sent by 
them to accomplish the work of renewing the ungodly and of sanctifying 
the church. 

6 



82 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

2. Qualified sense of these titles. 

Like the word 'person', the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not 
to be confined within the precise limitations of meaning which wonld be 
required if they were applied to men. 

The Scriptures enlarge our conceptions of Christ's sonship by giving to 
him in Ms preexistent state the titles of the 'Logos' (Adyot = thought + word ; 
or divine reason + divine expression, John 1 : 1), and of the 'Image' and 
'Brightness' of God; (ek6w=copy, Col. 1: 15; dTrai^aa^a^naslimg-forth'; 
xapanTTjp TTjq vTvoardaecoc avrov =' counterpart of his essence ; ' Heb. 1:3). 

While the Logos as divine reason is one with God, the Logos as divine 
expression is distinguishable from God. Words are the means by which 
personal beings express or reveal themselves. Since Jesus Christ was ' the 
Word ' before there were any creatures to whom revelations could be made, 
it would seem to be only a necessary inference from this title, that in Christ, 
God must be from eternity expressed or revealed to himself. 

As the radiance of the sun manifests the sun's nature, which, otherwise 
would be unrevealed, yet is inseparable from the sun and ever one with it, 
so Christ reveals God but is eternally one with God; (Heb. 1: 2). 

In the Holy Spirit the movement is completed, and the divine activity 
and thought returns into itself. True religion in reuniting us to God, repro- 
duces in us, in our limited measure, this eternal process of the divine mind. 
Christian experience witnesses that God in himself is unknown; (John 1 : 18). 
Christ is the organ of external revelation; (eluav rov Qsov rov aoparov, Col. 1: 
15). But only the Holy Spirit can give us an inward apprehension or 
realization of the truth. It is 'through the eternal Spirit' (Heb. 9: 14) that 
Christ ' offered himself to God, ' and it is only through the Holy Spirit that 
the church has access to the Father (Eph. 2: 18. Eom. 8: 26), or fallen 
creatures return to God; (John 4: 24; 16: 8-11). 

Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1 : 173. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 
1: 111. 

3. Generation and procession consistent with equality. 

The Scripture terms ' generation' and ' procession', as applied to the Son and 
to the Holy Spirit, are to be interpreted in accordance with the principle 
already intimated. They are but approximate expressions of the truth, and 
we are to correct by other declarations of Scripture, any imperfect impres- 
sions we might derive solely from them. 

We use these terms, therefore, in a special sense, which we explicitly 
state and define as excluding all notion of inequality between the persons 
of the Trinity. The generation to which we hold is 

A. Not creation, but the Father's communication of himself to the Son. 
Since the names Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not applicable to the 
divine essence, but are only applicable to its hypostatical distinctions, they 
imply no derivation of the essence of the Son from the essence of the 
Father. 

B. Not a commencement of existence, but an eternal relation to the 
Father, — there never having been a time when the Son began to be, or when 
the Son did not exist as God with the Father. 



EQUALITY OF THE PERSON'S OF THE TRINITY. 83 

C. Not an act of the Father's will, but an internal necessity of the divine 
nature, — so that the Son is no more dependent upon the Father than the 
Father is dependent upon the Son. If it be consistent with deity to be 
Father, it is equally consistent with deity to be Son. 

Versus Thoinasius, Christi Person and Werk, 1 : 115. 

D. Not a relation in any way analogous to physical derivation, but a life- 
movement of the divine nature, in virtue of which Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit, while equal in essence and dignity, stand to each other in an order 
of personality, office and operation, and in virtue of which the Father works 
through the Son, and the Father and the Son through the Spirit. 

Eternal sonslnp is intimated in Ps. 2 : 7. Here ' this day have I begotten 
thee ' is most naturally interpreted as the declaration of an eternal fact in 
the divine nature ; (see Alexander, Psalms, in loco ; also., Com. on Acts, 
13: 33: " 'To-day' refers to the date of the decree itself; but this, as a 
divine act, was eternal, — and so must be the Sonship which it affirms." 

Neither the incarnation (Heb. 1: 5, 6), the baptism (Matt. 3: 17), the 
transfiguration (Mat. 17: 5), or the resurrection (Acts 13: 33, 34), mark the 
beginning of Christ's sonship or constitute him Son of God. These are 
but recognitions or manifestations of a preexisting Sonship inseparable 
from his Godhood. Proof-texts for this eternal generation are Rom. 1 : 4 
(opio$evToc= ' manifested to be the mighty Son of God ' Kara Tivevfia dytaovvqs 
= ' according to his divine nature'; .see Philippi and Alford); and Col. 1: 15 
(-pojroTOKoc Tzdcr/c hiTtceG)£=' begotten first before all creation,' Julius Muller, 
Proof -texts, 14; 'bom before every creature, while yet no created thing 
existed,' Meyer, Com. in loco; 'first born before every creature, i. e. be- 
gotten, and that antecedently to everything that was created,' Ellicott, in 
loco). 

This sonship is unique, — not predicable of, or shared with any creature; 
(John 1: 14, 18; Rom. 8: 32; Gal. 4: 4; cf. Prov. 8: 22-31; 30: 4). 

Weisz, Lehrbuch der Bib. Theol. N. T., 424, note. Luthardt, Com- 
pendium der Dogmatik, 81. Watson, Institutes, 1: 530-577. Bib. Sac, 
27: 268. 
The same principles upon Avhich we interpret the declaration of Christ's 
eternal sonship, apply to the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father 
and the Son, and show this to be not inconsistent with the Spirit's equal 
dignity and glory; (John 14 : 26; 15 : 26). 

Shedd, History of Doctrine, 1: 317. Dick, Lectures on Theology, 
1: 347-350. 
We therefore only formulate truth which is concretely expressed hi 
Scripture, and which is recognized by all ages of the church in hymns and 
prayers addressed to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, when we assert that in 
the nature of the one God there are three eternal distinctions, which are 
best described as persons, and each of which is the proper and equal object 
of Christian worship. 

We are alike warranted in declaring that, in virtue of these personal 
distinctioDs or modes of subsistence, God exists in the relations respectively, 
— first, of Source, Origin, Authority; secondly, of Expression, Medium, 
Revelation; thirdly, of Apprehension, Accomplishment, Realization. 



84 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

VI. While the Mode of this Triune Existence is unrevealed and 
inscrutable, the doctrine of the trinity contains no element of 
self-contradiction, but on the other hand is vitally connected with, 
and furnishes a princdple of union between, all the other doctrines 
of the Christian scheme. 

1. The mode of this triune existence is inscrutable. 
It is inscrutable because there are no analogies to it in our finite experi- 
ence. For this reason all attempts are vain adequately to illustrate it : 

A. From inanimate tilings ; as 

(a) The fountain, the stream, and the rivulet trickling from it (Athan- 
asius) ; 

(6) The cloud, the rain, and the rising mist (Boardman) ; 

(c) Color, shape, and size (F. W. Robertson) ; 

(d) The actinic, luminif erous, and calorific principles in the ray of light; 
(Solar Hieroglyphics, 34). 

B. From the constitution or processes of our own minds; as 

(a) The psychological unity of intellect, affection, and will (substantially 
held by Augustine); 

(6) The logical unity of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis (Hegel) ; 
(c) The metaphysical unity of subject, object, and subject-object (Me- 
lanchthon, Olshausen, Shedd). 

Shedd, History of Doctrine, 1: 365, note 2. Olshausen on John 1 : 1. 
Boardman, Higher Life. F. W. Robertson, Sermons, 3 : 58. 

Neither of these furnishes any proper analogue of the Trinity, since in 
neither of them is there found the essential element of tripersonality. Such 
illustrations may sometimes be used to disarm objection, but they furnish 
no positive explanation of the mystery of the Trinity, and unless carefully 
guarded, may lead to grievous error. 

2. The doctrine of the Trinity is not self-contradictory. 

This it would be only if it declared God to be three in the same numerical 
sense in which he is said to be one. This we do not assert. We assert 
simply that the same God who is one with respect to his essence, is three 
with respect to the internal distinctions of that essence, or with respect to the 
modes of his being. The possibility of this cannot be denied, except by 
assuming that the human mind is in all respects the measure of the divine. 

3. The doctrine of the Trinity has important relations to other doc- 
trines. 

A. It is essential to any proper theism. 

Neither God's independence nor God's blessedness can be maintained 
upon grounds of absolute unity. Anti-trinitarianism almost necessarily 
makes creation indispensable to God's perfection, tends to a belief in the 
eternity of matter, and ultimately leads, as in Mohammedanism and in 
modern Judaism and Unitarianism, to pantheism. 

For pantheistic view, see Strauss, Glaubenslehre, 1 : 462-524. Twesten, 
translated in Bib. Sac. 3 : 502. Thomasius, Christi Person mid Werk, 
1:105, 156. 



RELATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. 85 

B. It is essential to any proper revelation. 

If there be no Trinity, Christ is not God, and cannot perfectly know or 
reveal God. Christianity is no longer the one, all-inclusive, and final 
revelation, but only one of many conflicting and competing systems, each 
of which has its portion of truth, but also its portion of error. 

So too with the Holy Spirit. "As God can be revealed only through 
God, so also can he be appropriated only through God. If the Holy Spirit 
be not God, then the love and self -communication of God to the human 
soul are not a reality." 

In other words, without the doctrine of the Trinity we go back to mere 
natural religion and the far-off God of deism — and this is ultimately 
exchanged for pantheism in the way already mentioned. 

Martensen, Dogmatics, 104. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 
1: 156. 

C. It is essential to any proper redemption. 

If God be absolutely and simply one, there can be no mediation or atone- 
ment, since between God and the most exalted creature the gulf is infinite. 
Only one who is God can reconcile us to God. So too, only one who is God 
can purify our souls. A God who is only unity, but in whom is no plurality, 
may be our Judge, but so far as we can see, cannot be our Savior or our 
Sanctifier. 

Twesten, translated in Bib. Sac. 3: 510. 



CHAPTEE III. 

THE DECREES OF GOD. 

I. Definition of Decrees. 

By the decrees of God we mean that eternal plan by which God has 
rendered certain all the events of the universe, past, present and future. 
Notice in explanation, that 

1. The decrees are many only to our finite comprehension; in their own 
nature they are but one plan which embraces not only the ends to be 
secured but also the means needful to secure them. 

Hodge, Outlines of Theology, 165. 

2. The decrees, as the eternal act of an infinitely perfect will, though 
they have logical relation to each other, have no chronological relation. 
They are not therefore the result of deliberation, in any sense that implies 
short-sightedness or hesitancy. 

3. Since the will in which the decrees have their origin is a free will, the 
decrees are not to be regarded as a merely instinctive or necessary exercise 
of the divine intelligence or volition. 

Dick, Lectures on Theology, 1 : 355 ; lee. 34. 

4. The decrees are an internal exercise and manifestation of the divine 
attributes, and therefore are not to be confounded with that execution of 
the decrees which we call Creation, Providence, and Kedemption. 

5. The decrees are therefore not addressed to creatures ; are not of the 
nature of statute law ; and lay neither compulsion nor obligation upon the 
wills of men. 

II. Proof of the doctrine of Decrees. 

1. From, Scripture. 

A. All things are included in the divine decrees ; (Is. 14 : 26 ; 46 : 10, 11. 
Dan. 4 : 34, 35. Eph. 1 : 11). 

B. Special things and events are decreed: 

(a) The stability of the physical universe ; (Ps. 119 : 91). 

(6) The outward circumstances of nations ; (Acts 17 : 26). 

(c) The saving work of Christ ; (Eph. 3: 11. 1 Pet. 1 : 19, 20). 

(d) The length of human life ; (Job. 14 : 5). 

(e) The mode of our death ; (John 21 : 19). 
(/) The free acts of men : 

(Z 1 ) Good acts ; (Is. 44 : 28. Eph. 2 : 10). 

(/ 2 ) Evil acts ; (Gen. 50 : 20. Luke 22 : 22. Acts 2 : 23 ; 4 : 27, 28. Rom. 
9 : 17. Rev. 17 : 17). 



PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE OF DECREES. 87 

2. From Reason. 

A. From the divine omniscience. 

(a) From eternity God foresaw all the events of the universe as fixed and 
certain. This fixity and certainty could not have had its ground either in 
blind fate or in the variable wills of men, since neither of these had an 
existence. It could have had its ground in nothing outside of the divine 
mind, for in eternity nothing existed besides the divine mind. 

But for this fixity there must have been a cause, — if anything in the future 
was fixed, something must have fixed it. This fixity could have had its 
ground only in the plan and purpose of God. 

In fine, if God foresaw the future as certain, it must have been because 
there was something in himself which made it certain, — or in other words, 
because he had decreed it. 

To meet the objection that God might have foreseen the events of the 
universe, not because he had decreed each one, but only because he had 
decreed to create the universe and institute its laws, we may put the argu- 
ment in another form : 

(6) In eternity there could have been no cause of the future exist- 
ence of the universe, outside of God himself, since no being existed but 
God himself. In eternity God foresaw that the creation of the world 
and the institution of its laws would make certain its actual history even 
to the most insignificant details. 

But God decreed to create and to institute these laws. In so decreeing, 
he necessarily decreed all that was to come. In fine, God foresaw the 
future events of the universe as certain because he had decreed to create ; 
but this determination to create involved also a determination of all the 
actual results of that creation, — or in other words, God decreed those 
results. 

Hill, Divinity, 512-532. For Arminian view, see Watson, Institutes, 
2:422-448. 

There is therefore no such thing in God as scientia media, or knowledge 
of an event that is to be, though it does not enter into the divine plan ; for 
to say that God foresees an undecreed event, is to say that he views as 
future an event that is merely possible, — or in other words, that he views 
an event not as it is. 

God therefore foresees creation, causes, laws, events, consequences, only 
because he has decreed creation, causes, laws, events, consequences. 

Hill, Divinity, 528. Watson, Institutes, 1: 375-398. 

B. From the divine wisdom. 

It is the part of wisdom to proceed in every undertaking according to a 
plan. The greater the undertaking, the more needful a plan. 

Wisdom, moreover, shows itself in a careful provision for all possible cir- 
cumstances and emergencies that can arise in the execution of its plan. 
That many such circumstances and emergencies are uncontemplated and 
unprovided for in the plans of men, is due only to the limitations of human 
wisdom. 



88 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

It belongs to infinite wisdom, therefore, not only to have a plan, but . t<5 
embrace all, even the minutest details, hi the plan of the universe. 

C. From the divine immutability. 

"What God does, he always purposed to do. Since with him there is no 
increase of knowledge or power, such as characterizes finite beings, it fol- 
lows that what under any given circumstances he permits or does, he must 
have eternally decreed to permit or do. 

To suppose that God has a multitude of plans, and that he changes his 
plan with the exigencies of the situation, is to make him infinitely depend- 
ent upon the varying wills of his creatures, and to deny to him one neces- 
sary element of perfection, namely, immutability ; (James 1 : 17). 

D. From the divine benevolence. 

The events of the universe, if not determined by the divine decrees, must 
be determined either by chance or by the wills of creatures. 

It is contrary to any proper conception of the divine benevolence to sup- 
pose that God permits the course of nature and of history, and the ends to 
which both these are moving, to be determined for myriads of sentient 
beings by any other force or will than his own. 

Both reason and revelation, therefore, compel us to accept the doctrine of 
the Westminster Confession, that ' ' God did from all eternity, by the most 
just and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain what- 
soever comes to pass." 

Emmons, Works, 4: 273-401. 

III. Objections to the doctrine of Decrees. 

1. That they are inconsistent with the free agency of man. 
To this we reply that: 

A. The objection confounds the decrees with the execution of the 
decrees. 

The decrees are, like foreknowledge, an act internal to the divine nature, 
and are no more inconsistent with free agency than foreknowledge is. 

Even foreknowledge of events implies that those events are fixed. If this 
absolute fixity and foreknowledge is not inconsistent with free agency, 
much less can that which is more remote from man's action, namely, the 
hidden cause of this fixity and foreknowledge — God's decrees — be incon- 
sistent with free agency. 

If anything be inconsistent with man's free agency, it must be not the 
decrees themselves, but the execution of the decrees in creation and provi- 
dence. 

B. The objection rests upon a false theory of free agency, — namely, that 
free agency consists in indeterminateness or uncertainty ; in other words, in 
the power of the will to decide, in any given case, against its own charac- 
ter and all the motives brought to bear upon it. 

Free agency, on the contrary, is simply the power of the agent to act out 
his character in the circumstances which environ him, — and since this char- 
acter and these cu-curnstances are not beyond the influence of God, it fol- 
lows that a decree fixing the event is not inconsistent with free agency. If 



OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTR1XE OF DECREES. 89 

man, influenced by man, may still be free, then man, influenced by divinely 
appointed circumstances, may still be free. 

It may aid us, in estimating the force of this objection, to note the four 
senses in which the term freedom may be used. It may be used as equiv- 
alent to: 

(a) An absence of outward constraint ; 

(6) A state of moral indeterminateness ; 

(c) Power to manifest character in action ; 

(d) Ability to conform to the divine standard. 

With the first of these we are not now concerned, since all agree that the 
decrees lay no constraint upon men. Freedom in the second sense has no 
existence, since all men have character. Free agency, or freedom in the 
third sense, has just been shown to be consistent with the decrees. Free- 
dom in the fourth sense, or true moral freedom, is the special gift of God, 
and is not to be confounded with free agency. 

The objection mentioned rests wholly upon a false definition of free 
agency, and with this falls to the ground. 

Alexander, Moral Science, 107. Hodge, Systematic Theology, 2: 278. 

Calderwood, Moral Philosophy, 253, 258. Edwards, Tappan, Whedon, 

Hazard, on the Will. Bib. Sac, 4: 77 ; 19 : 400. 

C. The objection ignores the logical relation between the decree of the 
end and the decree of the means to secure it. 

The decrees of God not only ensure human action, but they ensure free 
agency as logically prior thereto. All conflict between them must therefore 
be apparent and not real. 

Since consciousness and Scripture assure us that free agency exists, it 
must exist by divine decree, and though we may be ignorant of the method 
in which the decrees are executed, we have no right to doubt either the 
decrees or the freedom. They must be held to be consistent, until one of 
them is proved to be a delusion. 

D. The objection confounds the decrees of God with fate. 
But it is to be observed that: 

(a) Fate is uirintelHgent, — while the decrees of God are framed in 
infinite wisdom. 

(6) Fate is indistinguishable from material causation and leaves no 
room for human freedom, — while the decrees of God exclude all notion of 
physical necessity. 

(c) Fate embraces no moral ideas or ends, — while the decrees of God 
make these controlling in the imiverse. 

2. TJiat they take aivay all motive for human exertion. 

To this we reply that: 

A. They cannot thus influence men, since they are not addressed to 
men, are not the rule of human action, and become known only after the 
event. This objection is therefore the mere excuse of indolence. 

B. Since the decrees connect means and ends together, and ends are 
decreed only as the result of means, they encourage effort instead of dis- 
couraging it. 



90 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

Belief in God's plan that success shall reward toil, incites to courageous 
and persevering effort. Upon the very ground of God's decree, the Scrip- 
ture urges us to the diligent use of means ; (Acts 27: 24, 31. Phil. 2: 12, 13. 
Eph. 2: 10. Deut. 29: 29). 

3. That they make God the author of sin. 
To this we reply that: 

A. They make God, not the author of sin, but the author of free beings 
who are themselves the authors of sin. 

God does not decree efficiently to work evil desires or choices in men. 
He decrees sin only in the sense of decreeing to create and preserve those 
who will sin, — in other words, he decrees to create and preserve human 
wills which, in their own self-chosen courses, will be and do evil. 

In all this, man attributes sin to himself and not to God, and God hates, 
denounces, and punishes sin. 

B. The decree to permit sin, is therefore a permissive decree, or a 
decree to permit, in distinction from a decree to produce by his own effi- 
ciency. 

No difficulty attaches to such a decree to permit sin, which does not 
attach to the actual permission of it. But God does actually permit sin 
and it must be right for him to permit it. It must therefore be right for 
him to decree to permit it. 

If God's holiness and wisdom and power are not impugned by the actual 
existence of moral evil, they are not impugned by the original decree that 
it should exist. 

O. The difficulty is therefore one which in substance clings to all theistic 
systems alike — the question why moral evil is permitted under the govern- 
ment of a God infinitely holy, wise, powerful, and good. 

This problem is, to our finite powers, incapable of full solution, and must 
remain to a great degree shrouded in mystery. With regard to it we can 
only say: 

(a) Negatively, — that God does not permit moral evil 
(a 1 ) Because he is not unalterably opposed to sin; nor 

(a 2 ) Because moral evil was unforeseen and independent of his will ; nor 
(a 3 ) Because he could not have prevented it in a moral system. 
Both observation and experience, which testify to multiplied instances 
of deliverance from sin without violation of the laws of man's being, forbid 
us so to limit the power of God. 

Birks, Difficulties of Belief, 17. Young, The Mystery, or Evil not 
from God. Bledsoe, Theodicy. 

(b) Positively, — we seem constrained to say that God permits moral evil 
(b 1 ) Because moral evil, though in itself abhorrent to his nature, is yet 

the incident of a system adapted to his purpose of self -revelation ; and 
further, 

(6 2 ) Because it is his wise and sovereign will to institute and maintain 
this system of which moral evil is an incident, rather than to withold his 



CONCLUDING REMARKS UPON DECREES. 91 

self -revelation or to reveal himself through another system in which moral 
evil should be continually prevented by the exercise of divine power. 

Edwards, 2: 515. Hill, System of Divinity, 528-559. Butler, Analogy, 
on the Government of God and Christianity, as schemes imperfectly 
comprehended; Bonn's Ed., 177, 232. Dr. John Brown, on Arthur H. 
Hallam's Theodicsea Novissima, in Spare Hours, 273. Bib. Sac, 20: 
471-488. 

IV. Concluding Remaeks. 

1. Practical uses of the doctrine of decrees. 

A. It inspires hiunility by its representation of God's unsearchable 
counsels and absolute sovereignty. 

B. It teaches confidence in him who has wisely ordered our birth, our 
death and our surroundings even to the minutest particulars, and has made 
all things work together for the triumph of his kingdom and the good of 
those who love him. 

C. It shows the enemies of God, that as their sins have been foreseen 
and provided for in God's plan, so they can never, while remaining in their 
sins, hope to escape their decreed and threatened penalty. 

D. It urges the sinner to avail himself of the appointed means of grace, 
if he would be counted among the number of those for whom God has 
decreed salvation. 

2. True method of preaching the doctrine. 

A. We should most carefully avoid exaggeration or unnecessarily obnox- 
ious statement. 

B. We should emphasize the fact that the decrees are not grounded hi 
arbitrary will, but in infinite wisdom. 

C. We should make it plain that whatever God does or will do, he must 
from eternity have purposed to do. 

D. We should illustrate the doctrine so far as possible by instances of 
completeness and far sightedness in human plans of great enterprises. 

E. We may then make extended application of the truth to the encour- 
agement of the Christian and the admonition of the unbeliever. 

Bushnell, Sermons for the New Life, sermon entitled : ' Every Man's 
Life a Plan of God.' Nehemiah Adams, Evenings with the Doctrines, 
243. 



CHAPTER IV. 
THE WORKS OF GOD ; OR THE EXECUTION OF THE DECREES. 



SECTION I. — CREATION. 
I. Definition of Creation. 

By creation we mean that free act of the triune God, by which, in the 
beginning, for his own glory, he made out of nothing the whole visible and 
invisible universe. In explanation we notice: 

1. Creation is not a fashioning of preexisting materials, nor an emana- 
tion from the substance of Deity, but is a making of that to exist which 
once did not exist either in form or substance. 

2. Creation is not an instinctive or necessary process of the divine nature, 
but is the free act of a rational will, put forth for a definite and sufficient end. 

3. Creation is the act of the triune God, in the sense that all the persons 
of the Trinity, themselves uncreated, have a part in it — the Father as the 
originating, the Son as the mediating, the Spirit as the realizing cause. 

Shedd, History of Doctrine, 1: 11. 

II. Proof of the Doctrine. 

Creation is a truth of which mere science or reason cannot fully assure 
us. Physical science can observe and record changes but it knows nothing 
of origins. Reason cannot absolutely disprove the eternity of matter. 

Hopkins, Yale Lectures on the Scriptural View of Man. Martineau, 
Essays, 1: 157-169. Wardlaw, Systematic Theology, 2: 65. 

For proof of the doctrine of creation, therefore, we rely wholly upon 
Scripture. 

1. Direct Scripture statements. 

A. Genesis 1:1, 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the 
earth. ' To this it has been objected that the verb &03 does not necessarily 
denote production out of nothing; (see Gen. 1: 27, 'God created man in 
his own image;' cf. 2: 7, 'the Lord God formed man of the dust of the 
ground;' also Ps. 51: 10, 'create hi me a clean heart'). But we reply: 

(a) While we acknowledge that the verb j03 "does not necessarily or 
invariably denote production out of nothing, we still maintain that it signi- 
fies the production of an effect for which no natural antecedent existed 
before, and which can be only the result of divine agency. " For this reason, 
in the Kal species it is used only of God, and is never accompanied by an 
accusative denoting material. 

Green, Hebrew Chrestomathy, 67. 



PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION. 39 

(6) In the account of the creation, &03 is accurately distinguished from 
TWp, 'to make' either from nothing or from already existing material (m'JZ^'S 
fc03j 'created in making' or made by creation,' in 2: 3 ; and t^jTl, of the fir- 
mament, in 1: 7), and from "IT, 'to form' out of such material. (See K*Q*1, 
of man regarded as a spiritual being, in 1: 27; but "li'^l, of man regarded 
as a physical being, in 2 : 7). 
Conant, Genesis, 1. 

(c) The context shows that the meaning here is creation out of nothing. 
Since the earth in its rude, unformed, chaotic condition is still called ' the 
earth ' in verse 2, the word JO| in verse 1 cannot refer to any shaping or 
fashioning of the elements, but must signify the calling of them into being. 

(d) The fact that J03 may have had an original signification of 'cutting,' 
'forming, 'and that it retains this meaning in the Piel conjugation, need not 
prejudice the conclusion thus reached, since terms expressive of the most 
spiritual processes are derived from sensuous roots. 

If K}3 does not signify absolute creation, no word exists in the Hebrew 
language that can express this idea. 

The Bible Commentary, on Gen. 1: 1. 

(e) But this idea of production out of nothing unquestionably existed 
among the Hebrews. The later Scriptures show that it had become natural 
to the Hebrew mind. An idea, so distinguishing them from the heathen 
nations, can be best explained by supposing that it was derived from this 
early revelation; (Ex. 34: 10. Num. 16: 30; cf. Jer. 31: 22. Is. 4: 5; 41: 20; 
45: 7, 8; 48: 6, 7; 57: 19; 65: 17, 18). 

B. Hebrews 11:3. ' Through faith we perceive that the worlds were 
framed by the word of God, so that what is seen has not arisen out of things 
which appear' (Bible Union version), =the world was made not out of sensi- 
ble and preexisting material, but by the direct fiat of omnipotence. This 
implies the creation of the world out of nothing; (see Alford, and Liine- 
mann in Meyer's Com., in loco. Cf. 2 Maccabees 7: 28, ef ova bv-ma eirolrjaev 
abra b Qeoc — Vulgate : quia ex nihilo fecit ilia Deus; Ps. 33 : 6-9; Bom. 4: 17; 
1 Cor. 1. 28). 

2. Indirect evidence from. Scripture. 

A. The past duration of the world is limited; (Mark 13 : 19, dpxn urioeog 
?}g ekticfv 6 9eoc ; John 17 : 5, npb rov rbv koguov elvai ; Eph. 1 : 4, tt po KarafiokfjQ 
70V koguov). 

B. Before the world began to be, each of the persons of the Godhead 
already existed; (Ps. 90: 2; Prov. 8: 22, 23. John 1: 1, ev apxy yv 6 &6yog. 
Col. 1: 17, ai'rog eon irpb Trdvruv. Heb. 9: 14, did Uvev/narog aitjvlov; see Tho- 
luck, Com. in loco). 

C. The origin of the universe is ascribed to God and to each of the 
persons of the Godhead; (Eph. 3:9; Rom. 11: 36; 1 Cor. 8: 6, eg ov rd 
irdvra. John 1: 3, Tcdvra 6C avrov eyevero. Col. 1: 16, rd iravra dc' avrov koi elg 
avrbv ektiotcu. Heb. 1: 2. Gen. 1: 2). 

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2: 232. 



94 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

These representations of Scripture are not only most consistent with the 
view that the universe was created out of nothing by God, but they are 
inexplicable upon any other hypothesis. Since other views, however, have 
been held to be more rational, we proceed to the examination of : 

III. Opposing Theories. 

1. Dualism. 

Of dualism, there are two forms : 

A. That which holds to two self-existent principles, God and matter. 
These are distinct from and coeternal with each other. Matter, however, 
is an unconscious, negative and imperfect substance, which is subordinate 
to God, and is made the instrument of his will. 

This was the view of the Alexandrian Gnostics. It was essentially an 
attempt to combine with Christianity the Platonic conception of the vlrj. 
In this way it thought to account for the existence of evil, and to escape the 
difficulty of imagining a creation out of nothing. 
Guericke, Church History, 1: 161. 

With regard to this view we remark: 

(a) The maxim ' ex nihilo nihil fit, ' upon which it rests, is true only in 
so far as it asserts that no event takes place without a cause. It is false, if 
it mean that nothing can ever be made except out of material previously 
existing. 

The maxim is therefore applicable only to the realm of second causes, 
and does not bar the creative power of the great first Cause. The doctrine 
of creation does not dispense with a cause ; on the other hand it assigns to 
the universe a sufficient cause in God. 

Martensen, Dogmatics, 116. Cudworth, Intellectual System, 3: 81, sq. 

(6) It is unphilosophical to postulate two eternal substances, when one 
self-existent Cause of all things will account for the facts. 

(c) It contradicts our fundamental notion of God as absolute Sovereign, 
to suppose the existence of any other substance to be independent of his will. 

(d) This second substance with which God must of necessity work, since 
it is, according to the theory, inherently evil and the source of evil, not 
only limits God's power but destroys his blessedness. 

Martensen, Dogmatics, 121. 

(e) The theory does not answer its purpose of accounting for moral evil, 
— unless it be also assumed that spirit is material, — in which case dualism 
gives place to materialism. 

The other form of dualism is: 

B. That which holds to the eternal existence of two antagonistic spirits, 
one evil and the other good. In this view, matter is not a negative and 
imperfect substance which nevertheless has self -existence, but is either the 
work or the instrument of a positively malignant intelligence, who wages 
war against all good. 

This was the view of the Manichaeans. Manichaeanism is a compound of 
Christianity and the Persian doctrine of two eternal and opposite intelli- 



ERRONEOUS THEORIES OF CREATION. 95 

geiices. Zoroaster, however, held matter to be pure and to be the creation 
of the good Being. Mani apparently regarded matter as captive to the evil 
spirit, if not absolutely his creation. 

Hagenbach, Hist. Doct. 1: 470. Guericke, Church History, 1: 185, 187. 
Gieseler, Church History, 1 : 203. Baur, das manichaische Religions- 
system. 
Of this view we need only say that it is refuted: 

(a) By all the arguments for the unity, omnipotence, sovereignty and 
blessedness of God. 

(6) By the Scripture representations of the prince of evil as the creature 
of God, and as subject to God's control; (Col. 1: 16. Eph. 6: 12. 2 Pet. 
2:4. Rev. 20: 2-10). 

Blunt, Diet. Doct. and Hist. Theology: Art. Dualism. Herzog, Ency- 
clopaedic : Art. Mani und die Manichaer. Neander, Ch. Hist. , 1: 478-505. 

2. Emanation. 

This theory holds that the universe is of the same substance with God, 
and is the product of successive evolutions from his being. 

This was the view of the Syrian Gnostics. Their system was an attempt to 
interpret Christianity in the forms of oriental theosophy. 

We object to it upon the following grounds : 

A. It virtually denies the infinity and transcendence of God, — by apply- 
ing to him a principle of evolution, growth, and progress, which belongs 
only to the finite and imperfect. 

B. It contradicts the divine holiness, — since man, who by the theory is 
of the substance of God, is nevertheless morally evil. 

C. It leads logically to pantheism, — since the claim that human person- 
ality is illusory, cannot be maintained without also surrendering belief in 
the personality of God. 

Neander, Church History, 1: 372-374. Shedd, Hist. Doct., 1: 318; 
also 1 : 11-13. Guericke, Church History, 1 : 160. 

A theory which seeks to avoid this pantheistic conclusion is that of: 

3. Creation from eternity. 

The necessity of supposing such creation from eternity has been argued 
upon the grounds : 

A. That it is a necessary result of God's omnipotence. But we reply 
that omnipotence does not necessarily imply actual creation ; it implies only 
power to create. 

Creation moreover is, in the nature of the case, a thing begun. Creation 
from eternity is a contradiction in terms, and that which is self-contradictory 
is not an object of power. 

B. That it is impossible to conceive of time as having had a beginning, 
and since the universe and time are coexistent, creation must have been 
from eternity. 

But we reply that the argument confounds time with duration. Time is 
duration measured by successions, and in this sense time can be conceived 



96 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

of as having had a beginning, — indeed it is impossible to conceive of its not 
having had a beginning. 

Birks, Difficulties of Belief, 81, 82. Julius Muller, Doctrine of Sin, 

1: 220-225. 

C. That the immutability of God requires creation from eternity. 

But we reply that God's immutability requires not an eternal creation but 
only an eternal plan of creation. The opposite principle would compel us 
to deny the possibility of miracles, incarnation and regeneration. Like 
creation, these too must be eternal. 

D. That God's love renders necessary a creation from eternity. 

But we reply, on the one hand, that a finite creation cannot furnish satis- 
faction to the infinite love of God ; and on the other hand, that God has 
from eternity an object of love infinitely superior to any possible creation, 
in the person of his Son. 

Martensen, Dogmatics, 114. 

Although this theory claims that creation is an act, in eternity past, of 
God's free will, yet its conceptions of God's omnipotence and love, as 
necessitating creation, are difficult to reconcile with the divine independence 
or personality. 

Since God's power and love are infinite, their demands cannot be satisfied 
without a creation infinite in extent as well as eternal in past duration, — 
in other words, a creation equal to God. 

But a God thus dependent upon external creation, is neither free nor sov- 
ereign. A God existing in necessary relations to the universe, if different 
in substance from the universe, must be the God of dualism ; if of the same 
substance with the universe, must be the God of pantheism. 

4. Spontaneous generation, 

This theory holds that creation is but the name for a natural process still 
going on, — matter itself having in it the power, under proper conditions, of 
taking on new functions, and of developing into organic forms. We object 
to this view that : 

A. It is a pure hypothesis, not only unverified, but contrary to all known 
facts. 

No credible instance of the production of living forms from inorganic 
material has yet been adduced. So far as science can at present teach us, 
the law of nature is ' omne vivum ex vivo, ' or ' ex ovo. ' 

B. If such instances could be authenticated, they would prove nothing 
as against a proper doctrine of creation, — for there" would still exist an 
impossibility of accounting for these vivific properties of matter, except 
upon the Scriptural view of an intelligent Contriver and Originator of mat- 
ter and its laws. 

In short, evolution implies previous involution,— if anything comes out 
of matter, it must first have been put in. 

C. This theory therefore, if true only supplements the, doctrine of orig- 
inal, absolute, immediate creation, with another doctrine of mediate and 
derivative creation, or the development of the materials and forces origin- 



THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF CREATION. 97 

ated at the beginning. , This development, however, cannot proceed to any- 
valuable end without the guidance of the same intelligence which initiated it. 
The Scriptures, although they do not sanction the doctrine of spontane- 
ous generation, do recognize processes of development as supplementing 
the divine fiat which first called the elements into being. 

Owen, Comparative Anatomy of the Vertebrates, 3: 814-818. Bastian, 
Modes of Origin of the Lowest Organizations ; Beginnings of Life ; and 
articles on Heterogeneous Evolution of Living Things, in 'Nature/ 
2: 170, 193, 219, 410, 431. Huxley's Address before the British Asso- 
ciation, and Reply to Bastian, in 'Nature,' 2: 400, 473; also, Origin 
of Species, 69-79 ; and Physical Basis of Life, in Lay Sermons, 
132. Answers to this last by Stirling, in Half-hours with Modern 
Scientists ; and by Beale, Protoplasm, or Life, Matter and Mind, 73-75. 
Hodge on Hylozoism, Syst. Theol., 1: 552, 606. Flint, Physiology of 
Man, 1:263-265. 

IV. The Mosaic Account of Creation. 

1. Its twofold nature, — as imiting the ideas of creation and cosmogony. 

All nature-worship, whether it take the form of ancient polytheism or 
modern materialism, looks upon the universe only as a birth or a growth. 
This view has a basis of truth, inasmuch as it regards natural forces as hav- 
ing a real existence. It is false in regarding these forces as needing no 
originator or upholder. 

A. Development recognized. 

The Mosaic account represents the present order of things as the result 
not simply of original creation, but also of subsequent arrangement and 
development. 

(a) A fashioning of inorganic materials is described, and also a use of 
these materials in providing the conditions of organized existence ; (Gen. 
1: 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 16— ; Z'jn, 17— |Ph ; 2: 6, 7, 8). 

(6) Life is described as reproducing itself after its first introduction, 
according to its own laws and by virtue of its own inner energy; (Gen. 1: 
11, 22, 24, 28). 

B. Creation asserted. 

The Mosaic narrative, however, avoids the error of making the universe 
the result of an eternal process. The cosmogony of Genesis, unlike the 
cosmogonies of the heathen, is prefaced by the originating act of God (Gen. 
1: 1, 503), and is supplemented by successive manifestations of creative 
power, as in the introduction of brute and of human life ; (Gen. 1 : 21 and 27 

— %na?l). 

If science, however, should ultimately render it certain that all the pres- 
ent species of living creatures were derived by natural descent from a few 
original germs, and that these germs were themselves an evolution of inor- 
ganic forces and materials, the Mosaic account would not therefore be 
proved untrue. We should only be required to revise our interpretation of 
the word S03 in Gen. 1 : 21 and 27, and to give it here the meaning of 
mediate creation. Such a meaning might almost seem to be favored by 
Gen. 1:11, 20, and 2: 7, 9. 
7 



98 NATURE, DECREES AXD WORKS OF GOD. 

This derivation of all living creatures, by successive modifications, from a 
few original germs, and much more, the theory of spontaneous generation 
already alluded to, are yet so far from being demonstrated, that we see no 
sufficient reason for departing from the conclusions previously reached, 
that the narrative describes the introduction of brute and of human life as 
acts of absolute origination. While the physical material was already at 
hand, as in the dust from which man's body was formed, the principle of 
life was apparently a new creation of God. 

Herzog, Encyclopadie, Art. Schopfung, 20: 718. Martensen, Dog- 
matics, 117. 

2. Its proper interpretation. 

There are three common interpretations which seem manifestly untenable : 

A. The allegorical or mythical, — which represents the Mosaic account 
as embodying, like the Indian and Greek cosmogonies, the poetic specula- 
tions of an early race as to the origin of the present system. 

We object to this interpretation upon the ground that the narrative of 
creation is inseparably connected with the succeeding history, and is there- 
fore most naturally regarded as itself historical. 

This connection of the narrative of creation with the subsequent history, 
moreover, prevents us from believing it to be the description of a vision 
granted to Moses. It is more probably the record of an original revelation 
to the first man, handed down to Moses' time, and used by Moses as a 
proper introduction to Ms history. 

Blackie, Comparison of Biblical with heathen Cosmogonies, in Theol. 

Eclectic, 1 : 77-87. For the theory of 'prophetic vision,' see Kurtz, 

History of the Old Covenant, Introduction, i-xxxvti, civ-cxxx; and 

Hugh Miller, Testimony of the Bocks, 179-210. 

B. The hyper-literal, — which would withdraw the narrative from all 
comparison with the conclusions of science, by putting the ages of geologi- 
cal history between the first and second verses of Gen. 1, and by making 
the remainder of the chapter an account of the fitting up of the earth, or of 
some limited portion of it, in six days of twenty-four hours each. 

Chalmers, Natural Theology, Works, 1: 228-258. John Pye Smith, 
Mosaic Account of Creation ; and Scripture and Geology. 
To this view it may be objected that: 

(a) There is no indication, in the Mosaic narrative, of so vast an interval 
l>etweeu the first and the second verses. 

(6) There is no indication, in the geological history, of any such break 
between the ages of preparation and the present time. 

Hugh Miller, Testimony of the Bocks, 141-178. 

(c) There are indications, in the Mosaic record itself, that the word ' day ' 
is not used in its literal sense ; while the other Scriptures unquestionably 
employ it to designate a period of indefinite duration; (Gen. 1: 5, 8, 13 ; 
2: 2; cf. Heb. 4: 3-10. Gen. 2: 4; cf. Is. 2: 12 ; Zech. 14: 7; 2 Pet. 3 : 8). 

Dana, Manual of Geology, 744. Leconte, Beligion and Science, 262. 



THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF CREATION". 99 

C. The hyper-scientific, — which would find in the narrative a minute 
and precise correspondence with the geological record. 

This is not to be expected, since it is foreign to the purpose of revelation 
to teach science. Although a general concord between the Mosaic and the 
geological histories may be pointed out, it is a needless embarrassment to 
compel ourselves to find in every detail of the former, an accurate statement 
of some scientific fact. The true interpretation is more probably : 

D. The pictorial-summary interpretation, — which holds that the Mosaic 
account is a rough sketch of the history of creation, true in all its essential 
features, but presented in a graphic form suited to the common mind and 
to earlier as well as later ages. 

While conveying to primitive man as accurate an idea of God's work as 
man was able to comprehend, the revelation was yet given in pregnant 
language, so that it could expand to all the ascertained results of subsequent 
physical research. This general correspondence of the narrative with the- 
teachings of science, and its power to adapt itself to every advance in human 
knowledge, differences it from every other cosmogony current among men. 

The view here presented does not compel us, either now or at any time 
in the future, to hold as a finality any definite scheme of reconciling Genesis 
and geology. Such a settlement of all the questions involved, presupposes 
not only a perfected science of the physical universe, but also a perfected 
science of hermeneutics. It is enough if we can offer tentative solutions 
which represent the present state of thought upon the subject. 

Remembering that any such scheme of reconciliation may speedily be 
outgrown without prejudice to the truth of the Scripture record, we may 
present the following as an approximate account of the coincidences between 
the Mosaic and the geological records. The scheme here given is a com- 
bination of the conclusions of Dana and of Guyot, and assumes the 
substantial truth of the nebular hypothesis. 

(a) The earth, if originally in the condition of a gaseous fluid, must 
have been void and formless, — as described in Genesis 1: 2. 

(6) The beginning of activity in matter would manifest itself by the 
the production of light, — since light is a resultant of molecular activity. 
This corresponds to the statement in verse 3. 

(c) The development of the earth into an independent sphere, and its 
separation from the fluid around it, answers to the dividing of the waters 
below, from the waters above the earth, in verse 7. 

(d) The production of the earth's physical features, by the partial con- 
densation of the vapors which enveloped the igneous sphere, and by the 
consequent outlining of the continents and oceans, is described, in verse 9, 
as the gathering together of the waters into one place. 

(e) The expression of the idea of life in the lowest plants, since it was, 
in type and effect, the creation of the vegetable kingdom, is next described 
in verse 11, as a bringing into existence of the characteristic forms of that 
kingdom. This precedes all mention of animal life, since the vegetable 
kingdom is the natural basis of the animal. 

(/) The vapors which have hitherto shrouded the planet are now cleared 
away as preliminary to the introduction of life in its higher animal forms. 



100 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

The consequent appearance of solar light is described, in verses 16 and 17, 
as a making of the sun, moon and stars, and a giving of them as luminaries 
to the earth. 

(g) The exhibition of the four grand types of the animal kingdom 
(radiate, molluscan, articulate, vertebrate), which characterizes the next stage 
of geological progress, is represented, in verses 20 and 21, as a creation of 
the lower animals — those that swarm in the waters, and the creeping and 
flying species of the land. 

(h) The introduction of mammals (viviparous species, which are eminent 
above all other vertebrates for a quality prophetic of a high moral purpose 
— that of suckling their young), is indicated in verses 24 and 25, by the 
creation of cattle and beasts of prey. 

(i) Man, the first being of moral and intellectual qualities, and the first 
in whom the unity of the great design has full expression, forms in both 
the Mosaic and the geologic record, the last step of progress in creation ; (see 
verses 26-31). With Prof. Dana, we may say that "in this succession we 
observe not merely an order of events like that deduced from science ; there 
is a system in the arrangement, and a far reaching prophecy, to which 
philosophy could not have attained, however instructed." 

Dana, Manual of Geology, 711-746. Guyot, in Bib. Sac, 12: 123, 324; 
14: 94. Tayler Lewis, Six Days of Creation. Thompson, Man in 
Genesis and in Geology. Agassiz, in Atlantic Monthly, January, 1874. 
Lesley, Lowell Lectures on Man's Origin and Destiny. Dawson, 
Story of the Earth and Man, 32. Henslow, Evolution and Religion, 
184. Leconte, Science and Religion, 264. Rogers, Superhuman 
Origin of the Bible, 445. Hill, in Bib. Sac, April, 1875. 

V. God's End in Creation. 

Infinite wisdom must, in creating, propose to itself the most comprehen- 
sive and the most valuable of ends, — the end most worthy of God and the 
end most fruitful in good. Only in the light of the end proposed can we 
properly judge of God's work, or of God's character as revealed therein. 

In determining this end, we turn first to 

1. The testimony of Scripture. 

This may be summed up in four statements : 

A. God finds his end in himself ; (Rom. 11: 36. Col. 1: 15. Rev. 22 : 
13; cf. 1 Cor. 15: 28, and Is. 48: 11. Prov. 16: 4=not 'the Lord hath 
made all things for himself ', but ' the Lord hath made everything for its 
purpose'; see Conant, in loco). 

B. God finds his end in his own will and pleasure ; (Eph. 1:5, 9. Rev. 
4: 11). 

C. God finds his end in his own glory; (Is. 48: 11; 60: 21; 61: 3. Luke 
2 : 14). 

D. God finds his end in the making known of his power, his wisdom, 
his holy name; (Ps. 143: 11. Ez. 36: 21, 22; 39: 7. Rom. 9: 17, 22, 23. 
Eph. 3: 9, 10). 



god's end in creation. 101 

All these statements may be combined in the following, namely, that 
God's supreme end in creation is nothing ontside of himself, but is his 
own glory — in the revelation, in and through creatures, of the infinite per- 
fections of his own being. 

Since holiness is the fundamental attribute in God, to make himself, his 
own pleasiu-e, his own glory, his own manifestation, to be his end in 
creation, is nothing else than to find his end in his own holiness, its main- 
tainarice, expression and communication. 

Hodge, Syst. Theol., 1: 436, 535, 565-568. Per contra, see Miller, 
Fetich in Theology, 19, 39-45, 88-98, 143-146. 

2. The testimony of reason. 

That his own glory, in the sense just mentioned, is God's supreme end 
in creation, is evident from the following considerations : 

A. God's own glory is the only end actually and perfectly attained in 
the universe. 

Wisdom and omnipotence cannot choose an end which is destined to be 
forever unattained; for "what his soul desireth even that he doeth" ; (Job 
23: 13). 

God's supreme end cannot be the happiness of creatures, since many are 
miserable here and will be miserable forever. God's supreme end cannot 
be the holiness of creatures, for many are unholy here and will be unholy 
forever. 

But while neither the holiness nor happiness of creatures is actually and 
perfectly attained, God's gjory is made known and will be made known in 
both the saved and the lost. This then must be God's supreme end in 
creation. 

B. God's glory is the end intrinsically most valuable. 

The good of creatures is of insignificant importance compared with this. 
Wisdom dictates that the greater interest should have precedence of the 
less. Because God can choose no greater end, he must choose for his end 
himself. But this is to choose his holiness, and his glory in the manifest- 
ation of that holiness; (Is. 40: 15, 16. Hebrews 6: 13. Psalm 89: 35). 

C. His own glory is the only end which consists with God's independence 
and sovereignty. 

Every being is dependent upon whomsoever or whatsoever he makes his 
ultimate end. If anything in the creature is the last end of God, God is 
dependent upon the creature. But since God is dependent only on himself, 
he must find in himself his end. 

D. His own glory is an end which comprehends and secures all other 
possible good. 

The interests of the universe are bound up in the interests of God. There 
is no holiness or happiness for creatures except as God is absolute sovereign, 
and is recognized as such. It is not selfishness, therefore, but benevolence, 
for God to make his own glory the supreme object of creation. 
Abp. Leighton, 20th Theological Lecture, Works, 695. 

E. God's glory is the end which in a right moral system is proposed to 
creatures. This must therefore be the end which he hi whose image they 
are made, proposes to himself. 



102 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

This principle of moral philosophy, and the conclusion drawn from it, are 
both confirmed by Scripture ; (Ps. 25: 11 ; 115: 1. 1 Cor. 10: 31. 1 Peter, 
2:9; 4: 11). 

Edwards, Works, 2 : 193-257. Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 358-362. 

VI. Relation of the Doctrine of Creation to other Doctrines. 

1. To the holiness and benevolence of God. 

Creation, as the work of God, manifests of necessity God's moral 
attributes. But the existence of physical and moral evil in the universe 
appears, at first sight, to impugn these attributes, and to contradict the 
Scripture declaration that the work of God's hand was "very good"; (Gen. 
1: 31). This difficulty may be in great part removed by considering that : 

A. As first created, the world was good in two senses : 

(a) As free from moral evil. Sin is a later addition, — the work, not of 
God, but of created spirits. 

(6) As adapted to beneficent ends, — for example, the revelation of God's 
perfections, and the probation and hai3piness of inteUigent and obedient 
creatures. 

B. Physical pain and imperfection, so far as they existed before the 
introduction of moral evil, are to be regarded: 

(a) As congruous parts of a system of which sin was foreseen to be an 
incident; and 

(b) As constituting, in part, the means of future discipline and redemp- 
tion for the fallen; (Rom. 8: 17-23. 2 Cor. 4: 17). 

Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, Chapter on ' Anticipative 
Consequences, ' 194-219. McCosh, Divine Government, 26-35 ; 249-261. 
Farrar, Science and Theology, 82-105. 

2. To the wisdom and free-will of God. 

Though the completed creation, as illustrating God's attributes, was 'very 
good, ' we are not warranted in asserting with the optimists, that the actual 
creation was the best possible, or the only possible creation. 

Since the resources of God's wisdom are infinite, there may have been in 
the divine mind many possible systems, equally adapted to manifest his 
glory. We must therefore regard the present creation simply as the act of 
God's free and sovereign will. 

For optimistic view, see Leibnitz, Opera Philos. , 468, 624 ; Chalmers, 

Works, 2: 286. Per contra, see Watson, Theological Institutes, 1: 419; 

Band, Elohim Revealed, 397-409, and esp., 402 ; Hovey, God with us, 

205-208. 

3. To providence and redemption. 

Christianity is essentially a scheme of supernatural love and power. It 
conceives of God as above the world, as well as in it, — able to manifest 
himself , and actually manifesting himself, in ways unknown to mere nature. 

But this absolute sovereignty and transcendence, which are manifested 
in providence and in redemption, are inseparable from creatorship. If the 



PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRESERVATION. 103 

world be eternal, like' God, it must be an efflux from the substance of God 
and must be absolutely equal with God. Only a proper doctrine of creation 
can secure God's absolute distinctness from the world and his sovereignty 
over it. 

The logical alternative of creation is therefore a system of pantheism, in 
which God is an impersonal and necessary force. Hence the pantheistic 
dicta of Fichte : ' ' The assumption of a creation is -the fundamental error of 
all false metaphysics and false theology"; of Hegel: "God evolves the 
world out of himself in order to take it back into himself again in the Spirit " ; 
and of Strauss : ' ' Trinity and creation, speculatively viewed, are one and 
the same, — only the one is viewed absolutely, the other empirically." 

We perceive from this point of view, moreover, the importance and value 
of the Sabbath, as commemorating God's act of creation, and thus God's 
personality, sovereignty and transcendence. 

Luthardt, Compendium der Dogmatik, 97. Hessey, Bampton Lectures 
on "The Sunday." 



SECTION II. — PRESERVATION. 

I. Definition of Preservation. 

Preservation is that continuous agency of God by which he maintains in 
existence the things he has created, together with the properties and powers 
with which he has endowed them. 

In explanation we remark : 

1. Preservation is not a mere negation of action, or a refraining to 
destroy, on the part of God. It is a positive agency by which, at every 
moment, he sustains the substances and forces of the universe. 

2. Preservation is not merely the maintenance of latent powers and 
properties in matter and mind. It is the upholding of these properties and 
powers in their actual exercise as well. 

3. Preservation recognizes the properties and powers of nature as having 
objective reality. Although matter and mind retain their existence and 
endowments only by the constant energy of God, second causes are not 
mere names for the great first cause. 

4. Preservation, however, implies a natural concurrence of God in all 
operations of matter and mind. Though God's will is not the sole force, it 
is still true that, without his concurrence, no being or substance in the, 
universe can continue to exist or act. 

II. Proof of the Doctrine of Preservation. 

1. From Scripture; 

Nehemiah 9: 6. Job 7: 20. Ps. 36: 6; 104: 28, 29. Acts 17: 28, kv avru 
£o)/uev nai KLVovjieBa nai ea/Ltev. Col. 1 : 17, ~d ndvra kv avrti awearyns. Heb. 1: 3, 
<j>epo)v rd Trdvra rw p///u.ari rf/g cwdjueug avrov. John 5: 17, "my Father worketh 
hitherto and I work," most naturally refers to preservation, since creation 
is a work completed; (cf. Gen. 2: 2, 3). See Perowne on Psalm 104. 



104 MATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

In several of these passages, preservation is expressly distinguished from 
creation. Though God rested from his work of creation and established an 
order of natural forces, a special and continuous divine activity is declared 
to be put forth in the upholding of the universe and its powers. 

2. From reason. ■ 

We may argue the preserving agency of God from the following con- 
siderations : 

A. Matter and mind are not self- existent. Since they have not the cause 
of their being in themselves, their continuance as well as their origin must 
be due to a superior power. 

B. Force implies a will of which it is the direct or indirect expression. 
"While we cannot identify the forces of the universe with the will of God, or 
regard God as the sole agent in the universe, what we know of force as 
exerted by our own wills, leads us to believe that force and will are correla- 
tive terms ; in other words, that force has a continuous existence, only by 
virtue of the continuous sustaining agency of the divine will. 

C. God's sovereignty requires a belief in his special preserving agency, 
— since this sovereignty would not be absolute, if anything occurred or 
existed independently of his will. 

For modern theories identifying force with divine will, see Herschell, 
Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects, 460 ; Murphy, Scientific Bases, 
13-15 ; 29-36 ; 42-52 ; Duke of Argyll, Eeign of Law, 121-127 ; Wal- 
lace, on Natural Selection, 363-371 ; Martineau, Essays, 1 : 63, 265. 
Per contra, see Porter, Human Intellect, 582-588. Hodge, Syst. Theol. , 
1 : 596. 

III. Theoeies which virtually deny the Doctrine of Preserva- 
tion. 

1. Deism. 

This view represents the universe as a self-sustained mechanism, from 
which God withdrew as soon as he had created it, and which he left to a 
process of self-development. 

Lord Herbert of Cherbury, De Veritate. Per contra, see Leslie and 
Leland, Method with the Deists. Blunt, Diet. : Art. Deism. 

We object to this view that : 

A. It rests upon a false analogy. 

Man is, able to construct a self -moving watch only because he employs 
preexisting forces, such as gravity, elasticity, cohesion. But in a theoiy 
which likens the universe to a machine, these forces are the very things to 
be accounted for. 

Woods, Works, 2 : 40. 

B. It is a system of anthropomorphism, while it professes to exclude 
anthropomorphism. 

Because the upholding of all things would involve a multiplicity of minute 
cares if man were the agent, it conceives of the upholding of the universe 



REMARKS UPOX THE DIYIXE CONCURRENCE. 105 

as involving such burdens in the case of God. Thus it saves the dignity of 

God, by virtually denying his omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence. 

Chalmers, Astronomical Discourses, Works, 7: 68. Kurtz, The Bible 

* and Astronomy, in introduction to Hist, of Old Covenant, lxxxii-xcviii. 

C. It cannot be maintained without denying all providential interference, 
in the history of creation, and in the subsequent history of the world. 

But the introduction of life, the creation of man, incarnation, regeneration, 
the communion of intelligent creatures with a present God, and interposi- 
tions of God in secular history are matters of fact. 

Pearson on Infidelity, 97. 

2. Continuous creation. 

This view regards the universe as from moment to moment the result of 
a new creation. 

Edwards, Works, 2: 486-490. Hopkins, Works, 1: 164-167. Emmons, 
Works, 4: 363-389, and especially, 381. Bothe, Dogrnatik, 1: 126-160, 
especially 150 ; and Theologische Ethik, 1 : 186-190. See statement of 
Botke's view in Bib. Sac, Jan., 1875: 144. 

To this view we object upon the following grounds: 

A. It contradicts our intuitive beliefs in substance and causality, by 
denying the existence and efficiency of second causes, and declaring these 
to be merely occasions for the exercise of divine energy. 

B. It exaggerates God's power only by sacrificing his truth, love, and 
holiness ; — for if the substances and powers of nature are not what they 
seem — namely, objective existences — God's veracity is impugned ; if the 
human soul have no real freedom and life, God's love has made no self- 
communication to creatures ; if God's will is the only force in the universe, 
God's holiness can no longer be asserted, for the divine will must in that 
case be regarded as the author of human sin. 

C. As deism tends to atheism, so the doctrine of continuous creation 
tends to pantheism. Arguing that because we get our notion of force from 
the action of our own wills, therefore all force must be will and divine will, 
it is compelled to merge the human will in this all- comprehending will of 
God. Mind and matter alike become phenomena of one force which has 
the attributes of both, and with the distinct existence and personality of the 
human soul, we lose the distinct existence and personality of God. 

Julius Muller, Doctrine of Sin, 1: 220-225. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 
2 : 258-272. Hodge, Systematic Theology, 1 : 577-581, 595. Baird, 
Elohim Bevealed, 50. 

IV. BEMAEKS UPON THE DlVINE CONCUEKENCE. 

1. The divine efficiency interpenetrates that of nature and that of man 
without destroying or absorbing them. The influx of God's sustaining 
energy is such that all things retain their natural properties and powers. 
•God does not work all, but "all in all"; (1 Cor. 12: 6; cf. Eph. 1: 23). 



106 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

2. Though God preserves mind and body in their working, we are ever 
to remember that God concurs with the evil acts of his creatures only as 
they are natural acts, and not as they are evil; (Jer. 44: 4. Hab. 1: 13. 
James 1: 13). 

On the importance of the idea of preservation in Christian doctrine, see 
Calvin, Institutes, 1: 182; (Chapter 16). 



SECTION" III. — PROVIDENCE. 

I. Definition of Providence. 

Providence is that continuous agency of God by which he makes all the 
events of the physical and moral universe fulfil the original design with 
which he created it. 

In explanation notice: 

1. Providence is not to be taken merely in its etymological sense of 
foreseeing. It is forseeing also, [or a positive agency in connection with 
all the events of history. 

2. Providence is to be distinguished from preservation. While preserva- 
tion is a maintenance of the existence and powers of created things, 
providence is an actual care and control of them. 

3. Since the original plan of God is all comprehending, the providence 
which executes the plan is all-comprehending also, embracing within its 
scope things small and great, and exercising care over individuals as well as 
over classes. 

4. Providence is therefore various in its methods, and in its relation to 
free human action, is by turns preventive, permissive, directive, and deter- 
minative. 

On the general subject of providence, see Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 
2: 272-284. Calvin, Institutes, 1: 182-219. Dick, Theology, 1: 416-446. 
Hodge, Syst. Theology, 1: 581-616. Bib. Sac, 12: 179; 21: 584; 
26:315; 30:593. 

II. Pkoof of the docteine of Providence. 

1. Scriptural proof. 

The Scripture witnesses to 

A. A general providential government and control : - 

(a) Over the universe at large ; (Ps. 103: 19. Dan. 4: 35. Eph. 1: 11— 
tov ra iravra evepyovvro^). 

(6) Over the physical world; (Job 37: 5, 10. Ps. 104: 14; 135: 6, 7. 
Mat. 5: 45). 

(c) Over the brute creation; (Ps. 104: 21, 27. Mat. 6: 26; 10: 29). 

(d) Over the affairs of nations; (Job 12: 23. Ps. 22: 28; 66: 7. Acts 
17: 26). 

(e) Over man's birth and lot in life ; (1 Sam. 16: 1. Ps. 139: 15, 16. Is. 
45: 5. Jer. 1: 5. Gal. 1: 15). 



(Ex. 12: 


: 36. 


1 Sam. 


24: 18. 


Ps. 


21 


:1. 


Jer. 


10: 23. 


Phil. 2: 


13. 


4: 


21; 


7: 13 


:; cf. 8: 


15. 2 Sam. 


2: 


11. 











PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE. 10? 

(/) Over the outward successes and failures of men's lives ; (Ps. 75: 6, 7. 
Luke 1: 52). 

(g) Over things seemingly accidental or insignificant ; (Proverbs 16: 33. 
Matt. 10: 30). 

(h) In the protection of the righteous; (Ps. 4: 8; 5: 12; 63: 8; 121: 4. 
Kom. 8: 28). 

(i) In the supply of the wants of God's people; (Gen. 22: 8, 14. Deut. 
8: 3. Phil. 4: 19). 

(j) In the arrangement of answers to prayer; (Ps. 68: 10. Is. 64: 4. 
Mat. 6: 8, 32, 33; cf. Eom. 8: 27. 1 Pet. 3: 12). 

(k) In the exposure and punishment of the wicked ; (Ps. 7 and 11). 

B. A government and control extending to the free actions of men : 

(a) To men's free acts in general; 
33: 14, 15. Prov. 16: 1 ; 19: 21 ; 20: 24 
Eph. 2 : 10. James 4 : 13-15). 

(6) To the sinful acts of men; (Ex. 
16: 10; 24: 1. Eom. 11: 32. 2 Thess. 

God's providence with respect to men's evil acts is described in Scripture 
as of four sorts : 

(b 1 ) Preventive, — God by his providence prevents sin, which would 
otherwise be committed ; (Gen. 20 : 6 ; 31 : 24. Num. 22 : 12. Ps. 19 : 13). 

That he thus prevents sin is to be regarded as matter not of obligation, 
but of grace. 

(6 2 ) Permissive, — God permits men to cherish and to manifest the evil 
dispositions of their hearts; (Ps. 81: 12, 13. Hosea 4: 17. Acts 14: 16. 
Rom. 1:24, 28; 3:25). 

God's permissive providence is simply the negative act of witholding 
impediments from the path of the sin Tier, instead of preventing his sin by 
the exercise of divine power. It implies no ignorance, passivity or indul- 
gence, but consists with hatred of the sin and determination to punish it. 

(6 3 ) Directive,— God directs the evil acts of men to ends unforeseen and 
unintended by the agents; (Gen. 50: 20. Ps. 76: 10. Is. 10: 5. Acts 
4: 27, 28). 

When evil is in the heart and must come out, God orders its flow in one 
direction rather than in another, so that its course can be best controlled and 
least harm may result. This is sometimes called overruling providence. 

(6 4 ) Determinative, — God determines the bounds reached by the evil 
passions of his creatures, and the measure of their effects ; (Job 1 : 12 ; 2:6. 
Ps. 124: 2. Rom. 9: 18. 2 Thess. 2: 7. Rev. 20: 2, 3). 

Since moral evil is a germ capable of indefinite expansion, God's deter- 
mining the measure of its growth does not alter its character or involve 
God's complicity with the perverse wills which cherish it. 

2. national proof. 

A. Arguments a priori from the divine attributes. 

(a) From the immutability of God. 

This makes it certain that he will execute Iris eternal plan of the universe 
and its history. But the execution of this plan involves not only creation 
and preservation, but also providence. 



108 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

(6) From the benevolence of God. 

This renders it certain that he will care for the intelligent universe he has 
created. What it was worth Iris while to create, it is worth his while to care 
for. But this care is providence. 

For heathen ideas of providence, see Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 2 : 30. 
Epictetus, Enchiridion, sec. 41; also Bib. Sac, 16: 374; Appleton, 
Works, 1: 146. 

(c) From the justice of God. 

As the source of moral law, God must assure the vindication of law, by 
administering justice in the universe, — rewarding the obedient and punish- 
ing the rebellious. But this administration of justice is providence. 

B. Arguments a posteriori from the facts of nature and of history. 
(a) The outward lot of individuals and nations is not wholly in their own 
hands, but is in many acknowledged respects subject to the disposal of a 
higher power. 

Sermon on 'Providence in Political Bevolutions, ' in Farrar, Science 
and Theology, 228. 

(6) The observed moral order of the world, although imperfect, cannot 
be accounted for without recognition of a divine providence. 

Vice is discouraged and virtue rewarded, in ways which are beyond the 
power of mere nature. There must be a governing mind and will, and this 
mind and will must be the mind and will of God. 
Bishop Butler, Analogy, Bonn's ed., 98. 

III. Opposing Theories. 

1. Fatalism. 

Fatalism maintains the certainty but denies the freedom of human self- 
determination, — thus substituting fate for providence. 
To this view we object that: 

A. It contradicts consciousness, which testifies that we are free. 

B. It exalts the divine power at the expense of God's truth, wisdom, 
holiness, love. 

C. It destroys all evidence of the personality and freedom of God. 

D. It practically makes necessity the only God, and leaves the impera- 
tives of our moral nature without present validity or future vindication. 

McCosh, Intuitions, 266. Kant, Metaphysics of Ethics, 52-74 ; 93-108. 
Mill, Autobiography, 168-170 ; System of Logic, 521-526. Hamilton, 
Metaphysics, 692. Stewart, Active and Moral Powers of Man, edited 
by Walker, 268-324. 

2. Casualism. 

Casualism transfers the freedom of mind to nature, as fatalism transfers 
the fixity of nature to mind. It thus exchanges providence for chance. 
Upon this view we remark that : 



ERRONEOUS THEORIES OE PROVIDED OE. 109 

A. If chance be only another name for human ignorance — a name for 
the fact that there are trivial occurrences in life which have no meaning or 
relation to us, — we may acknowledge this, and still hold that providence 
arranges every so-called chance, for purposes beyond our knowledge. Chance 
in this sense is providential coincidence which we cannot understand, and do 
not need to trouble ourselves about. 

B. If chance be taken in the sense of utter absence of all causal con- 
nections in the phenomena of matter and mind, — we oppose to this notion 
the fact that the causal judgment is formed in accordance with a fundamental 
and necessary law of human thought, and that no science or knowledge is 
possible without the assumption of its validity. 

C. If chance be used in the sense of undesigning cause, — it is evidently 
insufficient to explain the regular and uniform sequences of nature, or the 
moral progress of the human race. These things argue a superintending 
and designing mind — in other words, a providence. Since reason demands 
not only a cause, but a sufficient cause, for the order of the physical and 
moral world, casualism must be ruled out. 

3. Theory of a merely general providence. 

Many who acknowledge God's control over the movements of planets and 
the destinies of nations, deny any divine arrangement of particular events. 
Most of the arguments against deism are equally valid against the view 
just mentioned. This view is indeed only a form of deism which holds 
that God has not wholly withdrawn himself from the universe, but that his 
activity within it is limited to the maintenance of general laws. 

Blunt, Diet. Doct. and Hist. Theol., Art. Deism. Cicero, De Natura 
Deorum, 2 : 7, 66. Baden Powell, Order of Nature. 

In addition to the arguments above alluded to, we may urge against this 
theory, that 

A. General control over the course of nature and of history is impossi- 
ble without control over the smallest particulars which affect the course of 
nature and of history. 

Incidents so slight as well nigh to escape observation at the time of their 
occurrence, are frequently found to determine the whole future of a human 
life, and through that life, the fortunes of a whole empire and of a whole 
age. 

Instances in point, are the sleeplessness of King Ahasuerus, and the seem- 
ing chance that led to the reading of the record of Mordecai's service, and 
to the salvation of the Jews in Persia ; the storm which dispersed the Span- 
ish armada and saved England from the papacy, and the storm that dispersed 
the French fleet gathered for the conquest of New England ; the settling 
of New England by Puritans rather than by French Jesuits ; the order of 
Council restraining Cromwell and his friends from sailing to America ; 
Major Andre's lack of self-possession in presence of his captors ; the fatal 
shot at Fort Sumter. 

Appleton, Works, 1 ; 149, sq. 



110 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

B. The love of God which prompts a general care for the universe, must 
also prompt a particular care for the smallest events which affect the happi- 
ness of his creatures. 

It belongs to love to regard nothing as trifling or beneath its notice, which 
has to do with the interests of the object of its affection. Infinite love may 
therefore be expected to provide for all, even the minutest things in the 
creation. 

Without belief in this particular care, men cannot long believe in God's 
general care. Faith in a particular providence is indispensable to the very 
existence of practical religion, — for men will not worship or recognize a God 
who has no direct relation to them. 

C. In times of personal danger and in remarkable conjunctures of pub- 
lic affairs, men instinctively attribute to God a control of the events which 
take place around them. 

The prayers which such startling emergencies force from men's lips, are 
proof that God is present and active in human affairs. This testimony of 
our mental constitution must be regarded as virtually the testimony of him 
who framed this constitution. 

D. Christian experience confirms the declarations of Scripture that par- 
ticular events are brought about by God with special reference to the good 
or ill of the individual. Such events occur at times in such direct connec- 
tion with the Christian's prayers, that no doubt remains with regard to the 
providential arrangement of them. 

The possibility of such divine agency in natural events cannot be ques- 
tioned by one who, like the Christian, has had experience of the greater 
wonders of regeneration and daily intercourse with God, and who believes 
in the reality of creation, incarnation and miracles. 

IV. Eelations of the Doctrine or Providence. 

1. To miracles and works of grace. 

Particular providence is the agency of God in what seem to us the minor 
affairs of nature and of human life. Special providence is only an instance 
of God's particular providence, which has special relation to us or makes 
peculiar impression upon us. It is special, not as respects the means which 
God makes use of, but as respects the effect produced upon us. 

In both particular and special providence, God apparently makes use of 
ordinary laws of nature to accomplish Iris purposes. In special providences 
we have only more impressive manifestations of the control which God 
always exercises over nature's laws. 

But while providence, both general and special, works in the realm of 
nature and through the natural laws of matter and of mind, miracles and 
works of grace like regeneration, are supernatural acts, not to be explained 
from antecedent natural causes. While God can use natural forces for the 
accomplishment of his will, he is not, as man is, confined to these, but by 
his simple volition he can accomplish results far beyond the power of mere 
nature. 

Miracles and special providences therefore are not to be confounded with 
each other, since the latter belong to the nature, the former to the realm 



RELATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE. Ill 

above nature. Certain of the wonders of Scripture, such as the destruction 
of Sennacherib's army and the dividing of the Bed Sea, may possibly belong 
to the class of special providences rather than to the class of miracles. 

Trench, Miracles, 19. Mozley, Miracles, 117-120. For the naturalistic 
view, see Tyndall on Miracles and Special Providences, in Fragments 
of Science, 45, 418. Per contra, see Farrar, on Divine Providence and 
General Laws, in Science and Theology, 54-80. 

2. To prayer and Us answer. 

What has been said with regard to God's connection with nature, suggests 
the question how God can answer prayer consistently with the fixity of 
natural law. In reply we would remark, 

A. Negatively, that the true solution is not to be reached : 

(a) By making the sole effect of prayer to be its reflex influence upon 
the petitioner. 

Prayer presupposes a God who hears and answers. It will not be offered, 
unless it is believed to accomplish objective as well as subjective results. 
Tyndall, on Prayer and Natural Law, in Fragments of Science, 35. 

(6) Nor, by holding that God answers prayer simply by spiritual means, 
such as the action of the Holy Spirit upon the spirit of man. 

The realm of spirit is no less subject to law than the realm of matter. 
Scripture and experience, moreover, alike testify that in answer to prayer, 
events take place in the outward world which would not have taken place 
if prayer had not gone before ; (1 K. 18 : 42-45). 

Versus Baden Powell, in Essays and Beviews, 106-162. 

(c) Nor by maintaining that God suspends or breaks in upon the order 
of nature, in answering every prayer that is offered. 

This view does not take account of natural laws as having objective exist- 
ence, and as revealing the order of God's being. Omnipotence might thus 
suspend natural law, but wisdom, so far as we can see, would not. 

(cl) Nor by considering prayer as a physical force, linked in each case to 
its answer, as physical cause is linked to physical effect. 

Prayer is not a force acting directly upon nature ; else there would be no 
discretion as to its answer. It can accomplish results hi nature, only as it 
influences God. 

It seems more in accordance with both Scripture and reason to say that : 

B. God may answer prayer, even when that answer involves changes in 
the sequences of nature, 

(a) By new combinations of natural forces, in regions withdrawn from 
our observation, so that effects are produced which these same forces left to 
themselves would never have accomplished. 

As man combines the laws of chemical attraction and of combustion, to 
fire the gunpowder and split the rock asunder, so God may combine the 
laws of nature to bring about answers to prayer. In all this there may be 
no suspension or violation of law, but a use of law unknown to us. 

See this view elaborated in Chalmers, Works, 2 : 314 ; 7 : 234. Hop- 
kins, Sermon on Prayer Gauge, 16. Duke of Argyll, Beign of Law, 
81-127. 



112 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

Since prayer is nothing more or less than appeal to a personal and present 
God, whose granting or withholding of the requested blessing is believed 
to be determined by the prayer itself, we must conclude that prayer moves 
God, or in other words, induces the putting forth on his part of an imper- 
ative volition. But lest this should seem to imply mutability in God or 
inconstancy in nature, we remark, in addition, that : 

(b) God may have so prearranged the laws of the material universe and 
the events of history, that while the answer to prayer is an expression of his 
will, it is granted through the working of natural agencies, and in perfect 
accordance with the general principle that results, both temporal and spiritual, 
are to be attained by intelligent creatures through the use of the appropriate 
and appointed means. 

Since God is immanent in nature, an answer to prayer coming about 
through the intervention of natural law, may be as real a revelation of God's 
personal care, as if the laws of nature were suspended, and God interposed 
by an exercise of his creative power. Prayer and its answer, though having 
God's immediate volition as then- connecting bond, may yet be provided for 
in the original plan of the universe. 

McCosh, Divine Government, 215. Liddon, Elements of Religion, 
178-203. Hamilton, Autology, 690-694. 

(c) If asked whether this relation between prayer and its providential 
answer can be scientifically tested, we reply that it may be tested just as a 
father's love may be tested by a dutiful son. 

(c 1 ) There is a general proof of it in the past experience of the Christian, 
and in" the past history of the church ; (Ps. 116: 1-8). 

(c 2 ) In condescension to human blindness, God may sometimes submit 
to a formal test of his faithfulness and power, — as in the case of Elijah and 
the priests of Baal; (1 K. 18: 36-38). 

(c 3 ) When proof sufficient to convince the candid inquirer has been 
already given, it may not consist with the divine majesty to abide a test 
imposed by mere curiosity or scepticism, — as in the case of the Jews who 
sought a sign from heaven ; (Matt. 12: 39). 

(c 4 ) Since God's will is the link between prayer and its answer, there can 
be no such thing as a physical demonstration of its efficacy in any proposed 
case. Scientific tests have no application to things into which free will 
enters as a constitutive element. 

Hopkins, Prayer and the Prayer-gauge, 22. Upham, Interior Life, 
356. 

3. To Christian activity. 

Here the truth lies between the two extremes of quietism and naturalism. 

A. In opposition to the false abnegation of human reason and will which 
quietism demands, we hold that God guides us, not by continual miracle, 
but by his natural providence and the energizing of our own faculties by his 
Spirit, so that Ave rationally and freely do our own work, and work out our 
salvation. 



RELATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE. 113 

B. In opposition to naturalism, we hold that God is continually near 
the human spirit by his providential working, and that this providential 
working is so adjusted to the Christian's nature and necessities, as to fur- 
nish instruction with regard to duty, discipline of religious character, and 
needed help and comfort in trial. 

In interpreting God's providences, as in interpreting Scripture, we are 
dependent upon the Holy Spirit. The work of the Spirit is indeed, in great 
part, an application of Scripture truth to present circumstances. While we 
never allow ourselves to act blindly and irrationally, but accustom ourselves 
to weigh evidence with regard to duty, we are to expect as the gift of the 
Spirit, an understanding of circumstances — a fine sense of God's providen- 
tial purposes with regard to us, which shall make our true course plain to 
ourselves, although we may not always be able- to explain it to others ; (Ps. 
32: 8. Prov. 3: 6. Phil. 1: 9—aia^aei. James 1: 5). 

4. To the evil acts of free agents. 

A. Here we must distinguish between the natural agency and the moral 
agency of God, or between acts of permissive providence and acts of effi- 
cient causation. We are ever to remember that God neither works evil, nor 
causes his creatures to work evil. All sin is chargeable to the self-will and 
perversity of the creature ; — to declare God the author of it, is the greatest 
of blasphemies. 

B. But while man makes up his evil decision independently of God, 
God does by his natural agency, order the method in which this inward evil 
shall express itself, by limiting it in time, place and measure, or by guiding 
it to the end which his Avisdom and love, and not man's intent, has set. In 
all this, however, God only allows sin to develop itself after its own nature, 
so that it may be known, abhorred, and if possible, overcome and forsaken. 

0. In cases of persistent iniquity, God's providence still compels the 
sinner to accomplish the design with which he and all things have been 
created, namely, the manifestation of God's holiness.- Even though he 
struggle against God's plan, yet he must by his very resistance serve it. 
His sin is made its own detecter, judge and tormentor. His character and 
doom are made a warning to others. Refusing to glorify God in his salva- 
tion, he is made to glorify God in his destruction. 

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2: 272-284. Edwards, Works, 4: 300-312. 



114 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 



SECTION IV. — GOOD AND EVIL ANGELS. 

As ministers of divine providence there is a class of finite beings, greater 
in intelligence and power than man in his present state, some of whom pos- 
itively serve God's purpose by holiness and voluntary execution of his will, 
some negatively, by giving examples to the universe of defeated and pun- 
ished rebellion, and by illustrating God's distinguishing grace in man's 
salvation. 

Whately, Good and Evil Angels. Twesten, translation in Bib. Sac, 
1: 768; 2: 108. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2: 287-337; 3: 251-354 
Bii-ks, Difficulties of Belief, 78, sq. Herzog, Encyclopadie, Arts. : 
Engel ; Teufel. Scott, Existence of Evil Spirits. 

The scholastic subtleties which encumbered this doctrine in the middle 
ages, and the exaggerated representations of the power of evil spirits which 
then prevailed, have led, by a natural reaction, to an undue depreciation of 
it in more recent times. 

For scholastic representations, see Thomas Aquinas, Summa, Migne's 
ed., 1: 833-993. Eosetti, Shadow of Dante, 14, 15. 

There is, however, an antecedent probability that the ascending scale of 
created intelligences does not reach its topmost point in man. As the dis- 
tance between man and the lowest forms of life, is filled in with num- 
berless gradations of being, so it is probable that between man and 
God, there exist creatures of higher than human intelligence. 
Quenstedt, Theol., 1: 629. 

This probability is turned to certainty by the express declarations of 
Scripture. The doctrine is interwoven with the later as well as with the 
earlier books of revelation. 

We first consider the 

I. Scripture Statements and Intimations. 

1. As to the nature and attributes of angels. 

A. They are created beings; (Col. 1: 16; cf. 1 Pet. 3: 22). 

B. They are incorporeal beings; (Hebrews 1: 14 — Trvd'/xara. In Gen. 
6:2, ' sons of God'=not angels, but descen dents of Seth and worshippers of 
the true God; see Murphy, Com. in loco. Ps. 78: 25, 'Angels' food'= 
bread coming from heaven where angels dwell ; see Perowne, in loco. In 
Mat. 22: 30 wc ayyeloi, and in Luke 20: 36 IcayyzAoi, imply only that angels 
are without distinctions of sex). 

C. They are personal — that is, intelligent and voluntary — agents ; (2 Sam. 
14: 20. Rev. 22: 9. Luke 4: 34. 2 Tim. 2: 26). 

D. They are possessed of superhuman intelligence and power, yet an 
intelligence and power that has its fixed limits; (Mat. 24: 36. 1 Pet. 1: 12. 
Psalm 103: 20. 2 Thess. 1:7. 2 Pet. 2: 11. Bev. 20: 2, 10; cf. Ps. 72: 18). 



SCRIPTURE STATEMENTS RESPECTING ANGELS. 115 

E. They are an order of intelligences, distinct from man, and older than 
man ; (Gen. 3 : 1 ; cf . Eev. 20 : 2. Job. 38 : 7. 1 Cor. 6 : 3. Heb. 1 : 14^- 
"ketTwpyim ; 12: 22, 23. In Rev. 22: 9, cvvcovAog intimates likeness to men 
not in nature, but in service and subordination to God, the only proper 
object of worship. 

The constant representation of angels as personal beings in Scripture, 
cannot be explained as a personification of abstract good and evil, in accom- 
modation to Jewish superstitions, without wresting many narrative passages 
from their obvious sense ; implying on the part of Christ either dissimula- 
tion or ignorance as to an important point of doctrine ; and surrendering 
belief in the inspiration of the Old Testament from which these Jewish 
views of angelic beings were derived. 

The same remark apx3h.es to the view which regards Satan as but a col- 
lective term for all evil beings, human or superhuman. The Scripture 
representations of the progressive rage of the great adversary, from his first 
assault on human virtue in Genesis to his final overthrow in Revelation, 
join with the testimony of Christ just mentioned, to forbid any other con- 
clusion than this, that there is a personal being of great power, who carries 
on organized opposition to the divine government. 

Versus Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, 123-139. Per contra, 
see Smith's Bible Dictionary, Arts. : Angels, Demons, Demoniacs, 
Satan. Trench, Studies in the Gospels, 16-26. 

2. As to their number and organization. 

A. They are of great multitude ; (Deut. 33: 2. Ps. 68: 17. Daniel 7: 10. 
Rev. 5 : 11). 

B. They constitute a company as distinguished from a race ; (Mat. 22 : 
30. Luke 20: 36). 

C. They are of various ranks and endowments ; (Col. 1 : 16. 1 Thess. 
4: 16. Jude 9). 

D. They have an organization ; (1 Sam. 1 : 11. 1 K. 22 : 19. Mat. 26 
53; 25:41. Eph. 2: 2). 

With regard to the cherubim (Gen. 3 : 24; Ex. 37: 6-9 ; Ez. 1 and 10),— 
or the ' seraphim ' of Isaiah (6 : 1-8) and ' living creatures ' of the book of 
Revelation (4: 6-8 — fwa), with which the cherubim are to be identified, — 
the most probable interpretation is that which regards them not as actual 
beings of higher rank than man, but as symbolic appearances, intended to 
illustrate truths pertaining to the divine government in nature or in the 
church. 

The view that the cherubim are symbols of nature, as pervaded by the 
divine energy and subordinated to the divine purposes, is not so satisfactory 
as the view that they represent redeemed humanity, endowed with all the 
creature perfections lost by the fall, and made to be the dwelling place of 
God. The latter vieAv, however, rests largely upon the reading in Rev, 5 : 9 



116 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

— rjyopaoag rcJ Qeu r/ /nag kv T(3 dl/iari gov. Here A and Tischendorf omit li/mg. 
X, b and Tregelles, however, still retain it. 

For the former view, see Smith's Bible Dictionary, Art. : Cherub ; 
xilford, Com. on Eev. 4: 6-8, and Hnlsean Lectures for 1841, vol. 1, 
lecture 2 ; Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1 : 278. For the latter view, see Fair- 
bairn, Typology, 1 : 185-208 ; Elliott, Horse Apocalypticse, 1 : 87. 

3. As to their moral character. 

A. They were all created holy ; (Gen. 1 : 31). 

B. They had a probation. (This we infer from 1 Tim. 5 : 21 — ruv e/^e/crwv 
ayyzktdv ; cf. 1 Pet. 1 : 1, 2 — hiOiEKTolg elg vTTatiorjv). 

C. Some preserved their integrity ; (Ps. 89 : 7. Matt. 25 : 31). 

D. Some fell from their estate of innocence ; (John 8 : 44. 2 Pet. 2 : 4. 
Jude 6). 

E. The good are confirmed in good ; (Mat. 6 : 10 ; 18 : 10. 2 Cor. 11 : 14). 

F. The evil are confirmed in evil ; (Mat. 13 : 19. 1 John 5 : 18, 19— 
6 kov7]()oq; cf. John 8: 44). 

4. As to their employments. 

A. The employments of good angels. 

(a) They stand in the presence of God and worship him ; (Ps. 29 : 1, 2 ; 
89 : 5, 7; see Perowne, in loco. Mat. 18: 10; see Lange, in loco). 

(6) They rejoice in God's works ; (Job 38 : 7). 

(c) They execute God's will ; (Ps. 103 : 20, 21). 

(c 1 ) By working in nature; (Ps. 104: 4; see Alford on Heb. 1 : 7). 

(c 2 ) By guiding the affairs of nations; (Dan. 10: 13, 21 ; 11 : 1 ; 12 : 1). 

(c 3 ) By watching over the interests of particular churches ; (Rev. 1 : 20 ; 
see Alford, Com. in loco ; cf. 1 Cor. 11 : 10 ; Eph. 3 : 10 ; Col. 2 : 18 ; 1 Tim. 
5:21). 

(c 4 ) By assisting and protecting individual believers; (IK. 19: 5. Ps. 
91:11. Dan. 6:22. Mat. 4: 11; 18: 10; cf. 6. See Meyer, Com. in 
loco. Luke 16 . 22 ; cf . Acts 12 : 15, and Hackett, Com. in loco. Heb. 1 : 14). 

(c 5 ) By punishing God's enemies ; (2 K. 19 : 35. Acts 12 : 23). 

A general survey of this Scripture testimony as to the employments of 
good angels, leads us to the following conclusions: 

First, — that good angels are not to be considered as the mediating agents 
of God's regular and common providence, but as the ministers of his 
special providence in the affairs of his church. He ' makes his angels winds 
and flames of fire ' not in his ordinary procedure, but in connection with 
special displays of his power for moral ends ; (Deut. 33 : 2. Acts 7 : 53. 
Gal. 3: 19. Heb. 2: 2). 

Their intervention is apparently occasional and exceptional — not at their 
own option, but only as it is permitted or commanded by God. Hence we 
are not to conceive of angels as coming between us and God, nor are we, 
without special revelation of the fact, to attribute to them in any particular 
case the effects which the Scriptures generally ascribe to divine providence. 



SCRIPTURE STATEMENTS RESPECTING ANGELS. 11? 

Like miracles, therefore, angelic appearances mark God's entrance upon 
new epochs in the unfolding of his plans. Hence we read of angels at the 
completion of creation (Job 38 : 7) ; at the giving of the law (Gal. 3 : 19) ; at 
the birth of Christ (Luke 2 : 13) ; at the two temptations in the wilderness 
and in Gethsemane (Mat. 4: 11, Luke 22: 43); at the resurrection (Matt. 
28: 2) ; at the ascension (Acts 1: 10) ; at the final judgment (Mat. 25: 31). 

Secondly, — that their power, as being in its nature dependent and derived, 
is exercised in accordance with the laws of the spiritual and natural world. 
They cannot like God, create, perform miracles, act without means, 
search the heart. Unlike the Holy Spirit, who can influence the human 
mind directly, they can influence men only in ways analogous to those by 
which men influence each other. As evil angels may tempt men to sin, so 
it is probable that good angels may attract men to holiness. 

The substance of these remarks may be found in Hodge, Systematic 
Theology, 1 : 637-645. 

B. The employments of evil angels. 

(a) They oppose God and strive to defeat his will. This is indicated 

(a 1 ) In the names applied to their chief; (Satan = adversary, primarily to 
God; Job 1: 6. Devil = slanderer, of God to men, Gen 3: 4, 5; of men to 
God, Job 1 : 9, 11 ; 2 : 4, 5 ; Eev. 12 : 10). 

(a 2 ) In the description of the man of sin, (2 Thess. 2 : 4, 6 avriKeifievog ; cf. 
verse 9, nar' kvkpyeiav rav Harava). 

(6) They hinder man's temporal and eternal welfare : 

(6 1 ) By exercising a certain control over natural phenomena; (Job 1 : 12, 
16, 19 ; 2 : 7. Luke 13 : 16. Acts 10 : 38. 2 Cor. 12 : 7. 1 Thess. 2 : 18. 
Heb. 2: 14). 

(6 2 ) By temptation; (Gen. 3: 1, sq.; cf. Bev. 20: 2. Mat. 4: 3. John 
13 : 27. Acts 5:3; 13 : 10. Eph. 2:2. 1 Thess. 3:5. 1 Pet. 5:8). 

Satan's temptations are represented as both negative (Mark 4 : 15, he takes 
away the word sown), and positive (Mat. 13 : 39, he sows tares). He con- 
trols many subordinate evil spirits (Mat. 25 : 41, one SiaQoAog — many ayyeXot 
or oai/wvec; cf. Mark 5: 9, 12 ; Eph. 2:2; 6: 12), and through their agency 
he may accomplish his purposes. 

(6 3 ) By possession, — either physical (Mark 5 : 2-4), or spiritual (Acts 
16: 16). 

Possession is distinguished from bodily or mental disease, though such 
disease often accompanies or results from the possession ; (Mat. 17 : 15, 18 ; 
Mark 9: 25). The demons speak in their own persons, with supernatural 
knowledge, and are directly addressed by Christ ; (Mark 3 : 11, 12 ; Luke 
8: 30). Jesus recognizes Satanic agency in these cases of possession, and 
rejoices in the casting out of demons, as a sign of Satan's downfall ; (Luke 
10: 17, 18). 

These facts render it impossible to interpret the narratives of demoniac 
possession as popular descriptions of abnormal physical or mental condi- 
tions. 

Trench, Miracles, 125-136. Smith's Bible Diet., 1: 586. 



118 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OE GOD. 

(c) Yet, in spite of themselves, they execute God's plans : 

(c 1 ) Of punishing the ungodly; (Ps. 78: 49. 1 K. 22: 21). 

(c 2 ) Of chastening the good; (Job 1 and 2. 1 Cor. 5: 5. 1 Tim. 1: 20). 

(c 3 ) Of illustrating the nature and fate of moral evil ; (Mat. 8: 29 ; 25: 41. 
2 Thess. 2 : 6. James 2 : 19. Eev. 12 : 9, 12 ; 20 : 10). 

A survey of the Scripture testimony with regard to the employments of 
evil spirits, leads to the following general conclusions : 

First, — the power of evil spirits over men is not independent of the human 
will. This power cannot be exercised without at least the original consent 
of the human will, and may be resisted and shaken off through prayer and 
faith in God; (Luke 22: 31, 40. Eph. 6: 16. James 4:7. 1 Pet. 5: 9). 

Secondly, — their power is limited, both in time and in extent, by the per- 
missive will of God. Evil spirits are neither omnipotent, omniscient, nor 
omnipresent. We are to attribute disease and natural calamity to their agency, 
only when this is matter of special revelation. Opposed to God as evil 
spirits are, God compels them to serve his purposes. Their power for harm 
lasts but for a season, and ultimate judgment and punishment will vindicate 
God's permission of their evil agency; (1 Cor. 10: 13. Jude 6). 

II. Objections to the Doctkine of Angels. 

1. To the doctrine of angels in general. 

A. That it is opposed to the modern scientific view of the world, as a 
system of definite forces and laws. 

We reply that whatever truth there may be in this modern view, it does 
not exclude the play of divine or human free agency. It does not therefore 
exclude the possibility of angelic agency. 

B. That it is opposed to the modern doctrine of infinite space above and 
beneath us — a space peopled with worlds. With the surrender of the old 
conception of the firmament, as a boundary separating this world from the 
regions beyond, it is claimed that we must give up all belief in a heaven of 
the angels. 

We reply that the notions of an infinite universe, of heaven as a definite 
place, and of spirits as confined to fixed locality, are mere hypotheses, with- 
out warrant either in reason or in Scripture. We know nothing of the 
modes of existence of pure spirits. 

For rationalistic view, see Strauss, Glaubenslehre, 1 : 670-675. Per 
contra, see Van Oosterzee, Christian Dogmatics, 1 : 308-317 ; Marten- 
sen, Christian Dogmatics, 127-136. 

2. To the doctrine of evil angels in particular. 
It is objected that : 

A. The idea of the fall of angels is self contradictory, since a fall deter- 
mined by pride, presupposes pride, — that is, a fall before the fall. 

We reply that the objection ignores the relation between inward apostasy 
and its outward manifestation. Pride was itself the fall. How an unholy 
disposition could have originated in spirits created pure, is an insoluble 
problem. Our faith in God's holiness, however, compels us to attribute 
the origin of this evil disposition, not to the Creator, but to the creature. 



PRACTICAL USES OF THE DOCTRINE OF ANGELS. 119 

B. It is irrational to suppose that Satan should have been able to change 
his whole nature by a single act, so that he thenceforth willed only evil. 

But we reply that the circumstances of that decision are unknown to us, 
while the power of single acts permanently to change character, is matter of 
observation among men. 

C. It is impossible that so wise a being should enter upon a hopeless 
rebellion. 

We answer that no amount of mere knowledge ensures right moral action. 
If men gratify present passion, in spite of their knowledge that the sin 
involves present misery and future perdition, it is not impossible that Satan 
may have done the same. 

D. It is inconsistent with the benevolence of God to create and uphold 
spirits, whom he knows will be and do evil. 

We reply that this is no more inconsistent with God's benevolence, than 
the creation and preservation of men, whose action God overrules for the 
furtherance of his purposes, and whose iniquity he finally brings to light 
and punishes. 

E. The notion of organization among evil spirits is self-contradictory, 
since the nature of evil is to sunder and divide. 

We reply that such organization of evil spirits is no more impossible, than 
the organization of wicked men, for the purpose of furthering their selfish 
ends. Common hatred to God may constitute a principle of union among 
them, as among men. 

F. The doctrine is morally pernicious, as transferring the blame of 
human sin to the being or beings who tempt men thereto. 

We reply that neither conscience nor Scripture allow temptation to be an 
excuse for sin, or regard Satan as having power to compel the human will. 
The objection, moreover, contradicts our observation, — for only where the 
personal existence of Satan is recognized, do we find sin recognized in its 
true nature. 

G. The doctrine degrades man, by representing him as the tool and 
slave of Satan. 

We reply that it does indeed show his actual state to be degraded, but 
only with the result of exalting our idea of his original dignity, and of his 
possible glory hi Christ. It is not improbable, moreover, that the fact that 
man's sin was suggested from without and not from within, may be the one 
mitigating circumstance which renders possible his redemption. 

. Trench, Studies in the Gospels, 17. Birks, Difficulties of Belief, 
78-100. For fuller statement of these objections and answers, see Phil- 
ippi, Glaubenslehre, 3: 251-284. Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1: 291-293. 

III. Pbacticae uses of the Dooteine of Angels. 

1. Uses of the doctrine of good angels. 

A. It gives us a new sense of the greatness of the divine resources, and 
of God's grace in our creation, to think of the multitude of unfallen intel- 
ligences who executed the divine purposes before man appeared. 



120 NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD. 

B. It strengthens our faith in God's providential care, to know that 
spirits of so high rank are deputed to minister to creatures who are 
environed with temptations and are conscious of sin. 

0. It teaches us humility, that beings of so much greater knowledge and 
power than ours should gladly perform these unnoticed services, in behalf 
of those whose only claim upon them is that they are children of the same 
common Father. 

D. It helps us in the struggle against sin, to learn that these messengers 
of God are near, to mark our wrong doing if we fall, and to sustain us if we 
resist temptation. 

E. It enlarges our conceptions of the dignity of our own being, and of 
the boundless possibities of our future existence, to remember these forms 
of typical innocence and love, that praise and serve God unceasingly in 
heaven. 

2. Uses of the doctrine of evil angels. 

A. It illustrates the real nature of sin, and the depth of the ruin to which 
it may bring the soul, to reflect upon the present moral condition and eter- 
nal wretchedness to which these spirits, so highly endowed, have brought 
themselves by their rebellion against God. 

B. It inspires a salutary fear and hatred of the first subtle approaches of 
evil from within or from without, to remember that these may be the covert 
advances of a personal and malignant being, who seeks to overcome our 
virtue, and to involve us in his own apostasy and destruction. 

C. It shuts us up to Christ, as the only Being who is able to deliver us 
or others from the enemy of all good. 

Van Oosterzee, Christian Dogmatics, 1 : 316. Brooks, Satan's Devices. 
Robert Hall, Works, 3 : 35-51. 



PAET V. 

ANTHROPOLOGY, OE THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 



CHAPTER I. 

PRELIMINARY. 
I. Man a Creation of God. 

The fact of man's creation is declared in Gen. 1: 27; 2: 7. A considera- 
tion of these passages in the light of modern science enables us to draw the 
following conclusions : 

1. The Scriptures, on the one hand, negative the idea that man is the 
mere product of unreasoning natural forces. They refer Ms existence to a 
cause outside of nature, namely, to the creative act of God. 

2. But, on the other hand, the Scriptures do not disclose the method of 
man's creation. Whether man's physical system is, or is not, derived by 
natural descent, from the lower animals, the record of creation does not in- 
form us. As the command "let the earth bring forth the living creature" 
(Gen. 1 : 24) does not exclude the idea of mediate creation through natural 
generation, so the "forming of man from the dust of the ground" (Gen. 
2: 7) does not in itself determine whether the creation of man's body was 
mediate or immediate. 

3. Psychology, however, comes in to help our interpretation of Scripture. 
The radical differences between man's soul and the principle of intelligence 
in the lower animals, especially man's possession of general ideas, the moral 
sense and the power of self-determination, show that that which chiefly 
constitutes him man could not have been derived by any natural process of 
development from the inferior creatures. We are compelled, then, to believe 
that God's "breathing into man's nostrils the breath of life" (Gen. 2: 7) was 
an act of immediate creation, like the first introduction of life upon the 
planet. 

Porter, Human Intellect, 384, 386, 397. Hopkins, Outline Study of 
Man, 8-23. Chadbourne, Instinct, 187-211. Bib. Sac, 29: 275-282. 
Max Miiller, Lectures on the Philosophy of Language, Nos. 1, 2, 3. 

4. Comparative physiology, moreover, has up to the present time, done 
nothing to prevent the extension of this doctrine to man's body. No single 
instance has yet been adduced of the transformation of one animal species 
into another, either by natural or by artificial selection — much less has it 
been demonstrated that the body of the brute has ever been developed 
into that of man. Until this shall be done, the view that man's physical 
system is descended by natural generation from some ancestral simian form, 

9 



122 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN". 

can be regarded only as an unproved hypothesis. Since the soul, then, is 
an immediate creation of God, and the forming of man's body is mentioned 
by the Scripture writer in direct connection with this creation of the spirit, 
we prefer to believe that man's body was an immediate creation also. 

For the theory of natural selection, see Darwin, Origin of Species, 398- 
424; Descent of Man, 2:368-387. Huxley, Critiques and Addresses, 
241-269; Man's place in Nature, 71-138; Lay Sermons, 323. Per con- 
tra, see Wallace, Natural Selection, 338-360. Mivart, Genesis of Species, 
202-222; 259-307; Man and Apes, 88, 149-192. Quatrefages, Natural 
History of Man, 64-87. Dawson, Story of the Earth and Man, 321-329. 
Martensen, Christian Dogmatics, 136. Duke of Argyll, Primeval Man, 
38-75. 
The truth that man is the offspring of God, implies the correlative truth 
of a common divine Fatherhood. God is Father of all men, in that he 
originates and sustains them as personal beings like in nature to himself. 
Even toward sinners God holds this natural relation of Father. It is his 
fatherly love indeed which provides the atonement. Thus the demands of 
holiness are met and the prodigal is restored to the privileges of sonship 
which have been forfeited by transgression; (Mai. 2: 10. Luke 3: 38; 15: 
11-32. John 3: 16. Heb. 12: 9). This natural Fatherhood, therefore, does 
not exclude, but prepares the way for, God's special Fatherhood toward 
those who have been regenerated by his Spirit and who have believed on 
his Son; (John 1 : 12, 13. Eom. 8: 14, 15, 17. 2 Cor. 6: 17, 18. Gal. 3; 
26; 4: 6. 1 John 3; 1, 2). 

On the common Fatherhood of God, see Crawford, Fatherhood of God, 
9-26; 138-159. Per contra, see Candlish, Fatherhood of God; Wright, 
Fatherhood of God. 

II. Unity of the Bace. 

The Scriptures teach that the whole human race is descended from a 
single pair; (Gen. 1 : 27, 28; 2 : 7, 22; 3 : 20; 9 : 19). 

This truth lies at the foundation of Paul's doctrine of the organic unity 
of mankind in the transgression, and of the provision of salvation for the 
race in Christ, (Bom. 5 : 12, 19; cf. Heb. 2 : 16); it also constitutes the 
ground of man's obligation of natural brotherhood to every member of the 
race; (Acts 17 : 26). 

The Scripture statements may be corroborated by considerations drawn 
from history and science. 

1. Argument from History. 

So far as the history of nations and tribes in both hemispheres can be 
traced, the evidence points to a common origin and ancestry in Central Asia. 
Sir Henry Eawlinson, quoted in Burgess, Antiquity and Unity of the 
Bace, 156, 157. Quatrefages, Natural History of Man; Unite' de 1' 
Espece Humaine. Godron, Unite - de 1' Espece Humaine, 2: 412, sq. 
Guyot, Earth and Man, 298-334. Pickering, Baces of Man, 283-305. 
Bunsen, Philos. Univ. Hist., 2: 112. Smyth, Unity of Human Eaces, 
223-236. 



UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 123 

2. Argument from Language. 

Comparative philology points to a common origin of all the more impor- 
tant languages, and furnishes no evidence that the less important are not 
also so derived. 

On Sanscrit as connecting link between the Indo-Germanic languages, 
see Max Muller, Science of Language, 1: 146-165; 326-342. On 
Egyptian, as connecting Indo-European and Semitic tongues, see Bun- 
sen, Egypt's Place, 1 : Preface, 10. Smith, Bible Diet. , art. : Confusion 
of Tongues. Whitney, Study of Language, 307, 308; Life and Growth 
of Language, 269. Bib. Sac. 1870: 162. Smyth, Unity of Human Races, 
199-222. 

3. Argument from Psychology. 

The existence, among all families of mankind, of common mental and 
moral characteristics, as evinced in common maxims, capacities and ten- 
dencies, in the prevalence of similar traditions, and in the universal appli- 
cability of one philosophy and religion, is most easily and naturally 
explained upon the theory of a common origin. 

Zockler, in Jahrbuch fur deutsche Theologie, 8: 71-90. Hodge, Syst. 

Theol., 2: 77-91. Smyth, Unity of Human Races, 236-240. Prichard, 

Nat. Hist, of Man, 2: 657-714. Max Muller, Science of Language, 2: 

444-455. 

4. Argument from Physiology. 

A. It is the common judgment of comparative physiologists that man 
constitutes but a single species. The differences which exist between the 
various families of mankind are to be regarded as varieties of this species. 
In proof of these statements we urge : 

(a) The numberless intermediate gradations which connect the so-called 
races with each other. 

(6) The essential identity of all races in cranial, osteological and dental 
characteristics. 

(c) The fertility of unions between individuals of the most diverse types, 
and the continuous fertility of the offspring of such unions. 

Owen, quoted in Burgess, Ant. and Unity of Race, 185. Huxley 
Critiques and Addresses, 163; Origin of Species, 113. 

B. Unity of species is presumptive evidence of unity of origin. Oneness 
of origin furnishes the simplest explanation of specific uniformity, if indeed 
the very conception of species does not imply the repetition and reproduction 
of a primordial type-idea impressed at its creation upon an individual empow- 
ered to transmit this type-idea to its successors. 

Dana, quoted in Burgess, 186-194, and Bib. Sac, Oct., 1857: 862-866. 

(a) To this view is opposed the theory propounded by Agassiz, of differ- 
ent centres of creation, and of different types of humanity corresponding 
to the varying fauna and flora of each. But this theory makes the plural 
origin of man an exception in creation. Science points rather to a single 



124 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

origin of each species, whether vegetable or animal. If man be, as this 
theory grants, a single species, he should be, by the same rule, restricted to 
one continent in his origin. This theory, moreover, applies an unproved 
hypothesis with regard to the distribution of organized beings in general, 
to the very being whose whole nature and history show conclusively that he 
is an exception to such a general rule, if one exists. Since man can adapt 
himself to all climes and conditions, the theory of separate centres of creation 
is, in his case, gratuitous and unnecessary. 

Agassiz, Essay on Provinces of the Animal World, in Nott and Glid- 
clon's Types of Mankind. Per contra, see Bib. Sac, 19: 607-632. 
Princeton Eeview, 1862: 435-464. 

(£>) It is objected, moreover, that the diversities of size, color and physical 
conformation, among the various families of mankind, are inconsistent with 
the theory of a common origin. But we reply that these diversities are of 
a superficial character, and can be accounted for by corresponding diversities 
of condition and environment. Changes which have been observed and 
recorded within historic times, show that the differences alluded to may be 
the result of slowly accumulated divergences from one and the same original 
and ancestral type. 

Burgess, Antiquity and Unity of Bace, 195-202. Dawson, Story of 
Earth and Man, 360. Morris, Conflict of Science and Eeligion, 325- 
385. Keil and Delitzsch, Com. on Pentateuch, 1: 116. Zockler, in 
Jahrbuch fur deutsche Theologie, 8: 51-71. Prichard, Eesearches, 
5: 547-552; Nat. Hist, of Man, 2: 644-656. Smyth, Unity of Human 
Eaces, 255-283. Duke of Argyll, Primeval Man, 96-108. 

III. Essential Elements of Human Natube. 

1. The Dichotomous Theory. 

Man has a twofold nature, on the one hand material, on the other hand 
immaterial. He consists of body, and of spirit or soul. That there are 
two and only two elements in man's being is a fact to which consciousness 
testifies. This testimony is confirmed by Scripture, in which the prevailing 
representation of man's constitution is that of dichotomy. This will 
appear by considering: 

A. The record of man's creation (Gen. 2: 7), in which, as the result of 
the inbreathing of the divine Spirit, the body becomes possessed and 
vitalized by a single principle — the living soul; (cf. Job 27: 3; 32: 8; 33: 4). 

B. Passages in which the human soul or spirit is distinguished from the 
divine Spirit from whom it proceeded, and from the body which it inhabits; 
(Num. 16: 22. Zech. 12: 1. 1 Cor. 2: 11. Heb. 12: 9. Gen. 35: 18. 
1 K. 17: 21. Eccl. 12: 7. James 2: 26). 

C. The interchangeable use of the terms 'soul' and 'spirit' ; (Gen. 41 : 8 
_fnn DjfSfi!, cf. Ps. 42: 6— nni'P^n 'Ktej. Mat. 20: 28— Sovvai rrjv tyvxvv,- cf. 
Mat. 27: 50 — acpf/KE to Trvevfia. Heb. 12: 23 — ^vevfiaci <~iKai<.)v TereAsiafievow^ cf. 
Eev. 6: 9 — i/' u A'"? T & v ecfayjuevuv'). 



ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF HUMAN NATURE. 125 

D. The mention of body and soul (or spirit) as together constituting 
the whole man; (Mat. 10: 28; 1 Cor. 5: 3; 6: 20. 3 John, 2). 

For the dichotomous theory see Halm, Bib. Theology N. T. , 390, sq. 
Sclmiid, Bib. Theology N. T., 503. Weiss, Bib. Theology N. T., 214. 
Luthardt, Compendium der Dogrnatik, 112, 113. Hofmann, Schrift- 
beweis, 1: 294-298, Kalmis, Dogmatik, 1: 549; 3: 249. Nitzsch, 
Christian Doctrine, 202. Harless, on Eph. 4: 23, and Christian Ethics, 
22. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1: 164-168. Tholuck, 
Ebrard (in Olshausen's Com.), and Llinemann (in Meyer's Com.), 
on Heb. 4: 12. Hodge, in Princeton Review, 1865: 116; Systematic 
Theol., 2: 47-51. Ebrard, Dogmatik 1: 261-263. 

2. The Trichotomous Theory. 

Side by side with this common representation of human nature as con- 
sisting of two parts, are found passages which at first sight appear to favor 
trichotomy. It must be acknowledged that nyey/ia and tyvxh, although often 
used interchangeably and always designating the same indivisible substance, 
are sometimes employed as contrasted terms; (1 Thess. 5: 23; Heb. 4: 12; 
cf. 1 Cor. 2: 14; 15: 44; Eph. 4: 23; Jude 19). 

In this more accurate use, tyvxy denotes man's immaterial part in its infer- 
ior powers and activities, — as fvxv, man is a conscious individual, and in 
common with the brute creation, has an animal life, together with appetite, 
imagination, memory, understanding. ILvevfia, on the other hand, denotes 
man's immaterial part in its higher capacities and faculties, — as Kvevfia, man 
is a being related to God and possessing powers of reason, conscience and 
free-will, which difference him from the brute creation and constitute him 
responsible and immortal. The truth in trichotomy is simply this, that man 
has a triplicity of endowment, in virtue of which the single soul has relations 
respectively to matter, to self and to God. 

The trichotomous theory, however, as it is ordinarily denned, endangers 
the iinity and immateriality of our higher nature, by holding that man con- 
sists of three substances or three component parts, — body, soul and spirit, — 
and that soul and spirit are as distinct from each other as soul and body. 
The advocates of this view differ among themselves as to the nature of 
the ijvxv&jid. its relation to the other elements of our being, some (as Delitzsch) 
holding that the tpvxv is an efflux of the Tcvev/ia, distinct in substance, but 
not in essence, even as the divine Word is distinct from God, while yet he 
is God; others (as Goschel) regarding the tyvxv, not as a distinct substance, 
but as a resultant of the union of the irvsv/m and the otj/m. Still others (as 
Cremer) hold the tyvxv to be the subject of the personal life whose principle 
is the TTvev/Lia. 

But this theory of a tripartite nature in man appears untenable in all its 
forms, not only for the reasons already urged in proof of the dichotomous 
theory, but from the following additional considerations: 

A. Uvev/ia as well as fvxv belongs to the brute creation; (Eccl. 3: 21 — 
7"l!On3rj IT"]"!. Rev. 16: 3 — Ttaaa ijjvxv cnreftavev kv rrf ftaAdoori'). 

B. "*vx>/ is ascribed to Jehovah; (Amos 6: 8. Is. 42: 1. Heb. 10: 38). 



126 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

C. The disembodied dead are called ipvxal; (Rev. 6: 9; cf. 20: 4.) 

D. The highest exercises of religion are attributed to the ip'->x>/; (Mark 
12: 30. Luke 1: 47. Heb. 6: 19. James 1: 21). 

E. To lose this ipv X v is to lose all; (Mark 8 : 36, 37). 

F. The passages chiefly relied upon as supporting trichotomy may better 
be explained upon the view already indicated, that soul and spirit are not two 
distinct substances or parts, but that they designate the same immaterial prin- 
ciple from different points of view; (1 Thess. 5 : 23 — to irvev^a ml ?j ipvxv kcu to 
(TG)/ia=not a scientific enumeration of the constituent parts of human nature, 
but a comprehensive sketch of that nature in its chief relations; cf. Mark 
12: 30. Heb. 4: 12 — &XP 1 u-epia/uov ipvxVQ Kac Trvev/naTog, dp/icbv re nal /rue?iGJv=not 
the dividing of soul from spirit, but the piercing of the soul and of the 
spirit, even to their very joints and marrow, i. e., to the very depths of the 
spiritual nature. 

For trichotomous theory, see Olshausen, Opuscula, 134; Com. on 1 
Thess. 5: 23. Beck, Biblische Seelenlehre, 31. Delitzsch, Biblical 
Psychology, 117, 118. Goschel, in Herzog, Realencyclopadie, art. : 
Seele; also, art. by Auberlen: Geist des Menschen. Cremer, N. T. 
Lexicon, on Trvev/ia and ipvxf'j. Usteri, Paulin. Lehrbegriff, 384, sq. 
Neander, Planting and Training, 394. Van Oosterzee, Christian Dog- 
matics, 365, 366. Boardman, in Bap. Quarterly, 1: 177, 325, 428. 
Heard, Tripartite Nature of Man, 62-114. 

We conclude that the immaterial part of man, viewed as an individual 
and conscious life, capable of possessing and animating a physical organism, 
is called ipvxv', viewed as a rational and moral agent, susceptible of divine 
influence and indwelling, this same immaterial part is called ttvev/m. The 
irvevfia, then, is man's nature looking Godward, and capable of receiving 
and manifesting the Uvevua ayiov. The ipvxv is man's nature looking earth- 
ward, and touching the world of sense. We say with Porter, that "the 
spirit of man, in addition to its higher endowments, may also possess the 
lower powers which vitalize dead matter into a human body." Man's 
being is therefore not trichotomous, but dichotomous, and his immaterial 
part, while possessing duality of powers, has unity of substance. 

Porter, Human Intellect, 39. 

This view of the soul and spirit as different aspects of the same spiritual 
principle, furnishes a refutation of three important errors: 

(a) That of the Gnostics, who held that the Tcvev/u.a is part of the divine 
essence, and therefore incapable of sin. 

(6) That of the Apollinarians, who taught that Christ's humanity em- 
braced only ccjjua and ipvxv, while his divine nature furnished the irvev/m. 

(c) That of the Semi-pelagians, who excepted the human itvevfia from the 
dominion of original sin. 

The doctrine, moreover, in contrast with the heathen view, puts honor 
upon man's body: 



ORIGIN" OF THE SOUL. 127 

(a) As proceeding from the hand of God, and as therefore originally 
pure; (Gen. 1: 31). 

(6) As intended to be the dwelling place of the divine Spirit; (1 Cor. 
6: 19). 

(c) As containing the germ of the heavenly body; (1 Cor. 15: 44. Rom. 
8: 11 — <5ia to tvoinovv Hveviia — Tregelles). 

IV. Okigin of the Soul. 

Three theories with regard to this subject have divided opinion: 

1. The Theory of Preexistence. 

This view was held by Plato, Philo and Origen; by the first in order to 
explain the soul's possession of ideas not derived from sense; by the second 
to account for its imprisonment in the body; by the third to justify the dis- 
parity of conditions in which men enter the world. 

We concern ourselves, however, only with the forms which the view has 
assumed in modern times. Kant and Julius Muller in Germany, and Ed- 
ward Beecher in America, have advocated it, upon the ground that the 
inborn depravity of the human will can be explained only by supposing a 
personal act of self-determination in a previous or timeless state of being. 

Kant, Religion in. d. Grenzen der bl. Vernunft, 26, 27. Julius Muller, 
Doctrine of Sin, 2: 357-401. Edward Beecher, Conflict of Ages. 
Cf. Wordsworth, Intimations of Immortality; Tennyson, Two Voices. 

To this theory we urge the following objections: 

A. It is not only wholly without support from Scripture, but it directly 
contradicts the Mosaic account of man's creation in the image of God, and 
Paul's desciiption of all evil and death in the human race as the result of 
Adam's sin; (Gen. 1: 27, 31. Rom. 5: 12). 

B. If the soul in this preexistent state was conscious and personal, it is 
inexplicable that we should have no remembrance of such preexistence and 
of so important a decision in that previous condition of being; — if the soul 
was yet unconscious, the theory fails to show how a moral act involving 
consequences so vast could have been performed at all. 

C. The view sheds no light either upon the origin of sin or upon God's 
justice in dealing with it, since it throws back the first transgression to a 
state of being in which neither the flesh nor evil example existed to tempt, 
and then represents God as putting the fallen into sensuous conditions in 
the highest degree unfavorable to their restoration. 

D. While this theory accounts for inherited spiritual sin, such as pride 
and enmity to God, it gives no explanation of inherited sensual sin, which 
it holds to have come from Adam, and the goUt of which must logically be 
denied. 

Ernesti, Ursprung der Siinde 2: 1-217. Bruch, Lehre der Praexist- 
enz, translated in Bib. Sac, 20: 681. Also, Bib. Sac, 11: 186-191; 
12: 156; 17: 419-427; 20:447. Frohschammer, Ursprung der Seele. 



128 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

2. The Creatian Theory. 

This view Avas held by Aristotle, Jerome and Pelagius, and in modern 
times has been advocated by most of the Roman Catholic and Reformed 
theologians. 

It regards the soul of each human being as immediately created by God 
and joined to the body either at conception, at birth, or at some time between 
these two. 

The advocates of the theory urge in its favor certain texts of Scripture 
(asEccl. 12: 7; Isa. 57: 16; Zech. 12: 1; Heb. 12: 9), together with the 
fact that there is a marked individuality in the child which cannot be ex- 
plained as a mere reproduction of the qualities existing in the j)arents. 

Turrettin, Inst., Locus 5, Quaestio 13. Rothe, Dogmatik, 1: 249-251- 
Herzog, Realencyclopadie, art. : Seele. Hodge, Syst. Theol. , 2 : 65-76. 
Liddon, Elements of Religion, 99-106. Martensen, Dogmatics, 111-14:8. 

Creatianism is untenable for the f olio wing reasons : 

A. The passages adduced in its support may be with equal propriety 
regarded as expressing God's mediate agency in the origination of human 
souls, while the general tenor of Scripture, as we shall see, favors this latter 
interpretation. 

B. The individuality of the child, even in the most extreme cases, as in 
the sudden rise from obscure families and surroundings of marked men like 
Luther, may be better explained by supposing a law of variation impressed 
upon the species at its beginning — a law whose operation is foreseen and 
supervised by God. 

C. This theory, if it allows that the soul is originally possessed of de- 
praved tendencies, makes God the direct author of moral evil; if it holds 
the soul to have been created pure, it makes God indirectly the author of 
moral evil by teaching that he puts this pure soul into a body which will 
inevitably corrupt it. 

Kahilis, Dogmatik, 3: 250, 251. Alger, Doctrine of a Future Life, 1-17. 

3. The Tradueian Theory. 

This view was propounded by Tertullian, and implicitly held by Augustine. 
In modern times it has been the prevailing opinion of the Lutheran Church. 

It holds that the human race was immediately created in Adam and both in 
body and soul propagated from him by natural generation — all souls since 
Adam being only mediately created by God, as the upholder of the laws of 
the laws of propagation which were originally established by him. 

With regard to this view we remark : 

A. It seems to accord best with Scripture, which represents God as 
creating the species in Adam (Gen. 1; 27), and as increasing and perpetuat- 
ing it through secondary agencies; (1 : 28; cf. 22). Only once is breathed 
into man's nostrils the breath of life, (2: 17; cf. 22; 1 Cor. 11: S—yw?}^ 
hv6 P 6r. Gen. 4:1; 5:3; 46: 26; cf. Acts 17: 24-26; Heb. 7: 10) and after 
man's formation, God ceases from his work of creation; (Gen. 2: 2). 



ORIGIN OF THE SOUL. 129 

B. It is favored by the analogy of vegetable and animal life, in which 
increase of numbers is secured, not by a multiplicity of immediate creations, 
but by the natural derivation of new individuals from a parent stock. A 
derivation of the human soul from its parents no more implies a materialis- 
tic view of the soul and its endless division and subdivision, than the 
similar derivation of the brute proves the principle of intelligence in the 
lower animals to be wholly material. 

C. The observed transmission not merely of physical, but of mental and 
spiritual characteristics in families and races, and especially the uniformly 
evil moral tendencies and dispositions which all men possess from their 
birth, are proof that in soul as well as in body we derive our being from our 
human ancestry. 

D. The traducian doctrine embraces and acknowledges the element of 
truth which gives plausibility to the creatian view. Traducianism, properly 
defined, admits a divine concurrence throughout the whole development of 
the human species, and allows, under the guidance of a superintending 
Providence, special improvements in type at the birth of marked men, sim- 
ilar to those which we may suppose to have occurred in the introduction of 
new varieties in the animal creation. 

Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1 : 327-332. Birks, Difficulties of Belief, 161. 
Baird, Elohini Revealed, 137-151; 335-384. Edwards, Works, 2: 483. 
Hopkins, Works, 1: 289. Shedd, Hist. Doct., 2: 1-26. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE ORIGINAL STATE OF MAN. 

In determining man's original state, we are wholly dependent upon Scrip- 
tures. This represents human nature as coming from God's hand and 
therefore "very good ;" (Gen. 1: 31). It moreover draws a parallel between 
man's first state and that of his restoration; (Col. 3: 9, 10; Eph. 4: 24). In 
interpreting these passages, however, we are to remember the twofold 
danger, on the one hand of putting man so high that no progress is conceiv- 
able, on the other hand of putting him so low that he could not fall. "We 
shall the more easily avoid these dangers by distinguisliing between the 
essentials and the incidents of man's original state. 

On the general subject, see Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2: 337-399. Van 
Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 374-385. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 
1: 215-243. Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1: 267-276. Kahnis, Dogmatik, 
3: 283-290. Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2: 92-116. 

I. Essentials of Man's Original State. 

These are summed up in the phrase "the image of God. " In God's image 
man is said to have been created; (Gen. 1: 26, 27). In what did this image 
of God consist ? Vve reply that it consisted in : — 

1. Natural likeness to God, or personality. 

Man was created a personal being and was by this personality distin- 
guished from the brute. By personality we mean the two-fold power to 
know self as related to the world and to God, and to determine self in view 
of moral ends. 

By virtue of this personality, man could at his creation choose which of 
the objects of his knowledge, self, the world or God, should be the norm 
and centre of his development. Tliis natural likeness to God is inalienable, 
and as constituting a capacity for redemption, gives value to the life even of 
the unregenerate; (Gen. 9: 6. 1 Cor. 11: 7. James 3: 9). 

Porter, Human Intellect, 393, 394, 401. Wuttke, Christian Ethics, 
2: 42. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2: 343. 

2. Moral likeness to God, or holiness. 

In addition to the powers of self-consciousness and self-determination just 
mentioned, man was created with such a direction of the affections and will, 
as constituted God the supreme end of man's being, and constituted man a 
finite reflection of God's moral attributes. 

Since holiness is the fundamental attribute of God, this must of necessity 
be the chief attribute of his image in the moral beings whom he creates. 
That original righteousness was essential to this image is also distinctly 
taught in Scripture; (Eccl, 7: 29. Eph. 4: 24 — tov Kara Oedv KTia&ivTa ev 



ESSENTIALS OF MAN S ORIGINAL STATE. 131 

rikaioavnj Kai baiorjjTL rrj~ a?;T]d-£iag, Col. 3: 9, 10 — ~ov avaKatvoviievov elg ETriyvwaiv 
nar' eiKOva rov Kriaavroc avrov, where i-/ywjcsw==tliat knowledge of God which is 
the source of all virtue. On these two passages, see Commentaries of De 
Wette, Eiickert, Ellicott; compare also Gen. 5: 3; 2 Cor. 4: 4; Heb. 1:3). 

This original righteousness in which the image of God chiefly consisted 
is to be viewed : — 

(a) Not as constituting the substance or essence of human nature, for 

in this case, human nature would have ceased to exist as soon as man sinned; 
Mohler, Symbolism, 58, 59. 

(6) Nor as a gift from without, foreign to human nature, and added to 
it after man's creation, — for man is said to have possessed the divine image 
by the fact of creation, and not by subsequent bestowal; 

(c) But rather, as an original direction, condition or tendency of man's 
affections and will, still accompanied by the power of contrary choice, and 
so, differing from the perfected holiness of the saints, as instinctive affection 
and childlike innocence differ from the holiness that has been developed and 
confirmed by experience of tenrptation; 

(d) As a moral disposition, moreover, which was propagable to Adam's 
decendants, if it continued, and which, though lost to him and to them, if 
Adam sinned, would still leave man possessed of a natural likeness to God 
which made him susceptible of God's redeeming grace. 

Edwards, Works, 2:19,20,381-390; 3: 102-103. Hopkins, Works, 
1: 162. Shedd, Hist. Dock, 2: 50-66. 

In the light of the preceding investigation we may properly estimate two 
theories of man's original state which claim to be more Scriptural and 
reasonable : — 

A. The image of God as including only personality. 

This view is held by Nitzsch, Julius Miiller and Hofmann. 
Nitzsch, System of Christ. Doc, 201. ' Julius Miiller, Doctrine of Sin, 
2 : 113-133. Hofmann, Schrif tbeweis, 1 : 287-291. Bib. Sac. , 7 : 409-125. 

In addition to what has already been said in support of the opposite view 
we may urge against this theory the following objections : — 

(a) It is contrary to analogy, in making man the author of his own holi- 
ness; our sinful condition is not the product of our individual wills, nor is 
our subsequent condition of holiness the product of anything but God's re- 
generating power. 

'(b) The knowledge of God in which man was originally created logically 
presupposes a direction toward God of man's affections and will. 

(c) A likeness to God in mere personality, such as Satan also possesses, 
comes far short of answering the demands of the Scripture, in which the 
ethical conception of the divine nature so overshadows the merely natural. 
The image of God must be not simply ability to be like God, but actual 
likeness. 

For substance of these objections, see Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2 : 317. 
See also, Delitzsch, Bib. Psychol., 31, 78-87. 



132 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

B. The image of God as consisting simply in man's natural capacity for 
religion. 

This view, first elaborated by the Scholastics, is the doctrine of the Roman 
Catholic Church. It distinguishes between the image and the likeness of 
God. The former (S 1 ^ — Gen. 1: 27) alone belonged to man's nature at its 
creation. The latter (rv>D"J) was the product of his own acts of obedience. 
In order that this obedience might be made easier and the consequent like- 
ness to God more sure, a third element was added — an element not belong- 
ing to man's nature — namely, a supernatural gift of special grace, which 
acted as a curb upon the sensuous impulses, and brought them under the 
control of reason. 

Mohler, Symbolism, 21-35. 

Many of the considerations already adduced apply equally as arguments 
against this view. We may say however with reference to certain features 
peculiar to the theory : — 

(a) No such distinction can justly be drawn between the words O^i* and 
fi-lD"!. The addition of the synonym simply strengthens the expression and 
both together signifiy: 'the very image.' 

(b) Whatever is denoted by either or both of these words, was bestowed 
upon man in and by the fact of creation, and the additional hypothesis of a 
supernatural gift not originally belonging to man's nature but subsequently 
conferred, has no foundation either here or elsewhere in Scripture. 

(c) The natural opposition between sense and reason which this theory 
supposes, is inconsistent with the Scripture declaration that the work of 
God's hands ' was very good, ' and transfers the blame of temptation and sin 

from man to God. 

(d) This theory directly contradicts Scripture by making the effect of 
the first sin to have been a weakening but not a perversion of human nature, 
and the work of regeneration to be not a renewal of the will but a strength- 
ening of the natural powers. 

II. Incidents of Man's Okiginal State. 

1. Results of man's possession of the divine image. 

A. Reflection of this divine image in man's physical form. 

Even in man's body were typified those higher attributes which chiefly 
constituted his likeness'to God. A gross perversion of this truth, however, 
is the view which holds upon the ground of Gen. 2: 7; 3: 8, that the image 
of God consists in bodily resemblance to the Creator. In the first of these 
passages, it is not the divine image, but the body, that is formed of dust, 
and into this body the soul that possesses the divine image is breathed. 
The second of these passages is to be interpreted by those other portions of 
the Pentateuch in which God is represented as free from all limitations of 
matter; (Gen. 11 : 5; 18 : 25). 

For this view see Bretschneider, Dogmatik, 1: 682. Strauss, Glau- 
benslehre, 1: 687. Per contra, see Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2: 364. 



INCIDENTS OF MAN'S ORIGINAL STATE. 133 

B. Subjection of the sensuous impulses to the control of the spirit. 
Here we are to hold a middle ground between two extremes. On the one 

hand, the first man possessed a body and a spirit so fitted to each other that 
no conflict was felt between their several claims. On the other hand, this 
physical perfection was not final and absolute, but relative and provisional. 
There was still room for progress to a higher state of being; (Gen. 3 : 22). 

C. Dominion over the lower creation. 

Adam possessed an insight into nature analogous to that of susceptible 
childhood, and therefore was able to name and to rule the brute creation; 
(Gen. 2 : 19). Yet this native insight was capable of development into the 
higher knowledge of culture and science. 

From Gen. 1 : 26 (cf. Ps. 8 : 5-8), it has been erroneously inferred that the 
image of God in man consists in dominion over the brute creation and the 
natural world. But in this verse, the words "let them have dominion " do 
not define the image of God, but indicate the result of possessing that 
image. To make the image of God consist in this dominion, would imply 
that only the divine omnipotence was shadowed forth in man. 

For .this view, see Socinian writers generally, and especially Bacovian 
Catechism, 21. Held also by the Arminian Limborch, Theol. Christ., 
II, 24 : 2, 3, 11. 

D. Communion with God. 

Our first parents enjoyed the divine presence and teaching; (Gen. 2 : 16). 
It would seem that God manifested himself to them in visible form; (Gen. 
3:8). This companionship was both in kind and degree suited to their 
spiritual capacity, and by no means necessarily involved that perfected vision 
of God which is possible to beings of confirmed and unchangeable holiness; 
(Mat. 5: 8; 1 John 3: 2). 

2. Concomitants of marts possession of the divine image. 

A. Surroundings and society fitted to yield happiness and to assist a 
holy development of human nature; (Eden and Eve). 

B. Provision for the trying of man's virtue. 

Since man was not yet in a state of confirmed holiness, but rather of sim- 
ple child-like innocence, he could be made perfect only through temptation. 
Hence the 'tree of the knowledge of good and evil;' (Gen. 2: 9). The one 
slight command best tested the spirit of obedience. Temptation did not 
necessitate a fall. If resisted, it would strengthen virtue. In that case the 
posse non peccare would have become the non posse peccare. 

C. Opportunity of securing physical immortality. 

The body of the first man was in itself mortal; (1 Cor. 15 : 44). Science 
shows that physical life involves decay and loss. But means were appar- 
ently provided for checking this decay and preserving the body's youth. 
This means was the 'tree of life;' (Gen. 2 : 9). If Adam had maintained 
his integrity, the body might have been developed and transfigured, with- 
out intervention of death. In other words, the posse non mori might have 
become a non posse mori. 



134 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRIXE OF MAN. 

The conclusions we have thus reached with regard to the incidents of 
man's original state are combated upon two distinct grounds: 

1st. That facts bearing upon man's prehistoric condition point to a 
development from primitive savagery to civilization. Among these facts 
may be mentioned the succession of implements and weapons from stone 
to bronze and iron, the polyandry and communal marriage systems of the 
lowest tribes, the relics of barbarous customs still prevailing among the 
most civilized. 

Sir John Lubbock, Prehistoric Times; Origin of Civilization. 
"With regard to this view we remark: 

(a) It is based upon an insufficient induction of facts. History shows a 
law of degeneration supplementing and often counteracting the tendency 
to development. In the earliest times of which we have any record we find 
nations in a high state of civilization, but in the case of every nation whose 
history runs back of the Christian era, as for example, the Roman, the 
Greek, the Egyptian, the subsequent progress has been downward, and no 
nation is known to have recovered from barbarism except as the result of 
influences from without. 

Tylor, Primitive Culture, 1: 48. Whately, Origin of Civilization. 

Bib. Sac, 6: 715; 29: 282. 
(6) Later investigations have rendered it probable that the stone age 
of some localities was contemporaneous with the bronze and iron ages of 
others, while certain tribes and nations instead of progressing from one to 
the other, were never, so far back as we can trace them, without the 
knowledge and use of the metals. It is to be observed, moreover, that even 
without such knowledge and use, man is not necessarily a barbarian, 
though he may be a child. 

Southall, Recent Origin of Man, 386-449. Schhemann, Troy and her 

Remains, 274. 

(c) The barbarous customs to which this view looks for support, may 
better be explained as marks of broken-down civilization than as relics of a 
primitive and universal savagery. Even if they indicated a former state of 
barbarism, that state might have been itself preceded by a condition of 
comparative culture. 

Duke of Argyll, Primeval Man, 129, 133. 

(d) The well-nigh universal tradition of a golden age of virtue and 
happiness may be most easily explained upon the Scripture view of an 
actual creation of the race in holiness and its subsequent apostasy. 

Por references in classic writers to a golden age, see Luthardt, 
Dogmatik, 115. 

2nd. That the religious history of mankind warrants us in inferring 
a necessary and universal law of progress, in accordance with which man 
passes from fetichism to polytheism and monotheism, — this first theological 
stage, of which fetichism, polytheism and monotheism are parts, being 
succeeded by the metaphysical and that in turn by the positive. 
Comte, Positive Philosophy, 25, 26; 515-636. 



INCIDENTS OF MAN'S ORIGINAL STATE. 135 

This assumed law of progress, however, is contradicted by the following 
facts: 

(a) Not only did the monotheism of the Hebrews precede the great 
polytheistic systems of antiquity, but these very heathen religions are purer 
from polytheistic elements the further back we trace them, so that the facts 
point to an original monotheistic basis for them all. 

Martineau, Essays, 1: 24, 61. Max Muller, Chips, 1: 337. Jahrbuch 
fur deutsche Theol., 5: 669. Philip Smith, Anc. Hist, of East, 65, 195. 

(6) "There is no proof that the Indogermanic or Semitic stocks ever 
practised fetich worship, or were ever enslaved by the lowest types of 
mythological religion or ascended from them to somewhat higher." 

Quoted from Fisher, Essays on Supernatural Origin of Christian- 
ity, 545. 

(c) Some of the earliest remains of man yet found, show by the burial 
of food and weapons with the dead, that there already existed the idea of 
spiritual beings and a future state, and therefore a religion of a liigher sort 
than fetichism. 

Lyell, Antiquity of Man, quoted in Dawson, Story of Earth and Man, 
384; see also, 368, 372, 386. 

(d) The theory in question, in making theological thought a merely 
transient stage of mental evolution, ignores the fact that religion has its 
root in the intuitions and yearnings of the human soul, and that therefore, 
no philosophical or scientific progress can ever abolish it. While the terms 
theological, metaphysical and positive may properly mark the order in 
which the ideas of the individual and the race are acquired, positivism errs 
in holding that these three phases of thought are mutually exclusive and 
that upon the rise of the later the earlier must of necessity become extinct. 

On the fundamental principles of Positivism, see New Englander, 
1873: 323-386. 



CHAPTER III. 

SIN, OR MAN'S STATE OF APOSTASY. 



SECTION" I. — THE LAW OF GOD. 

As preliminary to a treatment of man's state of apostasy, it becomes neces- 
sary to consider the nature of that law of God, the transgression of which is 
sin. We may best approach the subject by inquiring what is the true con- 
ception of 

I. Law in genebal. 

The essential idea of law is that of a general expression of will enforced 
by power. It implies : — 

(a) A lawgiver, or authoritative will. 

(6) Subjects, or beings upon whom this will terminates. 

(c) A general command, or expression of this will. 

(d) A power, enforcing the command. 

These elements are found even in what we call natural law. The phrase 
* law of nature ' involves a self-contradiction when used to denote a mode of 
action or an order of sequence, behind which there is conceived to be no 
intelligent and ordaining will. 

Science derives the term law from the relations of voluntary agents, not 
vice versa. In her very use of the word she implicitly confesses that a 
supreme Will has set general rules which control the processes of the physi- 
cal and organic universe. 

The characteristic of law is generality. It is addressed to substances or 
persons in classes. Special legislation is contrary to the true theory of law. 
It is moreover essential to th'e existence of law, that there be power to en- 
force. Otherwise law becomes the expression of mere wish or desire. Since 
physical substances and forces have no intelligence and no power to resist, 
the four elements already mentioned exhaust the implications of the term 
law as applied to nature. In the case of rational and free agents, however, 
law implies in addition : — 

(e) Duty, or obligation to obey; and 

(/) Sanctions, or pains and penalties for disobedience. 

Rewards are motives, but they are not sanctions. Since public opinion 
may be conceived of as inflicting penalties for violation of her will, we 
speak figuratively of the laws of society, of fashion, of etiquette, of honor. 
Only so far as the community of nations can and does by sanctions compel 
obedience, can we with propriety assert the existence of international law. 

But the will which thus binds its subjects by commands and penalties is 
an expression of the nature of the governing power, and reveals the normal 
relations of the subjects to that power. Law is therefore, .finally, 
g) An expression of the nature of the lawgiver; and 

(A) Sets forth the condition or conduct in the subjects which is requisite 
for harmony with that nature. 



THE LAW OF GOD IN PARTICULAR. 137 

On the nature and definition of law, see Porueroy, in Johnson's Ency- 
clopedia, art. : 'Law.' Alirens, Cours de Droit Naturel, bk. 1, sec. 14. 
Austin, Province of Jurisprudence, 1: 88-93; 220-223. Amos, Science 
of Law, 33, 34, 48. Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, bk. 1, ch. 1. Way- 
land, Moral Science, 1. Paley, Nat. Theol., chap. 1. Kant, Metaphy- 
sic of Ethics, 169, 170, 172. Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, 64. J. S. 
Mill, quoted in "Webster's Diet. , at the word ' Law. ' 
II. The Law of God in particular. 

The law of God is a general expression of the divine will enforced by 
power. It has two forms: Elemental Law and Positive Enactment. 

1. Elemental Law, or law inwrought into the substances and forces of 
the rational and irrational creation. This is twofold: 

A. The expression of the divine will in the constitution of the material 
universe; — this we call physical, or natural law. 

B. The expression of the divine will in the constitution of rational and 
free agents; — this we call moral law. This elemental law of our moral nature 
with which only we are now concerned, has all the characteristics mentioned 
as belonging to law in general. It implies: — - 

[a) A divine Lawgiver, or ordaining will. 

(6) Subjects, or moral beings upon whom the law terminates. 

(c) General command, or expression of this will in the moral constitution 
of the subjects. 

(d) Power, enforcing the command. 

(e) Duty, or obligation to obey. 

(/) Sanctions, or pains and penalties for disobedience. 

All these are of a loftier sort than are found in human law. But we need 
specially to emphasize the fact that this law is an 

(g) Expression of the moral nature of God, and therefore of God's holi- 
ness, the fundamental attribute of that nature; and that it 

(h) Sets forth absolute conformity to that holiness, as the normal condi- 
tion of man. This law is inwrought into man's rational and moral being. 
Man fulfils it only when in Ms moral as well as his rational being he is the 
image of God. 

To the existence of this law all men bear witness. The consciences even 
of the heathen testify to it; (Rom. 2: 14, 15 — to epyov tov vofiov ypanrbv kv rdig 
Kajjoiatq avrov). Those who have the written law recognize this elemental law 
as of greater compass and penetration; (Rom. 7: 14 — vo/ioc Trvev/uarinoc ear/v. 
8: 4 — oi.Kaicojia tov vo/iov — Kara Hvev/aa). The perfect embodiment and fulfil- 
ment of this law is seen only in Christ; (Rom. 10: 4; Phil. 3: 8, 9). 
See on the passages from Romans, the Commentary of Philippi. 

Since the law of God is a transcript of the divine nature, certain concep- 
tions of it are excluded. It is 

(a) Not arbitrary; since there is no constraint, rashness or unwisdom on 
the part of God. 

(6) Not temporary, or ordained simply to meet an exigency; since its 
chief end is to manifest God. 
10 



138 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

(c) Not local; since no moral creature can escape from God or from his 
own being. 

(d) Not capable of change, or consisting in a sliding-scale of requirements 
adapted to the ability of the subjects; since God himself is unchangeable. 

A law thus identical with the eternal and necessary relations of the crea- 
ture to the Creator, and demanding of the creature nothing less than perfect 
holiness as the condition of harmony with the infinite holiness of God, is 
adapted: 

(a) To man's finite nature, as needing law. 

(6) To man's free nature, as needing moral law. 

(c) To man's progressive nature, as needing ideal law. 

The law of God is therefore all-comprehensive. It is over us at all times; 
it respects our past, our present, our future. It forbids every conceivable 
sin; it requires every conceivable virtue; omissions as well as commissions 
are condemned; (Ps. 119: 96; Eom. 3: 23; James 4: 17). It is spiritual, 
demanding not only right acts and words, but also right dispositions and 
states. Perfect obedience requires not only the intense and unremitting- 
reign of love toward God and man, but conformity of the whole inward and 
outward nature of man to the holiness of God; (Mark 12: 30, 31; 1 Pet. 1: 16). 

Only to the first man, then, was the law proposed as a method of salvation. 
With the first sin all hope of attaining the divine favor by perfect obedience 
is lost. To sinners, the law remains as a means of discovering and develop- 
ing sin in its true nature, and of compelling a recourse to the mercy provided 
in Jesus Christ; (Eom. 3: 20; Gal. 3: 24 — -aidayuybz elg Xpiardv). 

2. Positive Enactment, or the expression of the will of God in pub- 
lished ordinances. This is also twofold: — 

A. General moral precepts. These are written summaries of the elemen- 
tal law (Mat. 5:48; 22:36-40), or authorized applications of it to special 
human conditions (Ex. 20: 1-17; Mat. 5-8). 

B. Ceremonial or special injunctions. These are illustrations of the ele- 
mental law or approximate revelations of it suited to lower degrees of 
capacity and to earlier stages of spiritual training. Though temporary, only 
God can say when they cease to be binding upon us in their outward form. 

All positive enactments, therefore, whether they be moral or ceremonial, 
are republications of elemental law. Their forms may change, but the sub- 
stance is eternal. Certain modes of expression, like the Mosaic system, may 
be abolished, but the essential demands are unchanging; (Mat. 5: 17, 18). 
From the imperfection of human language, no positive enactments are able 
to express in themselves the whole content and meaning of the elemental 
law. "It is not the purpose of revelation to disclose the whole of our 
duties." Scripture is not a complete code of rules for practical action, but 
an enunciation of principles, with occasional precepts by way of illustration. 
Hence we must supplement the positive enactment by the law of being — 
the moral ideal found in the nature of God. 

On the Law of God, see Fairbairn, Revelation of Law in Scripture. 

Baird, Elohim Revealed, 187-242. Hovey, God with us, 187-210. 

Wuttke, Christian Ethics, 2: 82-92. Julius Muller, Doctrine of Sin, 

1: 45-50. Whewell, Elements of Morality, 2: 35. Murphy, Scientific 

Bases, 53-71. 



RELATION OF LAW TO GRACE. 139 

III. Relation of the Law to the Grace of God. 

In human government, while law is an expression of the will of the 
governing power and so of the nature lying behind the will, it is by no 
means an exhaustive expression of that will and nature, since it consists 
only of general ordinances, and leaves room for particular acts of command 
through the executive, as well as for "the institution of equity, the faculty 
of discretionary punishment, and the prerogative of pardon." 
Amos, Science of Law, 29-46, 

Applying this illustration to the subject under consideration, we remark: 

1. The law of God is a general expression of God's will, applicable to all 
moral beings. It therefore does not exclude the possibility of special in- 
junctions to individuals and special acts of wisdom and power in creation 
and providence. The very specialty of these latter expressions of will pre- 
vents us from classing them under the category of law. 

2. The law of God, accordingly, is a partial, not an exhaustive expres- 
sion of God's nature. It constitutes, indeed, a manifestation of that 
attribute of holiness which is fundamental in God, and which man must 
possess in order to be in harmony with God. But it does not fully express 
God's nature in its aspects of personality, sovereignty, helpfulness, mercy. 

3. Mere law, therefore, leaves God's nature in these aspects of person- 
ality, sovereignty, helpfulness, mercy, to be expressed toward sinners in 
another way, namely through the atoning, regenerating, pardoning, sancti- 
fying work of the gospel of Christ. As creation does not exclude miracles, 
so law does not exclude grace; (Rom. 8: 3 — to yap a&bvarov rob vo/wv, 6 Qebg 
[sc. £TToir/o£v~] ). 

4. Grace is to be regarded, however, not as abrogating law but as repub- 
lishing and enforcing it; (Rom. 3: 31 — vo/uov loTa/iev). By removing obstacles 
to pardon in the mind of God and by enabling man to obey, grace secures 
the perfect fulfilment of law; (Rom. 8: 4 — Ivarb Smaia/Lia rov vo/wv rrhjpatty), 
Even grace has its law (Rom. 8: 2 — vopcog rov ILvev/xarog ttjq C,afjg); another 
higher law of grace, the operation of individualizing mercy, overbears the 
'law of sin and death,' — this last, as in the case of the miracle, not being- 
suspended, annulled or violated, but being merged in, while it is trans- 
cended by, the exertion of personal divine will. 

5. Thus the revelation of grace, while it takes up and includes in itself 
the revelation of law, adds something different in kind, namely, the mani- 
festation of the personal love of the Lawgiver. Without grace, law has 
only a demanding aspect. Only in connection with grace does it become 
"the perfect law of liberty;" (James 1: 25). In fine, grace is that larger 
and completer manifestation of the divine nature, of which law constitutes 
the necessary but preparatory stage. 

Dorner, Hist. Doct. Person of Christ, 1: 64, 78, 79. Hooker, Eccl. 
Polity, 1: 155, 185, 194. Lord Bacon, Confession of Faith. Farrar, 
Science and Theology, 184. Salmon, Reign of Law. Murphy, Scien- 
tific Bases, 303-327. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 1: 31. Versus Strauss, 
Glaubenslehre, 1: 229; Baden Powell, Law and Gospel, in Noyes' 
Theological Essays, 27; Greg, Creed of Christendom, 2: 217-228. 



140 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

SECTION II. — NATURE OF SIN. 
I. Definition of Sin. 

Sin is lack of conformity to the moral law of God, either in act, disposi- 
tion or state. 

1. Explanations. 

A. This definition regards sin as predicable only of rational and volun- 
tary agents. 

B. It assumes, however, that man has a rational nature below conscious- 
ness, and a voluntary nature apart from actual volition. 

C. It holds that the divine law requires moral likeness to God in the 
affections and tendencies of the nature as well as in its outward activities. 

D. It therefore considers lack of conformity to the divine holiness in 
disposition or state, as a violation of law equally with the outward act of 
transgression. 

2. Proof. 

As it is readily admitted that the outward act of transgression is properly 
denominated sin, we here attempt to show only that lack of conformity to 
the law of God in disposition or state is also and equally to be so de- 
nominated. 

A. From Scripture. 

(a) The words ordinarily translated ' sin, ' or used as synonyms for it, are 
as applicable to dispositions and states as to acts; (H^cpn and duapna — a 
missing, failure, coming short [sc. of God's will]; see Num. 15: 28, Ps. 51: 
2, Eom. 3:23; cf. Judges 20: 16. JW§ [lxx. d<7£/foa]=separation from, re- 
bellion against [sc. God]; see Lev. 16: 16, 21; cf. Delitzsch on Ps. 32: 
1. jty [nxx. a&Kia]=bending, perversion [sc. of what is right], iniquity; 
see Lev. 5: 17; cf. John 7: 18. So also the Hebrew JH, V&1, [=ruin, 
confusion], and the Greek diroaraala, eTrc&vjuia, sxtfpa, nania, Trovtjpia, odp$. 

On the words mentioned, see Girdlestone, O. T. Synonyms, and Cremer, 
Lexicon N. T. Greek. 

(6) The New Testament descriptions of sin bring more distinctly to view 
the states and dispositions than the outward acts of the soul; (1 John 3 : 4- 
7/ dpapria scrip >) avopia, where dvofiia = not 'transgression of the law,' but, 
as both context and etymology show, ' lack of conformity to law.' 5 : 17 — 
itdaa ddiKia dpapria ear'tv. Rom. 3 : 23 — i/paprov — uarspovvrai r?)g 66^r/g rov Qeov. 
14 : 23 — ndv 6e b ovk etc irtareug, dpapria ear'tv. James 4 : 17 — eldori ovv KaAbv 
TTOielv, iwl uij TzoiOvvTL, dpapria av~(l) ear/v). 

(c) Moral evil is ascribed not only to the thoughts and affections, but to 
the heart from which they spring; (Matt. 5 : 22, 28; 15 : 19 — dtaloyiafwl 
TTovqpoi. Luke 6 : 45 — £k rov irovrjpov [sc. drjoavpov rijg Kapdiag]. Heb. 3 ; 12 — 
napdiaTzovrjpd diriGriag. Of. Is. 1: 5; Jer. 17: 9). 

(d) The state or condition of the soul which gives rise to wrong desires 
and acts is expressly called sin; (John 8 : 34 — dovAog kart rf/g d/nap-iag. Rom. 
7 : 8 — V dpaprla Karetoydoaro ev spot Trdaav kizi&vpiav- Cf. verses 11, 13, 14, 
17, 20). 



DEFINITION OF SIN. 141 

(e) Sin is represented as existing in the soul, prior to the consciousness 
of it, and as only discovered and awakened by the law; (Rom. 8: 9, 10 — 
z"k$ovc7}Q da Tf/c h>ToAf/c, y &/ucif)Tia dvtCr/aev), 

(/) The allusions to sin as a permanent power or reigning principle, not 
only in the individual, but in humanity at large, forbid us to define it as a 
momentary act, and compel us to regard it as being primarily a settled de- 
pravity of nature, of which individual sins or acts of transgression are only 
the workings and fruits; (Rom. 5: 21 — kfiaoLkevcev r) d/uaprla kv rtidavdrv- 6: 12 — 
lit) ovv fiacrfieveTG) r) djuaprla kv tQ -&vi/tuj vjxc)v aco/mri). 

Edwards, Works, 3: 16-18. Schmid, Bib. Theol. N. T., 194, 381, 442, 
488, 492, 604. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 3: 210-217. Julius Muller, 
Doct. Sin, 2: 259-306. 

B. From the common judgment of mankind. 

(a) Men universally attribute vice as well as virtue not only to conscious 
and deliberate acts, but also to dispositions and states. Belief in something 
more permanently evil than acts of transgression is indicated in the common 
phrases : ' hateful temper, ' ' wicked pride, ' ' bad character. ' 

(b) Outward acts indeed are condemned, only when they are regarded 
as originating in, and as symptomatic of, evil dispositions. Civil law pro- 
ceeds upon this principle in holding crime to consist not alone in the 
external act but also in the evil motive or intent with which it is performed. 

(c) The stronger an evil disposition, or in other words, the more it con- 
nects itself with, or resolves itself into, a settled state or condition of the soul, 
the more blameworthy it' is felt to be. This is shown by the distinction 
drawn between crimes of passion and crimes of deliberation. 

(d) This condemning sentence remains the same whatever the origin of 
the evil disposition or state may be. Neither the general sense of mankind, 
nor the law in which this general sense is expressed, goes behind the fact of 
an existing evil will, — whether inherited or resulting from personal trans- 
gression, this evil will is the man himself, and upon him terminates the 
blame. 

(e) When any evil disposition has such strength in itself, or is so com- 
bined with others, as to indicate a settled moral corruption in which no 
power to do good remains, this state is regarded with the deepest disappro- 
bation of all. Sin weakens man's power of obedience, but the can-not is a 
will-not, and is therefore condemnable. The opposite principle would lead 
to the conclusion that the more a man weakened his powers by transgression, 
the less guilty he would be, until absolute depravity became absolute in- 
nocence. 

Shedd, Hist. Doct., 2: 79-92, 152-157. Richards, Lectures on The- 
ology, 256-301. Edwards, Works, 2 : 134. Baird, Elohim Revealed, 
243-262. Princeton Essays, 2: 224-239. Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 
394. 

C. From the experience of the Christian. 

Christian experience is a testing of Scripture truth and therefore is not an 
independent source of knowledge. It may however corroborate conclusions 



142 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

drawn from the word of God. Since the judgment of the Christian is formed 
under the influence of the Holy Spirit, we may trust this more implicitly 
than the general sense of the world. We affirm, then, that just in propor- 
tion to his spiritual enlightenment and self-knowledge, the Christian 

(a) Regards his outward deviations from God's law, and his evil inclina- 
tions and desires, as outgrowths and revelations of a depravity of nature 
which lies below his consciousness, and 

(6) Repents more deeply for this depravity of nature which constitutes 
his inmost character and is inseparable from himself, than for what he 
merely feels or does. 

In proof of these statements we appeal to the biographies and writings of 
those in all ages who have been by general consent regarded as most 
advanced in spiritual culture and discernment. 

See Augustine, Confessions, bk. 10. On Luther's experience, see Mar- 
tensen, Dogmatics, 389. Jonathan Edwards, Autobiography, in Works, 
1 : 25, 26. Thomas a Kempis, Imitation of Christ, Gould and Lincoln's 
ed., 142. 
3. Inferences. 

In the light of the preceding discussion we may properly estimate the 
elements of truth and of error in the common definition of sin as 'the volun- 
tary transgression of known law. ' 

A. Not all sin is voluntary as being a distinct and conscious volition, — 
for evil disposition and state precede and cause evil volition, and evil dis- 
position and state are themselves sin. All sin, however, is voluntary, as 
springing from those perverse affections and desires which constitute the 
evil state of the will. Will, therefore, is not to be regarded as simply the 
faculty of volitions, but as primarily the underlying determination of the 
whole being to a supreme end. 

B. Deliberate intention to sin is an aggravation of transgression, but it 
is not essential to constitute any given act or feeling a sin. Those evil incli- 
nations and impulses which rise unbidden and master the soul before it is 
well aware of their nature, are themselves violations of the divine law, and 
indications of an inward depravity which in the case of each individual is 
the chief and fontal transgression. 

C. Knowledge of the sinfulness of an act or feeling is also an aggrava- 
tion of transgression, but it is not essential to constitute it a sin. Moral 
blindness is the effect of transgression, and as inseparable from corrupt 
affections and desires, is itself condemned by the divine law. 

D. Ability to fulfil the law is not essential to constitute the non-fulfilment 
sin. Inability to fulfil the law is a result of transgression, and as con- 
sisting not in an original deficiency of faculty but in a settled state of the 
affections and will, it is itself condemnable. Since the law presents the 
holiness of God as the only standard for the creature, ability to obey can 
never be the measure of obligation or the test of sin. 

On the definition of sin, see Hodge, Outlines of Theology, 234, 235. 
Charles Hodge, Syst. TheoL, 2: 180-190. Julius Muller, Doct. Sin, 



DEFINITION OF SIN. 143 

1: 40-72. Lawrence, Old School in N. E. Theol., in Bib. Sac, 20: 
317-328. Nitzsch, Christian Doct., 216. Hase, Hutterns Kedivivus, 
11th ed., 162-164. Luthardt, Compendium der Dogmatik, 124-126. 
Versus Fairchild, Nature of Sin, in Bib. Sac, 25: 30-48, and Whedon, 
in Bib. Sac, 19: 251. 

II. The Essential Principle of Sin. 

The definition of sin as lack of conformity to the divine law, does not ex- 
clude but rather necessitates an inquiry into the characterizing motive or 
impelling power which explains its existence and constitutes its guilt. 
Three views only require extended examination : — 

1. Sin as Sensuousness. 

This view regards sin as the necessary product of man's sensuous nature — 
a result of the soul's connection with a physical organism. 

Schleiermacher, Der Christliche Glaube, 1 : 361-364, Bothe, Dogmatik, 
1:300-302. 

In refutation of this view it will be sufficient to urge the following con- 
siderations : — 

A. It involves an assumption of the inherent evil of matter, at least so 
far as regards the substance of man's body. But this is either a form of 
dualism and may be met with the objections already brought against that 
system, or it implies that God, in being the author of man's physical organ- 
ism, is also the responsible originator of human sin. 

B. It rests upon an incomplete induction of facts, taking account of sin 
solely in its aspect of self-degradation, but ignoring the worse aspect of it 
as self-exaltation. Avarice, envy, pride, ambition, malice, cruelty, revenge, 
self -righteousness, unbelief, enmity to God, are none of them fleshly sins, 
and upon this principle are incapable of explanation. 

C. It leads to absurd conclusions, — as for example, that asceticism by 
weakening the power of sense must weaken the power of sin; that man be- 
comes less sinful as his senses fail with age; that disembodied spirits are 
necessarily holy. 

D. Instead of explaining sin, this theory virtually denies its existence, — 
for if it arises from the original constitution of our being, reason may recog- 
nize it as misfortune, but conscience cannot attribute to it guilt. 

E. It erroneously interprets Scripture. In passages like Rom. 7: 18 — 
ova oIkeT ev e/mu, tovt' eoTiv ev rrj caput iwv, ayaSov. — aap^ signifies, not man's body, 
but man's whole being when destitute of the Spirit of God. The Scriptures 
distinctly recognize the seat of sin as being in the soul itself, not in its 
physical organism. God does not tempt man, nor has he made man's nature 
to tempt him; (James 1: 13, 14). 

Julius Muller, Doct. Sin, 1: 295-333, especially 321; Proof -texts, 19. 
Ernesti, Ursprung der Sunde, 1: 29-274. Neander, Planting and 
Training, 386, 428. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2: 132-147. 



144 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

2. Sin as Finiteness. 

This view explains sin as a necessary result of the limitations of man's 
finite being. As an incident of imperfect development, the fruit of ignorance 
and impotence, sin is not absolutely but only relatively evil — an element in 
human education and a means of progress. 

Leibnitz, The'odice'e, part 1, § 20, 31. Spinoza, Ethics, part 4, prop. 20. 

We object to this theory, that 

A. Like the sense-theory of sin, it contradicts both conscience and Scrip- 
ture by denying human responsibility and by transferring the blame of sin 
from the creature to the Creator. This is to explain sin, again, by denying 
its existence. 

B. It is inconsistent with known facts, — as for example, the following: 
Not all sins are negative sins of ignorance and infirmity; there are acts of 
positive malignity, conscious transgressions, willful and presumptuous 
choices of evil. Increased knowledge of the nature of sin does not of 
itself give strength to overcome it, but on the contrary, repeated acts of 
conscious transgression harden the heart in evil. Men of greatest mental 
powers are not of necessity the greatest saints, nor are the greatest sinners 
men of least strength of will and understanding. 

C. It rests upon a pantheistic basis, as the sense-theory rests upon 
dualism. The moral is confounded with the physical; might is identified 
with right. Since sin is a necessary incident of finiteness and creatures can 
never be infinite, it follows that sin must be everlasting not only in the 
universe, but in each individual soul. 

Miiller, Doct. Sin, 1: 271-295. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 3: 123-131. 

3. Sin as Selfishness. 

"We hold the essential principle of sin to be selfishness. By selfishness 
we mean not simply that exaggerated self-love which constitutes the anti- 
thesis of benevolence, but that choice of self as the supreme end which 
constitutes the antithesis of supreme love to God. 

That selfishness is the essence of sin may be shown as follows : 

A. Love to God is the essence of all virtue. The opposite to this, the 
choice of self as the supreme end, must therefore be the essence of sin. 

We are to remember, however, that the love to God in which virtue con- 
sists, is love for that which is most characteristic and fundamental in God, 
namely, his holiness. It is not to be confounded with supreme regard for 
God's interests or for the good of being in general. Not mere benevolence, 
but love for God as holy, is the principle and source of holiness in man. 
Since the love of God required by the law is of this sort, it not only does 
not imply that love, in the sense of benevolence, is the essence of holiness 
in God, — it implies rather that holiness, or self -loving and self -affirming 
purity, is fundamental in the divine nature. From this self-loving and 
self-aifirming purity, love properly so-called, or the self-communicating 
attribute, is to be carefully distinguished; (see page 64). 

Hovey, God with us, 187-200. Hopkins, Works, 1 : 235. F. W. 
Bobertson, Sermon I, 



THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE OF SIN. 145 

B. All the different forms of sin can be shown to have their root in 
selfishness, while selfishness itself, considered as the choice of self as a 
supreme end, cannot be resolved into any simpler elements. 

Selfishness may reveal itself in the elevation to supreme dominion of any 
one of man's natural appetites, desires or affections. Sensuality is selfish- 
ness in the form of inordinate appetite. Selfish desire takes the forms 
respectively of avarice, ambition, vanity, pride, according as it is set upon 
property, power, esteem, independence. Selfish affection is falsehood or 
malice, according as it hopes to make others its voluntary servants, or regards 
them as standing in its way; it is unbelief or enmity to God, according as it 
simply turns away from the truth and love of God, or conceives of God's 
holiness as positively resisting and punishing it. 

Even in the nobler forms of unregenerate life, the principle of selfishness 

is to be regarded as manifesting itself in the preference of lower ends to 

that of God's proposing. Others are loved with idolatrous affection because 

these others are regarded as a part of self. That the selfish element is 

present even here, is evident upon considering that such affection does not 

seek the highest interest of its object, that it often ceases when unreturned, 

and that it sacrifices to its own gratification the claims of God and his law. 

Julius Muller, Doct. Sin, 1 : 147-182. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 3: 5,6. 

Baird, Elohim Kevealed, 243-262. Stewart, Active and Moral Powers, 

11-91. Hopkins, Moral Science, 86-156. 

0. This view accords best with Scripture. 

(a) The law requires love to God as its all-embracing requirement; 
(Matt. 22 : 37-39. Rom. 13 : 8-10. Gal. 5 : 14. James 2 : 8). 

(b) The holiness of Christ consisted in this, that he sought not his own 
will or glory, but made God his supreme end; (John 5 : 30; 7: 18. Rom. 
15: 3). 

(c) The Christian is one who has ceased to live for self ; (Rom. 14: 7. 
2 Cor. 5 : 15. Gal. 2 : 20). 

(d) The tempter's promise is a promise of selfish independence; (Gen. 
3: 5). 

(e) The prodigal separates himself from the father and seeks his own 
iuterest and pleasure; (Luke 15 : 12, 13). 

(/) The 'man of sin' illustrates the nature of sin, in 'opposing and 
exalting himself above all that is called God; ' (2 Thess. 2 : 4). 

Sin therefore is not merely a negative thing or an absence of love to God. 
It is a fundamental and positive choice or preference of self instead of God, 
as the object of affection and the supreme end of being. Instead of making 
God the centre of his life, surrendering himself unconditionally to God and 
possessing himself only in subordination to God's will, the sinner makes 
self the centre of his life, sets himself directly against God, and constitutes 
• his own interest the supreme motive and his own will the supreme rule. 

We may follow Dr. E. G. Robinson in saying that while sin as a state is 
unlikeness to God, as a principle is opposition to God, and as an act is trans- 
gression of God's law, the essence of it always and everywhere is selfishness. 
It is therefore not something external, or the result of compulsion from 
without, — it is a depravity of the affections and a perversion of the will, which 
constitutes man's inmost character. 



146 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

SECTION III. UNIVERSALITY OF SIN. 

Ill showing that sin is universal in the human race, we divide our proof 
into two parts. In the first, we regard sin in its aspect as conscious violation 
of law; in the second, in its aspect as a bias of the nature to evil, prior to 
or underlying consciousness. 

I. Every human being who has arrived at moral consciousness, 

HAS COMMITTED ACTS OR CHERISHED DISPOSITIONS CONTRARY TO THE DI- 
VINE LAW. 

1. Proof from Scripture. 

The universality of transgression is 

A. Set forth in direct statements; (IK. 8: 46. Ps. 143: 2. Prov. 20: 9. 
Eccl. 7: 20. Rom. 3: 9-12, 19, 20, 23. Gal. 3: 22. 1 John 1: 8; cf. 
Matt. 6: 12, 14; Luke 11: 13). 

B. Implied in declarations of the universal need of atonement (Mark 
16: 16. John 3: 16; 6: 51; 12: 47. Acts 4: 12), regeneration (John 3: 
3, 5), and repentance (Acts 17 : 30). 

C. Shown from the condemnation resting upon all who do not accept 
Christ; (John 3: 18, 36: cf. 1 John 5 : 19). 

Passages like Matt. 9: 12, 13, Luke 10: 30-37, Acts 10: 35, Rom. 2: 14, 
seem at first sight to be inconsistent with the doctrine here enunciated. A 
closer examination, however, will show that in each case, the goodness sup- 
posed is either a merely imperfect and fancied goodness, or else a goodness 
resulting from the trust of a conscious sinner in God's method of salvation. 

2. Proof from history, observation, and the common judgment of 
mankind. 

A. History witnesses to the universality of sin, in her accounts of the 
universal prevalence of priesthood and sacrifice. 

B. Every man knows himself to have come short of moral perfection, 
and in proportion to his experience of the world, recognizes the fact that 
every other man has come short of it also. 

C. The common judgment of mankind declares that there is an element 
of selfishness in every human heart, and that every man is prone to some 
form of sin. This common judgment is expressed in the maxims: "no 
man is perfect"; " every man has his weak side" or "his price"; and every 
great name in literature has attested its truth. 

See references in Luthardt, Fundamental Truths, 181-185, 393-397. 

3. Proof from Christian experience. 

A. In proportion to his spiritual progress does the Christian recognize 
evil dispositions within him, which but for divine grace might germinate 
and bring forth the most various forms of outward transgression. 

See Goodwin's experience, in Baird, Elohim Revealed, 499. 

B. Since those most enlightened by the Holy Spirit, recognize them- 
selves as guilty of unnumbered violations of the divine law, the absence of 
any consciousness of sin on the part of unregenerate men must be regarded 
as proof that they are blinded by persistent transgression. 



A CORRUPT NATURE COMMON TO THE RACE. 147 

Julius Miiller, Doct. Sin, 2: 248-259. Edwards, Works, 2: 326. Shedd, 
Sermons to the Natural Man, 86, 87. 
II. Every member of the human race without exception posses- 
ses A CORRUPTED NATURE WHICH IS THE SOURCE OF ACTUAL SIN AND IS 
ITSELF SIN. 

1. Proof from Scripture. 

A. All men are declared to be by nature children of wrath; (Eph. 2: 3). 
Here 'nature' signifies something inborn and original, as distinguished from 
that which is subsequently acquired. The text implies that 

(a) Sin is a nature, in the sense of a congenital depravity of the will. 

(b) This nature is justly condemnable, — since God's wrath rests only 
upon that which deserves it. 

(c) All men participate in this nature and in this consequent condem- 
nation. 

See Harless, Commentary on Ephesians, in loco. 

B. Death, the penalty of sin, is visited even upon those who have never 
exercised a personal and conscious choice; (Rom. 5: 12, 14). This text im- 
plies that 

(a) Sin exists in the case of infants prior to moral consciousness, and 
therefore in the nature, as distinguished from the personal activity. 

(b) Since infants die, this visitation of the penalty of sin upon them 
marks the ill- desert of that nature which contains in itself, though unde- 
veloped, the germs of actual transgression. 

(c) It is therefore certain that a sinful and condemnable nature belongs 
to all mankind. 

C. Sinful acts and dispositions are referred to, and explained by, a corrupt 
nature (Luke 6 : 43-45; cf. Matt. 12: 34. Ps. 58: 3) which underlies 
consciousness (Ps. 19 : 12), which man cannot change of his own power 
(Jer. 13: 23; Rom. 7: 24), which chiefly constitutes him a sinner before 
God (Ps. 51: 5, 6, 7. Jer. 17 : 9), and which is the common heritage of the 
race; (Job 14: 4. John 3:6). 

2. Proof from Reason. 
Three facts demand explanation: 

A. The universal existence of sinful dispositions in every mind, and of 
sinful acts in every life. 

B. The preponderating tendencies to evil, which necessitate the constant 
education of good impulses, while the bad grow of themselves. 

C. The yielding of the will to temptation, and the actual violation of the 
divine law, in the case of every human being so soon as he reaches moral 
consciousness. 

Reason seeks an underlying principle which will reduce these multitudi- 
nous phenomena to unity. As we are compelled to refer common physical 
and intellectual phenomena to a common physical and intellectual nature, 
so we are compelled to refer these common moral phenomena to a common 
moral nature, and to find in it the cause of this universal, spontaneous and 
all-controlling opposition to God and his law. The only possible solution 
of the problem is this, that the common nature of mankind is corrupt, or in 



148 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

other words, that the human will, prior to the single volitions of the in- 
dividual, is turned away from God and supremely set upon self -gratification. 
This unconscious and fundamental direction of the will, as the source of all 
actual sin, must itself be the sin par excellence, — and of this sin all mankind 
are partakers. 

Chase's Edition of Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Introd. , xxv, xxvi, 
and 32. Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2: 231-238. Shedd, Discourses and 
Essays, 226-236. Julius Midler, Doct. Sin., 2: 259-307. 



SECTION TV. — ORIGIN OF SIN. 

With regard to the origin of this sinful nature which is common to the 
race, and which is the source of all actual transgressions, reason affords no 
light. The Scriptures, however, refer the origin of this nature to that free 
act of our first parents by which they turned away from God, corrupted 
themselves, and brought themselves under the penalties of the law. 

I. The ScEiPTURAii Account in Genesis. 

1. Its general character not mythical or allegorical, but historical. 
We adopt this view for the following reasons: — 

A. There is no intimation in the account itself that it is not historical. 

B. As part of a historical book, the presumption is that it is itself his- 
torical. 

0. The later Scripture writers refer to it as veritable history even in its 
details; (John 8: 44 2 Cor. 11: 3. Kev. 20: 2). 

D. Particular features of the narrative, such as the placing of our first 
parents in a garden and the speaking of the tempter through a serpent-form, 
are incidents suitable to man's condition of innocent but untried childhood. 

E. This view that the narrative is historical does not forbid our assuming 
that the trees of life and of knowledge were symbols of spiritual truths, 
while at the same time they were outward realities. 

Boston Lectures for 1871 : 80, 81. Versus Hase, Hutterus Redivivus, 
161, 165, and Mtzsch, Christ. Doct., 218. 

2. Tlie course of the temptation and the resulting fall. 
The stages of the temptation appear to have been as follows : 

A. An appeal on the part of Satan to innocent appetites, together with 
an implied suggestion that God was arbitrarily withholding the means of 
their gratification; (Gen. 3: 1). 

The first sin was in Eve's isolating herself and regarding her own pleasure 
as a thing to be sought for a moment apart from God's will. This initial 
selfishness it was, which led her to listen to the tenipter instead of rebuking 
him or flying from him, and to exaggerate the divine command in her 
response; (Gen. 3: 3). 

B. A denial of the veracity of God on the part of the tempter, with a 
charge against the Almighty of jealousy and fraud in keeping his creatures 
in a position of ignorance and dependence; (Gen. 3: 4, 5). 



DIFFICULTIES CONNECTED WITH THE EALL. 149 

This was followed, on the part of the woman, by positive unbelief and by 
a conscious and presumptuous cherishing of desire for the forbidden fruit, 
as a means of independence and knowledge. Thus unbelief, pride and lust 
all sprang from the self -isolating, self-seeking spirit, and fastened upon the 
means of gratifying it; (Gen. 3: 6). 

C. The tempter needed no longer to urge his suit. Having poisoned 
the fountain, the stream would of necessity be evil. Since the heart and 
its desires had become corrupt, the inward disposition naturally manifested 
itself in act; (Gen. 3: 6 — 'did eat and gave also unto her husband with 
her '=who had been with her, and had shared her choice and longing). 

Thus man fell inwardly, before the outward act of eating the forbidden 
fruit, — fell in that one fundamental determination whereby he made supreme 
choice of self instead of God. This sin of the inmost nature gave rise to 
sins of the desires, and sin of the desires led to the outward act of trans- 
gression; (James 1: 15 — r) k-itfvjuia avAKafiovca rinTei u/xaprlav). 

Baird, Elohim Revealed, 388. Miiller, Doct. Sin, 2: 381-385. 

II. Difficulties connected with the Fall considered as the per- 
sonal act of Adam. 

1. Mow could a holy being fall 1 

Here we must acknowledge that we cannot understand how the first un- 
holy emotion could have found lodgment in a mind that was set supremely 
upon God, nor how temptation could have overcome a soul in which there 
were no unholy propensities to which it could appeal. 

The mere power of choice does not explain the fact of an unholy choice. 
The fact of natural desire for sensuous and intellectual gratification does 
not explain how this desire came to be inordinate. 

Nor does it throw light upon the matter to resolve this fall into a decep- 
tion of our first parents by Satan. Their yielding to such deception pre- 
supposes distrust of God and alienation from him. Satan's fall, moreover, 
since it must have been uncaused by temptation from without, is more 
difficult to explain than Adam's fall. 

But sin is an existing fact. God cannot be its author, either by creating 
man's nature so that sin was a necessary incident of its development, or by 
withdrawing a supernatural grace which was necessary to keep man holy. 
Reason therefore has no other recourse than to accept the Scripture doctrine 
that sin originated in man's free act of revolt from God. We accept the 
doctrine of the fall without comprehending the method of it. Reason can- 
not explain sin, because sin is essentially unreason. 

2. Hoiv could God justly permit Satanic temptation ? 
We see in this permission not injustice but benevolence. 

A. Since Satan fell without external temptation, it is probable that man's 
trial would have been substantially the same, even though there had been 
no Satan to tempt him. 

B. In this case, however, man's fall would perhaps have been without 
what now constitutes its single mitigating circumstance. Self-originated 
sin would have made man himself a Satan; (Matt. 13: 28). 



150 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAX. 

C. As in the conflict with temptation, it is an advantage to objectify evil 
under the image of corruptible flesh, so it is an advantage to meet it as em- 
bodied in a personal and seducing spirit. 

D. Such temptation has in itself no tendency to lead the soid astray. If 
the soul be holy, temptation may only confirm it in virtue. Only the evil 
will, self-determined against God, can turn temptation into an occasion of 
ruin. 

Birks, Difficulties of Belief, 101. Trench, Studies in the Gospels, 
16-29. Baird, Elohim Kevealed, 385-396. 

3. How could a penalty so great, be justly connected with disobedience 
to so slight a command f 

To this question we may reply : — 

A. So slight a command presented the best test of the spirit of obedience. 

B. The external command was not arbitrary or insignificant in its sub- 
stance. It was a concrete presentation to the human will of God's claim to 
eminent domain or absolute ownership. 

C. The sanction attached to the command shows that man was not left 
ignorant of its meaning or importance. 

D. The act of disobedience was therefore the revelation of a will thor- 
oughly corrupted and alienated from God — a will given over to ingratitude, 
unbelief , ambition and rebellion. 

HI. Consequences of the Fall — so far as respects Adam. 
1. Death. This death was two fold. It was partly 

A. Physical death, or the separation of the soul from the body. 

The seeds of death naturally implanted in man's constitution, began to de- 
velop themselves the moment that access to the tree of life was denied him. 
Man from that moment was a dying creature. — But this death was also and 
chiefly 

B. Spiritual death, or the separation of the soul from God. In this are 
included 

(a) Negatively, the loss of man's moral likeness to God, or that under- 
lying tendency of his whole nature toward God, which constituted his 
original righteousness. 

(b) Positively, the depraving of all those powers, which in their united 
action with reference to moral and religious truth, we call man's moral and 
religious nature, — or in other Words, the blinding of his intellect, the cor- 
ruption of his affections and the enslavement of his will. 

In fine, man no longer made God the end of Ms life, but chose self instead. 
While he retained the power of self-determination in subordinate things, he 
lost that freedom which consisted in the power of choosing God as his ulti- 
mate aim, and became fettered by a fundamental inclination of his will 
toward evil. The intuitions of the reason were abnormally obscured, since 
these intuitions, so far as they are concerned with moral and religious truth, 
are conditioned upon a right state of the affections; and — as a necessary re- 



Theories of imputation. 151 

suit of this obscuring of reason — conscience, which as the moral judiciary of 
the soul, decides upon the basis of the law given to it by reason, became 
perverse in its deliverances. Yet this inability to judge or act aright, since 
it was a moral inability sjjriiiging ultimately from will, was itself hateful and 
condenmable. 

Shedd, Sermons to the Natural Man, 202-230; esp. 205, 

2. Positive and formal exclusion- from God' 's presence. This included 

A. The cessation of man's former familiar intercourse with God, and the 
setting up of outward barriers between man and his Maker; (cherubim and 
sacrifice). 

B. Banishment from the garden where God had specially manifested his 
presence. 

Eden was perhaps a spot reserved, as Adam's body had been, to show what 
a sinless world would be. This positive exclusion from God's presence, with 
the sorrow and pain which it involved, may have been intended to illustrate 
to man the nature of that eternal death from which he now needed to seek 
deliverance. 

Edwards, Works, 2: 390-405. Hopkins, Works, 1: 206-246. Dwight, 
Theology, 1: 393-434. Watson, Institutes, 2: 19-42. Martensen, Dog- 
matics, 155-173. Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 402-412. Philippi, Glau- 
benslehre, 3: 61-73. 



SECTION V. — IMPUTATION OF SIN. 

We have seen that all mankind are sinners, and that the transgression of 
our first parents, so far as respects the human race, was the first sin. We 
have still to consider the nature of the connection between Adam's sin and 
the depravity and condemnation of the race. 

The Scriptures teach that the transgression of our first parents constituted 
their posterity sinners, so that Adam's sin is imputed, reckoned or charged 
to every member of the race of which he was the germ and head; (Bom. 
5: 12—19; especially 19 — 6ta rrjg TrapanoT/c; rov evog avd-puTtov duafjrcjAol Kareord^yjaav 
ol izoTCkol). 

Among the many attempted explanations of the Scriptural statements, the 
following are most worthy of attention. 

I. Theories of Imputation. 

1. The Pelagian Theory. 

Pelagius, a British monk, propounded his doctrines at Rome, 409. They 
were condemned by the Synod of Carthage, 412. Pelagianism, however, as 
opposed to Augustinism, designates a complete scheme of doctrine with re- 
gard to sin, of which Pelagius was the most thorough representative, 
although every feature of it cannot be ascribed to his authorship. Socinians 
and Unitarians are the more modern advocates of this general scheme. 

According to this theory, every human soul is immediately created by 
God, and created as innocent, as free from depraved tendencies, and as per- 
fectly able to obey God, as Adam was at his creation. The only effect of 



152 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

Adam's sin upon his posterity is the effect of evil example; it has in no way 
corrupted human nature; the only corruption of human nature is that habit 
of sinning which each individual contracts by persistent transgression of 
known law. Adam's sin therefore injured only himself; the sin of Adam is 
imputed only to Adam — it is imputed in no sense to his descendants; God 
imputes to each of Adam's descendants only those acts of sin which he has 
personally and consciously committed. Men can be saved by the law as 
well as by the gospel, and some have actually obeyed God perfectly and 
have thus been saved. Physical death therefore is not the penalty of sin, 
but an original law of nature; Adam would have died whether he had sinned 
or not; in Rom. 5: 12, eIq Trdvrag av&puTtovQ a tiavaTog fiaj'A&ev, kty' oj irdvreg i/fiaprnv 
signities: 'all incurred eternal death by sinning after Adam's example.' 
Of this theory we may say: 

A. It has never been recognized as Scriptural, nor has it been formu- 
lated in confessions, by any branch of the Christian church. Held only 
sporadically and by individuals, it has ever been regarded by the church at 
large as heresy. This constitutes at least a presumption against its truth. 

B. It contradicts Scripture in denying 

{a) That evil disposition and state, as well as evil acts, are sin. 

(6) That such evil disposition and state are inborn in all mankind. 

(c) That men universally are guilty of overt transgression so soon as they 
come to moral consciousness. 

{d) That no man is able without divine help to fulfil the law. 

(e) That all men without exception are dependent for salvation upon 
God's atoning, regenerating, sanctifying grace. 

(/) That man's present state of corruption, condemnation and death is 
the direct effect of Adam's transgression. 

C. It rests upon false philosophical principles; as, for example, 

{a) That the human will is simply the faculty of volitions; whereas it is 
also and chieiiy the faculty of self-determination to an ultimate end. 

(b) That the power of a contrary choice is essential to the existence of 
will; whereas the will fundamentally determined to self -gratification has 
this power only with respect to the subordinate choices by which its supreme 
determination is manifested and executed. 

(c) That ability is the measure of obligation; — a principle which would 
dimmish the sinner's responsibility, just in proportion to his progress in sin. 

(d) That law consists only in positive enactment; whereas it is the de- 
mand of perfect harmony with God, inwrought into man's moral nature. 

(e) That each human soul is immediately created by God and holds no 
other relations to moral law than those which are individual; whereas all 
human souls are organically connected with each other, and together have a 
corporate relation to God's law, by virtue of their derivation from one com- 
mon stock. 

Wiggers, Augustinism and Pelagianism, 59. Schaff, Church History, 
2: 783-856, and article in Bib. Sac, 5: 205-243. Sheldon, Sin and Re- 
demption. Neander, Church History, 2: 564-625. Martensen, Dog- 



THEORIES OF IMPUTATION. 153 

matics, 351r-362. Ellis, Half Century of Unitarian Controversy, 76. 
Shedd, Hist. Dock, 2: 93-110. Hagenbach, Hist. Dock, 1: 287, 296- 
310. Julius Midler, Doct. Sin, 2: 37-11. 

2. The Arminian Theory. 

Ai-minius (1560-1609), Professor in the University of Leyden in South 
Holland, while formally accepting the doctrine of the Adamic unity of the 
race propounded both by Luther and Calvin, gave a very different interpre- 
tation to it — an interpretation which verged toward Semi-Pelagianisni and 
the anthropology of the Greek Church. The Methodist body is the modern 
representative of this view. 

According to this theory, all men, as a divinely appointed sequence of 
Adam's transgression, are naturally destitute of original righteousness, and 
are exposed to misery and death. By virtue of the infirmity propagated 
from Adam to all his descendants, mankind are wholly unable without di- 
vine help perfectly to obey God or to attain eternal life. This inability, 
however, is physical and intellectual but not voluntary. As matter of justice 
therefore, God bestows upon each individual from the first dawn of con- 
sciousness a special influence of the Holy Spirit, which is sufficient to counter- 
act the effect of the inherited depravity and to make obedience possible, 
provided the human will cooperates, which it still has power to do. This 
gracious ability, so-called, is bestowed as a consequence of Christ's death for 
all men. The evil tendency and state may be called sin; but they do not 
in themselves involve guilt or punishment; still less are mankind accounted 
guilty of Adam's sin. God imputes to each man his inborn tendencies to 
evil, only when he consciously and voluntarily appropriates and ratifies these 
in spite of a power to the contrary specially communicated by divine grace. 
In Rom. 5: 12, £tg rrdvrac; avtfpioirouc; 6 ifdvarog dufktfzv, £(f (1 TravTeg ?jju.afjrov sig- 
nifies that physical and spiritual death is inflicted upon all men, not as the 
penalty of a common sin in Adam, but because, by divine decree, all suffer 
the consequences of that sin and because all personally consent to then in- 
born sinfulness by acts of transgression. 

With regard to this theory we remark: 

A. It is wholly extra-Scriptural in its assumptions 
(a) That there is a universal gift of the Holy Spirit. 

(6) That this gift remedies the general evil derived from Adam's fall. 

(c) That without this gift man would not be responsible for being mor- 
ally imperfect. 

{d) That at the beginning of moral life, all men consciously appropriate 
their inborn tendencies to evil. 

B. It contradicts Scripture in maintaining 

(a) That inherited moral evil does not involve guilt. 

(6) That the gift of the Spirit, and the regeneration of infants, are matters 
of justice. 

(c) That physical death is not the just penalty of sin, but is a matter of 
arbitrary divine decree. 
11 



154 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF HAN. 

C. It rests upon false philosophical principles, as for example, 

(a) That the will is simply the faculty of choices. 

(b) That the power of a contrary choice is essential to will. 

(c) That ability is the measure of obligation. 

(d) That law condemns only volitional transgression. 

(e) That man has no organic moral connection with the race. 

D. It furnishes no proper ground for human responsibility, — for unless 
the universality of sin and the universal need of a Savior be merely hypothe- 
tical, sinful action must proceed from inborn sinful tendencies by a uniform 
and necessary law, in which case power to the contrary has no existence and 
human responsibility for sinful action, according to the theory, must cease. 

Bib. Sac, 19: 241; 20: 327, 328; 23: 206; 28: 779. Bib. Bepos., 1831: 
226-263. Hagenbach, Hist. Doct., 2: 214-216. Shedd, Hist. Doct., 
2: 178-196. Baird, Elohim Bevealed, 479-494. Julius Miiller, Doct. 
Sin, 2: 320-326. Watson, Institutes, 2: 54. Whedon, Com. on Bom. 
5: 12-19. McClintock and Strong, Cyclopaedia, art. : Arminius. 

3 The New School Theory. 

This theory is called New School because of its recession from the old 
Puritan anthropology of which Edwards and Bellamy in the last century 
were the expounders. The New School theory is a general scheme built 
up by the successive labors of Hopkins, Emmons, Dwight, Taylor, and 
Finney. It is held at present by New School Presbyterians and by the 
larger part of the Congregational body. 

According to this theory all men are born with a physical and moral con- 
stitution which predisposes them to sin, and all men do actually sin so soon 
as they come to moral consciousness. This vitiosity of nature may be 
called sinful because it uniformly leads to sin, but it is not itself sin, since 
nothing is to be properly denominated sin but the voluntary act of trans- 
gressing known law. God imputes to men only their own acts of personal 
transgression; he does not impute to them Adam's sin; neither original 
vitiosity nor physical death are penal inflictions; they are simply conse- 
quences which God has in his sovereignty ordained to mark his displeasure 
at Adam's transgression, and subject to which evils God immediately creates 
each human soul. In Bom. 5: 12, e\q iravrag av&puirovg 6 ■&dvarog dir)7&£v, £©' 
u itavreg tffiaprov signifies ' spiritual death passed on all men, because all men 
have actually and personally sinned. ' 

To this theory we object: 

A. It contradicts Scripture in maintaining or implying: 

(a) That sin consists solely in voluntary and conscious acts, and that the 
state which predisposes to acts of sin is not itself sin. 

(6) That the vitiosity which predisposes to sin is a part of each man's 
nature as it proceeds from the creative hand of God. 

(c) That physical death in the human race is not a penal consequence of 
Adam's transgression. 



THEORIES OF IMPUTATION. 155 

(d) That infants, before moral consciousness, do not need Christ's sacri- 
fice to save them. Since they are innocent, no penalty rests upon them and 
none needs to be removed. 

(e) That we are neither condemned upon the ground of actual inbeing in 
Adam, nor justified upon the ground of actual inbeing in Christ. 

B. It rests upon false philosophical principles, as for example, 
(a) That the will is merely the faculty of volitions. 

(6) That natural ability is the measure of obligation. 

(c) That law consists wholly in outward command. 

(d) That the soul is immediately created by God. 

(e) That man's relations to moral law are exclusively individual. 

C. It impugns the justice of God. 

(a) By regarding him as the direct creator of a vicious nature which 
infallibly leads every human being into actual transgression. To maintain 
that in consequence of Adam's act, God brings it about that all men become 
sinners, and that, not by virtue of inherent laws of propagation but by the 
direct creation in each case of a vicious nature, is to make God indirectly 
the author of sin. 

(6) By representing him as the inflicter of suffering and death 
upon millions of human beings who in the present life do not come to moral 
consciousness and who are therefore, according to the theory, perfectly in- 
nocent. This is to make him visit Adam's sin on his posterity, while at the 
same time it denies that moral connection between Adam and his posterity 
which alone could make such visitation just. 

(c) By holding that the probation which God appoints to men is a separate 
probation of each soul when it first comes to moral consciousness and is 
least qualified to decide aright. It is much more consonant with our ideas 
of the divine justice that the decision should have been made by the whole 
race in one whose nature was pure and who perfectly understood God's law, 
than that heaven and hell should have been determined for each of us by a 
decision made in our own inexperienced childhood, under the influence of 
a vitiated nature, and which none of us can remember. 

D. Its limitation of responsibility to the evil volitions of the individual 
and the dispositions directly caused thereby, is inconsistent with the follow- 
ing facts: 

(a) The volitions are inseparable from the nature which they manifest, 
and have moral quality only as they are connected with and proceed from 
holy or unholy affections. Hence the blame for wrong action terminates not 
upon the volition but upon the evil state of the will which produces it — that 
is, upon the evil state of the man himself. 

(6) The uniformity of sinful action among men cannot be explained by 
the existence of a mere faculty of volitions. That men should uniformly 
choose may be thus explained, but that men should uniformly choose evil, 
requires us to postutate an evil tendency or state of the will itself, prior to 
these separate acts of choice. Upon this evil tendency or inborn determina- 
tion to evil, since it is the real cause of actual sins, the blame of sin must 
rest. 



156 ANTHROPOLOGY, OE THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

(c) Power in the will to prevent the inborn vitiosity from developing 
itself is upon this theory a necessary condition of responsibility for actual 
sins. But the absolute uniformity of actual transgression is evidence that 
no such power exists. A natural ability that is never exercised and never 
manifests itself is a figment of the imagination. Upon this theory, there- 
fore, there can be no responsibility at all. 

Bib. Sac. 7: 552, 567; 8: 607-647; 20: 317, 462, 576-593. Baird Elo- 
him Bevealed, 488. Julius Miiller, Doct. Sin, 2: 326-328. Hodge, 
Essays, 571-633. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 3: 61-73. Hagenbach, Hist. 
Doct., 2: 435-448. 
4. The Federal Theory. 

The federal theory, or theory of the covenants, had its origin with 
Cocceius (1603-1669), Professor at Leyden, but was more fully elaborated 
by Turrettin (1623-1687). It has become a tenet of the Beformed as dis- 
tinguished from the Lutheran church, and in this country it has its main 
advocates in the Princeton school of theologians, of whom Dr. Hodge is the 
representative. 

According to this view, Adam was constituted by God's sovereign ap- 
pointment the representative of the whole human race. With Adam as 
their representative, God entered into covenant, agreeing to bestow upon 
them eternal life on condition of his obedience, but making the penalty of 
his disobedience to be the corruption and death of all his posterity. 
In accordance with the terms of this covenant, since Adam sinned, God 
accounts all his descendants as sinners, and condemns them because of 
Adam's transgression. In execution of this sentence of condemnation, 
God immediately creates each soul of Adam's posterity with a corrupt 
and depraved nature, which infallibly leads to sin and which is itself 
sin. The theory is therefore a theory of the immediate imputation of 
Adam's sin to his posterity, their corruption of nature not being the 
cause of that imputation, but the effect of it. In Bom. 5: 12, ek ^nvrag 
av&pcdTzovQ 6 tiavaroq diTjWev, £0' u rrdvreg rji^aprov signifies : 'physical, spiritual 
and eternal death came to all, because all were regarded and treated as 
sinners. ' 

To this theory we object that 

A. It is extra-Scriptural, there being no mention of such a covenant 
with Adam in the account of man's trial. The assumed allusion to Adam's 
apostasy in Hosea 6 : 7, where the word ' covenant' is used, is too precarious 
and too obviously metaphorical to afford the basis for a scheme of imputa- 
tion; (see Henderson, Com. on Minor Prophets, in loco). In Heb. 8 : 8 — 
dt.a-&7]K.)?v K<uv?]v, there is suggested a contrast, not with an Adamic, but with 
the Mosaic covenant; (cf. verse 9). 

B. It contradicts Scripture in making the first result of Adam's sin to 
be God's regarding and treating the race as sinners. The Scripture on 
the contrary declares that Adam's offence constituted us sinners; (Bom. 5: 
19). We are not sinners simply because God regards and treats us as such, 
but God regards us as sinners because we are sinners. Death is said to 
have ' passed upon all men, ' not because all were regarded and treated as 
sinners, but 'because all sinned;' (Bom. 5: 12 — 'Trdvreg fj/xap'rov). 



THEORIES OF IMPUTATION". 157 

C. It impugns the justice of God by implying 

(a) That God holds men responsible for the violation of a covenant 
which they had no part in establishing. The assumed covenant is only a 
sovereign decree; the assumed justice only arbitrary will. 

(b) That upon the basis of this covenant God accounts men as sinners 
who are not sinners. But God judges according to truth. His condemna- 
tions do not proceed upon a basis of legal fiction. He can regard as 
responsible for Adam's transgression, only those who in some real sense 
have been concerned and have had part in that transgression. 

(c) That after accounting men to be sinners who are not sinners, God 
makes them sinners bv immediately creating each human soul with a cor- 
rupt nature such as will correspond to his decree. This is not only to 
assume a false view of the origin of the soul, but also to make God directly 
the author of sin. Imputation of sin cannot precede and account for cor- 
ruption, — on the contrary, corruption must precede and account for impu- 
tation. 

Cocceius, Summa Doctrinae de Foedere, cap. 1, 5. Turrettin, Inst., 
loc. 9, quaes. 9. Bib. Repestorv, 2: 435. Bib. Sac, 20: 455-462, 577; 
21:85-108. Hodge, Essays, 49-86; Syst. Theol., 2: 192-204. New 
Euglauder, 1868: 551-603. Birks, Difficulties of Belief, 141. Baird, 
Elohim Bevealed, 305-334, 435-450, 544. Julius Miiller, Doct. Sin, 2 : 336. 
5. Theory of Mediate Imputation. 

This theorv was first maintained by Placeus (1606-1655), Professor of 
Theology at Saumur in France. Placeus originally denied that Adam's sin 
was in any sense imputed to his posterity, but after his doctrine was con" 
demned by the Synod of the French Reformed Church in 1645, he published 
the view which now bears his name. 

According to this view, all men are born physically and morally depraved; 
this native depravity is the source of all actual sin and is itself sin; in 
strictness of speech it is this native depravity, and this only, which God 
imputes to men. This inborn sinfulness has descended by natural laws of 
propagation from Adam to all his posterity, and is the consequence, though 
not the penalty, of Adam's transgression. There is a sense, therefore, in 
which Adam's sin may be said to be imputed to his descendants — it is im- 
puted not immediately, as if they had been in Adam or were so represented 
in him that it could be charged directly to them, corruption not intervening, 
but it is imputed mediately, through and on account of the intervening 
corruption which resulted from Adam's sin. As on the federal theory im- 
putation is the cause of depravity, so on this theory depravity is the cause 
of imputation. In Rom. 5: 12, ?k rrnvrag av&puirovg 6 -&dvaroQ dctiWev, £0' 
d TcavTEQ riiiap-ov signifies ' death physical, spiritual and eternal passed upon 
all men, because all sinned by possessing a depraved nature. ' 
This view is exposed to the following objections: 

A. It gives no explanation of man's responsibility for his inborn de- 
pravity. No explanation of this is possible, which does not regard man's 
depravity as having had its origin in a free personal act, either of the indi- 
vidual, or of collective human nature in its first father and head. But this 
participation of all men in Adam's sin, the theory expressly denies. 



158 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

B. Since the origination of this corrupt nature cannot be charged to 
the account of man, man's inheritance of it must be regarded in the light 
of an arbitrary divine infliction — a conclusion which reflects upon the justice 
of God. Man is not only condemned for a sinfulness of which God is the 
author, but is condemned without any real probation either individual or 
collective. 

C. It contradicts those passages of Scripture which refer the origin of 
human condemnation, as well as of human depravity, to the sin of our first 
parents, and which represent universal death, not as a matter of divine 
sovereignty, but as a judicial infliction of penalty upon all men for the sin 
of the race in Adam; (Rora. 5 ■ 16, 18). It moreover does violence to the 
Scripture in its unnatural interpretation of navTec; fjimprov in Rom. 5 : 12 — 
words winch imply the oneness of the race with Adam, and the causative 
relation of Adam's sin to our guilt. 

Placeus, De Imputatione Primi Peccati Adaini. G. Payne, Original Sin. 
Cunningham, Historical Theology, 1 : 496-639. Shedd, Hist. Doctrine, 
2: 158. Baird, Elohim Revealed, 46, 47, 474^479, 504-507. Edwards, 
Works, 2: 482, 483. Julius Miiller, Doct. Sin, 2: 331. Hodge, Syst. 
Theol., 2: 205-214. Herzog, Encyclopadie, art.: Placeus. 

6. Theory of Adam's Natural Headship. 

This theory was first elaborated by Augustine (354-430), the great oppo- 
nent of Pelagius, although its central feature appears in the writings of 
Tertullian (died about 220), Hilary (350) and Ambrose (374). It is frequently 
designated as the Augustinian view of sin. It was the view held by the 
Reformers, Zwingle excepted. Its principal advocates in this country are 
Dr. Shedd and Dr. Baird. 

It holds that God imputes the sin of Adam immediately to all his posterity 
in virtue of that organic unity of mankind by which the whole race at the 
time of Adam's transgression existed seminally in him as its head. The 
total life of humanity was then in Adam; the race as yet had its being only 
in him. Its essence was not yet individualized; its forces were not yet dis- 
tributed; the powers which now exist in separate men were then unified 
and localized in Adam; Adam's will was yet the will of the species. In 
Adam's free act, the Avill of the race revolted from God and the nature of the 
race corrupted itself. The nature which we now possess is the same nature 
that corrupted itself in Adam — "not the same in kind merely but the same 
as flowing to us continuously from him." Adam's sin is imputed to us im- 
mediately, therefore, not as something foreign to us, but because it is ours, 
we and all other men having existed as one moral person in him, and as the 
result of that transgression, possessing a nature destitute of love to God and 
prone to evil. 

We regard this theory of the natural headship of Adam as the most satis- 
factory of the theories mentioned, and as fimiishing the most important help 
toward the understanding of the great problem of original sin. In its favor 
may be urged the following considerations: 

A. It puts the most natural interpretation upon Rom. 5: 12-21. The 
great majority of commentators regard the words in verse 12: £ig Trdvrag av- 
ftpuTTovg 6 ■&dvarog diijX'&F.v, a/>' (1) wavreg rjfj.aprov as signifying 'death passed upon 



THEORIES OF IMPUTATION. 159 

all men, because all sinned. ' The death spoken of is, as the whole context 
shows, mainly though not exclusively physical. It has passed upon all — even 
upon those who have committed no conscious and personal transgression 
whereby to explain its infliction; (verse 14). The legal phraseology of the 
passage shows that this infliction is not a matter of sovereign decree, but of 
judicial penalty; (verses 14, 16, 18 — vopog, -apa-rcoua, Kplua e£ hoc slg Karaicpi- 
fia, ^iKaiuua). As the explanation of this universal subjection to penalty, we 
are referred to Adam's sin. By that act (ovrug — v. 12) death came to all men, 
because all [not have sinned, but] sinned; {iravrec v,uap T ov — aorist of instan- 
taneous past action. Cf. 1 Cor. 15: 22 — tv rtf Add/J. rrdi'reg cnToftvqo-Kovcn. 2 
Cor. 5: 14 — si elg inrep irdvruv airiftavEv, apa oi Travrec cnred-civou). See Commen- 
taries of Meyer, Bengel, Olshausen, Philippi, Alford, Wordsworth, Lange. 

B. It permits whatever of truth there may be in the federal theory and 
in the theory of mediate imputation to be combined with it, while neither of 
these latter theories can be justified to reason unless they are regarded as 
corollaries or accessories of the truth of Adam's natural headship. Only on 
this supposition of natural headship could God justly constitute Adam our 
representative, or hold us responsible for the depraved nature we have re- 
ceived from him. It moreover justifies God's ways, in postulating a real 
and a fair probation of our common nature as preliminary to imputation of 
sin — a truth which the theories just mentioned, in common with that of the 
New School, virtually deny — while it rests upon correct philosophical prin- 
ciples with regard to will, ability, law, and accepts the Scriptural represen- 
tations of the nature of sin, the penal character of death, the origin of the 
soul, and the oneness of the race in the transgression. 

C. While its fundamental presupposition — a determination of the will of 
each member of the race prior to his individual consciousness — is an hypothe- 
sis difficult in itself, it is an hypothesis which furnishes the key to many 
more difficulties than it suggests. Once allow that the race was one in its 
first ancestor and fell in him, and light is thrown on a problem otherwise 
insoluble — the problem of our accountability for a sinful nature which we 
have not personally and consciously originated. Since we cannot, with the 
three theories first mentioned, deny either of the terms of this problem — 
inborn depravity or accountability for it — we accept this solution as the best 
attainable. 

D. We are to remember, however, that while this theory of the method 
of our union with Adam is merely a valuable hypothesis, the problem which 
it seeks to explain is, in both its terms, presented to us both by conscience 
and by Scripture. In connection with this problem a central fact is an- 
nounced in Scripture, which we feel compelled to believe upon divine testi- 
mony, even though every attempted explanation should prove unsatisfactory. 
That central fact, which constitutes the substance of the Scripture doctrine 
of original sin, is simply this, that the sin of Adam is the immediate cause 
and ground of inborn depravity, guilt and condemnation to the whole hu- 
man race. 

Augustine, De Pec. Mer. et Kern., 3: 7 — "In Adamo, omnes tunc pec- 
caverunt, quando in ejus natura adhuc omnes ille unus fuerunt; " De 



160 ANTHROPOLOGY, OK THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

Civ. Dei, 13: 14 — "Onmes enim fuimus in illo mio, quando omnes 
f uimus ille unus. * * * * Nondum erat nobis singillatim creata 
et distributa forma in qua singuli viveremus, sed jam natura erat sem- 
nalis ex qua j)ropagaremur. " Calvin, Institutes, book 2, cli. 1-3. Ed- 
wards, Original Sin, part 4, ch. 3. Shedd, on Original Sin, in Discour- 
ses and Essays, 218-271, and references, 261-263. Julius Muller, Doct. 
Sin, 2: 259-357. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 3: 28-38, 204-230. Marten- 
sen, Dogmatics, 173-183. Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2: 157-164, 227-257. 
Auberlen, Div. Revelation, 175-180. Naville, Problem of Evil. Hanna 
on Resurrection, lect. 3. Murphy, Scientific Bases, 262, sq; cf. 101. 
Haven, in Bib. Sac, 20: 451-455. Baird, Eloliim Bevealed, 410-435, 
451-460, 494. Birks, Difficulties of Belief, 135. Schaff, in Bib. Sac, 5: 
230; and in Lange's Com., on Rom. 5: 12. Thomasius, Christi Person 
und Werk, 1: 269-400. 

II. — Objections to the Doctrine of Imputation. 

The doctrine of imputation, to which we have thus arrived, is met by its 
opponents with the following objections. In discussing them, we are to 
remember that a truth revealed in Scripture may have claims to our belief 
in spite of insoluble difficulties connected with it. Yet it is hoped that ex- 
amination will show the objections in question to rest either upon false 
philosophical principles or upon misconceptions of the doctrine assailed. 

A. That there can be no sin apart from and prior to consciousness. 

This we deny. The larger part of men's evil dispositions and acts are im- 
perfectly conscious, and of many such dispositions and acts the evil quality 
is not discerned at all. The objection rests upon the assumption that law 
is confined to published statutes or to standards formally recognized by its 
subjects. A profounder view of law as identical with the constituent prin- 
ciples of being, as binding the nature to conformity with the nature of God, 
as demanding right volitions only because these are manifestations of right 
affections, as having claims upon men in then- corporate capacity, deprives 
this objection of all its force. 

B. That man cannot be responsible for a sinful nature which he did not 
personally originate. 

We reply that the objection ignores the testimony of conscience and of 
Scripture. These assert that we are responsible for what we are. The sin- 
ful nature is not something external to us but is our inmost selves. If man's 
original righteousness or the new affection implanted in regeneration have 
moral character, then the inborn tendency to evil has moral character; as 
the former are commendable, so the latter is condemnable. 

C. That Adam's sin cannot be imputed to us, since we cannot repent 
of it. 

The objection has plausibility only so long as we fail to distinguish be- 
tween Adam's sin as the inward apostasy of the nature from God, and 
Adam's sin as the outward act of transgression which followed and mani- 
fested that apostasy. We cannot indeed repent of Adam's sin as our per- 
sonal act or as Adam's personal act, but regarding his sin as the apostasy of 



OBJECTIONS TO IMPUTATION. 161 

our common nature — an apostasy which manifests itself in our personal 
transgressions as it did in his, ve can repent of it and do repent of it. In 
truth it is this nature, as self-corrupted and averse to God, for which the 
Christian most deeply repents. 

D. That if we be responsible for Adam's sin, we must also be responsible 
for the sins of our immediate ancestors. 

"We reply that the apostasv of human nature could occur but once. It 
occurred in Adam before the eating of the forbidden fruit, and revealed 
itself in that eatiner. The subsequent sins of Adam and of our immediate 
ancestors are no longer acts which determine or change the nature — they 
only show what the nature is. We are therefore responsible only for that 
original apostasy which constituted the one and final revolt of the race from 
God, and for the personal depravity and disobedience which in the case of 
each of us has resulted therefrom. 

E. That the organic unity of the race in the transgression is a thing so 
remote from common experience that the preaching of it neutralizes all ap- 
peals to the conscience. 

But whatever of truth is in this objection is due to the self -isolating nature 
of sin. Men feel the unity of the family, the profession, the nation to which 
they belong, and just in proportion to the breadth of their sympathies and 
their experience of divine grace do they enter into Christ's feeling of unity 
with the race; (cf. Is. 6: 5. Lam. 3: 39-45. Ezra 9: 6. Neh. 1: 6). The 
fact that the self-contained and self-seeking recognize themselves as respon- 
sible only for their personal acts, should not prevent our pressing upon 
men's attention the more searching standards of the Scriptures. Only 
thus can the Christian find a solution for the dark problem of a corruption 
which is inborn yet condemnable; only thus can the unregenerate man be 
led to a full knowledge of the depth of his rain and his absolute depend- 
ence upon God for salvation. 

F. That if all moral consequences are properly penalties, sin considered 
as a sinful nature, must be the pirnishment of sin, considered as the act of 
our first parents. 

But we reply that the impropriety of pirnishing sin with sin, vanishes 
when we consider that the sin which is punished is our own, equally with 
the sin with which we are punished. The objection is valid as against the 
federal theory or the theory of mediate imputation, but not as against the 
theory of Adam's natural headship. To deny that God through the opera- 
tion of second causes may punish the act of transgression by the habit and 
tendency which result from it, is to ignore the facts of every-day life, as 
well as the statements of Scripture in which sin is represented as ever re- 
producing itself, and with each reproduction increasing its guilt and punish- 
ment; CRom. 6: 19 — ttj avouia elg ttjv avouiav. James 1: 15 — duapria a~ore?.- 
EcfieiGa airoKvei ftavarov). 

G. That a constitution by which the sin of one individual involves the 
nature of all men who descend from him in guilt and condemnation, is con- 
trary to God's justice. 

"We acknowledge that no human theory can fully solve the mystery of 
imputation. But we prefer to attribute God's dealings to justice rather 



162 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

than to sovereignty. The following considerations, though partly hypo- 
thetical, may throw light upon the subject. 

(a) A probation of our common nature in Adam, sinless as he was and 
with full knowledge of God's law, is more consistent with divine justice 
than a separate probation of each individual, with inexperience, inborn de- 
pravity and evil example, all favoring a decision against God. 

(b) A constitution which made a common fall possible, may have been 
indispensable to any provision of a common salvation. 

(c) Our chance for salvation as sinners under grace, may be better than 
it would have been as sinless Adams under law. 

(d) A constitution which permitted oneness with the first Adam in the 
transgression cannot be unjust, since a like principle of oneness with Christ 
the second Adam, secures our salvation. Our ruin and our redemption were 
alike wrought out without personal act of ours. As all the natural life of 
humanity was in Adam, so all the spiritual life of humanity was in Christ. 
As our old nature was corrupted in Adam and propagated to us by physical 
generation, so our new nature was restored in Christ and communicated to 
us by the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit. If then we are justified 
upon the ground of our inbeing in Christ, we may in like manner be con- 
demned upon the ground of our inbeing in Adam. 

For replies to these and other objections, see Schaff, in Bib Sac, 5: 
230. Shedd, Sermons to the Natural Man, 266-284. Baird, Elohim 
Bevealed, 507-509, 529-544. Birks, Difficulties of Belief, 13^-188. 
Stahl, Phiiosophie des Rechts, quoted in Olshausen's Com. on N. T., 
3: 574. Edwards, Original Sin, in Works, 2: 473-510. Tennyson, 
Vision of Sin. 



SECTION VI.— CONSEQUENCES OF SIN TO ADAMS POSTERITY. 

As the result of Adam's transgression, all his posterity are born into the 
same state into which he fell. But since law is the all-comprehending de- 
mand of harmony with God, all moral consequences flowing from transgres- 
sion are to be regarded as sanctions of law, or expressions of the divine 
displeasure through the constitution of things which he has established. 
Certain of these consequences, however, are earlier recognized than others 
and are of minor scope; it will therefore be useful to consider them under 
the three aspects of depravity, guilt and penalty. 

I. Depravity. 

By this we mean on the one hand, the lack of original righteousness or 
of holy affection toward God, and on the other hand, the corruption of the 
moral nature or bias toward evil. That such depravity exists has been 
abundantly shown both from Scripture and from reason, in our considera- 
tion of the universality of sin. Two questions only need detain us: 

1. Depravity partial or total ? 

The Scriptures represent human nature as totally depraved. The phrase 
' total depravity, ' however is liable to misinterpretation, and should not be 
used without explanation. By the total depravity of universal humanity 
we mean, 



DEPRAVITY. 163 

A. Negatively, — not that every sinner is 

(a) Destitute of conscience, — for the existence of strong impulses to 
right, and of remorse for wrong doing, show that conscience is often keen; 
(John 8: 9). 

(b) Devoid of all qualities pleasing to men, and useful when judged by 
a human standard, — for the existence of such qualities is recognized by 
Christ; (Mark 10: 21). 

(c) Prone to every form of sin, — for certain forms of sin exclude certain 
others; (Mat. 23: 23. Horn. 2: 14). 

{d) Intense as he can be in his selfishness and opposition to God, — for 
he becomes worse every day; (Gen. 15: 16). 

B. Positively, — that every sinner is 

{a) Totally destitute of that love to God which constitutes the funda- 
mental and all-inclusive demand of the law; (John 5: 42). 

(b) Supremely determined in his whole inward and outward life by a 
preference of self to God; (2 Tim. 3 : 2). 

(c) Possessed of an aversion to God, which, though sometimes latent, 
becomes active enmity, so soon as God's will comes into manifest conflict 
with his own; (Rom. 8 : 7 — to (ppovr/iia rfjq aapnw; ex&pa slg Qeov). 

(d) Disordered and corrupted in every faculty — through this substitution 
of selfishness for supreme affection toward God; (Eph. 4: 18 — hanorcafievoi 
tij titavoia. Tit. 1: 15 — iiEfiiavTcu b vovg ml 7] avveidrjaig. 2 Cor. 7: 1 — fiolvofiov 
napKog Kal TrveiifiaTog, Heb. 3: 12 — napSia izovr) pa air car car). 

(e) Credited with no thought, emotion or act of which divine holiness 
can fully approve; (Rom. 3: 9-18; 7: 18 — ovkoIkeI kv k/iol ayaMv). 

(/) Subject to a law of constant progress in depravity, which he has no 
recuperative energy to enable him successfully to resist; (Rom. 7: 23 — 
v6fjL(.) TTJq djuaprtac;. 18 — ~o 6e naTepya&c&ai to nahbv ovx Evpiotao). 

Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 248. Baird, Elohim Revealed, 510-522. 
Chalmers, Institutes, 1: 519-542. Cunningham, Historical Theology, 
1:516-531. 

2. Ability or inability f 

In opposition to the plenary ability taught by the Pelagians, the gracious 
ability of the Arminians, and the natural ability of the New School theo- 
logians, the Scriptures declare the total inability of the sinner to turn him- 
self to God or to do that which is truly good in God's sight; (John 1: 12, 
13; 3: 5; 6: 44; cf. 15: 4, 5. Rom. 7: 18, 24; 8 : 7. 1 Cor. 2: 14. 2 Cor. 
3: 5. Eph. 2: 1, 8-10. Heb. 11: 6). 

This inability is natural in the sense of inborn; — it is not acquired by our 
personal act, but is congenital. It is not natural, however, as resulting 
from the loss of any essential faculty of human nature or from the original 
limitations of human nature as it came from the hand of the Creator. Hu- 
man nature at its first creation was endowed with ability perfectly to keep 
the law of God. The inability to good which now characterizes human 
nature is an inability that results from sin and is itself sin. 

We hold therefore to an inability that is both natural and moral, — moral 
as having its source in the self-corruption of man's moral nature and the 



164 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

fundamental aversion of his will to God; — natural, as being inborn and as 
affecting the action of all his powers. For his inability in both these as- 
pects of it, man is responsible. 

To the use of the phrase ' natural ability ' to designate merely the sin- 
ner's possession of all the constituent faculties of human native, we object 
upon the following grounds: 

A. Since volitions exist and have moral character only as manifestations 
of moral affections, the absence of right affections renders right choices 
impossible. There can be no natural ability to right choice unless man 
may, by volition, change his affections from wrong to right — but this he 
cannot do, since he cannot separate even the first volition from the moral 
affections which control it and from which it springs. Natural ability to 
good involves not only a full complement of faculties, but also a bias of the 
affections and will toward God. Without this bias there is no possibility 
of right moral action, and where there is no such possibility, there can be 
no ability either natural or moral. 

B. In addition to the psychological argument just mentioned, we may 
urge another from experience and observation. These testify that man is 
cognizant of no such ability. Since no man has ever yet by the exercise of 
his natural powers turned himself to God or done an act truly good in 
God's sight, the existence of a natural ability to good is a pure assumption. 
There is no scientific warrant for inferring the existence of an ability, which 
has never manifested itself in a single instance since history began. 

C. The practical evil attending the preaching of natural ability furnishes 
a strong argument against it. The Scriptures, in their declarations of the 
sinner's inability and helplessness, aim to shut him up to sole dependence 
upon God for salvation. The doctrine of natural ability, assuring him that 
he is able at once to repent and turn to God, encourages delay by putting 
salvation at all times within his reach. If a single volition will secure it, 
he may be saved as easily to-morrow as to-dav. The doctrine of inability 
presses men to immediate acceptance of God's offers, lest the day of grace 
for them pass by. 

It is to be borne in mind, however, that the denial to man of all ability, 
whether natural or moral, to turn himself to God or do that which is truly 
good in God's sight, does not iurplv a denial of man's power to order his 
external life in many particulars conformably to moral rules, or even to at- 
tain the praise of men for virtue. Man has still a range of freedom in 
acting out his nature. He may choose higher or lower forms of selfish 
action, and pursue these chosen courses with various degrees of selfish 
energy. Freedom of choice between these various methods of manifesting 
his nature is by no means incompatible with complete bondage of the will 
as respects spiritual things. 

Hodge, Systematic Theology, 2: 257-277. Baird, Elohim Kevealed, 
523-528. Cunningham, Historical Theology, 1: 567-639. Calvin, In- 
stitutes, bk. 2, chap. 2. Westminster Confession, 16: 7. 



GUILT. 165 

II. Guilt. 

1. Nature of guilt. 

By guilt we mean desert of punishment, or obligation to render satisfac- 
tion to God's justice for self-determined violation of law. The following 
remarks may serve both for proof and for explanation: 

A. Guilt is incurred only through self-determined transgression either 
on the part of man's nature or person. We are guilty only of that sin which 
we have originated or have had part in originating. Guilt is not therefore 
mere liability to punishment, nor can there be such a thing as constructive 
guilt under the divine government. We are accounted guilty only for what 
we have done, either personally or in our first parents, and for what we are, 
in consequence of such doing; (Ez. 18: 20. John 9: 2, 3). 

B. Every sin whether of nature or person, is an offence against God 
(Ps. 51 : 4-6), an act or state of opposition to his will, which has for its 
first effect God's personal wrath (Ps. 7: 11. John 3: 18, 36), and which 
must be expiated either by punishment or by atonement; (Heb. 9: 22.) 
Not only does sin as unlikeness to divine purity, involve pollution, — it also, 
as antagonism to God's holy will, involves guilt. This guilt or obligation 
to satisfy the outraged holiness of God is explained in the New Testament 
by the terms debtor and debt; (Matt. 6: 12 — bcber/J/uara. Luke 13: 4 — 
ixpeiASTcu. Matt. 5: 21 — evoxoQ sarac ry Kpiaei. Rom. 3: 19 — ij~66inog ru Oea. 
6: 23 — bipcjvia. Ej)h. 2: 3 — rmva bpyf/g). 

C. Guilt, then, as an objective result of sin, is not to be confounded 
with the subjective consciousness of guilt. In the condemnation of con- 
science, God's condemnation partially and prophetically manifests itself; 
(1 John 3: 20 — fteifav karlv 6 Oeof). But guilt is primarily a relation to God 
and only secondarily a relation to conscience. Progress in sin is marked by 
diminished sensitiveness of moral insight and feeling. As ' the greatest of 
sins is — to be conscious of none, ' so guilt may be great just in proportion 
to the absence of consciousness of it; (Ps. 19: 12; 51: 6. Eph. 4: 18, 19 — 
aizTjylTiKdTEg). There is no evidence, however, that the voice of conscience 
can be completely or finally silenced. The time for repentance may pass, 
but not the time for remorse. 

Julius Muller, Doctrine of Sin, 1: 193-267. Martensen, Christian 
Dogmatics, 203-209. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1: 346. 
Baird, Elohim Revealed, 461-473. Delitzsch, Bib. Psychologie, 121-148. 

2. Degrees of Guilt 

The Scriptures recognize different degrees of guilt as attaching to differ- 
ent kinds of sin. The variety of sacrifices under the Mosaic law, and the 
variety of awards in the judgment (Luke 12: 47, 48 — dapyoercu iro'AMg, 
oAiyag — sc. TrAr/ydc. Rom. 2:. 6 — aTzoctjaec endo-io Kara ra epya civtov} are to be 
explained upon this principle. 

Casuistry, however, has drawn many distinctions wliich lack Scriptural 
foundation. Such is the distinction between venial sins and mortal sins in 
the Roman Catholic Church; — every sin unpardoned being mortal, and all 
sins being venial, since Christ has died for all. Nor is the common distinc- 



166 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

tion between sins of omission and sins of commission more valid, since the 
very omission is an act of commission; (Matt. 25: 45 — i(j>' baov ovk eirot^aare. 
James 4 :17 — jirj tcolovvti, d/uapria). 

The following distinctions are indicated in Scripture as involving different 
degrees of guilt: 

A. Sin of nature, and personal transgression. 

The former involves guilt (Eph. 2 : 3), though not so great a guilt as that 
attaching to the personal transgression by which the sin of nature is reas- 
serted. Although we have emphasized the reality of the guilt of inborn 
sin, because this truth is most contested, it is to be remembered that men 
reach a conviction of their native depravity only through a conviction of 
their personal transgressions. For this reason, by far the larger part of 
our preaching upon sin should consist in applications of the law of God 
to the acts and dispositions of men's lives. (See Ez. 18: 20. Matt. 19: 
14; 23 : 32). 

B. Sins of ignorance, and sins of knowledge. 

Here guilt is measured by the degree of light possessed, or in other words, 
by the opportunities of knowledge men have enjoyed, and the powers with 
which they have been naturally endowed. Genius and privilege increase 
responsibility. The heathen are guilty, but those to whom the oracles of 
God have been committed, are more guilty than they; (Matt. 10 : 15. Luke 
12: 47, 48; 23: 34. John 19: 11. Acts 17: W—imept6ki>. Eom. 1: 32; 
2: 12. 1 Tim. 1: 13, 15). 

C. Sins of infirmity, and sins of presumption. 

Here the guilt is measured by the energy of the evil will. Sin may be 
known to be sin, yet may be committed in haste or weakness. Though 
haste and weakness constitute a palliation of the offence which springs 
therefrom, yet they are themselves sins, as revealing an unbelieving and 
disordered heart. But of far greater guilt are those presumptuous choices 
of evil in which not weakness but strength of will is manifest; (Ps. 19; 12, 
13. Is. 5 : 18. Gal. 6:1. 1 Tim. 5 ; 24). 

D. Sin of incomplete, and sin of final obduracy. 

Here the guilt is measured not by the objective sufficiency or insufficiency 
of divine grace, but by the degree of unreceptiveness into which sin has 
brought the soul. As the only sin unto death which is described in Scrip- 
ture, is the sin against the Holy Ghost, we here consider the nature of that 
sin; (see Matt. 12: 31; cf. 1 John 5 : 16; Heb. 10 : 26). 

The sin against the Holy Ghost is not to be regarded as an isolated act, 
but rather as the external symptom of a heart so radically and finally set 
against God that no power which God can consistently use will ever save 
it. The sin, therefore, can be only the culmination of a long coiu'se of 
self-hardening and self- depraving. He who has. committed it must be 
either profoundly indifferent to his own condition, or actively and bitterly 
hostile to God; so that anxiety or fear on account of one's condition, are 
evidences that it has not been committed. The sin against the Holy Ghost 
cannot be forgiven, simply because the soul that has committed it has 



PENALTY. 16? 

ceased to be receptive of divine influences, even when those influences are 
exerted in the utmost strength which God has seen fit to employ in his 
spiritual administration. 

Upon the general subject of kinds of sin and degrees of guilt, see 
Julius Muller, Doct. Sin, 1 : 193-267; 2: 403-430. Kahnis, Dogma- 
tik, 3 : 284, 298. Birks, Difficulties of Belief, 169-174. On the sin 
against the Holy Ghost, see Julius Muller, Doct. Sin, 2: 425. Schaff, 
Sin against the Holy Ghost. 

TTT. Penalty. 

1. Idea of penalty. 

By penalty we mean that pain or loss which is directly or indirectly in- 
flicted by the Lawgiver in vindication of his justice outraged by the 
violation of law. In this definition it is implied that 

A. The natural consequences of transgression, although they constitute 
a part of the penalty of sin, do not exhaust that penalty. In all penalty 
there is a personal element — the holy wrath of the Lawgiver — which natural 
consequences but partially express. 

B. The object of penalty is not the reformation of the offender or the 
ensuring of social or governmental safety. These ends may be incidentally 
secured through its infliction, but the great end of penalty is the vindica- 
tion of the character of the Lawgiver. Penalty therefore is essentially a 
necessary reaction of the divine holiness against sin. 

2. The actual penalty of sin. 

The one word in Scripture which designates the total penalty of sin, is 
death. Death, however, is twofold: 

A. Physical death, — or the separation of the soul from the body, in- 
cluding all those temporal evils and sufferings which result from disturbance 
of the original harmony between body and soul, and which are the working 
of death in us. That physical death is a part of the penalty of sin, appears 

(a) From Scripture. 

This is the natural import of the threatening in Gen. 2: 17 — 'thou shalt 
surely die'; cf. 3: 19 — 'unto dust shalt thou return.' Allusions to this 
threat in the O. T. confirm this interpretation : Num. 16: 29 — ' visited after 
the visitation of all men,' where "lp3 = judicial visitation or punishment; 
27: 3 — Lxx. — <V dpapriav nvrov. The prayer of Moses in Ps. 90: 7-9, 11, and 
the prayer of Hezekiah in Is. 38: 17, 18 recognize plainly the penal nature 
of death. The same doctrine is taught in the N. T. , as for example, John 
8: 44 — av&puTToicTovoc fjv ott' apxVC- Rom. 5:12 — 6 fidvarog oi^A&ev, k(j) u travrzc, 
ijpaprov. 14, 16 — npipa si; evbg ££f naraKptpa. 17 — tgj tov kvbc TrapaTrrcjpaTi 6 
Mvarog, where the judicial phraseology is to be noted; (cf. Rom. 1: 32). 
6; 23 — brfjcjvia rye dfiaprtaq, tidvaroc;. 10 — Xp/orbg — ry dpapria dn£-&avev efydTral; . 
8: 3, 10 — el de Xpiarbg kv vp.lv. rb pev a<jpa veupbv dt dpaprlav. These latter passages 
show that Christ submitted to physical death as the penalty of sin. 1 Cor. 
15: 21, 22 — h) ru ' ' Kddp iravreg aTiotivr/oKovGi, where observe the antithesis 
between bodily death and bodily resurrection. 1 Pet. 4: 6 — npitfcJci Kara 
dv&pamovg captd, where death is spoken of as God's judgment upon sin. 



168 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OE MAN. 

(6) From reason. 

The universal prevalence of suffering and death among rational creatures 
cannot be reconciled with the divine justice, except upon the supposition 
that it is a judicial infliction on account of a common sinfulness of nature 
belonging even to those who have not reached moral consciousness. 

The objection that death existed in the animal creation before the fall 
may be answered by saying that but for the fact of man's sin, it would not 
have existed. We may believe that God arranged even the geologic history 
to correspond with the foreseen fact of human apostacy; (cf. Rom. 8: 
20-23 — where the creation is said to have been made subject to vanity by 
reason of man's sin). 

The translation of Enoch and Elijah, and of the saints that remain at 
Christ's second coming, seems intended to teach us that death is not a neces- 
sary law of organized being, and to show what would have happened to 
Adam if he had been obedient. He was created a ocbpa ipvxuwv, xoUov, but 
might have attained a higher being, the acopa irvev/iariKdv, eirovpdvcov, without 
the intervention of death. Sin, however, has turned the normal condition 
of things into the rare exception; (cf. 1 Cor. 15: 42-50). Since Christ en- 
dured death as the penalty of sin, death to the Christian becomes the gateway 
through which he enters into full communion with his Lord; (cf. John 
14: 3. 1 Cor. 15: 54-57. 2 Cor. 5: 1-9. Phil. 1: 23). 

B. Spiritual death, — or the separation of the soul from God, including 
all that. pain of conscience, loss of peace and sorrow of spirit, which result 
from disturbance of the normal relation between the soul and God. 

Although physical death is a part of the penalty of sin, it is by no means 
the chief part. The term death is frequently used in Scripture in a moral 
and spiritual sense, as denoting the absence of that which constitutes the 
true life of the soul, namely, the presence and favor of God; (Matt. 8: 22 — 
h(peg rovg venpovg -&dipai rove; eavruv venpovg. Luke 15: 32 — o aoe'A<pog gov ovrog 
venpbg yv. John 5: 24 — fJ.eraj3eftriK.ev en rov tiavdrov elg ryv L,u?]v. 8: 51 — ftavarov 
ov pi) -d-eopyoy. Rom. 8: 13 — el yap icara adpna £yre, peXAere dnO-tivyoneLv. Eph. 
2: 1 — venpovg rolg napa-irTtopaoi nai ralg dpapriatg. 5: 14 — nvdara en ruv venpav. 
1 Tim. 5: 6 — tjtica -e-B-vyne. James 5: 20 — ouoec ipvxyv £li fiavdrov. 1 John 
3: 14 — o pi/ dyaTTcbv rov ade'A<pbv, pevei ev ru tfavdru). Rev. 3: 1 — ^yg nal venpbg el). 

It cannot be doubted that the penalty denounced in the garden and fallen 
upon the race, is primarily and mainly that death of the soul which consists 
in its separation from God. In this sense only, death was fully visited upon 
Adam in the day on which he ate the forbidden fruit; (Gen. 2: 17). In 
this sense only, death is escaped by the Christian; (John 11 : 26). Eor this 
reason, in the parallel between Adam and Christ (Rom. 5: 12-21), the apostle 
passes from the thought of mere physical death in the early part of the 
passage to that of both physical and spiritual death at its close; (verse 21 — 
ugrrep efiaoiAevcev y dpaprla ev t<1) -d-avdru, o'vrco nal ?} x^P L ^ ftaaCAevoi) elg ^uyv 
aluvLov — where eternal life is more than endless physical existence and death 
is more than death of the body). 

Eternal death may be regarded as the culmination and completion of 
spiritual death, and as essentially consisting in the correspondence of the 



THE SALVATION OF INFANTS. 169 

outward condition with the inward state of the evil soul; (Acts 1: 25 — rropev- 
■&7jvai elg rbv -6-nv rbv Ictov), It would seem to be inaugurated by some pecul- 
iar repellant energy of the divine holiness (Matt. 25: 41 — -opeveade arc' kfiov, 
oi Karr/pauevoi. 2 Thess. 1: 9 — oIktjv tigovgcv, ofa&pov alcoviov, airb Trpoeairov rov 
Kvplov) and to involve positive retribution visited by a personal God upon 
both the body and the soul of the evil doer; (Matt. 10: 28. — owdfievov nal ibvxvv 
ml cidua airoXiaat. Heb. 10: 31 — tpoftepbv rb kfiireaeiv elg %elpag Qeov ^uvrog. Rev. 
11: 11 — 6 nanvbg rov fiaoaviGnov avruv avaSaivet elr alovag alcdvuv). 

On the general subject of the penalty of sin, see Julius Muller, Doct. 
Sin, 1: 215 sq.; 2: 286-397. Baird, Elohim Revealed, 263-279. Bush- 
nell, Nature and the Supernatural, 191-219. Krabbe, Lehre von der 
Siinde und vom Tode. Weisse, in Studien und Kritiken, 1836 : 371. 



SECTION VII. — THE SALVATION OF INFANTS. 

The views which have been presented with regard to inborn depravity 
and the reaction of divine holiness against it, suggest the question whether 
infants dying before arriving at moral consciousness are saved, and if so, in 
what way. To this question we reply as follows: 

1. Infants are in a state of sin, need to be regenerated, and can be saved 
only through Christ; (Job 14: 4 Ps. 51: 5. John 3: 6. Rom. 5: 14. Eph. 
2: 3. Cf. Matt. 19: 11 — aQere ra izaidia nal /ir/ Kiokvere aiird i7Suv Trpog fie — 'to me 
whom they need as a Savior'). 

2. Yet as compared with those who have personally transgressed, they 
are recognized as possessed of a relative innocence and of a submissiveness 
and trustfulness which may serve to illustrate the graces of Christian char- 
acter; (Deut. 1: 39. Jonah 4: 11. Rom. 9: 11 — [iTjde -rrpa^dvruv rl dya-&bv rj 
kolkov. Matt. 18: 3, 4 — eav iirj arpmf/re ml yevec&e cog ra. Trcucia). 

3. For this reason they are the objects of special divine compassion and 
care, and through the grace of Christ are certain of salvation; (Matt. 18: 5, 
6, 10; 19: 14 — rav yap tocovtcov eartv rj j3aac?.eia rov ovpavuv= 'the kingdom of saved 
sinners.') 

4. The descriptions of God's merciful provision, as coextensive with 
the ruin of the fall, also lead us to believe that those who die in infancy re- 
ceive salvation through Christ as certainly as they inherit sin from Adam; 
(John 3: 16 — ovtoj yap rjyarrrjaev 6 Qebg rbv Koa t uov. Rom. 5: 14, 19-21 — ov 6e 
eTT/.eovaaev i] duaprla, V7repe~epl(jaevaev rj x a P i( ~)- 

5. The condition of salvation for adults is personal faith. Infants are 
incapable of fulfilling this condition. Since Christ has died for all, we have 
reason to believe that provision is made for their reception of Christ in some 
other way; (2 Cor. 5: 15 — virep Ttavruv cnre-d-avev. Mark 16: 16 — o nicrevoag nai 
BatrTur&elg, acj^Tjaerat). 

6. At the final judgment, personal conduct is made the test of character. 
But infants are incapable of personal transgression. We have reason, there- 
fore, to believe that they will be among the saved, since this rule of decision 
will not apply to them; (Matt. 25: 45 — k<f boov ovx k-noirjaare. Rom. 2: 6 — 
be aTTGccocei eicaoTG) Kara ra epya abrov). 

12 



170 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 

7. Since there is no evidence that children dying in infancy are regener- 
ated prior to death, either with or without the use of external means, it 
seems most probable that the work of regeneration may be performed by 
the Spirit in connection with the infant soul's first view of Christ in the other 
world. As the remains of natural depravity in the Christian are eradicated 
not by death, but at death, through the sight of Christ and union with him, 
so the first moment of consciousness for the infant may be coincident with 
a view of Christ the Savior, which accomplishes the entire sanctification of 
its nature; (cf. 2 Cor. 3: 18 — rrjv So^av Kvplov KaroTrrpi^6fj.Evoi, ttjv avrr/v e'iKova 
jueTa/LLopcpovfie&a. 1 John 3: 2 — bjioioi avru Eoo/ie&a, on oipo/j.E'&a, avrbv Kcidug egtl). 

While, in the nature of things and by the express declarations of Scrip- 
ture, we are precluded from extending this doctrine of regeneration at death 
to any who have committed personal sins, we are nevertheless warranted in 
the conclusion, that certain and great as is the guilt of original sin, no human 
soul is eternally condemned solely for this sin of nature, but that on the 
other hand, all who have not consciously and wilfully transgressed are made 
partakers of Christ's salvation. 

Eidgeley, Body of Divinity, 1 : 422-425. Hodge, Syst. Theol. ,1:26, 27. 



PART VI. 

SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION THROUGH 
THE WORK OF CHRIST AND OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. 



CHAPTER I. 
CHRISTOLOGY, OR THE REDEMPTION WROUGHT BY CHRIST. 



SECTION" I. — HISTORICAL PREPARATION" FOR REDEMPTION. 

Since God had from eternity determined to redeem mankind, the history 
of the race from the time of the fall to the coming of Christ was providen- 
tially arranged to prepare the way for this redemption. This preparation 
was two-fold : 

I. Negative Preparation, in the history of the heathen world. This 
showed, 

1. The true nature of sin, and the depth of spiritual ignorance and of 
moral depravity to which' the race, left to itself, must fall. 

2. The powerlessness of human nature to preserve or regain an adequate 
knowledge of God, or to deliver itself from sin by philosophy or art. 

Tholuck, on Nature and Moral Influence of Heathenism, in Bib. Repos. , 
1832: 80, 246, 441. Dollinger, Gentile andJew. DePressense, Re- 
ligions before Christ. Max Miiller, Science of Religion, 1-128. Cocker, 
Christianity and Greek Philosophy. Ackermann, Christian Element in 
Plato. Farrar, Seekers after God. 
II. Positive Preparation, in the history of Israel. 

A single people was separated from all others from the time of Abraham 
and was educated in three great truths: 

1. The majesty of God, in his unity, omnipotence and holiness. 

2. The sinfulness of man, and his moral helplessness. 

3. The certainty of a coming salvation. 

This education from the time of Moses was conducted by the use of three 
principal agencies : 

A. Law. The Mosaic legislation 

(a) By its theophanies and miracles, cultivated faith in a personal and 
almighty God and Judge. 

(6) By its commands and threatenings, wakened the sense of sin. 

(c) By its priestly and sacrificial system, inspired hope of some way of 
pardon and access to God. 



172 SOTERIOLOOY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

B. Prophecy. This was of two kinds: 

(a) Verbal, — beginning with the protevangelium in the garden, and ex- 
tending to within four hundred years of the coming of Christ. 

(6) Typical, — in persons, as Adam, Melchisedek, Joseph, Moses, Joshua, 
David, Solomon, Jonah; and in acts, as Isaac's sacrifice and Moses lifting 
up the serpent in the wilderness. 

C. Judgment. Repeated divine chastisements for idolatry culminated 
in the overthrow of the kingdom and the captivity of the Jews. The exile 
had two principal effects: 

(a) Religious, — in giving monotheism firm root in the heart of the peo- 
ple, and in leading to the establishment of the synagogue-system by which 
monotheism was thereafter preserved and propagated. 

(b) Civil, — in converting the Jews from an agricultural to a trading peo- 
ple, scattering them among all nations, and finally imbuing them with the 
spirit of Roman law and organization. 

Thus a people was made ready to receive the gospel and to propagate it 
throughout the world, at the very time when the world had become conscious 
of its needs, and through its greatest philosophers and poets was expressing 
its longings for deliverance. 

Dollinger, Gentile and Jew, 2 : 291-419. Martensen, Dogmatics, 224- 
236. Hengstenberg, Christology of the O. T. Smith, Prophecy a 
Preparation for Christ. Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 458-485. Fairbairn, 
Typology. MacWhorter, Jahveh Christ. Kurtz, Christliche Religions- 
lehre, 114. Edwards, History of Redemption, in Works, 1: 297-395. 
Walker, Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation. Conybeare and Howson, 
Life and Epistles of St. Paul, 1 : 1-37. Luthardt, Fundamental Truths, 
257-281. Schaff, Hist. Christian Ch., 1: 3S-49. Butler's Analogy, 
Bonn's ed., 228-238. Bushnell, Vicarious Sac, 63-66. Max Muller, 
Science Language, 2: 443. 



SECTION" II. — THE PERSON OF CHRIST. 

The redemption of mankind from sin was to be effected through a Medi- 
ator who should unite in himself both the human nature and the divine, in 
order that he might reconcile God to man and man to God. To facilitate 
an understanding of the Scriptural doctrine under consideration, it will be 
desirable at the outset to present a brief 

I. Historical Survey of Views respecting the Person of Christ. 

1. The Ebionites (jf^K — 'poor'; A. D. 107?) denied the reality of 
Christ's divine nature and held him to be merely man, whether naturally or 
supernaturally conceived. This man, however, held a peculiar relation to 
God, in that, from the time of his baptism, an unmeasured fulness of the 
divine Spirit rested upon him. Ebionism was simply Judaism within the 
pale of the Christian church, and its denial of Christ's godhood was occa- 
sioned by the apparent incompatibility of this doctrine with monotheism. 
Dorner, History Doctrine Person of Christ, A. 1: 187-217. Reuss, 
Hist. Christ. Theol., 1: 100-107. Schaff, Church History, 1: 212-215. 



VIEWS RESPECTING THE PERSON OF CHRIST. 173 

2. The Docetae (ooaiu — 'to seem,' ' to appear'; A. D. 70-170) like most 
of the Gnostics in the second century and the Manichees in the third, denied 
the reality of Christ's human body. This view was the logical sequence of 
their assumption of the inherent evil of matter. If matter is evil and Christ 
was pure, then Christ's human bod^ must have been merely phantasmal. 
Docetism was simply pagan philosophy introduced into the church. 

Dorner, A. 1: 218-252. Neander, Church History, 1: 387. 

3. The Avians (Arms condemned at Nice, 325) denied the integrity of 
the divine nature in Christ. They regarded the Logos who united himself 
to humanity in Jesus Christ, not as possessed of absolute godhood, but as 
the first and highest of created beings. This view originated in a misinter- 
pretation of the Scriptural accounts of Christ's state of humiliation, and in 
mistaking temporary subordination for original and permanent inequality. 

Dorner, A. 2 : 227-244. Herzog, Encyclopadie, art. : Arianismus. 

4. The Apollinarians (Apollinaris condemned at Constantinople, 381) 
denied the integrity of Christ's human nature. According to this view, 
Christ had no human vovg or -vev/m^ other than that which was furnished 
by the divine nature. Christ had only the human oti/m and i>vxv, — the 
place of the human vovg or rrvi;v/j.a was filled by the divine Logos. Apolli- 
narism is an attempt to construe the doctrine of Christ's person in the forms 
of the Platonic trichotomy. 

Dorner, A. 2: 352-399. Shedd, History of Doctrine, 1: 394. 

5. The Nestorians -(Nestorius removed from the Patriarchate of Con- 
stantinople, 431) denied 'the real union between the divine and the human 
natures in Christ, making it rather a moral than an organic one. They re- 
fused therefore to attribute to the resultant unity the attributes of each 
nature, and regarded Christ as a man in very near relation to God. Thus 
they virtually held to two natures and two persons, instead of two natures 
in one person. 

Dorner, B. 1: 53-79. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4: 210. 

6. The Eutyehians (condemned at Chalcedon, 451) denied the distinction 
and coexistence of the two natures, and held to a mingling of both into one, 
which constituted a tertium quid or third nature. Since in this case the 
divine must overpower the human, it follows that the human was really ab- 
sorbed into or transmuted into the divine, although the divine was not in 
all respects the same after the union, that it was before. Hence the Euty- 
ehians were often called Monophysites, because they virtually reduced the 
two natures to one. 

Dorner, B. 1: 83-93. Guericke, Church History, 1: 356-360. 
The foregoing survey would seem to show that history had exhausted the 
possibilities of heresy, and that the future denials of the doctrine of Christ's 
person must be, in essence, forms of the views already mentioned. All 
controversies with regard to the person of Christ must of necessity hinge 
upon one of three points: first, the reality of the two natures; secondly, 
the integrity of the two natures; thirdly, the union of the two natures in one 
person. Of these points, Ebionism and Docetism deny the reality of the 



174 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

natures; Arianism and Apollinarism deny their integrity; while Nestorianisni 
and Eutychianisni deny their proper union. In opposition to all these 
errors, 

7. The Orthodox doctrine (promulgated at Chalcedon, 451) holds that 
in the one person Jesus Christ there ^.*e two natures, a human nature and a 
divine nature, each in its completeness and integrity, and that these two 
natures are organically and indissolubly united, yet so that no third nature 
is formed thereby. In brief, to use the antiquated dictum, orthodox doc- 
trine forbids us either to divide the person or to confound the natures. 

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4: 189, sq. Dorner, History of the Doctrine 
of the Person of Christ, B. 1: 93-119. 

That this doctrine is Scriptural and rational we have yet to show. We 
may most easily arrange our proofs by reducing the three points mentioned 
to two, namely: first, the reality and integrity of the two natures; secondly, 
the union of the two natures in one person. 

II. The two Natures of Christ, — their Reality and Integrity. 
1. The Humanity of Christ. 

A. Its Reality. This may be shown as follows : 

{a) He expressly called himself and was called 'man'; (John 8: 40. 
Acts 2 : 22. Rom. 5 : 15. 1 Cor. 15: 21. 1 Tim. 2: 5. Cf. the genealogies 
in Matt. 1 and Luke 3; the phrase 'Son of man,' e. g., in Matt. 20: 28; 
and the term 'flesh' = human nature, in John 1: 14 and 1 John 4: 2). 

(6) He possessed the essential elements of human nature as at present 
constituted, a material body and a rational soul; (Matt. 26: 38; John 12: 
27 — fvxh. John 11 : 33— -vevua. Matt. 26: 26— oaiua. 2%—alau. Luke 24: 
39 — capua Kai barka. Heb. 2: 14 — aapubc; ml di.ij.arog. Cf. 1 John 1: 1-3). 

(c) He was moved by the instinctive principles and he exercised the 
active powers which belong to a normal and developed humanity; (Matt. 4 
2 — hunger; 8: 24 — sleep: John 4: 6 — weariness; 19: 28 — thirst; Matt. 9 
36 — compassion; Mark 10: 21 — love; John 11: 33 — groaning; 35 — weeping 
Mark 3: 5 — anger; Heb. 5: 7 — anxiety and fear; Matt. 14: 23 — prayer). 

(d) He was subject to the ordinary laws of human development both in 
body and soul; (Luke 2: 40 — grew and waxed strong in spirit; 46 — asked 
questions; 52 — grew in wisdom and stature. Heb. 2: 10 — made perfect 
through sufferings; 18 — suffered being tempted; 5 : 8 — learned obedience. 
Cf. Gal. 4: 4; Heb. 2: 10). 

(e) He suffered and died; (Luke 22: 44 — bloody sweat; John 19: 30 — 
TrapeouKE to Trvevfia. 34 — k^T^&ev ai/ia nal hoop). 

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4 : 408. 

B. Its Integrity. We here use the term integrity to signify not merely 
completeness but perfection. Christ's human nature was 

(a) Supernaturally conceived; (Luke 1 : 35). "He had no earthly father; 
his birth was a creative act of God, breaking through the. chain of human 
generation." 

Julius Muller, Proof-texts, 29. 



THE TWO NATURES OF CHRIST. 175 

(6) Free from all taint of sin, whether original or actual; (Luke 1: 35 — 
rb yewufievov ayiuv. 2: 52. John 8: 46; 14: 30 — ev kfioi ovk §xei ovdev. Horn. 
8: 3 — sv duoiunari. capKoc duapriac. 2 Cor. 5: 21 — rbv yap py yvbvra auapriav. 
Heb. 4: 15; 7: 26, 27; 9: 14. 1 Pet. 1: 19; 2: 21, 22. 1 John 3: 5, 7). 

Ullmann, Sinlessness of Jesus. Thomasius, Christi Person unci Werk, 

2: 7-17. Schaff, Person of Christ, 51-72. 

(c) Ideal human nature, —furnishing the pattern which man is progressively 
to realize; (Psalm 8: 4-8; cf. Heb. 2: 6-10. 1 Cor. 15: 45,49. 2 Cor. 
3: 18. Phil. 3: 21. Col. 1: 18. 1 Pet, 2: 21. 1 John 3: 3. This seems 
indicated in the phrase 'Son of man' — John 5: 27; cf. Dan. 7: 13, and Com. 
of Pusey, in loco). 

F. TV. Robertson, Sermon on the Glory of the Divine Son. Wilberforce, 
Incarnation, 22-99. Ebrard, Dogmatik, 2: 25. Moorhouse, Nature 
and Revelation, 37. Tennyson, Introduction to In Memoriam. Far- 
rar, Life of Christ, 1: 148-154; 2: excursus IV. Tyler, in Bib. Sac, 
22: 51, 620. 

(d) A human nature germinal and capable of self -communication, — so 
constituting him the spiritual head and beginning of a new race; (Isa. 53: 
10. John 5: 21 — obg \}e/.ei ^uo-oleI. 15: 1; 17: 2 — ougel avrolg (u>?jv aluviov. 
1 Cor. 15: 45 — o kcx^'og 'Adau elg rcvEVjia ^cjo-olovv. Eph. 5 : 23 — KEoa'/j] tF/c 
EKK/jjoiaq. Col. 1 : 18 — &PXV- Heb. 2: 13 — eyh nai ra Traioia. Rev. 22: 16 — 
pi£a nat ru ykvog \a3lo).. 

Wilberforce, Incarnation, 227-241. 

The passages thus reviewed abundantly confute the Docetic denial of 
Christ's veritable human body, and the Apollinarian denial of Christ's verita- 
ble human soul. More than this, they establish the reality and integrity of 
Christ's human nature, as possessed of all the elements, faculties and powers 
essential to humanity. 

2. The Deity of Christ. 

The reality and integrity of Christ's divine nature have been sufficiently 
proved in a former chapter of these lectures; (see pages 72-80). We need 
only refer to the evidence there given, that, during his earthly ministry, 
Christ not only 

(a) Possessed a knowledge of his own deity (John 3 : 13 — 6 uv h ra 
obpavG). 8: 58 — ~plv 'AiSpaau yevEa&at, kycj slue 10: 30 — £yu Km 6 Ylart/p iv 
eauev. 14: 9, 10 — o icopaKcjg eue, EupanE rbv HarEpa) but also 

(6) Exercised divine attributes and prerogatives; (John 2 : 25 — kyivuonE 
ri fjv ev TGi aniptj-cj. Mark 4 : 39 — dire ry d-aMooy, 1i6~a, -coipicjoo. Matt. 9: 
6 — etjovaiav exet a<pievat ap.apriaq. Cf. Mark 2: 7). 

But this is to say, in other words, that there were in Christ a knowledge 
and a power such as belong only to God. The passages cited furnish a refu- 
tation of both the Ebionite denial of the reality, and the Arian denial of the 
integrity of the divine nature in Christ. 



176 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE LOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

III. The Union of the two Natures in one Person. 

Distinctly as the Scriptures represent Jesus Christ to have been possessed 
of a divine nature and of a human nature, each unaltered in essence and 
nndivested of its normal attributes and powers, they with equal distinctness 
represent Jesus Christ as a single undivided personality in whom these two 
natures are vitally and inseparably united, so that he is properly, not God 
and man, but the God-man. The two natures are bound together not by 
the moral tie of friendship nor by the spiritual tie which links the believer 
to his Lord, but by a bond unique and inscrutable, which constitutes them 
one person with a single consciousness and will, this consciousness and will 
including within their possible range both the human nature and the divine. 

1. Proof of this Union. 

A. Christ uniformly speaks of himself, and is spoken of, as a single 
person. There is no interchange of ' I ' and ' thou ' between the human 
and the divine natures, such as we find between the persons of the Trinity; 
(John 17: 23). Christ never uses the plural number in referring to himself, 
unless it be in John 3 : 11 — 8 oidafiev XaXov/xev, and even here, 'we' is more 
probably used as inclusive of the disciples. 1 John 4: 2 — ev capd EkrfkvMra 
is supplemented by John 1 : 14 — trdpf eyevero, and these texts together assure 
us that Christ so came in human nature, as to make that nature an element 
in his single personality. 

B. The attributes and powers of both natures are ascribed to the one 
Christ, and conversely the works and dignities of the one Christ are ascribed 
to either of the natures, in a way inexplicable except upon the principle 
that these two natures are organically and indissolubly united in a single 
person; (examples of the former usage are Rom. 1 : 3 and 1 Pet. 3: 18; of 
the latter, 1 Tim. 2: 5 and Heb. 1 : 2, 3). Hence we can say on the one 
hand, that the God-man existed before Abraham, yet was born in the reign 
of Augustus Csesar, and that Jesus Christ wept, was weary, suffered, died, 
yet is the same yesterday, to-day and forever; — on the other hand, that a 
divine Saviour redeemed us upon the cross, and that the human Christ is 
present with his people even to the end of the world; (Eph. 1: 23; 4: 10. 
Matt 28: 20). 

C. The constant Scriptural representations of the infinite value of Christ's 
atonement and of the union of the human race with God which has been 
secured in him, are intelligible only when Christ is regarded not as a man 
of God, but as the God-man, in whom the two natures are so united that 
what each does has the value of both; (1 John 2: 2; Eph. 2: 16-18, 21, 22; 
2 Pet. 1 : 4). 

D. It corroborates this view to remember that the universal Christian 
consciousness recognizes in Christ a single and undivided personality, and 
expresses this recognition in its services of song and prayer. 

The foregoing proof of the union of a perfect human nature and of a 
perfect divine nature in the single person of Jesus Christ, suffices to refute 
both the Nestorian separation of the natures and the Eutychian confound- 



UNION OF THE TWO NATUKES IN ONE PERSON. 177 

ing of them. Certain modern forms of stating the doctrine of this union 
however — forms of statement into which there enter some of the miscon- 
ceptions already noticed — need a brief examination before we proceed to 
our own attempt at elucidation. 

For Lutheran view of this union and its results hi the communion of 
natures, see Hase, Hutterus Redivivus, 11th ed. ? 195-197; Thomasius, 
Christi Person und Werk, 2 : 24, 25. For Eeformed view, see Tur- 
rettin, loc. 13, quaest. 8. Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2: 387-397, 407-418. 

2. Modern misrepresentations of this union. 

A. The theory that the humanity in Christ is a contracted and metamor- 
phosed deity, — in other words, that the divine Logos reduced himself to 
the condition and limits of human nature and thus literally became a human 
soul. 

This theory is held in slightly varying forms by the German Gess, Hof- 
mann and Ebrard, and by the American Beecher and Crosby. It differs 
from Apollinarism in that it does not necessarily presuppose a trichotomous 
view of man's nature. While Apollinarism, however, denied the human 
origin only of Christ's irvevfia, this theory extends the denial to his entire 
immaterial being, his body alone being derived from the Virgin. 

Gess, Scripture Doctrine of the Person of Christ, and synopsis of his 
view by Eeubelt, in Bib. Sac, 1870: 1-32. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, 
1: 234-241; 2: 20. Ebrard, Dogmatik, 2: 144-151, and in Herzog, 
Encyclopaclie, art.: Jesus Christ, der Gottmensch. H. W. Beecher^ 
Life of Jesus the Christ, chap. 3. Howard Crosby, in Bap. Quarterly, 
1870 : 350-363. Goodwin, Christ and Humanity. On Dr. Watts' view 
of a pre-existent humanity of Christ, see Bib. Sac, 1875: 421. 

Against this theory we urge the following objections: 

(a) It rests upon a false interpretation of the passage John 1: 14 — 
6 16yog oap% eyevero. The word aap^ here has its common New Testament 
meaning. It designates neither soul nor body alone, but human nature in 
its totality; (cf. John 3: 6 — to yeyevvqfievov ktcr^g cap/cog, caps eon.. Rom. 7: 18 — 
ovk oIksI kv kfioi, tovt' eonv kv Ttj oapni tiov, ayatiov). That vyevETo does not imply 
a transmutation of the 7.6yog into human nature or into a human soul is 
evident from eoKfjvuaev which follows — an allusion to the Shechinah of the 
Mosaic tabernacle, and from the parallel passage 1 John 4: 2 — kv caput 
klrj'Xv&oTa, where we are taught not only the oneness of Christ's person but 
the distinctness of the constituent natures. 

(6) It contradicts the two great classes of Scripture passages already re- 
ferred to, which assert on the one hand the divine knowledge and power of 
Christ and his consciousness of oneness with the Father, and on the other 
hand the completeness of his human nature and its derivation from the 
stock of Israel and the seed of Abraham: (Matt. 1: 1-16. Heb. 2: 16). 
Thus it denies both the true humanity and the true deity of Christ. 

(c) It is inconsistent with the Scriptural representations of God's im- 
mutability, in maintaining that the Logos gives up the attributes of godhead 
and his place and office as second person of the Trinity, in order to contract 



178 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRIXE OF SALVATION. 

himself into the limits of humanity. Since attribute and substance are 
correlative terms, it is impossible to hold that the substance of God is in 
Christ, so long as he does not possess divine attributes. The only exit from 
this difficulty is through the pantheistic hypothesis that God and man are 
not two but one in essence. To pantheism, therefore, this theory actually 
tends. 

(d) It is destructive of the whole Scriptural scheme of salvation, in that 
it renders impossible any experience of human nature on the part of the 
divine, — for when God becomes man he ceases to be God; in that it renders 
impossible any sufficient atonement on the part of human nature, — for mere 
humanity even though its essence be a contracted and dormant deity, is 
not capable of a suffering which shall have infinite value; in that it renders 
impossible any proper union of the human race with God in the person of 
Jesus Christ, — for where true deity and true humanity are both absent, 
there can be no union between the two. 

Hovey, God with us, 62-69. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4: 386-408. 

Biedermann, Christliche Dogmatik, 356-359. Dorner, Unverander- 

lichkeit Gottes, in Jahrbuch fur deutsche Theologie, 1:361; 2:440- 

3: 579. Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2: 430-440. 

B. Theory of a union between the divine and the human natures which 
is not completed by the incarnating act, but is accomplished by a gradual 
communication of the fulness of the divine Logos to the man Christ Jesus. 
This communication is mediated by the human consciousness of Jesus. 
Before the human consciousness begins, the personality of the Logos is not 
yet divine-human. The personal union completes itself only gradually, as 
the human consciousness is sufficiently developed to appropriate the divine. 
This view is held by Dorner and Bothe. 

Dorner, History Doctrine Person of Christ, 5: 248-261; Outlines of 
Theology, in Princeton Review, 1873: 71-87. Rothe, Dogmatik, 
2: 49-182; and in Bib. Sac, 27: 386. 

This view is objectionable for the following reasons: — 

(a) The Scripture plainly teaches that that which was born of Mary was 
as completely Son of God as Son of man (Luke 1: 35 — to yewojuevuv ayiov kItj- 
tHioE-ca vlbg Qwv), and that in the incarnating act, and not at his resurrection 
Jesus Christ became the God-man; (Phil. 2: 7 — iiopoyv dovkov 'Aaftav, hv 6/ioidj- 
yuan av&pcj-ov yevofievog). But this theory virtually teaches the birth of a man 
who subsequently and gradually became the God-man, by consciously ap- 
propriating the Logos to whom he has sustained ethical relations. 

(b) Since consciousness and will belong to personality as distinguished 
from nature, the hypothesis of a mutual, conscious and voluntary appropria- 
tion of divinity by humanity and of humanity by divinity during the 
earthly life of Christ, is but a more subtle form of the Nestorian doctrine 
of a double personality. It follows, moreover, that as these two person- 
alities do not become absolutely one until the resurrection,, the death of the 
man Christ Jesus to whom the Logos has not yet fully united himself, can- 
not possess an infinite atoning efficacy. 



UNION OF THE TWO NATURES IN ONE PERSON. 179 

(c) While this theory asserts a filial complete union of God and man in 
Jesus Christ, it renders this union far more difficult to reason, by holding it 
to be a merging of two persons in one, rather than a union of two natures 
in one person. We have seen, moreover, that the Scripture gives no coun- 
tenance to the doctrine of a double personality during the earthly life of 
Christ. The God-man never says: "I and the Logos are one;" "he that 
hath seen me hath seen the Logos;" "the Logos is greater than I;" "I go 
to the Logos. " In the absence of all Scripture evidence in favor of this 
theory, we must regard th e rational and dogmatic arguments against it as 
conclusive. 

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4: 364-380. Thomasius, Christi Person und 
Werk, 2 : 68-70, 80-92, 193-195. Liebner, in Jahrbuch fur deutsche 
Theologie, 3: 349-366. Biedermann, Dogmatik, 351-353. Hodge. 
Syst. Theol., 2: 428-430. 

3. lite real nature of this union. 

A. While the Scriptures represent the person of Christ as the crowning 
mystery of the Christian scheme (Matt. 11: 27. Col. 1: 27. 1 Tim. 3: 16), 
they incite ns to its study; (John 17: 3; 20: 27; cf. Luke 24: 39. Phil. 
3-8, 10). This is the more needful, since Christ is not only the central 
point of Christianity, but is Christianity itself — the embodied reconcilia- 
tion and union between man and God. The following remarks are offered, 
not as fully explaining, but only as in some respects relieving, the difficulties 
of the problem. 

B. The union of the two natures in Christ's person is necessarily inscru- 
table, because there are no analogies to it in our experience. Attempts to 
illustrate it on the one hand from the union and yet the distinctness of soul 
and body, of iron and heat, and on the other hand from the union and yet 
the distinctness of Christ and the believer, of the divine Son and the Father, 
are one-sided and become utterly misleading, if they are regarded as fur- 
nishing a rationale of the union and not simply a means of repelling objec- 
tion. The first two illustrations mentioned above lack the essential element 
of two natures to make them complete : soul and body are not two natures 
but one, nor are iron and heat two substances. The last two illustrations 
mentioned above lack the element of single personality: Christ and the be- 
liever are two persons, not one, even as the Son and the Father are not one 
person but two. 

Blunt, Diet. Doct. and Hist. Theology, art. : Hypostasis. Sartorius, 
Person and Work of Christ, 27-65. Wilberforce, Incarnation, 39-77. 
Luthardt, Fund. Truths, 281-334. 

C. The possibility of the union of deity and humanity in one person is 
grounded in the original creation of man in the divine image. Man's kin- 
ship to God, in other words, his possession of a rational and spiritual nature, 
is the condition of incfarnation. Brute-life is incapable of union with God. 
But human nature is capable of the divine, in the sense not only that it 
lives, moves and has its being in God, but that God may unite himself in- 
dissolubly to it and endue it with divine powers, while yet it remains all the 
more truly human. Since the moral image of God in human nature has 



180 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

been lost by sin, Christ, the perfect image of God after which man was 
originally made, restores that lost image by uniting himself to humanity 
and filling it with his divine life and love; (2 Pet. 1: 4). 

Talbot, in Bap. Quar. , 1868 : 129. Martensen, Christian Dogmatics, 

270. 

D. This possession of two natures does not involve a double personality 
in the God-man, for the reason that the Logos takes into union with himself 
not an individual man with already developed personality, but human na- 
ture which has had no separate existence before its union with the divine. 
Christ's human nature is impersonal, in the sense that it attains self-con- 
sciousness and self-determination only in the personality of the God-man. 
Here it is important to mark the distinction between nature and person. 
Nature is substance possessed in common. The persons of the Trinity have 
one nature. There is a common nature of mankind. Person is nature 
separately subsisting, with powers of consciousness and will. Since the 
human nature of Christ has not and never had a separate subsistence, it is 
impersonal, and the Logos in the God-man furnishes the principle of per- 
sonality. It is equally important to observe that self-consciousness and self- 
determination do not belong to nature as such, but only to personality. For 
this reason Christ has not two consciousnesses and two wills, but a single 
consciousness and a single will. This consciousness and will moreover is 
never simply human, but is always theanthropic, an activity of the one per- 
sonality which unites in itself the human and the divine; (Mark 13 : 32. 
Luke 22: 42). 

For the theory of two consciousnesses and two wills, see Philippi, 
Glaubenslehre, 4: 129, 234. Kahnis, Dogmatik, 2: 314. Eidgeley, 
Body of Divinity, 1: 476. Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2: 378-391. Per con- 
tra, see Hovey, God with us, 66. Porter, Human Intellect, 626. Schaff, 
Church Hist., 1: 757; 3: 751. Calderwood, Moral Philosophy, 12-14. 
Wilberforce, Incarnation, 148-169. Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 512-518. 

E. The union of the divine and the human natures makes the latter 
possessed of the powers belonging to the former; in other words, the attri- 
butes of the divine nature are imparted to the human without passing over 
into its essence — so that the human Christ even on earth had power to be, 
to know, and to do, as God. That this power was latent or was only rarely 
manifested, was the result of the self chosen state of humiliation upon 
which the God-man had entered. In this state of humiliation, the com- 
munication of the contents of his divine nature to the human was mediated 
by the Holy Spirit. The God-man in his servant-form knew and taught 
and performed only what the Spirit permitted and directed; (Matt. 3: 16. 
John 3: 34. Acts 10: 38. Heb: 9: 14). But when thus permitted, he knew, 
taught and performed, not like the prophets by power communicated from 
without, but by virtue of his own inner divine energy; (Matt. 17: 2; 28: 
20. Mark 5: 39. Luke 5: 20, 21. John 2: 11, 24, 25; 3: 13; 20: 19). 

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4: 131, sq. Robins, in Bib. Sac, Oct., 1874: 
615. Wilberforce, Incarnation, 208-241. 



UNION" OF THE TWO NATURES IN ONE PERSON. 181 

F. This communion of the natures was such that although the divine 
nature in itself is incapable of ignorance, weakness, temptation, suffering 
or death, the one person Jesus Christ was capable of these by virtue of 
the union of the divine nature with a human nature in him. As the human 
Saviour can exercise divine attributes, not in virtue of his humanity alone, 
but derivatively by virtue of his possession of a divine nature, so the divine 
Saviour can suffer and be ignorant as man, not in his divine nature, but 
derivatively by virtue of -his possession of a human nature. We may illus- 
trate this from the connection between body and soul. The soul suffers 
pain from its union with the body, of which apart from the body it woidd 
be incapable. So the God-man, although in his divine nature impassible, 
was capable through his union with humanity, of absolutely infinite suffering. 

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4: 300, sq. Lawrence, in Bib. Sac, 24: 41. 
Schoberlein, in Jahrbuch fur d. Theol., 1871: 459-501. 

G. The union of two natures in one person is necessary to constitute 
Jesus Christ a proper mediator between man and God. His two-fold nature 
gives him fellowship with both parties, since it involves an equal dignity 
with God and at the same time a perfect sympathy with man; (Heb. 2: 17, 
18; 4: 15, 16). This two-fold nature, moreover, enables him to present to 
both God and man proper terms of reconciliation: being man, he can make 
atonement for man, — being God, his atonement has infinite value; while 
both his divinity and his humanity combine to move the hearts of offenders 
and constrain them to submission and love; (1 Tim. 2 : 5. Heb. 7: 25). 

Wilberforce, Incarnation, 170-208. 

H. The union of humanity with deity in the person of Christ is indis- 
soluble and eternal. Unlike the avatars of the East, the incarnation was a 
permanent assumption of human nature by the second person of the Trinity. 
In the ascension of Christ, glorified humanity has attained the throne of 
the universe. By his Spirit, this same divine-human Saviour is omnipresent 
to secure the progress of his kingdom. The final subjection of the Son to 
the Father, alluded to in 1 Cor. 15 : 28, cannot be other than the complete 
return of the Son to his original relation to the Father, since, according to 
John 17 : 5, Christ is again to possess the glory which he had with the 
Father before the world was. (Cf. Heb. 1:8; 7: 24, 25). 

On the general subject of this union, see Herzog, Encyclopadie, art. : 
Christologie. Barrows, in Bib. Sac, 10: 765; 26: 83. See also Bib. 
Sac, 17: 535. John Owen, Person of Christ, hi Works, 1: 223. 
Hooker, Eccl. Polity, book V: chap. 51-56. Boyce, in Bap. Quar., 
1870 : 385. Shecld, Hist. Doct. , 1 : 403,' sq. Hovey, God with us, 61-88. 
Plumptre, Christ and Christendom, Appendix. 



182 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

SECTION" III. — THE TWO STATES OF CHRIST. 

I. The State of Humiliation. 
1. The nature of this humiliation. 

We may dismiss as unworthy of serious notice the views that it consisted 
essentially in 

A. The union of the Logos with human nature, — for this union with 
human nature continues in the state of exaltation. 

B. The outward trials and privations of Christ's human life, — for this 
view casts reproach upon poverty, and ignores the power of the soul to rise 
superior to its outward circumstances. 

We may devote more attention to the theory 

C. That the Logos, although retaining his divine self-consciousness and 
his immanent attributes of holiness, love and truth, surrendered his relative 
attributes of omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence, in order to take 
to himself veritable human nature. According to this view there are two 
natures in Christ, indeed, but neither of these natures is infinite. Thomasius 
and Delitzsch are advocates of this theory. 

Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 2: 233-255, 542-550. Delitzsch, 
Biblische Psychologie, 323-333. 

We object to this view that 

{a) It contradicts the Scriptures already referred to, in which Christ as- 
serts his divine knowledge and power. Divinity, it is said, can give up its 
world-functions, for it existed without these before creation. But to give 
up divine attributes is to give up the substance of Godhead. Nor is it a 
sufficient reply to say that only the relative attributes are given up, while the 
immanent which chiefly characterize the Godhead are retained, for the im- 
manent necessarily involve the relative, as the greater involve the less. 

Hase, Hutterus, Redivivus, 11th ed., 217, note. Dorner, in Jahrbuch 
fur deutsche Theologie, 1: 397-408. Liebner, in Jahrbuch, 3: 349-356. 

(b) Since the Logos in uniting himself to a human soul, reduces himself 
to the condition and limitations of a human soul, the theory is virtually a 
theory of the coexistence of two human souls in Christ. But the union of 
two finite souls is more difficult to explain than the union of a finite and an 
infinite, since there can be in the former case no intelligent guidance and 
control of the human element by the divine. 

Hovey, God with us, 68. 

(c) This theory fails to secure its end of making comprehensible the hu- 
man development of Jesus, for even though divested of the relative attri- 
butes of Godhood, the Logos still retains his divine self-consciousness 
together with his immanent attributes of holiness, love and truth. This is as 
difficult to reconcile with a purely natural human development as the pos- 
session of the relative divine attributes would be. The theory logically 
leads to a further denial of the possession of any divine attributes or of any 
divine consciousness at all on the part of Christ, and merges itself in the 
view of Gess and Beecher, that the Godhead of the Logos is actually trans- 
formed into a human soul. 

Kahnis, Dogmatik, 3 : 343. 



Christ's state of humiliation. 183 

D. The true view we conceive to be that the humiliation of Christ con- 
sisted 

{a) In that act of the preexistent Logos by which he gave up his divine 
glory with the Father hi order to take a servant-form. In this act he re- 
signed not the possession, nor yet entirely the use, but rather the indepen- 
dent exercise of the divine attributes; (John 17: 5. Phil. 2: 6, 7. 2 Cor. 
8: 9). 

(6) In the submission of the Logos to the control of the Holy Spirit and 
the limitations of his Messianic mission, in his communication of the divine 
fulness to the human nature which he had taken into union with himself; 
(Actsl: 2; 10: 38. Heb. 9: 14). 

(c) In the continuous surrender on the part of the God-man, so far as 
his human nature was concerned, of the exercise of those divine powers 
with which it was endowed by virtue of its union with the divine, and in 
the voluntary acceptance which followed upon this, of temptation, suffering 
and death; (Matt. 26: 53. John 10 : 18. Phil. 2: 8). 

Each of these elements of the doctrine has its own Scriptural support. 
We must therefore regard the humiliation of Christ, not as consisting in a 
single act, but as involving a continuous self-renunciation, which began 
with the Kenosis of the Logos in becoming man, and which culminated in 
the self-subjection of the God-man to the death of the cross. In Phil. 
2 : 6-8, the most explicit of the passages cited, the subject of the sentence is 
at first (verses 6, 7) Christ Jesus regarded as the preexistent Logos; subse- 
quently (verse 8) this same Christ Jesus, regarded as incarnate. This 
change in the subject is indicated by the contrast between popcjyg -&£ov (verse 
6) and fwptyr/v . onvlov (verse 7), as well as by the participles "kafi&v and yevopevoq 
(verse 7) and Evpe-&e}q (verse 8). It is asserted, then, that the preexistent 
Logos, 'although subsisting in the form of God, did not regard his equality 
with God as a tiling to be forcibly retained, but emptied himself by taking 
the form of a servant, (that is), by being made in the likeness of men. And 
being found in outward condition as a man, he (the incarnate Son of God, 
yet further) humbled himself, by becoming obedient unto death, even the 
death of the cross;' (verse 8). 

Here notice that what the Logos divested himself of in becoming man, is 
not the substance of his Godhead, but the ' form of God ' in which this sub- 
stance was manifested. This ' form of God ' can be only that independent 
exercise of the powers and prerogatives of Deity, which constitutes 'his 
equality with God. ' This he surrenders in the act of ' taking the form of 
a servant ' — or becoming subordinate, as man. (Here other Scriptures com- 
plete the view by their representations of the controlling influence of the 
Holy Spirit in the earthly life of Christ.) The phrases 'made in the like- 
ness of men' and 'found in outward condition as a man ' are used to inti- 
mate, not that Jesus Christ was not really man, but that he was God as well 
as man, and therefore free from the sin which clings to man; (cf. Rom. 
8 • 3 — ev 6 l uo/.o) l uari oapnoQ dpapriax;). Finally, this one person, now God and 
man united, submits himself, consciously and voluntarily, to the humiliation 
of an ignominious death. 



184 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALTATION. 

On the interpretation of Phil. 2 : 6-11, see Com. of Neander, Meyer, 
Lange, Ellicott and Lightfoot. On the general subject of the Kenosis 
of the Logos, see Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4 : 138-150, 386-475. Pope, 
Person of Christ, 23. Bodenieyer, Lehre von der Kenosis. South, 
Sermons, 2 : 9. Baircl, Elohiin Revealed, 585. Sartorius, Person and 
Work of Christ, 39. Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2 : 610-625. On the question 
whether Christ would have become man, had there been no sin, see 
Julius Midler, Dogmat. Abhandlungen, 66-126. Van Osterzee, Dog- 
matics, 512-526, 543-558. 

2. The stages of Christ's humiliation. 

We may distinguish 

A. That act of the preincarnate Logos, by which in becoming man, he 
gave up the independent exercise of the divine attributes. 

B. His submission to the common laws which regulate the origin of souls 
from a preexisting sinful stock, in taking his human nature from the vir- 
gin — a human nature which only the miraculous conception rendered pure. 

C. His subjection to the limitations involved in a human growth and de- 
velopment, reaching the consciousness of his sonship at his twelfth year, 
and working no miracles till after the baptism. 

D. The subordination of himself, in state, knowledge, teaching and 
acts, to the control of the Holy Spirit, so living not independently but as a 
servant. 

E. His subjection, as connected with a sinful race, to temptation and 
suffering, and finally to the death which constituted the penalty of the law. 

II. The State of Exaltation. 

1. The nature of this exaltation. 
It consisted essentially in 

A. A resumption, on the part of the Logos, of his independent exercise 
of divine attributes. 

B. The withdrawal, on the part of the Logos, of all hnritations in his 
communication of the divine fulness to the human nature of Christ. 

C. The corresponding exercise, on the part of the human nature, of those 
powers which belonged to it by virtue of its union with the divine. 

2. The stages of Christ's exaltation. 
A. The quickening and resurrection. 

Both Lutherans and Romanists distinguish between these two, making 
the former precede and the latter follow, Christ's ' preaching to the spirits 
in prison. ' These views rest upon a misinterpretation of 1 Pet. 3 : 18-20. 
Lutherans teach that Christ descended into hell to proclaim his triumph, to 
evil spirits. But this is to give EnqpvZev the unusual sense of proclaiming 
his triumph, instead of his gospel. Romanists teach flat Christ entered 
the underworld to preach to Old Testament saints, that they might be saved. 
But the passage speaks only of the disobedient; it cannot be pressed into 
the support of a sacramental theory of the salvation of Old Testament be- 



THE PROPHETIC OFFICE OF CHRIST. 185 

lievers. The passage does not assert a descent of Christ into the world of 
spirits, but only a work of the preincarnate Logos in offering salvation 
through Noah to the world then about to perish. 

Cowles, in Bib. Sac., 1875: 401. Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2: 616-622. 

B. The ascension and sitting at the right hand of God. 

As the resurrection proclaimed Christ to men as the perfected and glori- 
fied man, the conqueror of sin and lord of death, the ascension proclaimed 
him to the universe as the reinstated God, the possessor of universal do- 
minion, the omnipresent object of worship and hearer of prayer. Dextra 
Dei ubique est. (Matt. 28 : 18-20. Mark 16 : 19. Acts 7 : 56. 2 Cor. 
13: 4. Eph. 1: 23; 4: 10). 

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4: 184-189. Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 558-576. 



SECTION IV. — THE OFFICES OF CHRIST. 
The Scriptures represent Christ's offices as three in number, — prophetic, 
priestly and kingly. Although these terms are derived from concrete hu- 
man relations, they express perfectly distinct ideas. The prophet, the 
priest and the king, of the Old Testament, were detached but designed 
prefigurations of him who should combine all these various activities in 
himself, and should furnish the ideal reality of which they were the imper- 
fect symbols; (cf. 1 Cor. 1 : 30). 

Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 583-586. Archer Butler, Sermons, 1 : 314. 

I. The Prophetic Office of Christ. 

1. The nature of Christ' 's prophetic work. 

Here we must avoid the narrow interpretation which would make the 
prophet a mere foreteller of future events. He was rather an inspired in- 
terpreter or revealer of the divine will, a medium of communication between 
God and men; {jr po^rr]<;= not foreteller, but forteller. Cf. Gen. 20 : 7, — ■ 
of Abraham; Ps. 105 : 15, of the patriarchs; Matt. 11 : 9, — of John the 
Baptist; 1 Cor. 12: 28; Eph. 2 : 20; 3: 5— of N. T. expounders of Scripture). 

Stanley, Jewish Church, 1: 491. 
The prophet commonly united three methods of fulfilling his office, — those 
of teaching, predicting, and miracle-working. In all these respects Jesus 
Christ did the work of a prophet; (Deut. 18 : 15; cf. Acts 3 : 22; 7: 37. Matt. 
13: 57. Luke 13: 33. John 6: 14). He taught (Matt. 5-7), he uttered 
predictions (Matt. 24 and 25), he wrought miracles (Matt. 8 and 9), while in 
his person, his life, his work and his death, he revealed the Father; (John 
8: 26; 14: 9; 17: 8). 

2. Stages of Christ's prophetic work. 
These are four, namely: 

A. The preparatory work of the Logos in enlightening mankind before 
the time of Christ's advent in the flesh. All preliminary religious knowl- 

13 



186 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION". 

edge, whether within or without the bounds of the chosen people, is from 
Christ, the revealer of God; (John 1: 9; Heb. 12: 24-26; Luke 11: 49; 
cf. Matt. 23: 34). 

B. The earthly ministry of Christ incarnate. In his earthly ministry 
Christ showed himself the prophet par excellence. While he submitted, 
like the Old Testament prophets, to the direction of the Holy Spirit, unlike 
them, he found the sources of all knowledge and power within himself. 
The word of God did not come to him — he was himself the Word; (John 8; 
28, 58; cf. Jer. 2 : 1. Matt. 26 : 53. John 10: 18). 

Martensen, Christian Dogmatics, 295-301. 

C. The guidance and teaching of his church on earth since his ascension. 
Christ's prophetic activity is continued through the preaching of his apos- 
tles and ministers, and by the enlightening influences of his Holy Spirit; 
(John 16: 12, 13. Acts 1: 1 — np^aro 6i66.ckelv). The apostles unfolded the 
germs of doctrine put into their hands by Christ. The church is, in a de- 
rivative sense, a prophetic institution established to teach the world by its 
preaching and its ordinances. But Christians are prophets only as being 
proclaimers of Christ's teaching ; (Num. 11: 29. Joel 2: 28). 

D. Christ's final revelation of the Father to his saints in glory; (John 
16: 25; 17: 24, 26). 

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, IV., part 2 : 24-27. 

II. The Priestly Office of Christ. 

The priest was a person divinely appointed to transact with God on man's 
behalf. He fulfilled his office, first by offering sacrifice, and secondly by 
making intercession. In both these respects Christ is priest; (Heb. 7: 
24-28). 

1. Christ's Sacrificial Work, or the Doctrine of the Atonement 

The Scriptures teach that Christ obeyed and suffered in our stead to 
satisfy an immanent demand of the divine holiness and thus remove an ob- 
stacle in the divine mind to the pardon and restoration of the guilty. 

A. Scripture Methods of Bepresenting the Atonement. 

(a) As a provision originating in God's love, and manifesting this love 
to the universe; (John 3: 16. Bom. 5: 8; 8:32. Eph. 2: 4-7. 1 John 
4: 9, 10). 

(6) As an example of disinterested love, to secure our deliverance from 
selfishness; (Luke 9: 22-24. 2 Cor. 5: 15. Gal. 1: 4. Eph. 5: 25-27. 
Col. 1: 21. Tit. 2: 14. Heb. 12: 2. 1 Pet. 2: 21-24). In these passages, 
Christ's death is referred to as a source of moral stimulus to men. 

(c) As a ransom, paid to free us from the bondage of sin; (Matt. 20: 28 — 
Avrpov avrl txoWuv. 26: 28 — rczpl txqWuv skxvvo/lievov elg dipectv dfiapnuv. 1 Tim. 
2: 6 — b doijg eavrbv avrilvrpov virep tt&vtuv. 2 Pet. 2: 1 — rbv ayopaaavra avrovg 
6£Ott6tt)v apvov/ievoi). 

(d) As a penalty, borne in order to rescue the guilty; (Bom. 4: 25 — 
napadddr} did rd -rrapaTTTUjuaTa tjixuv. 8: 3. 1 Cor. 15: 3. 2 Cor. 5: 21 — vneg 



THE PRIESTLY OFFICE OF CHRIST. 187 

■fjpciv dfiapriav ettoitigev — oiKatoa'wq. Gal. 1:4; 3: 13 — ysvdpevog virep r/uav Kara pa. 
cf. Dent. 21: 23. Heb. 9: 28 — slg to tto'AAuv dvevsjKelv dpapriag. cf. Lev. 5: 17; 
24:15; Num. 14:34; Lam. 5: 7. Iu Matt. 8: 17 — rag vdaovg ej3daraaev== 
typical removals of sin; see Alford, in loco). 

(e) As an exhibition of God's righteousness, necessary to the vindication 
of his procedure in the pardon and restoration of sinners; (Rom. 3: 24-26 — 
slg evchi^iv rijgoLKaioc'vvTjg avrov. Cf. Heb. 9:15 — fiavdrov yevopevov etc arrolvrptocuv). 
Here we are taught that Christ's atonement is that which enables God, in 
consistency with his righteousness, to pardon and save sinners. 

(/) As a substitution, of Christ's obedience and sufferings for ours; (Luke 
22: 37— perd dvduuv eXoyicity. Cf. Lev. 16: 21; Is. 53: 5, 6. John 10: 11. 
Rom. 5: 6-8, 19; cf. Matt. 3: 15; 5: 17; Gal. 4: 4; Phil. 2:8; 3:9; Heb. 
10 : 7. 1 Pet. 3 : 18 — difccuog virep ddinuv. For the use of vnep with substitu- 
tionary meaning, see Philem. 13; 2 Cor. 5: 20). 

(g) As a sin-offering, presented on behalf of transgressors; (John 1: 29 — 
dpvbg rov Qeov. Cf. Is. 53: 7-12. 1 Cor. 5: 7 — to 7rdcx a W^v krv&r) Xpicrdg. 
Cf. Deut. 16: 2-6. Eph. 5: 2—^poo(j>opdv ml &vaiav. Heb. 9: 12-14, 22-26. 
1 John 1:7. 1 Pet. 1: 18-21 — a'cuan ug auvov dpupuv. Rev. 5: 9). 

(h) As a propitiation, which satisfies the demands of violated holiness; 
(Rom. 3-25 — iXaoTqpuw, sc. -&vpa or lspe"iov= propitiatory sacrifice — elg to elvat 
avTov dimwv ml ouiatovv-a. Heb. 2: 17. 1 John 2:2; 4: 10 — lAaapov. Cf. Gen. 
32: 20, lxx., and Prov. 16: 14, lxx.). 

{%) As a work of priestly mediation, which reconciles God to men; 
(Heb. 9: 11, 12. Rom. 5: -9-11. 2 Cor. 5: 18, 19. Eph. 2: 16; cf. verses 
12, 13, 19. In these latter passages, the term 'reconciliation' — xaTaTiXdoou 
or dta'Aldcou — has its usual sense of removing enmity, not from the offending, 
but from the offended party; (cf. 1 Sam. 29: 4; Matt. 5: 23, 24). 

On Scripture proofs, see Crawford, Atonement, 1 : 1-193. Dale, Atone- 
ment, 65-256. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, IV. part 2 : 243-342. Smeaton, 
Our Lord's, and the Apostles' Doctrine of Atonement. 
An examination of the passages referred to shows that while the forms in 
which the atoning work of Christ is described are in part derived from 
moral, commercial and legal relations, the prevailing language is that of 
sacrifice. A correct view of the atonement must therefore be grounded 
upon a proper interpretation of 

B. The Institution of Sacrifice, especially as found in the Mosaic system. 
We may dismiss as untenable, on the one hand, the theory that sacrifice 
is essentially the presentation of a gift (Hofmann, Baring-Gould) or a feast 
(Spencer) to the Deity; and on the other hand the theory that sacrifice is a 
symbol of renewed fellowship (Keil) or of the grateful offering to God of the 
whole life and being of the worshipper (Bahr). 

Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, II. part 1 : 214-294. Baring-Gould, Origin 
and Devel. of Relig. Belief, 368-390. Spencer, De Legibus Hebrae. 
orum. Keil, Bib. Archaologie, Sec. 43, 47. Bahr, Symbolik des 
Mosaischen Cultus, 2: 196, 269; also, synopsis of Bahr's view in Bib. 
Sac, Oct. 1870: 593; Jan., 1871: 171. 



188 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

Neither of these theories can explain the fact that the sacrifice is a bloody 
offering, involving the suffering and death of the victim, and brought not 
by the simply grateful, but by the conscience-stricken soul. The true import 
of the sacrifice, as is abundantly evident from both heathen and Jewish 
sources, embraced two elements, namely : 

(a) Satisfaction to offended Deity, or propitiation offered to violated 
holiness; and 

(6) Substitution of suffering and death on the part of the innocent, for 
the deserved punishment of the guilty. 

Combining these two ideas, we have as the total import of the sacrifice: 
satisfaction by substitution. The bloody sacrifice among the heathen ex- 
pressed the consciousness that sin involved guilt; that guilt exposed man to 
the righteous wrath of God; that without expiation of that guilt, there was 
no forgiveness. 

Nagelsbach, Nachhomerische Theologie, 338, sq. , and Stahl, Christliche 
Philosophie, 146; quoted in Luthardt, Compendium der Dogmatik,170. 
In considering the exact purport and efficacy of the Mosaic sacrifices, we 
must distinguish between their theocratical and their spiritual offices. They 
were, on the one hand, the appointed means whereby the offender could be 
restored to the outward place and privileges as member of the theocracy, 
which he had forfeited by neglect or transgression, and they accomplished 
this purpose irrespectively of the temper and spirit with which they were 
offered. On the other hand, they were symbolic of the vicarious sufferings 
and death of Christ, and obtained forgiveness and acceptance with God, 
only as they were offered in true penitence and with faith in God's method 
of salvation; (Heb. 9: 13, 14; 10: 3, 4). 

Thus the Old Testament sacrifices, when rightly offered, involved a con- 
sciousness of sin on the part of the worshipper, the bringing of a victim to 
atone for the sin, the laying of the hand of the offerer upon the victim's 
head, the confession of sin by the offerer, the slaying of the beast, the 
sprinkling or pouring out of the blood upon the altar, and the consequent 
forgiveness of the sin and acceptance of the worshipper; (Lev. 1:4; 4: 20, 
31, 35; 5: 10, 16; 6: 7; 17: 11; cf. Job.42: 7-9). The sin-offering and the 
scape-goat of the great day of atonement symbolized yet more distinctly the 
two elementary ideas of sacrifice, namely, satisfaction and substitution, to- 
gether with the consequent removal of guilt from those on whose behalf the 
sacrifice was offered; (Lev. 16: 1-34. Cf. Gen. 22: 13; Ex. 32: 30-32; 
Deut. 21: 1-9; Is. 53:1-12). 

Fairbairn, Typology, 1 : 209-223. Smeaton, Apostles' Doctrine of Atone- 
ment, 25-53. Kurtz, Sacrificial Worship of O. T. , 120. Crawf ord on 
Atonement, 197-278. Candlish on Atonement, 123-142. Weber, vom 
Zorne Gottes, 161-180. See on passages in Leviticus, the Com. of 
Knobel, in Exeg. Handb. d. Alt. Test. 
It is not essential to this view to maintain that a formal divine institution 
of the rite of sacrifice at man's expulsion from Eden can be proved from 
Scripture. Like the family and the state, sacrifice may, without such for- 
mal inculcation, possess divine sanction, and be ordained of God. The 



THE PRIESTLY OFFICE OF CHRIST. 189 

well-nigh universal prevalence of sacrifice, however, together with the fact 
that its nature as a bloody offering seems to preclude man's own invention 
of it, combines with certain Scripture intimations, to favor the view that it 
was a primitive divine appointment; (Heb. 11 : 4 — -iarei. irAeiova ftvc'iav ' 'A(3eX. 
Gen. 4: 4; 8: 20; cf. 3: 21). From the time of Moses, there can be no 
question as to its divine authority. 

The New Testament assumes and presupposes the Old Testament doctrine 
of sacrifice. The sacrificial language in which its descriptions of Christ's 
work are clothed, cannot be explained as an accommodation to Jewish 
methods of thought, since this terminology was in large part in common use 
among the heathen, and Paul used it more than any other of the apostles in 
his dealing with the Gentiles. To deny to it its Old Testament meaning, 
when used by New Testament writers to describe the work of Christ, is to 
deny any proper inspiration both in the Mosaic appointment of sacrifices 
and in the apostolic interpretations of them. 

We must therefore maintain, as the result of a simple induction of Scrip- 
ture facts, that the death of Christ is a vicarious offering, provided by God's 
love for the purpose of satisfying an internal demand of the divine holiness, 
and of removing an obstacle in the divine mind to the renewal and pardon 
of sinners. 

C. Theories of the Atonement. 

1st. The Socinian, or Example Theory of the Atonement. 

This theory holds that subjective sinfulness is the sole barrier between man 
and God. Not God but only man needs to be reconciled. The only method 
of reconciliation is to better man's moral condition. This can be effected by 
man's own will through repentance and reformation. The death of Christ is 
but the death of a noble martyr. He redeems us, only as his human exam- 
ple of faithfulness to truth and duty has a powerful influence upon our 
moral improvement. This fact the apostles, either consciously or uncon- 
sciously, clothed in the language of the Greek and Jewish sacrifices. 

This theory was fully elaborated by Laelius Socinus and Faustus Socinus 
of Poland, in the 16th century. Its modern advocates are found in the 
Unitarian body. 

Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, 1 : 566-600. Martineau, Studies of 

Christianity, 83-176. Sheldon, Sin and Eedemption, 146-210. J. F. 

Clarke, Orthodoxy, Its Truths and Errors, 235-265. Ellis, Unitarianism 

and Orthodoxy. 
To this theory we make the following objections: — 

(a) It is based upon false philosophical principles, — as, for example, 
that will is merely the faculty of volitions; that the foundation of virtue is 
in utility; that law is an expression of arbitrary will; that penalty is a means 
of reforming the offender; that righteousness in either God or man is only 
a manifestation of benevolence. 

(6) It is a natural outgrowth from the Pelagian view of sin, and logically 
necessitates a curtailment or surrender of every other characteristic doctrine 
of Christianity— inspiration, the deity of Christ, justification, regeneration, 
and eternal retribution. 



190 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OE SALVATION. 

(c) It contradicts the Scripture teachings that sin involves objective 
guilt as well as subjective defilement; that the holiness of God must punish 
sin; that the atonement was a bearing of the punishment of sin for men; 
and that this vicarious bearing of punishment was necessary on the part of 
God, to make possible the showing of favor to the guilty. 

(d) It furnishes no proper explanation of the sufferings and death of 
Christ. The unmartyrlike anguish cannot be accounted for, and the for- 
saking by the Father cannot be justified, upon the hypothesis that Christ 
died as a mere witness to truth. If Christ's sufferings were not propitiatory, 
they neither furnish us with a perfect example, nor constitute a manifesta- 
tion of the love of God. 

(e) The influence of Christ's example is neither declared in Scripture 
nor found in Christian experience to be the chief result secured by his 
death. Mere example is but a new preaching of the law, which repels and 
condemns. The cross has power to lead men to holiness, only as it first 
shows a satisfaction made for their sins. Accordingly, most of the passages 
which represent Christ as an example, also contain references to his pro- 
pitiatory work. 

(/) This theor3 T contradicts the whole tenor of the New Testament in 
making the life and not the death of Christ the most significant and import- 
ant feature of his work. The constant allusions to the death of Christ as 
the source of our salvation, as well as the symbolism of the ordinances, can- 
not be explained upon a theory which regards Christ as a mere example and 
considers his sufferings as incidents rather than essentials of his work. 

Crawford, Atonement, 279-296. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, IV- part 2: 

156-180. Shedd, Hist. Doctrine, 2: 376-386. 

2nd. The Bushnellian, or Moral-influence Theory of the Atonement. 
This holds, like the Socinian, that there is no principle of the divine 
nature which is propitiated by Christ's death, but that this death is a mani- 
festation of the love of God, suffering in and with the sins of his creatures. 
Christ's atonement, therefore, is the merely natural consequence of his taking 
human nature upon him, and is a suffering, not of penalty in man's stead, 
but of the combined woes and griefs which the living of a human life in- 
volves. This atonement has effect, not to satisfy divine justice, but to so 
reveal divine love, as to soften human hearts and lead them to repentance; 
in other words, Christ's sufferings were necessary, not in order to remove 
an obstacle to the pardon of sinners which exists in the mind of God, but 
in order to convince sinners that there exists no such obstacle. This theory, 
for substance, has been advocated by Bushnell, Robertson, Maurice, Camp- 
bell, and Young. 

Bushnell, Vicarious Sacrifice; Forgiveness and Law. Robertson (F. 

W.), Sermons, 1: 163-178. Maurice, on Sacrifice, 209; Theol. Essays, 

141, 228. Campbell, Atonement, 129-191. Young, Life and Light of 

Men, 283-313. 

To this theory we object as follows: — 

(a) While it embraces a valuable element of truth, namely, the moral 
influence upon men of the sufferings of the God-man, it is false by de- 



THE PRIESTLY OFFICE OF CHRIST. 191 

feet, in that it substitutes a subordinate effect of the atonement for its chief 
aim, and yet unfairly appropriates the name vicarious, which belongs only 
to the latter. Suffering with the sinner is by no means suffering in his stead. 
(6) It rests upon false philosophical principles, — as that righteousness is 
identical with benevolence, instead of conditioning it; that God is subject to 
an eternal law of love, instead of being himself the source of all law; that 
the aim of penalty is the reformation of the offender. 

(c) It contradicts the plain teachings of Scripture that the atonement is 
necessary not simply to reveal God's love but to satisfy his justice; that 
Christ's sufferings are propitiatory and penal; and that the human con- 
science needs to be propitiated by Christ's sacrifice, before it can feel the 
moral influence of his sufferings. 

(d) It can be maintained only by wresting from their obvious meaning 
those passages of Scripture which speak of Christ as suffering for our sins; 
which represent his blood as accomplishing something for us in heaven, 
when presented there by our intercessor; which declare forgiveness to be a 
remitting of past offences upon the ground of Christ's death; and which 
describe justification as a pronouncing, not a making just. 

(e) This theory would confine the influence of the atonement to those 
who have heard of it, thus excluding patriarchs and heathen. But the Scrip- 
tures represent Christ as being the Savior of all men, in the sense of securing 
for them grace, which but for his atoning work, could never have been 
bestowed consistently with the divine holiness. 

Hovey, God with us, 181-271. Crawford, Atonement, 297-366. Theol. 
Eclectic, 4: 364-409. 

3rd. The Grotian, or Governmental Theory of the Atonement. 
This theory holds that the atonement is a satisfaction not to any internal 
principle of the divine nature but to the necessities of government. God's 
government of the universe cannot be maintained nor can the divine law 
preserve its authority over its subjects, unless the pardon of offenders is 
accompanied by some exhibition of the high estimate which God sets upon 
his law, and the heinous guilt of violating it. Such an exhibition of divine 
regard for the law is furnished in the sufferings and death of Christ. Christ 
does not suffer the precise penalty of the law, but God graciously accepts 
his suffering as a substitute for the penalty. This bearing of substituted 
suffering on the part of Christ gives the divine law such hold upon the 
consciences and hearts of men, that God can pardon the guilty upon their 
repentance, without detriment to the interests of his government. 

The author of this theory was Hugo Grotius, the Dutch jurist and theo- 
logian; (1583-1645). The theory is characteristic of the New England 
theology, and is generally held by those who accept the New School view 
of sin. 

Grotius, Defensio Eidei Catholicae de Satisfactione, in Works, 4: 
297-338. Wardlaw, Systematic Theology, 2: 358-395. Albert Barnes, 
on Atonement. Discourses and Treatises on the Atonement, edited by 
Prof. Park. 



192 SOTERIOLOGY, OR, THE EOCTRI^E OF SAEVATIOK. 

To this theory we urge the following objections : — 

(a) "While it contains a valuable element of truth, namely, that the suffer- 
ings and death of Christ secure the interests of God's government, it is 
false by defect, in substituting for the chief aim of the atonement one 
which is only subordinate and incidental. 

(6) It rests upon false philosophical principles, — as that utility is the 
ground of moral obligation; that law is an expression of the will, rather than 
of the nature of God; that the aim of penalty is to deter from the commis- 
sion of offences; and that righteousness is resolvable into benevolence. 

(c) It ignores and virtually denies that immanent holiness of God, of 
which the law with its threatened penalties, and the human conscience with 
its demand for punishment, are only finite reflections. There is something 
back of government, — if the atonement satisfies government, it must be by 
satisfying that justice of God of which government is an expression. 

(d) It makes that to be an exhibition of justice which is not an exercise 
of justice; the atonement being, according to this theory, not an execution 
of law, but an exhibition of regard for law, which will make it safe to par- 
don the violators of law. Such a merely scenic representation can inspire 
respect for law, only so long as the essential unreality of it is unsuspected. 

(e) The intensity of Christ's sufferings in the garden and on the cross 
is inexplicable upon the theory that the atonement was a histrionic exhibi- 
tion of God's regard for his government, and can be explained only upon 
the view that Christ actually endured the wrath of God against human sin. 

(/) The actual power of the atonement over the human conscience and 
heart is due, not to its exhibiting God's regard for law, but to its exhibiting 
an actual execution of law, and an actual satisfaction of violated holiness 
made by Christ in the sinner's stead. 

(g) The theory contradicts all those passages of Scripture which repre- 
sent the atonement as necessary; as propitiating God himself; as being a 
revelation of God's righteousness; as being an execution of the penalty of 
the law; as making salvation a matter of debt to the believer, on the ground 
of what Christ has done; as actually purging our sins, instead of making 
that purging possible; as not simply assuring the sinner that God may now 
pardon him on account of what Christ has done, but that Christ has actually 
wrought out a complete salvation, and will bestow it upon all who come to 
him. 

Shedd, Hist. Doctrine, 2: 347-369. Crawford, Atonement, 367. Cun- 
ningham, Hist. Theol. , 2 : 355. Princeton Essays, 1st Series, 259-292. 
S. H. Tyng, Christian Pastor. 

4th. The Irvingian Theory, or Theory of a Subjective Atonement. 

This holds that in his incarnation Christ took human nature as it was in 
Adam, not before the fall but after the fall, — human nature therefore with 
its inborn corruption and predisposition to moral evil; that notwithstanding 
the possession of this tainted and condemned nature, Christ, through the 
power of the Holy Spirit or of his divine nature, not only kept his human 
nature from manifesting itself in any actual or personal sin, but gradually 



THE PRIESTLY OFFICE OF CHRIST. 193 

purified it through struggle and suffering, until in his death he completely 
extirpated its original depravity and reunited it to God. This subjective 
purification of human nature in the person of Jesus Christ constitutes his 
atonement, and men are saved not by any objective propitiation, but only 
by becoming through faith partakers of Christ's new humanity. 

This theory was elaborated by Edward Irving, of London (1792-1834), and 
it has been held, in substance, by Menken and Dippel in Germany. 

Irving, Collected Works, 5 : 9-398. Life of Irving, by Mrs. Oliphant. 
Menken, Schriften, 3: 279-401; 6: 351, sq. For other references, see 
Hagenbach, Hist. Doct., 2: 496-498. 

To this theory we offer the following objections: — 

(a) While it embraces an important element of truth, namely, the fact of 
a new humanity in Christ of which all believers become partakers, it is 
chargeable with serious error in denying the objective atonement which 
makes the subjective application possible. 

(&) It rests upon false fundamental principles, — as that law is identical 
with the natural order of the universe, and as such, is an exhaustive expres- 
sion of the will and nature of God; that sin is merely a power of moral evil 
within the soul, instead of also involving an objective guilt and desert of 
punishment; that penalty is the mere reaction of law against the transgressor 
instead of being also the revelation of a personal wrath against sin; that the 
evil taint of human nature can be extirpated by suffering its natural con- 
sequences — penalty in this way reforming the transgressor. 

(c) It contradicts the express and implicit representations of Scripture 
with regard to Christ's freedom from all taint of hereditary sin; misrepre- 
sents his life as a growing consciousness of the underlying corruption of 
his human nature, which culminated at Gethsemane and Calvary; and denies 
the truth of his own statements, when it declares that he must have died 
for his own sinfulness, even though none were to be saved thereby. 

(d) It makes the active obedience of Christ and the subjective purifica- 
tion of his human nature to be the chief features of his work, while the 
Scriptures make his death and passive bearing of penalty the centre of all, 
and ever regard him as an innocent being vicariously bearing the punish- 
ment of the guilty. 

(e) It necessitates the surrender of the doctrine of justification as a 
merely declaratory act of God; and requires such a view of the divine holi- 
ness expressed only through the order of nature, as can be maintained 
only upon principles of Pantheism. 

Princeton Eeview, April, 1863: 207. Christian Review, 28: 234, sq. 
Ullmann, Sinlessness of Christ, 219-232. 

5th. The Anselmic, or Commercial Theory of the Atonement. 

This theory holds that sin is a violation of the divine honor or majesty, 
and as committed against an infinite being, deserves an infinite punishment; 
that the majesty of God requires him to execute punishment, while the love 
of God pleads for the sparing of the guilty; that this conflict of divine 



194 SOTERIOLOGY, OR TEtE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

attributes is eternally reconciled by the voluntary sacrifice of the God-man, 
who bears by virtue of the dignity of his person the intensively infinite 
punishment of sin, which must have been otherwise suffered extensively and 
eternally by sinners; that this suffering of the God-man presents to the divine 
majesty an exact equivalent for the deserved sufferings of the elect; and 
that as the result of this satisfaction of the divine claims, the elect sinners 
are pardoned and regenerated. 

This view was first broached by Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) as a 
substitute for the earlier patristic view that Christ's death was a ransom 
paid to Satan, to deliver sinners from his power. It is held by many Scotch 
theologians, and in this country, by the Princeton School. 

Anselm, Cur Deus Homo; translated in Bib. Sac, 11: 729; 12: 52. 

Symington, Candlish, Martin, Smeaton, on Atonement. Hodge, Syst. 

Theol., 2 : 470-540. Alexander (A. A.), on Atonement. 

To this theory we make the following objections: — 

(a) While it contains a valuable element of truth, in its representation 
of the atonement as satisfying a principle of the divine nature, it conceives 
of this principle in too formal and external a manner — making the idea of 
the divine honor or majesty more prominent than that of the divine holiness 
in which the divine honor and majesty are grounded. 

(b) In its eagerness to maintain the atoning efficacy of Christ's passive 
obedience, the active obedience, quite as clearly expressed in Scripture, is 
well-nigh lost sight of. 

(c) It allows disproportionate weight to those passages of Scripture 
which represent the atonement under commercial analogies, as a debt or 
ransom, to the exclusion of those which describe it as an ethical fact, whose 
value is to be estimated not quantitatively, but qualitatively. 

(d) It represents the atonement as having reference only to the elect, 
and ignores the Scripture declarations that Christ died for all. 

(e) It is defective in holding to merely an external transfer of the merit 
of Christ's work, while it does not clearly state the internal ground of that 
transfer in the union of the believer with Christ. 

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, IV. part 2: 70, sq. Baur, Dogmengeschichte, 
2: 417, sq. Shedd. Hist. Doctrine, 2: 273-286. Dale, Atonement, 
279-292. 

6th. The Ethical Theory of the Atonement. 

This holds that the necessity of an atonement is grounded in the holiness 
of God. There is an ethical principle in the divine nature, which demands 
that sin shall be punished. Aside from its results, sin is essentially ill- 
deserving. As we who are made in God's image mark our growth in purity 
by the increasing quickness with which we detect impurity, and by the in- 
creasing hatred which we feel toward it, so infinite purity is a consuming 
fire to all iniquity. As there is an ethical demand in our natures that not 
only others' wickedness but our own wickedness be visited with punishmetn, 
and a keen conscience cannot rest till it has made satisfaction to justice for 
its misdeeds, so there is an ethical demand of God's nature that penalty 
follow sin. 



THE PRIESTLY OFFICE OF CHRIST. 195 

Punishment is the constitutional reaction of God's being against moral 
evil — the self-assertion of infinite holiness against its antagonist and would- 
be destroyer. In God this demand is devoid of all passion, and is consistent 
with infinite benevolence. It is a demand that cannot be evaded, since the 
holiness from which it springs is unchanging. The atonement is therefore 
a satisfaction of the ethical demand of the divine nature by the substitution 
of Christ's penal sufferings for the punishment of the guilty. 

This substitution is unknown to mere law, and above and beyond the 
powers of law. It is an operation of grace. Grace however does not vio- 
late or suspend law, but takes it up into itself and fulfils it. The righteous- 
ness of law is maintained, in that the source of all law, the judge and 
punisher, himself voluntarily submits to bear the penalty and bears it in 
the human nature that has sinned. 

Thus the atonement answers the ethical demand of the divine nature that 
sin be punished if the offender is to go free. The interests of the divine 
government are secured as a first subordinate result of this satisfaction to 
God himself of whose natm-e the government is an expression; while as a 
second subordinate result, provision is made for the needs of human nature — 
on the one hand the need of an objective satisfaction to its ethical demand 
of punishment for sin, and on the other the need of a manifestation of divine 
love and mercy that will affect the heart and move it to repentance. 

In favor of the substitutionary or ethical view of the atonement we may 
urge the following considerations: 

(a) It rests upon correct philosophical principles with regard to the na- 
ture of will, law, sin, penalty, righteousness. 

(b) It combines in itself all the valuable elements in the theories before 
mentioned, while it avoids their inconsistencies by showing the deeper 
principle upon which each of these elements is based. 

(c) It most fully meets the requirements of Scripture, (Acts 17 : 3. 
Luke 24: 26), by holding that the necessity of the atonement is absolute, 
since it rests upon the demands of immanent holiness, the fundamental 
attribute of God. 

(d) It furnishes the only proper explanation of the sacrificial language 
of the New Testament, and of the sacrificial rites of the Old, considered as 
prophetic of Christ's atoning work. 

(e) It alone gives proper place to the death of Christ as the central fea- 
ture of his work, — set forth in the ordinances, and of chief power in Chris- 
tian experience. 

(/) It gives us the only means of understanding the sufferings of Christ 
in the garden and on the cross, or of reconciling them with the divine jus- 
tice. 

(g) As no other theory does, this view satisfies the ethical demand of 
human nature; pacifies the convicted conscience; assures the sinner that he 
may find instant salvation in Christ; and so makes possible a new life of 
holiness, while at the same time it furnishes the highest incentives to such 
a life. 

Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 272-324; Philosophy of History, 65-69. 
Dale on Atonement, 265-440. Magee, Atonement and Sacrifice, 1 : 27, 53, 



196 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

253. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, IV. part 2 : 27-114. Weber, vom Zorne 
Gottes, 214-334. Owen, Dissertation on Divine Justice, chap. II., 
in Works, 10: 500-512. Farrar, Science and Theology, 157, sq. Moor- 
house, Nature and Revelation, 60-86. Edwards, Works, 4: 140, sq. 
Hopkins, Works, 1: 319-363. Schoberlein, in Studien and Kritiken, 
1845: 267-318; 1847: 7-70; and in Herzog, Encyclopadie, art.: Ver- 
sohnung. Jahrbuch fur d. Theol., 3: 713; 8: 213. Wallace, Repre- 
sentative Responsibility. Macdonnell, Donnellan Lectures on Atone- 
ment, 115-214. Luthardt, Saving Truths, 146-155. Baird, Elohim 
Revealed, 605-637. Lawrence, in Bib. Sac, 20: 332-339. 

D. The Extent of the Atonement. 

The Scriptures represent the atonement as having been made for all men, 
and as sufficient for the salvation of all. Not the atonement therefore is 
limited, but the application of the atonement through the work of the Holy 
Spirit. 

Upon this principle of an universal atonement, but a special application 
of it to the elect, we must interpret such passages as Eph. 1 : 4, 7. 2 Tim. 
1: 9, 10. John 17: 9, 20, 24. 2 Pet. 2: 1. 1 John 2: 2. 1 Tim. 2: 6; 
4: 10. Tit. 2: 11. 

If it be asked in what sense Christ is the Saviour of all men, we reply, 

(a) That the atonement of Christ secures for all men a delay in the exe- 
cution of the sentence against sin, and a space for repentance, together with 
a continuance of the common blessings of life which have been forfeited 
by transgression. 

(6) That the atonement of Christ has made objective provision for the sal- 
vation of all, by removing from the divine mind every obstacle to the pardon 
and restoration of sinners, except their wilful opposition to God and refusal 
to turn to him. 

(c) That the atonement of Christ has procured for all men the powerful 
incentives to repentance presented in the cross, and the combined agency 
of the Christian church and of the Holy Spirit, by which these incentives are 
brought to bear upon them. 

Christ is specially the Saviour of those who believe, in that he exerts a 
special power of his Spirit to procure their acceptance of his salvation. 
This is not however a part of his work of atonement; it is the application 
of the atonement, and as such is hereafter to be considered. 

Jenkyn, Extent of the Atonement. E. D. Griffin, Extent of the Atone- 
ment. 

E. Objections to the Doctrine of Atonement. 

(a) That a God who does not pardon sin without atonement, must lack 
either omnipotence or love. 

We answer on the one hand, that God's omnipotence is the revelation 
of his nature, and not a matter of arbitrary will; and on the other hand, 
that God's love is ever exercised consistently with nis fundamental attribute 
of holiness, so that while holiness demands the sacrifice, love provides it. 



THE PRIESTLY OFFICE OF CHRIST. 197 

(b) That satisfaction and forgiveness are mutually exclusive. 

We answer, that since it is not a third party but the Judge himself who 
makes satisfaction to his own violated holiness, forgiveness is still optional, 
and may be offered upon terms agreeable to himself. The objection is valid 
against a merely commercial view of the atonement, not against a moral 
view of it. 

(c) That there can be no real propitiation, since the Judge and the sacri- 
fice are one. 

We answer that this objection ignores the existence of personal relations 
within the divine nature, and the fact that the God-man is distinguishable 
from God. The satisfaction is grounded in the distinction of persons in the 
Godhead, while the love in which it originates belongs to the unity of the 
divine essence. 

(d) That the suffering of the innocent for the guilty is not an execution 
of justice, but an act of manifest injustice. 

We answer that this is true only upon the supposition that the Son bears 
the penalty of our sins not voluntarily but compulsorily, — a hypothesis con- 
trary to Scripture and to fact. 

(e) That there can be no transfer of punishment or merit, since these are 
personal. 

We answer that the idea of representation and suretyship is common in 
human society and government, and that such representation and suretyship 
are inevitable wherever there is community of life between the innocent and 
the guilty. 

(/) That remorse, as a part of the penalty of sin, could not have been 
suffered by Christ. 

We answer, on the one hand, that it may not be essential to the idea of 
penalty that Christ should have borne the identical pangs which the lost 
would have endured; and on the other hand, that we do not know how com- 
pletely a perfectly holy being, possessed of superhuman knowledge and 
love, might have felt even the pangs of remorse for the condition of that 
humanity of which he was the central conscience and heart. 

(g) That the sufferings of Christ as finite in time do not constitute a 
satisfaction to the infinite demands of the law. 

We answer that the infinite dignity of the sufferer constitutes his suffer- 
ings a full equivalent in the eye of infinite justice. 

(h) That if Christ's passive obedience made satisfaction to the divine 
justice, then his active obedience was superfluous.- 

We answer that the active obedience and the passive obedience are in- 
separable. The latter is essential to the former, and both are needed to 
secure for the sinner, on the one hand, pardon, and on the other, that which 
goes beyond pardon, namely restoration to the divine favor. The objection 
holds only against a superficial and external view of the atonement. 

(i) That the doctrine is immoral in its practical tendencies, since Christ's 
obedience takes the place of ours and renders ours unnecessary. 

We answer that the objection ignores not only the method by which the 



198 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

benefits of the atonement are appropriate d, namely repentance and faith, but 

also the regenerating and sanctifying power bestowed upon all who believe. 

Faith in the atonement does not induce license, but "works by love and 

purifies the heart." 

(j ) That if the atonement requires faith as its complement, then it does 

not in itself furnish a complete satisfaction to God's justice. 

We answer that faith is not the ground of our acceptance with God, as 

the atonement is, and so is not a work at all, — faith is only the medium of 

appropriation. We are saved not by faith but through faith. 

For answers to these and other objections, see Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 
IV. part 2: 156-180. Crawford, Atonement, 383-468. Hodge, Syst. 
Theol., 2: 527-543. Baird, Elohim Revealed, 623, sq. Owen on Jus- 
tification, chap, viii., in Works, 5: 175-201. 

2. Christ's Intercessory Work. 

The Priesthood of Christ does not cease with his work of atonement but 
continues forever; (Heb. 7: 23-28.) In the presence of God he fulfils the 
second office of the priest, namely that of intercession. 

A. The nature of Christ's Intercession. 

This is not to be conceived of either as an external and vocal petitioning, 
nor as a mere figure of srjeech for the natural and continuous influence of 
his sacrifice; but rather as a special activity of Christ in securing, upon the 
ground of that sacrifice, whatever of blessing comes to men, whether that 
blessing be temporal or spiritual; (1 John 2:1. Rom. 8: 34. Heb. 7: 25; 
9: 24). 

B. Objects of Christ's Intercession. 

We may distinguish between : 

(a) That general intercession which secures to all men certain temporal 
benefits of his atoning work (Isaiah 53: 12. Luke 23: 34), and 

(6) That special intercession which secures the divine acceptance of the 
persons of believers, and the divine bestowment of all gifts needful for their 
salvation; (Matt. 18: 19, 20. Luke 22: 32. John 14: 16; 17: 9. Acts 2: 
33. Eph. 1: 6; 2: 18; 3: 12. Heb. 2: 17, 18; 4: 15, 16. 1 Pet. 2: 5. Rev. 
5: 6; 7: 16, 17). 

C. Relation of Christ's Intercession to that of the Holy Ghost. 

The Holy Spirit is an advocate within us, teaching us what to pray for as 
we ought; Christ is an advocate in heaven, securing from the Father the an- 
swer of our prayers. Thus the work of Christ and of the Holy Spirit are 
complements to each other and parts of one whole; (John 14: 26. Rom. 
8: 26; cf. 1 John 2: 1). 

D. Relation of Christ's Intercession to that of saints. 

All true intercession is either directly or indirectly the intercession of 
Christ. Christians are organs of Christ's Spirit. To suppose Christ in us 
to offer prayer to one of his saints, instead of directly to the Father, is to 
blaspheme Christ, and utterly misconceive the nature of prayer. 



THE KINGLY OFFICE OF CHRIST. 199 

III. The Kingly Office of Christ. 

This is to be distinguished from the sovereignty which Christ originally 
possessed in virtue of his divine nature. Christ's Kingship is the sovereignty 
of the divine-human Redeemer, which belonged to him of right from the 
moment of his birth, but which was fully exercised only from the time of 
his entrance upon the estate of exaltation. By virtue of this kingly office, 
Christ rules all things in heaven and earth for the glory of God and the 
execution of God's purpose of salvation. 

(a) With respect to the universe at large, Christ's kingdom is a king- 
dom of power. He upholds, governs and judges the world. 

(6) With respect to his militant church, it is a kingdom of grace. He 
founds, legislates for, administers, defends and augments his church on earth. 
(c) With respect to his church triumphant, it is a kingdom of glory; he 
rewards his redeemed people with the full revelation of himself, upon the 
completion of his kingdom in the resurrection and the judgment; (Ps. 2: 
6, 7; 8: 6; .cf. Heb. 2: 8. Matt. 25: 31, 34; 28: 18. Luke 2: 11; 19: 38. 
John 17: 24; 18: 37. Rom. 8: 28. Eph. 1: 22. Heb. 1:8. 1 Pet. 3: 22. 
2 Pet. 1: 11). 

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, IV. part 2: 342-351. Van Oosterzee, Dog- 
matics, 586, sq. Garbett, Christ as Prophet, Priest and King, 2 : 243- 
438. J. M. Mason, Sermon on Messiah's Throne, in Works, 3: 241-275. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE RECONCILIATION OF MAN TO GOD, OR THE 

APPLICATION OF REDEMPTION THROUGH 

THE WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. 

SECTION I. — THE APPLICATION OF CHRIST'S REDEMPTION 
IN ITS PREPARATION. 

Ill this section we treat of Election and Calling; Section Second being 
devoted to the Application of Christ's Redemption in its Actual Begin- 
ning — namely, in Regeneration, Conversion, Union with Christ and Justifi- 
cation; while Section Third has for its subject the Application of Christ's 
Redemption in its Continuation — namely, in Sanctification and Persever- 
ance. 

See Julius Muller, Proof -texts, 35, from which this arrangement is taken. 

In treating Election and Calling as applications of Christ's redemption, 
we imply that they are, in God's decree, logically subsequent to that re- 
demption. In this we hold the Sublapsarian view, as distinguished from 
the Supralapsarianism of Calvin and Beza, which regarded the decree of 
individual salvation as preceding in the order of thought, the decree to per- 
mit the fall. In this latter scheme, the order of decrees is as follows : — 
1. the decree to save certain and to reprobate others; 2. the decree to create 
both those who are to be saved and those who are to be reprobated ; 3. the 
decree to permit both the former and the latter to fall; 4. the decree to 
provide salvation only for the former, that is, for the elect. 

But the Scriptures teach that men as sinners, and not men irrespective of 
their sins, are the objects of God's saving grace in Christ; (John 15: 19. 
Rom. 11: 5, 7. Eph. 1: 4-6. 1 Pet. 1: 2). Condemnation moreover is an 
act, not of sovereignty, but of justice, and is grounded in the guilt of the 
condemned; (Rom. 2: 6-11. 2 Thess. 1: 5-10). The true order of the de- 
crees is therefore as follows: — 1. the decree to create; 2. the decree to per- 
mit the fall; 3. the decree to provide a salvation in Christ sufficient for the 
needs of all; 4. the decree to secure the actual acceptance of this salvation 
on the part of some — or in other words, the decree of Election. 

Those Sublapsarians who hold to the Anselmic view of a limited Atone- 
ment, make the decrees 3. and 4. just mentioned, exchange places, — the de- 
cree of election thus preceding the decree to provide redemption. The 
Scriptural reasons for preferring the order here given, have been already 
indicated in our treatment of the Extent of the Atonement; (page 194). 

Calvin, Institutes, book III. , chap. 21-24. Hodge, Outlines of Theology, 
174-185. Hase, Hutterus Redivivus, 11th Ed. , 180-183. Van Oosterzee, 
Dogmatics, 446-458. 



ELECTION". 201 

I. Election. 

Election is that eternal act of God, by which in his sovereign pleasure 
and on account of no foreseen merit in them, he chooses certain out of the 
number of sinful men to be the recipients of the special grace of his Spirit, 
and so to be made voluntary partakers of Christ's salvation. 

1. Proof of the Doctrine of Election. 

A. From Scripture. 

See John 10: 26; Acts 13: 48; Eom. 8: 28-30— foreknew =< to regard, 
to make an object of attention and care; by implication, to make choice of 
for one's self and admit to near and intimate relationship; cf. Amos 3: 2; 
James 2: 23; and especially Conant on Gen. 18: 19. See also Kom. 9: 11-15; 
Eph. 1:4, 11; 2: 7-10. In this last passage, however, the neuter rovro (verse 
8) refers, not to ' faith, ' but to ' salvation. ' But faith is elsewhere represented 
as having its source in God; cf. John 6: 44, 65; Acts 15: 9; Rom. 12: 3; 
1 Cor. 12: 9; Phil. 2: 13; Col. 2: 12— mareug ttjq evepyeiag rov Qeov, 2 Thess. 
1 : 11 — spyov TcioTeug, and 2 Tim. 1 : 9. 

These passages furnish a conclusive refutation 

(a) Of the Lutheran view that election is simply God's determination 
from eternity to provide an objective salvation for universal humanity; and 

(6) Of the Arminian view that election is God's determination from eter- 
nity to save certain individuals upon the ground of their foreseen faith. 

B. From Reason. 

(a) What God does, he has eternally purposed to do. Since he bestows 
special regenerating grace on some, he must have eternally purposed to be- 
stow it — in other words, must have chosen them to eternal life. Thus the 
doctrine of election is only a special application of the doctrine of decrees; 
(see pages 86-91). 

(b) This purpose cannot be conditioned upon any merit or faith of those 
who are chosen, since there is no such merit — faith itself being God's gift and 
foreordained by him. 

(c) The depravity of the human will is such, that without this decree to 
bestow special divine influences upon some, all without exception would 
have rejected Christ's salvation after it was offered to them, and so all with- 
out exception must have perished. Election therefore may be viewed as a 
necessary consequence of God's decree to provide an objective Redemption. 

2. Objections to the Doctrine of Election. 

A. It is unjust to those who are not included in this purpose of salvation. 
Answer: — That any should be saved, is matter of pure grace, and those 

who are not included in this purpose of salvation suffer only the due reward 
of their deeds. There is therefore no injustice in God's election. We may 
better praise God that he saves any, than charge him with injustice because 
he saves So few. 

B. It represents God as partial in his dealings and a respecter of persons. 
Answer: — Since there is nothing in men that determines God's choice of 

one rather than of another, the objection is invalid. It would equally apply 

14 



202 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

to God's selection of certain nations as Israel, and certain individuals as 
Cyrus, to be recipients of special temporal gifts; (Ps. 44: 3. 1 Cor. 4: 7). 

C. It represents God as arbitrary. 

Answer: — It represents God not as arbitrary, but as exercising the free 
choice of a wise and sovereign will, in ways and for reasons which are in- 
scrutable to us. To deny the possibility of such choice is to deny God's 
personality. To deny that God has reasons for his choice is to deny his 
wisdom. The doctrine of election finds these reasons not in men but in 
God. 

D. It tends to immorality, by representing men's salvation as indepen- 
dent of their own obedience. 

Answer: — The objection ignores the fact that the salvation of believers is 
ordained only in connection with their regeneration and sanctification as 
means; and that the certainty of final triumph is the strongest incentive to 
strenuous conflict with sin. 

E. It inspires pride in those who think themselves elect. 

Answer: — This is possible only in the case of those who pervert the doc- 
trine. On the contrary, its proper influence is to humble men. Those who 
exalt themselves above others, upon the ground that they are special favorites 
of God, have reason to question their election. 

F. It discourages effort for the salvation of the impenitent, whether on 
their own part or on the part of others. 

Answer: — Since it is a secret decree, it cannot hinder or discourage such 
effort. On the other hand it is a ground of encouragement, and so a stimu- 
lus to effort — for without election, it is certain that all would be lost; (cf. 
Acts 18: 10). While it humbles the sinner so that he is willing to cry for 
mercy, it encourages him also, by showing him that some will be saved, and 
(since election and faith are inseparably connected) that he will be saved, 
if he will only believe. "While it makes the Christian feel entirely depen- 
dent on God's power in his efforts for the impenitent, it leads him to say with 
Paul that he ' ' endures all things for the elect's sakes, that they may attain 
the salvation that is in Christ Jesus with eternal glory;" (2 Tim. 2: 10). 

G. The decree of election implies a decree of reprobation. 

Answer: — The decree of reprobation is not a positive decree like that of 
election, but a permissive decree to leave the sinner to his self-chosen re- 
bellion and its natural consequences of punishment; (Rom. 9: 22. 2 Tim. 
2: 20. 1 Pet. 2: 8. Jude 4). 

On the general subject of Election, see Ridgeley, Works, 1: 261-324; 
esp. 322. Mozley on Predestination. Edwards, Works, 2: 527, sq. 
"Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 446-458. Martensen, Dogmatics, 362-382. 

II. Calling. 

Calling is that act of God by which men are invited to accept, by faith, 
the salvation provided by Christ. The Scriptures distinguish between 



CALLING. 203 

1. The general, or external call to all men through God's providence, 
word and Spirit; (Is. 45: 22; 55: 6; 65: 12. Ez. 33: 11. Matt. 11: 28; 22: 
3. Mark 16: 15. John 12: 32. Eev. 3: 20). 

2. The special, efficacious call of the Holy Spirit to the elect; (Luke 
14: 23. Eom. 1: 6, 7; 8 : 30; 11: 29. 1 Cor. 1: 26. Phil. 3: 14. Eph. 1: 
18. 1 Thess. 2: 12. 2 Thess. 2: 14. 2 Tim. 1: 9. Heb. 3: 1. 2 Pet. 
1: 10). 

Two questions only need special consideration: — 

A. Is God's general call sincere ? 

This is denied upon the ground that such sincerity is incompatible, first, 
with the inability of the sinner to obey; and secondly, with the design of 
God to bestow only upon the elect, the special grace without which they 
will not obey. 

(a) To the first objection we reply, that since this inability is not a physi- 
cal, but a moral inability, consisting simply in the settled perversity of an 
evil will, there can be no insincerity in offering salvation to all who are 
willing to. receive it, especially when the offer is in itself a proper motive to 
obedience. 

(6) To the second we reply, that the objection, if true, would equally 
hold against God's foreknowledge. The sincerity of God's general call is 
no more inconsistent with his determination that some shall be permitted to 
reject it, than it is with his foreknowledge that some will reject it, 
Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2: 643. 

B. Is God's special call irresistible ? 

We prefer to say that this special call is efficacious — that is, that it in- 
fallibly accomplishes its purpose of leading the sinner to the acceptance of 
salvation. This implies two things: — 

{a) That the operation of God is not an outward constraint upon the hu- 
man will, but that it accords with the laws of our mental constitution. We 
reject the term irresistible, as implying a coercion and compulsion which is 
foreign to the nature of God's working in the soul; (Ps. 110: 3. Phil. 2: 
13). 

(6) That the operation of God is the originating cause of that new dis- 
position of the affections, and that new activity of the will, by which the 
sinner accepts Christ. The cause is not in the response of the will to the 
presentation of motives by God, nor in any mere cooperation of the will 
of man with the will of God, but to an almighty act of God in the will of 
man, by Avhich its freedom to choose God as its end is restored and rightly 
exercised; (John 1: 12, 13). For further discussion of the subject, see, in 
the next section, the remarks on Regeneration — with which this efficacious 
call is identical. 

Andrew Fuller, Works, 2: 373, 513; 3: 807. Robert Hall, Works, 3: 
75. GUI, Body of Divinity, 2: 121-130. 



204 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

SECTION II. — THE APPLICATION OF CHRIST'S REDEMPTION 
IN ITS ACTUAL BEGINNING. 
Under this head we treat of Regeneration, Conversion (embracing Re- 
pentance and Faith), Union with Christ, and Justification. Much confusion 
and error have arisen from conceiving these as occurring in chronological 
order. The order is logical, not chronological. Regeneration and conver- 
sion are but the divine and the human sides or aspects of the same fact, 
although regeneration has logical precedence, and man turns only as God 
turns him. So, too, the moment of a sinner's regeneration and conversion 
is also the moment of his union with Christ and his justification, although 
only as he believes, is he united to Christ, and only as he is united to Christ, 
is he justified. 

I. Regeneration. 

Regeneration is that act of God by which, through the truth as a means, 
the governing disposition of the soul is made holy. 

1. Scripture Representations. 

A. Regeneration is a change indispensable to the salvation of the sinner; 
(John 3: 7. Gal. 6: 15. Cf. Heb. 12: 14; Eph. 2: 3; Rom. 3: 11; John 
6: 44, 65; Jer. 13: 23). 

B. It is a change in the inmost principle of life; (John 3: 3; 5: 21. 
Rom. 6: 13. 2 Cor. 5: 17. Eph. 2: 1; 5: 14). 

C. It is a change in the heart, or governing disposition; (Matt. 12: 33, 
35; 15: 19. Acts 16: 14. Rom. 6: 17; 10: 10. Cf. Ps. 51: 10; Jer. 31: 
33; Ez. 11: 19). 

D. It is a change in the moral relations of the soul; (Eph. 2: 5; 
4: 24. Col. 1: 13). 

E. It is a change wrought through the truth as a means; (James 1: 18, 
1 Pet. 1: 23. 2 Pet. 1: 4. Cf. Jer. 23: 29; John 15: 3; Eph. 6: 17; Heb. 
4: 12; 1 Pet. 2: 9). 

F. It is an instantaneous change; (John 5: 24. Cf. Mat, 6: 24). 

G. It is a change secretly wrought, inscrutable, and known only in its 
results; (John 3: 8. Cf. Phil. 2: 12, 13; 2 Pet. 1: 10). 

H. It is a change wrought by God; (John 1: 13; 3: 5. Eph, 1: 19, 20; 
2: 10. 1 Pet. 1: 3. Cf. 1 Cor. 3: 6, 7; 2 Cor. 10: 4). 

On the Scripture Representations, see E. D. Griffin, Divine Efficiency, 
117-164. 

2. Necessity of Regeneration. 

That all men without exception need to be changed in moral character, is 
manifest, not only from Scripture passages already cited, but from the fol- 
lowing rational considerations : — 

A. Holiness, or conformity to the fundamental moral attribute of God, 
is the indispensable condition of securing the divine favor, of attaining 
eace of conscience, and of preparing the soul for the associations and em- 
ployments of the blest. 



REGENERATION. 



205 



B. The condition of universal humanity as by nature depraved, and 
when arrived at moral consciousness, as guilty of actual transgression, is 
precisely the opposite of that holiness without which the soul cannot exist 
in normal relation to God, to self, or to holy beings. 

C. A radical internal change is therefore requisite in every human soul — 
a change in that which constitutes its character. Holiness cannot be at- 
tained, as the Pantheist claims, by a merely natural growth or development, 
since man's natural tendencies are wholly in the direction of selfishness. 
There must be a reversal of his inmost dispositions and principles of action, 
if he is to see the kingdom of God. 

Anderson, Regeneration, 51-88. 

3. The Efficient Cause of Regeneration. 

Three views only need be considered, — all others are modifications of 
these. The first view puts the efficient cause of regeneration in the human 
will; the second, in the truth considered as a system of motives; the third, 
in the immediate agency of the Holy Spirit. 

A. The human will, as the efficient cause of regeneration. 

This view takes two forms, according as the will is regarded as acting 
apart from, or in conjunction with, special influences of the truth applied by 
God. Pelagians hold the former; Arminians the latter. 

(a) To the Pelagian view that regeneration is solely the act of man, and 
is identical with self -reformation, we object that the depravity of the sin- 
ner's will, since it consists in a fixed state of the affections which determines 
the character of all the volitions, amounts to a moral inability. Without a 
renewal of the affections from which all moral action springs, man will not 
choose holiness nor accept salvation. 

J. S. Mill, Autobiography, 132-142. Henslow, Evolution, 134. 

(6) To the Arminian view that regeneration is the act of man, cooperat- 
ing with divine influences applied through the truth (synergistic theory), 
we object that no beginning of holiness is in this way conceivable. For so 
long as man's selfish and perverse affections are unchanged, no choosing 
God is possible but such as proceeds from supreme desire for one's own in- 
terest and happiness. But the man thus supremely bent on self -gratification 
cannot see in God or his service anything productive of happiness, or if he 
could see in them anything of advantage, his choice of God and his service 
from such a motive would not be a holy choice, and therefore could not be 
a beginning of holiness. 

On the Arminian view, see Bib. Sac, 19: 265, 266. For modification of 
this view, see N. W. Taylor, Revealed Theology, 389-406. Review of 
Taylor and Fitch, by E. D. Griffin, Divine Efficiency, 13-54. 

B. The truth, as the efficient cause of regeneration. 

According to this view, the truth as a system of motives is the direct and 
immediate cause of the change from unholiness to holiness. This view is 
' objectionable for two reasons : — 



206 SOTER10LOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

(a) It erroneously regards motives as wholly external to the mind that is 
influenced by them. This is to conceive of them as mechanically constrain- 
ing the will, and is indistinguishable from necessitarianism. On the con- 
trary, motives are compounded of external presentations and internal dispo- 
sitions. It is the soul's affections which render certain suggestions attractive 
and others repugnant to us. In brief, the heart makes the motive. 

(6) Only as truth is loved, therefore, can it be a motive to holiness. But 
we have seen that the aversion of the sinner to God is such that the truth is 
hated instead of loved, and a thing that is hated, is hated more intensely, 
the more distinctly it is seen. Hence no mere power of the truth can be 
regarded as the efficient cause of regeneration. 

E. D. Griffin, Divine Efficiency, 105-116, 203-22L 

C. The immediate agency of the Holy Spirit, as the efficient cause of 
regeneration. 

In ascribing to the Holy Spirit the authorship of regeneration, we do not 
affirm that the divine Spirit accomplishes his work witnout any accompany- 
ing instrumentality. We simply assert that the power which regenerates 
is the power of God, and that although conjoined with the use of means, 
there is a direct operation of this power upon the sinner's heart which 
changes its moral character. We add two remarks by way of further ex- 
planation : — 

(a) The scriptural assertions of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and of 
his mighty power in the soul, forbid us to regard the divine Spirit in re- 
generation as coming in contact not with the soul, but only with the truth. 
Since truth is simply what is, there can be no change wrought in the truth. 
The phrases: "to energize the truth," "to intensify the truth, " "to il- 
luminate the truth," have no proper meaning, since even God cannot make 
the truth more true. If any change is wrought, it must be wrought, not in 
the truth, but in the soul. For, still further, 

(6) Even if truth could be thus energized, intensified, illuminated, there 
would still be needed a change in the moral disposition before the soul 
could recognize its beauty or be affected by it. No mere increase of light 
can enable a blind man to see, — the disease of the eye must first be cured 
before external objects are visible. So God's work in regeneration must be 
performed within the soul itself. Over and above all influence of the truth, 
there must be a direct influence of the Holy Spirit upon the heart. Al- 
though wrought in conjunction with the presentation of truth to the intel- 
lect, regeneration differs from moral suasion in being an immediate act of 
God. 

For the view that truth is ' energized ' or ' intensified ' by the Holy 
Spirit, see Phelps, New Birth, 61: 121; Walker, Philosophy of Plan of 
Salvation, chap. 18. Per contra, see E. D. Griffin, Divine Efficiency, 
73-116; Anderson, Begeneration, 123-163; Edwards, Works, 2: 547- 
597; Chalmers, Lectures on Romans, chap. 1; Payne, Divine Sover- 
eignty, lect. 23; Hodge, Syst. Theol. 3: 3-37. 



REGENERATION. 207 

4. The Instrumentality used in Regeneration. 

A. Konianists hold that regeneration is accomplished through the instru- 
mentality of baptism. With them the standards of the English Church, 
and most Lutherans and Disciples (Campbellites) agree. To this view we 
urge the following objections : — 

(a) The Scriptures represent baptism to be not the means but only the 
sign of regeneration, and therefore to presuppose and follow regeneration. 
For this reason only believers — that is, persons giving credible evidence of 
being regenerate — were baptized; (Acts 8 : 12). Not external baptism, but 
the conscientious turning of the soul to God which baptism symbolizes, 
saves us; (1 Pet. 3: 21 — avvetdr/aecog aya&TJg eizep&TTjua). Texts like John 3: 5, 
Acts 2: 38, Col. 2: 12, Tit. 3: 5, are to be explained upon the principle that 
regeneration the inward change, and baptism the outward sign of that 
change, were regarded as only different sides or aspects of the same fact, 
and either side or aspect might therefore be described in terms derived from 
the other. For further explanation, see under the head of Baptism. 

(6) Upon this view there is a striking incongruity between the nature of 
the change to be wrought and the means employed to produce it. The 
change is a spiritual one, but the means are physical. It is far more rational 
to suppose that in changing the character of intelligent beings, God uses 
means which have relation to their intelligence. The view we are consider- 
ing is part and parcel of a general scheme of mechanical rather than moral 
salvation, and is more consistent with a materialistic than with a spiritual 
philosophy. 

B. The Scriptural view is that regeneration is accomplished through the 
iDstrumentality of the truth. Although the Holy Spirit does not in any 
way illuminate the truth, he does illuminate the mind, so that it can per- 
ceive the truth (Eph. 1: 17, 18), and in conjunction with this appeal to 
man's rational nature through the truth, he works a change of man's inner 
disposition. Two inferences may be drawn : — 

(a) Man is not properly passive at the time of his regeneration. Although 
the efficient power is divine, man is not therefore unconscious, nor is he a 
mere machine moved by God's fingers. On the other hand his whole moral 
nature, under God's working, is alive and active. We reject the 'exercise 
system,' which regards God as the direct author of all man's thoughts, 
feelings and volitions, not only in its general tenor, but in its special appli- 
cation to regeneration. 

(6) This activity of man's mind in regeneration, is activity in view of the 
truth. In all God's regenerating work, the exercise of his power is con- 
nected with the use of truth as a means. Here we perceive the link between 
the activity of man and the efficiency of God. Only as the sinner's mind is 
brought into contact with the truth, does God exert his regenerating power. 
Christian work is successful only as it " commends the truth to every man's 
conscience;" (2 Cor. 4: 2). 

For denial of instrumentality of truth in regeneration, see Pierce, in 
Bap. Quar. , Jan. , 1872 : 52. Per contra, see Anderson, Begeneration, 
89-122. For the 'Exercise System,' see Emmons, Works, 4: 339-411; 
Hagenbach, Hist. Doctrine, 2: 439. 



208 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

5. The Nature of the Change wrought in Regeneration. 

A. It is a change in which the governing disposition is made holy. This 
implies that 

(a) It is not a change in the substance of either body or soul. Regener- 
ation is not a physical change. There is no physical seed or germ implanted 
in man's nature. Regeneration does not add to or subtract from the num- 
ber of man's intellectual, emotional or voluntary faculties. But regener- 
ation is the giving of a new direction or tendency to powers of affection 
which man possessed before. Man had the faculty of love before, but his 
love was supremely set on self. In regeneration the direction of that faculty 
is changed and his love is now set supremely upon God. 

(b) Regeneration involves an enlightenment of the understanding and a 
rectification of the volitions. But it seems most consonant with Scripture 
and with a correct psychology, to regard these changes as immediate and 
necessary consequences of the change of disposition already mentioned, 
rather than as the primary and central facts in regeneration. The taste for 
truth logically precedes perception of the truth, and love for God logically 
precedes obedience to God — indeed, without love no obedience is possible. 
Reverse the lever of affection and this moral locomotive, without further 
change, will move away from sin, and toward truth and God. 

(c) It is objected indeed that we know only of mental substance and of 
mental acts, and that the new disposition or state just mentioned, since 
it is not an act, must be regarded as a new substance and so lack 
all moral quality. But we reply that besides substance, and acts, there 
are habits, tendencies, proclivities, some of them native and some of them 
acquired. They are voluntary and have moral character. If we can by 
repeated acts originate sinful tendencies, God can surely originate in us 
holy tendencies. Such holy tendencies formed a part of the nature of 
Adam as he came from the hand of God. As the result of the fall we are 
born with tendencies toward evil for which we are responsible. Regenera- 
tion is a restoration of the original tendencies toward God which were lost 
by the fall. Such holy tendencies (tastes, dispositions, affections) are not 
only not unmoral — they are the only possible springs of right moral action. 
Only in the restoration of them does man become truly free. 

Hodge, Essays and Reviews, 1-48. Owen on Holy Spirit, in Works, 
3: 297-336. Charnock on Regeneration. Andrew Fuller, Works, 2: 
461-471, 512-560; 3: 796. Edwards on Religious Affections, in Works, 
3: 1-21. Bellamy, Works, 2: 502. Dwight, Works, 2: 418. Woods, 
Works, 3: 1-21. Anderson, Regeneration, 21-50. 

B. It is an instantaneous change, in a region of the soul below conscious- 
ness, and is therefore known only in its results. 

(a) It is an instantaneous change. Regeneration is not a gradual work. 
Although there may be a gradual work of God's providence and Spirit pre- 
paring the change, and a gradual recognition of it after it has taken place, 
there must be an instant of time when, under the influence of God's Spirit, 
the disposition of the soul just before hostile to God, is changed to love. 
Any other view assumes an intermediate state of indecision which has no 
moral character at all. 



CONVERSION". 



209 



(6) This change takes place in a region of the soul below consciousness. 

It is by no means true that God J s work in regeneration is always recog- 
nized by the subject of it. On the other hand, it is never directly perceived 
at all. The working of God in the human soul, since it contravenes no law 
of man's being, but rather puts him in the full and normal possession of 
his own powers, is secret and inscrutable. Although man is conscious, he is 
not conscious of God's regenerating agency. 

(c) This change however, is recognized, indirectly, in its results. 

At the momeut of regeneration, the soul is conscious only of the truth 
and of its own exercises with reference to it. That God is the author of its 
new affection is an inference from the new character of the exercises which 
it prompts. The human side or aspect of regeneration is Conversion. 
This, and the Sanctification which follows it (including the special gifts of 
the Holy Spirit), are the sole evidences in any particular case that regenera- 
tion is an accomplished fact. 

On evidences of regeneration, see Anderson, Regeneration, 169-214, 
229-295. Woods, Works, 3: 44-55. 

II. CONVEESION. 

Conversion is that voluntary change in the mind of the sinner in which 
he turns, on the one hand, from sin, and on the other hand, to Christ. The 
former or negative element in conversion, namely, the turning from sin, we 
denominate repentance. The latter or positive element in conversion, 
namely, the turning to Christ, we denominate faith. 

Andrew Fuller, Worlds, 1: 666. Luthardt, Compendium der Dog- 
matik, 3rd ed., 202-206. 

Conversion is the human side or aspect of that fundamental spiritual 
change, which, as viewed from the divine side, we call regeneration. It is 
simply man's turning. The Scriptures recognize the voluntary activity of 
the human soul in this change as distinctly as they recognize the causative 
agency of God. While God turns men to himself (Ps. 85: 4; Cant. 1: 4; 
Jer. 31: 18; Lam. 5: 21), men are exhorted to turn themselves to God(Prov. 
1: 23; Is. 31: 6; 59: 20. Ez. 14: 6; 18: 32; 33: 9, 11. Joel 12: 12-14). 
While God is represented as the author of the new heart and the new spirit 
(Ps. 51 : 10. Ez. 11: 19; 36: 26) men are commanded to make for themselves 
a new heart and a new spirit (Ez. 18: 31; 2 Cor. 7:1; cf. Phil. 2: 12). 

This twofold method of representation can be explained only when we 
remember that man's powers may be interpenetrated and quickened by the 
divine, not only without destroying man's freedom, but with the result of 
making man for the first time truly free. Since the relation between the 
divine and the human activity is not one of chronological succession, man 
is never to wait for God's working. If he is ever regenerated it must be in 
and through a movement of his own will, in which he turns to God as un 
constrainedly and with as little consciousness of God's operation upon him, 
as if no such operation of God were involved in the change. And in preach- 
ing, we are to press upon men the claims of God and their duty of immediate 
submission to Christ, with the certainty that they who do so submit, will 
subsequently recognize this new and holy activity of their own wills as due 
to a working within them of divine power; (cf. Ps. 110: 3). 



210 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION". 

From the fact that the word 'conversion' means simply a 'turning,' every 
turning of the Christian from sin, subsequent to the first, may, in a subordinate 
sense, be denominated a conversion; (Luke 22: 32). Since regeneration is 
not complete sanctification, and the change of governing disposition is not 
identical with complete purification of the nature, such subsequent turnings 
from sin are necessary consequences and evidences of the first; (cf. John 
13: 10). But they do not, like the first, imply a change in the governing 
disposition — they are rather new manifestations of a disposition already 
changed. For this reason, conversion proper, like the regeneration of which 
it is the obverse side, can occur but once. The phrase 'second conversion,' 
even if does not imply radical misconception of the nature of conversion, 
is misleading. We prefer therefore to describe these subsequent experiences 
not by the term ' conversion, ' but by such phrases as ' breaking off, forsak- 
ing, returning from, neglects or transgressions, ' and ' coming back to Christ, 
trusting anew in him. ' It is with repentance and faith, as elements in that 
first and radical change by which the soul enters upon a state of salvation, 
that we have now to do. 

1. Repentance. 

We may analyze repentance into three constituents, each succeeding term 
of which includes and implies the one preceding : — 

A. An intellectual element, — recognition of sin as involving personal guilt, 
defilement and helplessness; (Ps. 51: 3, 7, 11). If unaccompanied by the fol- 
lowing elements, this recognition may manifest itself in fear of punishment, 
although as yet there is no hatred of sin. This element is indicated in the 
Scripture phrase eiriyvoctg d/iapriag (Rom. 4: 20; cf. 1: 32). 

B. An emotional element, — sorrow for sin as committed against goodness 
and justice, and therefore hateful to God, and hateful in itself; (Ps. 51 : 
1, 2, 10, 13-15). This element of repentance is indicated in the Scripture 
word juerafzi?io/xac. If accompanied by the following elements, it is a "kvirn nard 
Qebv. If not so accompanied, it is a \viz7) tov /coa/zoii=remorse and despair; 
(Mat. 27: 3; Luke 18: 23; 2 Cor. 7: 9, 10). 

C. A voluntary element, — inward turning from sin and disposition 
to seek pardon and cleansing; (Ps. 51: 5, 7, 10. Jer. 25: 5). This includes 
and implies the two preceding elements, and is therefore the most important 
aspect of repentance. It is indicated in the Scripture term jieravola (Acts 
2: 38. Eom. 2: 4). 

In broad distinction from the Scriptural doctrine, we find the Romanist 
view, which regards the three elements of repentance as the following: 
1. Contrition; 2. Confession; 3. Satisfaction. Of these, contrition is the 
only element properly belonging to repentance, yet from this contrition the 
Romanist excludes all sorrow for sin of nature. Confession is confession to 
the priest, and satisfaction is the sinner's own doing of outward penance, 
as a temporal and symbolic submission and reparation to violated law. 
This view is false and pernicious, in that it confounds repentance with its 
outward fruits, conceives of it as exercised rather toward the church than 
toward God, and regards it a meritorious ground, instead of a mere con- 
dition of pardon. 



CONVERSION. 211 

In further explanation of the Scripture representations, we remark : — 

(a) That repentance in each and all of its aspects, is wholly an inward 
act, not to be confounded with the change of life which proceeds from it. 

True repentance is indeed manifested and evidenced by confession of sin 
before God (Luke 18: 13), and by reparation for wrongs done to men (Luke 
19: 8). But these do not constitute repentance, — they are rather fruits of 
repentance. Between repentance and 'fruit meet for repentance,' Scripture 
plainly distinguishes; (Mat. 3: 8). 

(b) That repentance is only a negative condition, and not a positive 
means of salvation. 

This is evident from the fact that repentance is no more than the sinner's 
present duty, and can furnish no offset to the claims of the law on account of 
past transgression. The truly penitent man feels that his repentance has no 
merit. Apart from the positive element of conversion, namely, faith in 
Christ, it would be only sorrow for guilt unremoved. This very sorrow, 
moreover, is not the mere product of human will, but is the gift of God; 
(Acts 5: 31; 11: 18. 2 Tim. 2: 25). 

(c) That true repentance, however, never exists except in conjunction 
with faith. 

Sorrow for sin, not simply on account of its evil consequences to the 
transgressor, but on account of its intrinsic hatefulness as opposed to divine 
holiness and love, is practically impossible without some confidence in God's 
mercy. It is the cross which first makes us truly penitent; (cf. John 12: 
32, 33). Hence all true preaching of repentance is implicitly a preaching 
of faith (Mat. 3: 1-12; cf. Acts 19: 4), and repentance toward God involves 
faith in the Lord Jesus Christ (Acts 20: 21; Luke 15: 10, 24; 19: 8, 9; cf. 
Gal. 3: 7). 

(d) That conversely, wherever there is true faith, there is true repent- 
ance also. 

Since repentance and faith are but different sides or aspects of the same 
act of turning, faith is as inseparable from repentance as repentance is from 
faith. That must be an unreal faith where there is no repentance, just as 
that must be an unreal repentance where there is no faith. Yet because the 
one aspect of his change is more prominent in the mind of the convert than 
the other, we are not hastily to conclude that the other is absent. Only 
that degree of conviction of sin is essential to salvation, which carries with 
it a forsaking of sin and a trustful surrender to Christ; (2 Cor. 7: 10). 

Anderson on Begeneration, 279-288. Bp. Ossory, Nature and Effects 
of Faith, 40-48, 311-318. Woods, Works, 3: 68-78. Philippi, Glaubens- 
lehre, 5: 1-10, 208-246. Luthardt, Compendium, 3rd ed., 206-208. 
Hodge, Outlines of Theology, 375-381. Alexander, Evidences of 
Christianity, 47-60. Crawford on Atonement, 433-439. 
2. Faith. 

We may analyze faith also into three constituents^ each succeeding term 
of which includes and implies the preceding : — 



212 SOTERIOLOGY, Oil THE DOCTRIXE OF SALVATION. 

A. An intellectual element (notitia), — recognition of the truth of God's 
revelation, or of the objective reality of the salvation provided by Christ 
(John 2: 23, 24; cf. 3: 2. James 2: 19). 

This includes not only a historical belief in the facts of the Scripture, but 
an intellectual belief in the doctrine taught therein as to man's sinfulness 
and dependence upon Christ. 

B. An emotional element (assensus), — assent to the revelation of God's 
power and grace in Jesus Christ, as applicable to the present needs of the 
soul; (Mat. 13: 20, 21; cf. Ps. 106: 12; Is. 58: 2; Ez. 33: 31, 32; John 5: 35). 

Those in whom this awakening of the sensibilities is unaccompanied by 
the fundamental decision of the will which constitutes the next element of 
faith, may seem to themselves, and for a time may appear to others, to have 
accepted Christ. Saving faith, however, includes also 

C. A voluntary element (fiducia), — trust in Christ as Lord and Savior; 
or, in other words — to distinguish its two aspects : — 

(a) Surrender of the soul, as guilty and denied, to Christ's governance 
(Matt. 11. 28. John 8: 12; 14: 1. Acts 16: 31); together with 

(b) Reception and appropriation of Christ, as the source of pardon and 
spiritual life; (John 1: 12; 4: 14; 6: 53; 20: 31. Eph. 3: 17. Heb. 11: 1- 
Rev. 3: 20). 

Corresponding to the distinction between a merely external and a truly sav- 
ing faith is a varied usage of cases and prepositions with ttiotsugj. External 
faith believes Christ (accusative — John 5: 46). Saving faith believes in or 
upon Christ — {elc, Acts 20: 21; ev, 1 Tim. 3: 13), and these prepositions are 
not used when trust in a human being is spoken of. 

The passages already referred to, refute the view of the Romanist, that 
saving faith is simply implicit assent to the doctrines of the church; and the 
view of the Disciple or Campbellite, that faith is merely intellectual belief 
in the truth, on the presentation of evidence. 

"True faith," says Luther, "is that assured trust and firm assent of heart, 
by which Christ is laid hold of — so that Christ is the object of faith. Yet 
he is not merely the object of faith, but in the very faith, so to speak, Christ 
is present. Faith lays hold of Christ and grasps him as a present possession, 
just as the ring holds the jewel." 

"Faith," says Edwards, "includes the whole act of unition to Christ as a 
Savior. The entire active uniting of the soul, or the whole of what is called 
coming to Christ and receiving of him, is called faith in the Scripture. " 

In further explanation of the Scripture representations, we remark : — 

(a) That faith is an act of the affections and will as truly as it is an act 
of the intellect. 

It has been claimed that faith and unbelief are purely intellectual states, 
which are necessarily determined by the facts at any given time presented 
to the mind, and that they are for this reason as destitute of moral quality 
and as far from being matters of obligation, as are our instinctive feelings of 



CONVERSION. 213 

pleasure and pain. But this view unwarrantably isolates the intellect, and 
ignores the fact that in all moral subjects, the state of the affections and 
will affects the judgments of the mind with regard to truth. In the intel- 
lectual act the whole moral nature expresses itself. Since the tastes determine 
the opinions, faith is a moral act, and men are responsible for not believ- 
ing; (John 3: 18-20; 5: 40; 16: 9). 

(6) That faith is not chronologically subsequent to regeneration, but is its 
accompaniment. 

As the soul's appropriation of Christ and Ins salvation, it is not the result 
of an accomplished renewal, but rather the medium through which that 
renewal is effected. Otherwise it would follow that one who had not yet 
believed (i. e. , received Christ) might still be regenerate, whereas the Scrip- 
ture represents the privilege of sonship as granted only to believers; (John 
1: 12-14 Gal. 3: 26). 

(c) That the object of saving faith is, in general, the whole truth of God 
so far as it is objectively revealed or made known to the soul; but, in par- 
ticular, the person and work of Jesus Christ, which constitute the centre 
and substance of God's revelation; (Acts 17: 18. 1 Cor. 1: 23. Col. 1: 27. 
Rev. 19: 10). 

The patriarchs, though they had no knowledge of a personal Christ, were 
saved by believing in God so far as God had revealed himself to them, and 
whoever among the heathen are saved, must in like manner be saved by 
casting themselves as helpless sinners upon God's plan of mercy dimly 
shadowed forth in nature and providence. But such faith, even among the 
patriarchs and heathen, is implicitly a faith in Christ, and would become 
explicit and conscious trust and submission, whenever Christ were made 
known to them; (Acts 4: 12; 10: 31, 44; 16: 31). 

For instances of apparently regenerated heathen, see Godet on John 7: 
17, note; and Life of Brainard, by Edwards, 173-175. 

{d) That the ground of faith is the external word of promise. The 
ground of assurance, on the other hand, is the inward witness of the Spirit 
that we fulfill the conditions of the promise; (Rom. 4: 20, 21; 8: 16. Eph. 
1: 13. 1 John 4: 13; 5: 10). 

True faith is therefore possible without assurance of salvation. But if 
Alexander's view were correct, that the object of saving faith is the propo- 
sition : "God, for Christ's sake, now looks with reconciling love on me, 
a sinner," no one could believe, without being at the same time assured that 
he was a saved person. Upou the true view, that the object of saving faith 
is not a proposition, but a person, we can perceive not only the simplicity of 
faith, but the possibility of faith even where the soul is destitute of assu- 
rance or of joy. 

(e) That faith necessarily leads to good works, since it embraces the 
whole truth of God so far as made known, and appropriates Christ not only 
as an external Savior, but as an internal sanctifying power; (Heb. 7: 16. 
Gal. 5: 6), 



214 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION". 

Good works are the proper evidence of faith. The faith which does not 
lead jnen to act upon the commands and promises of Christ, or in other 
words, does not lead to obedience, is called in Scripture a 'dead,' that is, 
an unreal faith. Such faith is not saving, since it lacks the voluntary ele- 
ment — actual appropriation of Christ; (James 2: 14-26). 

(/) That faith, as characteristically the inward act of reception, is not to 
be confounded with love or obedience, its fruit. 

Faith is, in the Scriptures, called a work, only in the sense that man's 
active powers are engaged in it. It is a work which God requires, yet which 
God enables man to perform; (John 6: 29 — epyov rov Qenv. cf. Rom. 1: 
17 — GLKCLLoGwr] Qeov). As the gift of God and as the mere taking of undeserved 
mercy, it is expressly excluded from the category of works upon the basis 
of which man may claim salvation; (Eom. 3: 28; 4: 4, 5, 16). It is not the 
act of a full soul bestowing, but the act of an empty soul receiving. 
Although this reception is prompted by a drawing of heart toward God 
inwrought by the Holy Spirit, this drawing of heart is not yet a conscious 
and developed love, — such love is the result of faith; (Gal. 5: 6). Obedi- 
ence can be rendered only after faith has laid hold of Christ and with him 
has obtained the spirit of obedience; (Rom. 1: 5 — vnaKorjv -ioreug =' obedi- 
ence resulting from faith'). Hence faith is not the procuring cause of 
salvation, but is only the instrumental cause. The procuring cause is the 
Christ, whom faith embraces. 

(g) That faith is susceptible of increase. 

This is evident whether we consider it from the human or from the divine 
side. As an act of man it has an intellectual, an emotional and a voluntary 
element, each of which is capable of growth. As a work of God in the 
soul of man, it can receive through the presentation of the truth and the 
quickening agency of the Holy Spirit, continually new accessions of knowl- 
edge, sensibility and active energy. Such increase of faith, therefore, we 
are to seek, both by resolute exercise of our own powers, and above all, by 
direct application to the source of faith in God; (Luke 17; 5). 

Kostlin, Die Lehre von dem Glauben, 13-85, 301-341, and in Jahrb. f. d. 
Theol. 4: 177, sq. Belief, What Is It?, 150-179, 290-298. Romaine on 
Faith, 9-89. Alexander, Discourses on Faith, 63-118. Bishop of Ossory, 
Nature and Effects of Faith, 1-40. Venn, Characteristics of Belief, 
Introd. Luther, Com. on Galatians, 1 : 191, 247, quoted in Thomasius, 
III. 2: 183. Edwards, Works, 4: 71-73; 2: 601-641. 

III. Union with Chkist. 

The Scriptures declare that, by faith, there is constituted a union of the 
soul with Christ different in kind from God's natural and providential con- 
cursus with all sx3irits (Acts 17: 28), as well as from all unions of mere asso- 
ciation or sympathy, moral likeness or moral influence, — a union of life, in 
which the human spirit, while then most truly possessing its own individ- 
uality and personal distinctness, is interpenetrated and energized by the 



UNIO^ST WITH CHRIST. 215 

Spirit of Christ, is made inscrutably but indissolubly one with him, and so 
becomes a member and partaker of that new humanity of which he is the 
head. 

1. Scripture Representations of this Union. 

A. Figurative teaching. It is illustrated : — 

(a) From the union of a building and its foundation; (Eph. 2: 20-22. 

1 Pet. 2: 4-6. Cf. Ps. 118: 22; Is. 28: 16). 

(6) From the union between husband and wife; (Rom. 7: 4. 2 Cor. 
11: 2. Eph. 5: 31, 32. Rev. 19: 7; 22: 17. Cf. Isa. 54: 5; Jer. 3: 20; 
Hos. 2: 2-5; and Song of Solomon). 

(c) From the union between the vine and its branches; (John 15: 1-10. 
Rom. 6: 5; 11: 17-24. Col. 2: 6, 7). 

(d) From the union between the members and the head of the body; 
(1 Cor. 6: 15, 19; 12: 12. Eph. 1: 22, 23; 4: 15, 16; 5: 30). 

(e) From the union of the race with the source of its life in Adam; 
(Rom. 5: 12-19. 1 Cor. 15: 22-49). 

B. Direct statements. 

(a) The believer is said to be in Christ; (John 14 : 20. Rom. 6: 11; 8: 1. 

2 Cor. 5: 17. Eph. 1: 4; 2: 13). 

(6) Christ is said to be in the believer; (John 14: 20. Rom. 8: 9; cf. 10. 
Gal. 2: 20). 

(c) The Father and the Son dwell in the believer; (John 14: 23; cf. 
10. Eph. 3: 17. 1 John 4: 16). 

(d) The believer has life by partaking of Christ, as Christ has life by 
partaking of the Father; (John 6: 53, 56, 57. 1 Cor. 10: 16, 17. 1 John 
1: 3. In the last two passages, «oivwria='2Darticipation'). 

(e) All believers are one in Christ, as Christ is one with God; (John 17: 
21, 22). 

(/) The believer is made partaker of the divine nature; (2 Pet. 1: 4). 
(g) The believer is made one spirit with the Lord; (1 Cor. 6 : 17). 

2. Nature of this Union. 
A. Negatively. It is not 

(a) A merely natural union, like that of God with all human spirits — as 
held by rationalists; nor 

(6) A merely moral union, — as held by Socinians and Arminians; nor 

(c) A union which destroys the distinct personality and subsistence of 
either Christ or the human spirit, — as held by many of the Mystics; nor 

(d) A union mediated and conditioned by participation of the sacra- 
ments of the church, — as held by Romanists, Lutherans and High-Church 
Episcopalians; but 



210 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE EOCTRENE OF SALVATION. 

B. Positively, it is 

(a) An organic union, in which we become members of Christ and par- 
takers of his humanity; (Eph. 5: 30). 

(b) A vital union, in which Christ's life becomes the dominating prin- 
ciple within us; (Gal. 2: 20. Col. 3: 3, 4). 

(c) A spiritual union, that is, a union not of natural but of spiritual life; 
(Eom. 8: 9, 10). 

(d) A union mediated, not by sacraments, since sacraments presuppose 
it as already existing, but solely by faith; (Eph. 3: 17). 

(e) An indissoluble union; (Matt. 28: 20. John 10: 28. Eom. 8: 35, 39. 

1 Thess. 4: 14, 17). 

(/) An inscrutable union; mystical, however, only in the sense of sur- 
passing in its intimacy and value any other union of souls which we know; 
(Eph. 5: 32. Col. 1: 27). 

Baird, Elohim Bevealed, 601. Wilberforce, Incarnation, 208-272; New 
Birth of Man's Nature, 1-30. 

3. Consequences of this Union. 

A. As respects Christ. 

(a) It involves him in all the legal liabilities of those with whom he is 
thus united. As virtually constituting one person with them, Christ bears 
the penalty of their sins and makes satisfaction to the divine justice; (1 Cor. 
12: 12. Eph. 5: 23-30. Heb. 2: 14). 

Baird, Elohim Revealed, 607-610. Owen, on Justification, chap. 8. 
Boston, on the Covenant of Grace, chap. 2.. 

(b) It gives him fellowship with believers in all their labors, temptations 
and sufferings; (Phil. 4: 13. Heb. 4: 15; cf. Isa. 63: 9). 

B. As respects the believer. 

(a) It gives to him the legal standing and rights of Christ. As Christ's 
union with us involves atonement, so our union with Christ involves justifi- 
cation. The believer is entitled to take for his own all that Christ is and all 
that Christ has done, and this because he has within him that new life of 
humanity which suffered in Christ's death and rose from the grave in Christ's 
resurrection, — in other words, because he is virtually one person with his 
Redeemer; (Acts 13: 39. Rom. 6; 8; 7: 4; 8: 1, 17. 1 Cor. 1: 30; 3: 22; 
6: 11. 2 Cor. 5: 14, 21. Gal. 2: 20. Eph. 1: 4, 6; 2: 5, 6. Phil. 3: 9. 

2 Tim. 2: 11.) In Christ the believer is prophet (Luke 12: 12. 1 John 
2: 20), priest (1 Pet. 2: 5. Rev. 20: 6), and king (1 Pet. 2: 9. Rev. 3: 
21; 5: 10). 

(6) It secures to the believer the transforming, assimilating power of 
Christ's life— first, for the soul (John 1: 16. Rom. 8: 10. 1 Cor. 15: 45. 
Phil. 2:5. 1 John 3 : 2); secondly, for the body — sanctifying it in the present 
(1 Cor. 6: 17, 19), and in the future, raising it up in the likeness of Christ's 
glorified body (Rom. 8: 11. 1 Cor. 15: 49. Phil. 3: 21). 



UNION WITH CHRIST. 217 

(c) It leads to the believer's fellowship Avith Christ's whole experience on 
earth; (Phil. 3: 10. Col. 1: 24. 1 Pet. 4: 13). 

(d) It secures the spiritual unity and fellowship of all believers; (John 
17: 21. 1 Cor. 10: 17. Eph. 2: 14-18). 

(e) It furnishes a basis for the eternal fellowship of heaven; (1 Thess. 
4: 17. Heb. 12 : 23. Rev. 21 and 22). 

We append a few statements with regard to this union and its conse- 
quences, from noted names in theology and in the church: — 

Luther : ' ' By faith thou art so glued to Christ that of thee and him there 
becomes as it were one person, so that with confidence thou canst say: 'I am 
Christ — that is, Christ's righteousness, victory, etc., are mine;' and Christ 
in turn can say: 'I am that sinner — that is, his sins, his death, etc., are 
mine, because he clings to me and I to him, for we have been joined through 
faith into one flesh and bone.' " 

Calvin: "I attribute the highest importance to the connection between 
the head and the members; to the inhabitation of Christ in our hearts; in a 
word, to the mystical union by which we enjoy him, so that being made 
ours, he makes us partakers of the blessings with which he is furnished." 

Edwards: "Faith is the soul's active uniting with Christ. God sees fit 
that in order to a union's being established between two intelligent active 
beings, there should be the mutual act of both, that each should receive 
the other as entirely joining themselves to one another." 

Andrew Fuller : ' 'I have no doubt that the imputation of Christ's righteous- 
ness presupposes a union with him; since there is no perceivable fitness in 
bestowing benefits on one for another's sake, where there is no union or re- 
lation between." 

Pascal, Thoughts, Eng. trans., 429. Hodge, Outlines, 369. Baird, 
Elohim Revealed, 590-617. Edwards, Works, 4: 66, 69, 70. Upham, 
Divine Union; Interior Life; Life of Madame Guyon, and Fenelon. 
Schoberlein, in Studien und Kritiken, 1847: 7-69. Tillotson, Sermons, 
3 : 307. Trench, Studies in Gospels, 284, and Christ the True Vine, 
in Hulsean Lectures. Hooker, Eccl. Polity, book 5, ch. 56. Andrew 
Fuller, Works, 2: 685. Calvin, Institutes, 1: 660. A. J. Gordon, In 
Christ. For other references, see Thomasius, Christi Person und 
Werk, 3: 325. 

IV. Justification. 

1. Definition of Justification. 

By justification Ave mean that judicial act of God by which, on account of 
Christ to Avhom the sinner is united by faith, he declares that sinner to be 
no longer exposed to the penalty of the law, but to be restored to his favor. 

Justification, as thus defined, is therefore a declarative act, as distinguished 
from an efficient act; an act of God external to the sinner, as distinguished 
from an act within the sinner's nature and changing that nature; a judicial 
act as distinguished from a sovereign act; an act based upon and logically 
presupposing the sinner's union with Christ, as distinguished from an act 
which causes and is folloAved by that union Avith Christ. 
15 



218 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

2. Proof of the Doctrine of Justification. 

A. Scripture proofs of the doctrine as a whole. 

See Eom. 1: 17; 3: 24-30; 4: 5. Gal. 3: 11. Eph. 1: 7. Heb. 11: 4, 7. 
Cf. Gen. 15: 6; Isa. 7: 9; 28: 16; Hab. 2: 4. 

B. Scripture use of the special words translated 'justify' and 'justifica- 
tion. ' 

In the Septuagint and in the New Testament, 

(a) (JiKaiou — uniformly, or with only a single exception, signifies not to 
make righteous, but to declare just, or free from guilt and exposure to pun- 
ishment; Ex. 23: 7. Deut. 25: 1. Job 27: 5. Ps. 143: 2. Prov. 17: 15. 
Isa. 5: 23; 50: 8; 53: 11. The only O. T. passage where this meaning is 
questionable, is Dan. 12 : 3. But even here, the proper translation is, in all 
probability, not ' they that turn many to righteousness, ' but ' they that justify 
many,' i. e., cause many to be justified. For the Hiphil force of the verb, 
see Girdlestone, O. T. Syn. 257, 258, and Delitzsch on Is. 53: 11. Cf. James 
5: 19, 20. 

Matt. 12: 37. Luke 7: 29; 10: 29; 16: 15; 18: 14; cf. 13. Bom. 4: 6-8; 
cf. Ps. 32: 1, 2. Bom. 5: 18, 19; 8: 33, 34. 2 Cor. 5: 19, 21. In Bom. 
6: 7—o yap airotfavojv 6edtKalurai cittu ri/g d^a/j-i'af =' he that once died with 
Christ was acquitted from the service of sin considered as a penalty. ' In 
1 Cor. 4: 4 — oiidev yap b/uavroj obvocda. a'X?J ovk ev tovtg) dedinaiupai^'Tsbm con- 
scious of no fault, but that does not in itself make certain God's acquittal 
as respects this particular charge.' The usage of the Epistle of James 
does not contradict this — the doctrine of James is that we are justified only 
by such faith as brings forth good works; "he uses the word exclusively in 
a judicial sense; he combats a mistaken view of alone, not a mistaken view 
of Auicuocj," — see James 2: 21, 23, 24, and Cremer, N. T. Lexicon, Eng. 
trans. , 182, 183. The only N. T. passage where this meaning is questionable, 
is Bev. 22: 11; but here Afford, with tf, a and b, reads dmaLoavvriv tcoliigcltlj. 

(6) StuaioGLg — is the act, in process, of declaring a man just, — that is, 
acquitted from guilt and restored to the divine favor; (Bom. 4: 25; 5: 18). 

(c) dinaUoua — is the act, as already accomplished, of declaring a man just, — 
that is, no longer exposed to penalty but restored to God's favor; (Bom. 
5: 16, 18; cf. 1 Tim. 3: 16). Hence in other connections, chmt^uahas the 
meaning of statute, legal decision, act of justice; (Luke 1: 6. Bom. 2: 26. 
Heb. 9: 1). 

(d) diKaioobv)] — is the state of one justified or declared just. Bom. 8: 10. 
1 Cor. 1: 30. In Bom. 10: 3, Paul inveighs against ryv loiav diK.atoGvv7jv as 
insufficient and false, and in its place would put r?)v rov Qsov 6/.Kaioabv//v — that 
is, a otKaioabvy] which God not only requires but provides, which is not 
only acceptable to God but proceeds from God and is appropriated by 
faith, — hence called oiKaioabv?] Triarecog or ek tvlcteuq. "The primary significa- 
tion of the word in Paul's writings is therefore that state of the believer 
which is called forth by God's act of acquittal — the state of the believer as 
justified," that is, freed from punishment and restored to the divine favor. 

See Cremer, N. T. Lexicon, Eng. trans., 174. 



JUSTIFICATION". 219 

Since this state of acquittal is accompanied by changes in the character 
and conduct, duuuoovvti comes to mean, secondarily, the moral condition of 
the believer as resulting from this acquittal and inseparably connected with 
it; (Eom. 14: 17. 2 Cor. 5: 21). This righteousness arising from justifica- 
tion becomes a principle of action; (Mat. 3: 15. Acts 10: 35. Horn. 6; 13, 
18). The term, however, never loses its implication of a justifying act upon 
which this principle of action is based. 

It is worthy of special observation, that, in the passages cited above, the 
terms 'justify' and 'justification' are contrasted, not with the process of 
depraving or corrupting, but with the outward act of condemning; and that 
the expressions used to explain and illustrate them are all derived, not from 
the inward operation of purifying the soul or infusing into it righteousness, 
but from the procedure of courts in their judgments, or of offended persons 
in then forgiveness of offenders. We conclude that these terms, wherever 
they have reference to the sinner's relation to God, signify a declarative and 
judicial act of God, external to the sinner, and not an efficient and sovereign 
act of God changing the sinner's nature and making him subjectively 
righteous. 

On ,these Scripture terms, see Bp. of Ossory, Nature and Effects of 
Faith, 436-496. Lange, Com. on Kom. 3 : 24. Buchanan on Justifica- 
tion, 226-249. Per contra, see Knox, Remains; Newman, Lectures on 
Justification, 68-143. 

3. Elements of Justification. 
These are two : — 

A. Remission of punishment. 

God acquits the ungodly who believe in Christ and declares them just. 
This is not to declare them innocent — that would be a judgment contrary to 
truth. It is a declaration that the demands of the law have been satisfied 
with regard to them, and that they are now free from its condemnation; 
(Rom. 4: 5). 

This acquittal, in so far as it is the act of God as judge or executive, ad- 
ministering law, may be denominated pardon; (Mic. 7: 18 — Eng. version.) 
In so far as it is the act of God as a father personally injured and grieved by 
sin, yet showing grace to the sinner, it is denominated forgiveness; (Ps. 
130: 4 — Eng. version). 

The declaration that the sinner is no longer exposed to the penalty of 
law, has its ground not in any satisfaction of the law's demand on the part of 
the sinner himself, but solely in the bearing of the penalty by Christ to 
whom the sinner is united by faith. Justification, in its first element, there- 
fore, is that act by which God, for the sake of Christ, acquits the trans- 
gressor and suffers him to go free. 

B. Restoration to favor. 

Justification is more than remission or acquittal. These would leave the 
sinner simply in the position of a discharged criminal, — law requires a positive 
righteousness also. Besides deliverance from punishment, justification im- 



220 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

plies God's treatment of the sinner as if he were, and had been, personally 
righteous. The justified person receives not only remission of penalty, but 
the rewards promised to obedience; (Luke 15: 22-24: Rom. 5: 1, 2. 1 Cor. 
1: 30. 2 Cor. 5: 21. Gal. 3: 6. Eph. 2: 7; 3: 12. Phil. 3: 8, 9. Col. 1: 22. 
Tit. 3: 4-7. Rev. 19: 8). 

This restoration to favor, viewed in its aspect as the renewal of a broken 
friendship, is denominated reconciliation; viewed in its aspect as a renewal 
of the soul's true relation to God as a father, it is denominated adoption; 
(John 1: 12. Rom. 5: 11. Gal. 4: 5. Eph. 1: 5. Cf. Rom. 8: 23). 

The declaration that the sinner is restored to God's favor, has its ground 
not in the sinner's personal character or conduct, but solely in the obedience 
and righteousness of Christ, to whom the sinner is united by faith. Thus 
Christ's work is the procuring cause of our justification in both its elements. 
As we are acquitted on account of Christ's suffering of the penalty of the 
law, so on . account of Christ's obedience we receive the rewards of law; 
(John 20: 31). 

Quenstedt, 3: 524. Philippi, Active Obedience of Christ. 

4. Relation of Justification to God's Laiv and Holiness. 

A. Justification has been shown to be a forensic term. A man may in- 
deed be conceived of as just in either of two senses : — 

(a) As just in moral character — that is, absolutely holy in nature, dispo- 
sition and conduct. 

(6) As just hi relation to law — or as free from all obligation to suffer 
penalty, and as entitled to the rewards of obedience. 

So too a man may be conceived of as justified, in either of two senses : — 
{a) Made just in moral character. 

(b) Made just in his relation to law. 

But the Scriptures declare that there does not exist on earth a just man 
in the first of these senses; (Eccl. 7 : 20). Even in those who are renewed 
in moral character and united to Christ, there is a remnant of moral depravity. 

If there be any such thing as a just man therefore, he must be just, not 
in the sense of possessing an unspotted holiness, but in the sense of being 
delivered from the penalty of law and made partaker of its rewards. If 
there be any such thing as justification, it must be not an act of God which 
renders the sinner absolutely holy, but an act of God which declares the 
sinner to be free from legal penalties and entitled to legal rewards. 

B. The difficult feature of justification is the declaration on the part of 
God, that a sinner whose remaining sinfulness seems to necessitate the vin- 
dicative reaction of God's holiness against him, is yet free from such reaction 
of holiness as is expressed in the penalties of the law. 

The fact is to be accepted on the testimony of Scripture. If this testi- 
mony be not accepted, there is no deliverance from the condemnation of 
law. But the difficulty of conceiving of God's declaring the sinner no 
longer exposed to legal penalty is relieved, if not removed, by the threefold 
consideration : — 



JUSTIFICATION. 221 

(a) That Christ has endured the penalties of the law in the sinner's stead; 
(Gal. 3: 13). 

(b) That the sinner is so united to Christ, that Christ's life already con- 
stitutes the dominating principle within him (Gal. 2: 20); and 

(c) That this life of Christ is a power in the soul which will gradually, 
bat infallibly, extirpate all remaining depravity, until the whole physical 
and moral nature is perfectly conformed to the divine holiness; (Phil. 3: 21; 
Col. 3: 1-4:). 

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, V. 1 : 201-208. 

5. Relation of Justification fo Union with Christ and the Work of the 
Spirit. 

A. Since the sinner at the moment of justification is not yet completely 
transformed in character, we have seen that God can declare him just, not 
on account of what he is in himself, but only on account of what Christ is. 
The ground of justification is therefore : — 

(a) Not, as the Romanists hold, a new righteousness and love infused 
into us and now constituting our moral character; 

(6) Nor, as Osiander taught, the essential righteousness of Christ's divine 
nature, which has become ours by faith; but 

(c) The satisfaction and obedience of Christ, as the head of a new hu- 
manity, and as embracing in himself all believers as his members. 

As Adam's sin is imputed to us, not because Adam is in us, but because we 
were in Adam, so Christ's righteousness is imputed to us, not because Christ 
is in us, but because we are in Christ — that is, joined by faith to one whose 
righteousness and life are infinitely greater than our power to appropriate 
or contain. In this sense we may say that we are justified through a Christ 
outside of us, as we are sanctified through a Christ within us. " The justi- 
fication of the believer is no other than his being admitted to communion 
in, or participation of, this head and surety of all believers;" (1 Tim. 3: 16. 
Acts 13: 39; Rom. 4: 25). 

Edwards, Works, 4: 66. Hodge, Outlines, 384-388, 392. Baird, Elo- 
him Revealed, 448. 

B. The relation of justification to regeneration and sanctiiication, more- 
over, delivers it from the charges of externality and immorality. God does 
not justify ungodly men in their ungodliness. He pronounees them just, 
only as they are united to Christ, who is absolutely just, and who, by his 
Spirit, can make them just, not only in the eye of the law, but in moral 
character. The very faith by which the sinner receives Christ, is an act in 
which he ratifies all that Christ has done, and accepts God's judgment 
against sin as his own; (John 16: 11). 

Justification is possible, therefore, because it is always accompanied by 
regeneration and union with Christ and is followed by sanctification. But 
this is a very different thing from the Romanist confounding of justification 
and sanctification, as different stages of the same process of making the 



222 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

sinner actually holy. It holds fast to the Scripture distinction between 
justification as a declarative act of God, and regeneration and sanctification 
as those efficient acts of God by which justification is accompanied and 
followed. 

Girdlestone, O. T. Synonyms, 104, note. 

6. Relation of Justification to Faith. 

A. We are justified by faith, rather than by love or by any other grace: — 
(a) Not because faith is itself a work of obedience by which we merit 

justification, — for this would be a doctrine of justification by works; 

(6) Nor because faith is accepted as an equivalent of obedience, — for there 
is no equivalent except the perfect obedience of Christ; 

(c) Nor because faith is the germ from which obedience may spring here- 
after, — for it is not the faith which accepts, but the Christ who is accepted, that 
renders such obedience possible; but 

(d) Because faith, and not repentance or love or hope, is the medium or 
instrument by which we receive Christ and are united to him. Hence we 
are never said to be justified 3ia itiariv — on account of faith, but only cut 
TciGTeciQ — through faith, or ek ttiotsuc — by faith. Or to express the same truth in 
other words, while the grace of God is the efficient cause of justification, and 
the obedience and sufferings of Christ are the meritorious or procuring cause, 
faith is the mediate or instrumental cause. "Faith justifies, because faith 
includes the whole act of unition to Christ as a Savior. It is not the nature 
of any other graces or virtues directly to close with Christ as a mediator, any 
further than they enter into the constitution of justifying faith, and do be- 
long to its nature." 

Edwards, Works, 4: 69-73. 

B. Since the ground of justification is only Christ, to whom we are 
united by faith, the justified person has peace. If it were anything in our- 
selves, our peace must needs be proportioned to our holiness. 

The practical effect of the Romanist mingling of works with faith, as a 
joint ground of justification, is to render all assurance of salvation impossible. 
(Council of Trent, 9th chap. : "Every man, by reason of his own weakness 
and defects, must be in fear and anxiety about his state of grace. Nor can 
any one know with infallible certainty of faith that he has received forgive- 
ness of God)." But since justification is an instantaneous act of God, com- 
plete at the moment of the sinner's first believing, it has no degrees. Weak 
faith justifies as perfectly as strong faith, although since justification is a 
secret act of God, weak faith does not give so strong assurance of salvation. 
Foundations of our Faith, 216. 

C. Justification is instantaneous, complete and final; instantaneous, 
since otherwise there would be an interval during which the soul was neither 
approved nor condemned by God (Mat. 6: 24); complete, since the soul 
united to Christ by faith, becomes partaker of his complete satisfaction to 
the demands of law (Col. 2: 10); and final, since this union with Christ is 
indissoluble; (John 10: 28-30). 



S A NOTIFICATION. 223 

As there are many acts of sin in the life of the Christian, so there are 
many acts of pardon following them. But all these acts of pardon are vir- 
tually implied in that first act by which he was finally and forever justified '■> 
as also successive acts of repentance and faith after such sins, are virtually 
implied in that first repentance and faith which logically preceded justification. 

Edwards, Works, 4: 104. 
7. Advice to Inquirers demanded by a Scriptural view of Justification. 

A. Where conviction of sin is yet lacking, our aim should* be to show 
the sinner that he is under God's condemnation for his past sins and that no 
future obedience can ever secure his justification, since this obedience even 
though perfect, could not atone for the past, and even if it could, he is un- 
able without God's help to render it. 

B. Where conviction of sin already exists, our aim should be, not, in the 
first instance, to secure the performance of external religious duties such 
as prayer or Scripture-reading or uniting with the church, but to induce 
the sinner a 3 his first and all-inclusive duty to accept Christ as his only and 
sufficient sacrifice and Savior, and, committing himself and the matter 
of his salvation entirely to Christ's hands, to manifest this trust and sub- 
mission by entering at once upon a life of obedience to Christ's commands. 

Edwards, Works, 4: 64-132. Buchanan on Justification, 250-411. 
Herzog, Encyclopadie, art. : Rechtfertigung. Thomasius, Christi Per- 
son und Werk, 3: 193-200. Moehler, Symbolism, 79-190. Newman, 
Lectures on Justification, 253-345. Owen on Justification, in Works, 
vol. 5. Ritschl, Christian Doctrine of Justification, 121-226. Bp. of 
Ossory, Nature and Effects of Faith, 49-152. Hodge, Syst. Theol., 
3: 114-212. 



SKCTION" III. — THE APPLICATION OF CHRIST'S REDEMPTION 
IN ITS CONTINUATION. 

Under this head we treat of Sanctification and of Perseverance. These 
two are but the divine and the human sides of the same fact, and bear to 
each other a similar relation to that which exists between Regeneration and 
Conversion. 

I. Sanctification. 

1. Definition of Sanctification. 

Sanctification is that continuous operation of the Holy Spirit, by which 
the holy disposition imparted in regeneration is strengthened and confirmed. 
This definition implies : 

A. That although in regeneration the governing disposition of the soul 
is made holy, there still remain tendencies to evil which are unsubdued; 
(John 13: 10). 



224 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

B. That the existence in the believer of these two opposing principles, 
gives rise to a conflict which lasts through life; (Gal. 5: 17). 

C. That in this conflict, the Holy Spirit enables the Christian, through 
increasing faith, more fully and consciously to appropriate Christ, and thus 
progressively to make conquest of the remaining sinfulness of his nature. 
(Eom. 8: 13, 14 1 Cor. 6: 11). 

2. Explanations and Scripture Proof. 

A. Sanctification is the work of God; (1 Thess. 5: 23. Jude 1). 

B. It is a continuous process; (Phil. 1: 6; 3: 15. Col. 3: 9, 10). 

C. It is distinguished from regeneration as growth from birth, or as the 
strengthening of a holy disposition from the original importation of it; 
(Eph. 4: 15. 1 Thess. 3: 12. 2 Pet. 3: 18). 

D. The operation of God reveals itself in, and is accompanied by, in- 
telligent and voluntary activity of the believer in the discovery and morti- 
fication of sinful desires and in the bringing of the whole being into obedience 
to Christ and conformity to the standards of his word; (John 17: 17. 2 Cor. 
10: 5. Phil. 2: 12, 13). 

E. The agency through which God effects the sanctification of the be- 
liever is the indwelling Spirit of Christ; (John 14: 17, 18; 15: 3-5. Bom. 
8:9, 10; 15:16. 1 Cor. 1: 2, 30; 6: 19. 2 Cor. 3: 18. Col. 1:27-29. 2 Tim. 
1:14). 

F. The mediate or instrumental cause of sanctification, as of justifica- 
tion, is faith; (Acts 15: 9. Bom. 1: 17). 

G. The object of this faith is Christ himself, as the head of a new humanity 
and the source of truth and life to those united to him; (2 Cor. 3: 18. Eph. 
4: 13). 

H. Though the weakest faith perfectly justifies, the degree of sanctifica- 
tion is measured by the strength of the Christian's faith and the persistence 
with which he apprehends Christ in the various relations which the Scrip- 
tures declare him to sustain to us; (Matt. 9: 29. Luke 17: 5. Bom. 1: 17; 
7: 1; 13: 14 Eph. 4: 24). 

I. From the lack of persistence in using the means appointed for Chris- 
tian growth — such as the word of God, prayer, association with other be- 
lievers, and personal effort for the conversion of the ungodly — sanctification 
does not always proceed in regular and unbroken course, and it is never 
completed in this life; (Phil. 3: 12. 1 John 1: 8). 

J. Sanctification both of the soul and of the body of the believer is com- 
pleted in the life to come — that of the former at death, that of the latter at 
the resurrection; (Phil. 3: 21. Col. 3: 4. Heb. 12: 23. l.John 3: 2. Jude 
24 Bev. 14: 5). 



SAKCTIFICATION. 225 

3. Erroneous Views refuted by these Scripture Passages. 

A. The Antinomian, — which holds that since Christ's obedience and 
sufferings have satisfied the demands of the law, the believer is free from 
obligation to observe it. 

To this view we urge the following objections : — 

(a) That since the law is a transcript of the holiness of God, its demands 
as a moral rule are unchanging. Only as a system of penalty and a method 
of salvation, is the law abolished in Christ's death; (Mat. 5: 17-19. Eom. 
10: 4. 2 Cor. 3: 13. Col. 2: 14). 

(6) That the union between Christ and the believer secures not only the 
bearing of the penalty of the law by Christ, but also the impartation of 
Christ's spirit of obedience to the believer — in other words brings him into 
communion with Christ's work and leads him to ratify it in his own experience ; 
(Rom. 8: 9, 10. Gal. 5: 21. 1 John 1: 6; 3: 6). 

(c) That the freedom from the law of which the Scriptures speak, is 
therefore simply that freedom from the constraint and bondage of the law, 
which characterizes those who have become one with Christ by faith; (Rom. 
3: 8, 31; 6: 14, 15, 22; 8: 4. Gal. 5: 1). 

B. The Perfectionist, — which holds that the Christian may, in this life, 
become perfectly free from sin. 

In reply it will be sufficient to observe : — 

(a) That the theory rests upon false conceptions: — 

First, of the law — as a sliding-scale of requirement graduated to the moral 

condition of creatures, instead of being the unchangeable reflection of God's 

holiness. 

Secondly, of sin — as consisting only in voluntary acts, instead of em- 
bracing also those dispositions and states of the soul which are not con- 
formed to the divine holiness. 

Thirdly, of the human will — as able to choose God supremely and persis- 
tently at every moment of life, and to fulfil at every moment the obliga- 
tions resting upon it, instead of being corrupted and enslaved by the fall. 

(6) That the theory finds no support in, but rather is distinctly contra- 
dicted by, Scripture. 

First, the Scriptures never assert or imply that the Christian may in this life 
live without sin — passages like 1 John 3 : 6, if interpreted consistently with 
the context, setting forth either the ideal standard of Christian living, or the 
actual state of the believer so far as respects his new nature. 

Secondly, the apostolic admonitions to the Corinthians and Hebrews 
show that no such state of complete sanctification had been generally 
attained by the Christians of the first century; (cf. Rom. 8 : 24). 

Thirdly, there is express record of sin committed by the most perfect 
characters of Scripture — as Noah, Abraham, Job, David, Peter. 



226 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE EOCTRINE OF SALVATION. 

Fourthly, the word teIeIoq, as applied to spiritual conditions already attained, 
can fairly be held to signify only a relative perfection, equivalent to sincere 
piety or maturity of Christian judgment; (1 Cor. 2: 6. Phil. 3: 15). 

Fifthly, the Scriptures distinctly deny that any man on earth lives without 
sin; (1 K. 8: 46. 2 Chron. 6: 36. Eccles. 7: 20. 1 John 1: 8). 

(c) That the theory is disproved by the testimony of Christian ex- 
perience. 

In exact proportion to the soul's advance in holiness, does it shrink from 
claiming that holiness has been already attained, and humble itself before 
God for its remaining apathy, ingratitude and unbelief; (Phil. 3: 12-14). 

Perfectionism is best met by proper statements of the nature of the law 
and of sin. While we thus rebuke spiritual pride, however, we should be 
equally careful to point out the inseparable connection between justification 
and sanctification, and their equal importance as together making up the 
biblical idea of salvation. While we show no favor to those who would 
make sanctification a sudden and paroxysmal act of the human will, we 
should hold forth the holiness of God as the standard of attainment, and 
the faith in a Christ of infinite fulness, as the medium through which that 
standard is to be gradually but certainly realized in us; (2 Cor. 3: 18). 

For statements of the Perfectionist view, see Peck, Christian Perfec- 
tion; Mahan, Christian Perfection, and art. in Biblical Repos., 2nd 
Series, Vol. IV, Oct., 1840: 408-428; Finney, Systematic Theology, 
586-766. Per contra, see Princeton Essays, 1st Series, 335-365; Hodge, 
Syst. Theol., 3: 213-258; Snodgrass, Scriptural Doctrine of Sanctifica- 
tion; Calvin, Institutes, III. 11: 6. Bib. Repos., 2nd Series, Vol. I, 
Jan., 1839: 44-58, and Vol. II, July, 1839: 143-166; Woods, Works, 4: 
465-523. Van Oosterzee, Christian Dogmatics, 657-662. John Owen, 
Works, 3: 366-651; 6: 1-313. 

II. Peesevekance. 

The Scriptures declare that in virtue of the original purpose and continu- 
ous operation of God, all who are united to Christ by faith will infallibly 
continue in a state of grace and finally attain to everlasting life. This volun- 
tary continuance on the part of the Christian, in faith and well-doing, we 
call perseverance. 

Perseverance is therefore the human side or aspect of that spiritual pro- 
cess, which, as viewed from the divine side, we call sanctification. It is not 
a mere natural consequence of conversion, but involves a constant activity 
of the human will from the moment of conversion to the end of life. 

1. Proof of the Doctrine of Perseverance. 

A. From Scripture; (John 10: 28, 29; 17: 11. Rom. 11: 29. 1 Cor. 13: 7— 
rravra vTtofuhei, cf. 13. Phil. 1: 6. 2 Thess. 3:3. 2 Tim. 1:12. 1 Pet. 
1 : 5. Jude 24. Rev. 3 : 10). 



PERSEVERANCE. 227 

B. From Eeason. 

(a) It is a necessary inference from other doctrines — such as election, 
regeneration, union with Christ, justification, sanctification. 

(b) It accords with analogy — God's preserving care being needed by, 
and being granted to, his spiritual, as well as his natural creation. 

(c) It is implied in all assurance of salvation — since this assurance is 
given by the Holy Spirit, and is based nqt upon the known strength of 
human resolution, but upon the purpose and operation of God. 

2. Objections to the Doctrine of Perseverance. 

These objections are urged chiefly by Arminians and by Romanists. 

A. That it is inconsistent with human freedom. Answer : — It is no more so 
than is the doctrine of Election or of Decrees. 

B. That it tends to immorality. Answer: — This cannot be, since the 
doctrine declares that God will save men by securing their perseverance in 
holiness; (1 Pet. 1:2. 2 Pet. 1 : 10). 

C. That, it leads to indolence. Answer: — This a perversion of the doc- 
trine, continuously possible only to the unregenerate, — since to the regenerate, 
certainty of success is the strongest incentive to activity in the conflict 
with sin; (1 John 5:4). 

D. That the Scripture commands to persevere and warnings against 
apostasy, show that certain, even of the regenerate, will fall away. Answer : — 

(a) They show that some, who are apparently regenerate, will fall away; 
(1 John 2: 19). 

(b) They show that the truly regenerate, and those who are only appar- 
ently so, are not certainly distinguishable in this life ; (Mai. 3 : 18. Mat. 
14: 25, 47. Rom. 9: 6. Rev. 3: 1). 

(c) They show the fearful consequences of rejecting Christ, to those who 
have enjoyed special divine influences, but who are only apparently re- 
generate; (Heb. 10: 26). 

(d) They show what the fate of the truly regenerate would be, in case 
they should not persevere ; (Heb. 6 : 4). 

(e) They show that the j)erseverance of the truly regenerate may be 
secured by these very commands and warnings ; but 

(/) They do not show that it is certain or possible that any truly regen- 
erate person will fall away. 

E. That we have actual examples of such apostasy. We answer : — 

(a) Such are either men once outwardly reformed, like Judas and 
Annanias, but never renewed in heart ; or 

(6) They are regenerate men, who, like David and Peter, have fallen into 
temporary sin, from which they will, before death, be reclaimed by God's 
discipline. 

Edwards, Works, 3: 509-532; 4: 104. Ridgeley, Body of Divinity, 
2: 164-194. John Owen, Works, Vol. 11. Woods, Works, 3: 221-246. 
Van Oosterzee, Christian Dogmatics, 662-666. 



PART VII. 

ECCLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE CONSTITUTION" OF THE CHURCH. 

I. Definition of the Chukch. 

The church of Christ, in its largest signification, is the whole company of 
regenerate persons in all times and ages, in heaven and on earth; (Mat. 
16: 18. Eph. 1: 22, 23; 3: 10; 5: 24, 25. Col. 1: 18. Heb. 12: 23). In 
this sense, the church is identical with the spiritual kingdom of God, — both 
signify that redeemed humanity, in which God in Christ exercises actual 
spiritual dominion; (John 3: 3, 5). 

Cremer, Lexicon N. T., Eng. trans., 113, 114, 331. Jacob, Eccl. Polity 
of N. T., 12. 

The Scriptures, however, distinguish between this invisible or universal 
church, and the individual church, in which the universal church takes local 
and temporal form, and in which the idea of the church as a whole is con- 
cretely exhibited. 

The individual church may be defined as that smaller company of re- 
generate persons who in any given community unite themselves voluntarily 
together in accordance with Christ's laws, for the purpose of securing the 
complete establishment of his kingdom in themselves and in the world; 
(Mat. 18: 17. Acts 14: 23. Rom. 16: 5. 1 Cor. 1: 2; 4: 17. 1 Thess. 
2: 14). 

Besides these two significations of the term church, there are properly in 
the New Testament no others. The word emfAycia is indeed used in Acts 
7: 38; 19: 32, 39, 41; Heb. 2: 12, to designate a popular assembly, but 
since this is a secular use of the term, it does not here concern us. In cer- 
tain passages, as for example, Acts 9: 31 {kuKkijcia, sing., kabc), 1 Cor. 12: 
28, Phil. 3: 6 and 1 Tim. 3: 15, eiu&Tjata appears to be used either as a generic 
or as a collective term, to denote simply the body of independent local 
churches existing in a given region or at a given epoch. Bat since there is 
no evidence that these churches were bound together in any outward organ- 
ization, this use of the term EKKlrjaia cannot be regarded as adding any new 
sense to those of "the universal church," and "the local church" already 
mentioned. 

On the meaning of ennArjaia, see Cremer, Lex. N. T. , 329. Trench, 
Syn. N. T., 1: 18. Girdlestone, Syn. O. T., 367. Curtis, Progress 
Baptist Principles, 301. Dexter, Congregationalism, 25. Dagg, Church 
Order, 100-120. Robinson, N. T. Lexicon, sub voce. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE CHURCH. 229 

Tlie prevailing usage of the N. T. gives to the term evilr/ola the second 
of these two significations. It is this local church only which has definite 
and temporal existence, and of this alone we henceforth treat. Our definition 
of the individual church implies the two following particulars: — 

1. The church, like the family and the state, is an institution of divine 
appointment. This is plain : 

A. From its relation to the church universal, as its concrete embodiment. 

B. From the fact that its necessity is grounded in the social and re- 
ligious nature of man. 

C. From the Scripture — as for example, Christ's command in Matt. 18 : 17, 
and the designation 'church of God', applied to individual churches; (1 
Cor. 1: 2). 

2. The church, unlike the family and the state, is a voluntary society. 

A. This results from the fact that the local church is the outward expres- 
sion of that rational and free life in Christ which characterizes the church 
as a whole. In this it differs from those other organizations of divine 
appointment, entrance into which is not optional. Membership in the 
church is not hereditary or compulsory. 

B. The doctrine of the church, as thus defined, is a necessary outgrowth 
of the doctrine of regeneration. As this fundamental spiritual change is 
mediated not by outward appliances, but by inward and conscious reception 
of Christ and his .truth, union' with the church logically follows, not precedes, 
the soul's spiritual union with Christ. 

II. Organization or the Church. 

1. The fact of organization. 

That there was organization in the N. T. church, is abundantly shown from 
its stated meetings (Acts 20: 7. Heb. 10: 25), elections (Acts 1: 23-26; 6: 
5, 6), officers (Phil. 1: 1); from the designations of its ministers (Acts 20: 17, 
28), together with the recognized authority of the minister and of the church 
(Mat. 18: 17. 1 Pet. 5:2); from its discipline (1 Cor. 5: 4, 5, 13), contribu- 
tions (Rom. 15: 26. 1 Cor. 16: 1, 2), letters of commendation (Acts 18: 
27. 2 Cor. 3: 1), registers of widows (1 Tim. 5: 9; cf. Acts 6: 1), uniform 
customs (1 Cor. 11: 16), ordinances (Acts 2: 41. 1 Cor. 11: 23-26); from the 
order enjoined and observed (1 Cor. 14: 40. Col. 2: 5), the qualifications 
for membership (Mat. 28: 19. Acts 2: 47), the common work of the whole 
body (Phil. 2 : 30). 

As indicative of a developed organization in the N. T. church, of which 
only the germ existed before Christ's death, it is important to notice the 
progress in names from the gospels to the epistles. In the gospels, the word 
"disciples" is the common designation of Christ's followers, but it is not 
once found in the epistles. In the epistles, there are only "saints," "breth- 
ren," "churches." 



230 ECCLES10LOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. 

A consideration of the facts here referred to is sufficient to evince the 
unscriptural nature of two modern theories of the church: — 

A. The theory that the church is an exclusively spiritual body, destitute 
of all formal organization, and bound together only by the mutual relation 
of each believer to his indwelling Lord. 

The church, upon this view, so far as outward bonds are concerned, is 
only an aggregation of isolated units. Those believers who chance to gather 
at a particular place, or to live at a particular time, constitute the church of 
that place or time. This view is held by the Friends and by the Plymouth 
Brethren. It ignores the tendencies to organization inherent in human 
nature, confounds the visible with the invisible church, and is directly 
opposed to the Scripture representations of the visible church as compre- 
hending some who are not true believers; (Acts 5: 1-11. Phil. 4: 18; cf. 
Mat. 13: 47-50). 

See quotations in Fish, Ecclesiology, 314-316. Per contra, see Plymouth 
Brethrenism Unveiled, 79-143. Dagg, Church Order, 80-83. 

B. The theory that the form of church organization is not definitely 
prescribed in the New Testament, but is a matter of expediency, each body 
of believers being permitted to adopt that method of organization which 
best suits its circumstances and condition. 

The view under consideration seems in some respects to be favored by 
Neander, and is often regarded as incidental to his larger conception of 
church history as a progressive development. But a proper theory of 
development does not exclude the idea of a church organization already 
complete in all essential particulars before the close of the inspired canon, 
so that the record of it may constitute a providential example of binding 
authority upon all subsequent ages. The view mentioned exaggerates the 
differences of practice between the N. T. churches, underestimates the 
need of divine direction as to methods of church union, and admits a prin- 
ciple of ' church powers ' which may be historically shown to be subversive 
of the very existence of the church as a spiritual body. 

Neander, Church History, 1: 179-190. Hitchcock, in Presbyterian 
Beview, 1868: 265. 

2. The nature of this organization. 

The nature of any organization may be determined by asking, first : who 
constitute its members? secondly: for what object has it been formed? 
and, thirdly : what are the laws which regulate its operations ? 
Wayland, Principles and Practices of Baptists. 

A. They only can properly be members of the local church, who have 
previously become members of the church universal — or, in other words, 
have become regenerate persons; (Acts 2: 47; 5': 14. 1 Cor. 1: 2). From 
this limitation of membership to regenerate persons, certain results follow : — 



ORGANIZATION OF THE CHURCH. 231 

(a) Since each member bears supreme allegiance to Christ, the church 
as a body must recognize Christ as the only lawgiver. The relation of the 
individual Christian to the church does not supersede, but furthers and ex- 
presses his relation to Christ. 

(b ) Since each regenerate man recognizes in every other a brother in 
Christ, the several members are upon a footing of absolute equality; (Mat. 
23: 8-10). 

(c) Since each local church is directly subject to Christ, there is no 
jurisdiction of one church over another, but all are ou an equal footing 
and all are independent of interference or control by the civil power. 

B. The sole object of the local church is the glory of God, in the com- 
plete establishment of his kingdom, both in the hearts of believers and in the 
world. This object is to be promoted: — 

(a) By united worship, — including prayer and religious instruction 
(Heb. 10: 25); 

(b) By mutual watch-care and exhortation (1 Thess. 5: 11. Heb. 3: 13); 
and 

(c) By common labors for the reclamation of the impenitent world; 
(2 Cor. 8: 5). 

C. The law of the church is simply the will of Christ, as expressed in the 
Scriptures and interpreted by the Holy Spirit. This law respects : — 

(a) The qualifications for membership. 

These are regeneration and baptism, i. e. , spiritual new birth and ritual 
new birth; the surrender of the inward and of the outward life to Christ- 
the spiritual entrance into communion with Christ's death and resurrection 
and the formal profession of this to the world, by being buried with Christ 
and rising with him in baptism. 

(b) The duties imposed on members. 

In discovering the will of Christ from the Scriptures, each member has 
the right of private judgment, being directly responsible to Christ for his 
use of the means of knowledge, and for his obedience to Christ's commands 
when these are known. 

Dagg, Church Order, 74-99. Curtis, on Communion, 1-61. 

C. The genesis of this organization. 

(a) The church existed in germ before the day of Pentecost, — otherwise 
there would have been nothing to which those converted upon that day could 
have been " added;" (Acts 2: 47). Among the apostles, regenerate as they 
were, united to Christ by faith and in that faith baptized (Acts 19 : 4), under 
Christ's instruction and engaged in common work for him, there were already 
the beginnings of organization. There was a treasurer of the body (John 
13: 29), and as a body they celebrated for the first time the Lord's Supper 
(Mat. 26: 26-29). To all intents and purposes they constituted a church, 



232 ECCLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. 

although the church was not yet fully equipped for its work by the out- 
pouring of the Spirit (Acts 2), and by the appointment of pastors and deacons. 
The church existed without officers, as in the first days succeeding Pentecost. 
Fish, Ecclesiology, 11-14. 

(b) That provision for these offices was made gradually as exigencies 
arose, is natural when we consider that the church immediately after Christ's 
ascension was under the tutelage of inspired apostles, and was to be pre- 
pared by a process of education for independence and self-government. As 
doctrine was communicated gradually yet infallibly* hrough the oral and 
written teaching of the apostles, so we are warranted in believing that the 
church was gradually but infallibly guided to the adoption of Christ's own 
plan of church organization and of Christian work. The same promise of 
the Spirit which renders the New Testament an unerring and sufficient rule 
of faith, renders it also an unerring and sufficient rule of practice for the 
chinch in all places and times; (John 16: 12-16. 1 Cor. 14: 37). 

On the question how far the apostles, in the organization of the church, 
availed themselves of the synagogue as a model, see Neander, Planting 
and Training, 28-34. 

(c) Any number of believers may therefore constitute themselves into a 
Christian church by adopting for their rule of faith and practice Christ's 
law as laid down in the New Testament, and by associating themselves to- 
gether, in accordance with it, for his worship and service. It is important, 
where practicable, that a council of churches be previously called to advise 
the brethren proposing this union, as to the desirableness of constituting a 
new and distinct local body, and if it be found desirable, to recognize them, 
after its formation, as being a church of Christ. But such action of a coun- 
cil, however valuable as affording ground for the fellowship of other churches, 
is not constitutive, but is simply declaratory, and without such action, the 
body of believers alluded to, if formed after N. T. example, may be notwith- 
standing, a true church of Christ. Still further, a band of converts, among the 
heathen or providentially precluded from access to existing churches, might 
rightfully appoint one of their number to baptize the rest and then might 
organize, de novo, a New Testament church. 

III. GOVEENMENT OF THE CHURCH. 

1. Nature of this government in general. 

It is evident from the direct relation of each member of the church, and 
so of the church as a whole, to Christ as sovereign and lawgiver, that the 
government of the church, so far as regards the source- of authority, is an ab- 
solute monarchy. 

In ascertaining the will of Christ, however, and in applying his commands 
to providential exigencies, the Holy Spirit enlightens one member through 
the counsel of another, and as the result of combined deliberation, guides 
the whole body to right conclusions. This work of the Spirit is the founda- 
tion of the Scripture injunctions to unity. This unity, since it is a unity of 
the Spirit, is not an enforced, but an intelligent and willing unity. 



GOVERNMENT OF THE CHURCH. 233 

While Christ is sole king, therefore, the government of the church, so far 
as regards the interpretation and execution of his will by the body, is an 
absolute democracy, in which the whole body of members is intrusted with 
the duty and responsibility of carrying out the laws of Christ as expressed 
in his word. 

A. Proof that the government of the church is democratic or congrega- 
tional. 

(a) From the duty of the whole church to preserve unity in its action; 
(Eom. 12: 16. 1 Cor. 1: 10. 2 Cor. 13: 11. Eph. 4: 3. Phil. 1: 27. 1 
Pet. 3:8). 

(6) From the responsibility of the whole church for maintaining pure 
doctrine and practice; (1 Tim. 3: 15. Jude 3. Rev. 2 and 3). 

(c) From the committing of the ordinances to the charge of the whole 
church to observe and guard. As the church expresses truth in her teach- 
ing, so she is to express it in symbol through the ordinances; (Matt. 28: 19; 
cf. Luke 24: 33 and Acts 1 : 15. 1 Cor. 11 : 2; cf. 23, 24). 

Curtis, Progress of Baptist Principles, 299. Robinson, Harmony of 
Gospels, Notes, § 170. 

(d) From the election, by the whole church, of its own officers and dele- 
gates; (Acts 1: 23, 26; 6: 3, 5; 15: 2, 4, 22, 23, 30. 2 Cor. 8: 19. In Acts 
14: 23, the literal interpretation of x EL P orov ^ aavTe Q is not to be pressed. In 
Titus 1:5, "when Paul empowers Titus to set presiding officers over the 
communities, this circumstance decides nothing as to the mode of choice, 
nor is a choice by the community itself thereby necessarily excluded"). 

Neander, Church History, 1: 189. Guericke, Church History, 1: 110. 
Dexter, Congregationalism, 138. On Acts 14: 23, see Commentaries 
of Barnes, Alexander, Hackett. Baumgarten, Apostolic History, 1 : 456. 

(e) From the power of the whole church to exercise discipline; (Matt. 
18 : 17. 1 Cor. 5 : 3—5, 13. 2 Cor. 2 : 6, 7; 7 : 11. 2 Thess. 3 : 6, 14, 15). Pas- 
sages which show the right of the whole body to exclude, show also the 
right of the whole body to admit members. 

Coleman, Manual on Prelacy and Ritualism, 87-125. 

B. Erroneous views as to church government refuted by the foregoing 



(a) The world-church theory, or the Romanist view. 

This holds that all local churches are subject to the supreme authority of 
the bishop of Rome, as the successor of Peter and the infallible vicegerent 
of Christ, and as thus united, constitute the one and only church of Christ 
on earth. We reply : — 

First, — Christ gave no such supreme authority to Peter. Matt. 16:18 

simply refers to the personal position of Peter as first confessor of Christ 

and preacher of his name to Jews and Gentiles. Hence other apostles also 

constituted the foundation; (Eph. 2: 20. Rev. 21: 14). On one occasion 

16 



234 ECCLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. 

the counsel of James was regarded as of equal weight with that of Peter 
(Acts 15 : 7-30), while on another occasion Peter was rebuked by Paul (Gal. 
2: 11), and Peter calls himself only a fellow-elder; (1 Pet. 5: 1). 

Secondly, — If Peter had such authority given him, there is no evidence 
that he had power to transmit it to others. 

Thirdly, — There is no conclusive evidence that Peter ever was at Rome, 
much less that he was bishop of Rome. 

Fourthly, — There is no evidence that he really did so appoint the bishops 
of Rome as his successors. 

Fifthly, — If he did so appoint the bishops of Rome, the evidence of con- 
tinuous succession since that time is lacking. 

Sixthly, — There is abundant evidence that a hierarchical form of church 
government is corrupting to the church and dishonoring to Christ. 

Coleman, Manual on Prelacy and Ritualism, 265-274. Park, in Bib. 
Sac, 2: 451. 

(b) The national-church theory, or the theory of provincial or national 
churches. 

This holds that all members of the church in any province or nation are 
bound together in provincial or national organization, and that this organ- 
ization has jurisdiction over the local churches. We reply : — 

First, — The theory has no support in the Scriptures. There is no evidence 
that the word EKKlrjcia in the New Testament ever means a national church 
organization. 1 Cor. 12: 28, Phil. 3: 6, and 1 Tim. 3:15, may be more 
naturally interpreted as referring to the generic church. In Acts 9: 31, 
£kk/i?/oiu is a mere generalization for the local churches then and there exist- 
ing, and implies no sort of organization among them. 
Jacob, Ecclesiastical Polity of the N. T., 9. 

Progress to episcopacy is thus described by Lightfoot: — "In the time of 
Ignatius, the bishop, then primus inter pares, was regarded only as a centre 
of unity; in the time of Irenseus, as a depositary of primitive truth; in the 
time of Cyprian, as absolute vicegerent of Christ in things spiritual." 

Lightfoot on Christian Ministry, in Appendix to Com. on Philippians, 
179-267. 
Secondly, — It is contradicted by the intercourse which the New Testa- 
ment churches held with each other as independent bodies, — for example, 
at the council of Jerusalem; (Acts 15). 

Thirdly, — It has no practical advantages over the Congregational polity, 
but rather tends to formality, division, and the extinction of the principles 
of self-government and direct responsibility to Christ. 

Jacob, Eccl. Polity of N. T., 130. Dexter, Congregationalism, 236. 

Fourthly, — It is inconsistent with itself, in binding a professedly spiritual 
church by formal and geographical lines. 



GOVERN M EXT OF THE CHURCH. 235 

Fifthly, — It logically leads to the theory of Eonianisni. If two churches 
need a superior authority to control them and settle their differences, then 
two countries and two hemispheres need a common ecclesiastical govern- 
ment, — and a world-church, under one visible head, is Romanism. 
Coleman, Manual on Prelacy and Ritualism, 128-264. 

2. Officers of the Church. 

A. The number of offices in the church is two : — 
(a) The office of bishop, presbyter or pastor. 
(6) The office of deacon. 

Dexter, Congregationalism, 77-98. Dagg, Church Order, 241-266. 

That the appellations bishop, presbyter, and pastor designate the same 
office and order of persons, may be shown from Acts 20 : 28 — emaKoirovg 
TToifiaiveiv, cf. 17— Trpecpv-epovg. Phil. 1: 1. 1 Tim. 3: 1, 8. Titus 1: 5, 7. 
1 Pet. 5: 1, 2 — Trpeofivrepovr • ■ ■ Tcapana/jo 6 avfiirpea^vrepog • • ■ iroi/idvare 

Tto'tpVlOV • • • ZTTMJKOTTOVVTSC. 

Conybeare and Howson: "The terms bishop and elder are used in the 
New Testament as equivalent, — the former denoting (as its meaning of over- 
seer implies) the duties, the latter the rank, of the office." See passages 
quoted in Giessler, Church History, 1 : 90, note 1 — as for example, Jerome : 
' ' Apud veteres iidem episcopi et presbyteri, quia illud nomen dignitatis est, 
hoc aetatis. Idem est ergo presbyter qui episcopus." 

The only plausible objection to the identity of the presbyter and the bishop, 
is that first suggested by Calvin, on the ground of 1 Tim. 5: 17. But this 
text only shows that the one office of presbyter or bishop involved two kinds 
of labor, and that certain presbyters or bishops were more successful in one 
kind than in the other. That gifts of teaching and ruling belonged to the 
same individual, is clear from Acts 20: 28-31; Heb. 13: 7; 1 Tim. 3: 2— 

ETTICKOKOV (hcUKTlKOV. 

Dexter, Congregationalism, 114. Jacob, Eccl. Polity of N. T., 56. 
Olshausen, on 1 Tim. 5: 17. Wilson, Primitive Government of Christian 
Churches. Hackett, on Acts 14: 23. 

In certain of the N. T. churches, there appears to have been a plurality 
of elders; (Acts 20: 17. Phil. 1: 1. Tit. 1: 5). There is, however, no 
evidence that the number of these was uniform, or that the plurality which 
frequently existed was due to any other cause than the size of the churches for 
which these elders cared. The N. T. example, while it permits the multiplica- 
tion of assistant pastors according to need, does not require a plural elder- 
ship in every case, nor does it render this eldership, where it exists, of 
coordinate authority with the church. 

Per contra, see Fish, Ecclesiology, 229-249. 

B. The duties belonging to these offices. 

{a) The pastor, bishop, or elder is, — first, a spiritual teacher, in publio 
and private (Acts 20: 35. 1 Thess. 5: 12. Heb. 13: 7, 17); secondly, — adminis- 



236 ECCLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. 

trator of the ordinances (Matt. 28: 19. 1 Cor. 1: 16); thirdly, — superinten- 
dent of the discipline (1 Tim. 5: 17, and 3: 5), as well as presiding officer 
at meetings of the church. 

Dexter, Congregationalism, 155, 157. Samson, in Madison Avenue Lec- 
tures, 261-288. Jacob, Eccl. Polity of N. T., 99. Wayland, Apostolic 
Ministry. 
(6) The deacon is helper to the pastor and the church, in both spiritual 
and temporal things; first, — relieving the pastor of external labors, inform- 
ing him of the condition and wants of the church, and forming a bond of 
union between pastor and people; and secondly, — helping the church by 
relieving the poor and sick, and ministering in an informal way to the 
church's spiritual needs, as well as performing certain external duties con- 
nected with the service of the sanctuary; (Acts 6: 1-4 — dicucnveiv r pa-Kate. Cf. 
8-10; Eom. 16: 1; 1 Cor. 12: 28— avrik^zi^. 

See Robinson, N. T. Lexicon, avriXqifjig. Dexter, Congregationalism, 
69, 132. Baptist Quarterly, 1869: 40. Williams, The Deaconship. 

C. Ordination of officers. 
(a) What is ordination ? 

Ordination is the setting apart of a person divinely called to a work of 
special ministration in the church. It does not involve the communication 
of power — it is simply a recognition of powers previously conferred by God, 
and a consequent formal authorization, on the part of the church, to exercise 
the gifts already bestowed. This recognition and authorization may be ex- 
pressed simply in the vote in which the condidate is chosen to his office, or 
may be accompanied by a special service of admonition, prayer and the 
laying-on of hands. 

Licensure simply commends a man to the churches as fitted to preach. 
Ordination recognizes him as set apart to the work of preaching and ad- 
ministering ordinances, in some particular church or in some designated 
field of labor, as representative of the church. 

Of his call to the ministry, the candidate himself is to be first persuaded; 
(1 Cor. 9: 16. 1 Tim. 1: 12); but, secondly, the church must be persuaded 
also, before he can have authority to minister among them; (1 Tim. 3: 2-7; 
4:14. Titus 1:6-9). 

Ordination is the act of the church, not the act of a privileged class in 
the church, as the eldership has sometimes wrongly been regarded, nor yet 
the act of other churches, assembled by their representatives in council. 
No ecclesiastical authority higher than that of the local church is recognized 
in the New Testament. This authority however has its limits, and since the 
church has no authority outside of its own body, the candidate for ordination 
should be a member of the ordaining church. 

(6) Who are to ordain ? 

Since each church is bound to recognize the presence of the Spirit in other 
rightly constituted churches, and its own decisions, in like manner, are to be 
recognized by others, it is desirable, in ordination, as in all important steps 
affecting other churches, that advice be taken before the candidate is in- 



RELATION OF LOCAL CHURCHES TO EACH OTHER. 237 

ducted into office, and that other churches be called to sit with it in coun- 
cil, and if thought best, assist in setting the candidate apart for the ministry. 
It is always to be remembered, however, that the power to ordain rests 
with the church, and that the church may proceed without a council, or 
even against the decision of the council. Such ordination, of course, would 
give authority only within the bounds of the individual church. Where no 
immediate exception is taken to the decision of the council, that decision is 
to be regarded as virtually the decision of the church by which it was called. 
In so far as ordination is an act performed by the local church with the 
advice and assistance of other rightly constituted churches, it is justly re- 
garded as giving formal permission to exercise gifts and administer ordinan- 
ces within the bounds of such churches. Ordination is not therefore to be 
repeated upon the transfer of the minister's pastoral relation from one 
church to another. In every case, however, where a minister from a body 
of Christians not scripturally constituted, assumes the pastoral relation in 
a rightly organized church, there is peculiar propriety in that act of formal 
recognition and authorization which is called ordination. 

Wayland, Principles and Practices of Baptists, 114. Dexter, Congre- 
gationalism, 136, 145, 146, 150, 151. Per contra, see Fish, Ecclesiology, 
365-399. 

3. Discipline of the Church. 

A. Kinds of discipline. 

Discipline is of two sorts, according as offences are private or public. 

(a) Private offences are to be dealt with according to the rule in Matt. 18 : 
15-17. 

(6) Public offences are to be dealt with according to the rule in 1 Cor. 
5: 4, 5, 13, and 2 Thess. 3: 6. 

B. Relation of the pastor to discipline. 

(a) He has no original authority, 

( b) But is the organ of the church, and 

(c) Superintendent of its labors for its own purification and for the recla- 
mation of offenders; and therefore 

(d) May best do the work of discipline, not directly, by constituting 
himself a special policeman or detective, but indirectly, by securing proper 
labor on the part of the deacons or brethren of the church. 

A more full discussion of this subject is relegated to the department of 
Pastoral Theology. 

Savage, Church Discipline, Formative and Corrective. Dagg, Church 
Order, 268-274. 

IV. Relation of Local Chueches to each other. 

1. The general nature of this relation is that of fellowship between 
equals. Notice here : — 

A. The absolute equality of the churches. 



238 ECCLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. 

No church or council of churches, no association or convention or society, 
can relieve any single church of its direct responsibility to Christ, or assume 
control of its action. 

B. The fraternal fellowship and cooperation of the churches. 

No church can properly ignore or disregard the existence or work of other 
churches around it. Every other church is presumptively possessed of the 
Spirit in equal measure with itself. There must therefore be sympathy and 
mutual furtherance of each other's welfare, among churches, as among in- 
dividual Christians. Upon this principle are based letters of dismission, 
recognition of the pastors of other churches, and all associational unions 
or other unions for common Christian work. 

2. This fellowship involves the duty of special consultation with regard 
to matters affecting the common interest. 

A. The duty of seeking advice. 

Since the order and good repute of each is valuable to all others, cases of 
grave importance and difficulty in internal discipline, as well as the question 
of ordaining members to the ministry, should be submitted to a council of 
churches called for the purpose. 

B. The duty of taking advice. 

For the same reason, each church should show readiness to receive admo- 
nition from others. So long as this is in the nature of friendly reminder 
that the church is guilty of defects from the doctrine or practice enjoined 
by Christ, the mutual acceptance of whose commands is the basis of all 
church fellowship, no church can justly refuse to have such defects pointed 
out, or to consider the scripturalness of its own proceeding. 

Such admonition or advice, however, whether coming from a single church 
or from a council of churches, is not of itself of binding authority. It is 
simply in the nature of moral suasion. The church receiving it, has still to 
compare it with Christ's laws. The ultimate decision rests entirely with the 
church so advised, or asking advice. 

3. This fellowship may be broken by manifest departures from the 
faith or practice of the Scriptures, on the part of any church. 

In such case, duty to Christ requires the churches whose labors to 
reclaim a sister church from error have proved unavailing, to withdraw their 
fellowship from it, until such time as the erring church shall return to the 
path of duty. In this regard, the law which applies to individuals applies 
to churches, and the polity of New Testament is Congregational rather than 
Independent. 

Dexter, Congregationalism, 2, 3, 61-64. Davidson, Eccl. Polity of the 
N. T. On the general subject of the church, see Hodge, Essays, 201; 
The Church, — a collection of essays by Luthardt, Kahnis, etc. Hooker, 
Ecclesiastical Polity. Flint, Christ's Kingdom on Earth, 53-82. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE ORDINANCES OF THE CHURCH. 

By the ordinances we mean those outward rites which Christ has appointed 
to be administered in his church as visible signs of the saving truth of the 
gospel. They are signs, in that they vividly express this truth and 
confirm it to the believer. 

In contrast with this characteristically Protestant view, the Romanist re- 
gards the ordinances as actually conferring grace and producing holiness. 
Instead of being the external manifestation of a preceding union with 
Christ, they are the physical means of constituting and maintaining this 
union. With the Romanist in this particular, sacramentalists of every 
name substantially agree. 

The Papal church holds to seven sacraments or ordinances: — ordination, 
confirmation, matrimony, extreme unction, penance, baptism and the eu- 
charist. The ordinances prescribed in the N. T. , however, are two and only 
two, viz : — Baptism and the Lord's Supper. 

I. Baptism. 

Christian Baptism is the immersion of a believer in water in token of his 
previous entrance into the communion of Christ's death and resurrection — 
or in other words, in token of his regeneration through union with Christ. 

1. Baptism an Ordinance of Christ. 

A. Proof that Christ instituted an external rite called baptism. 

(a) From the words of the great commission; (Mat. 28: 19. Mark 16: 16). 

(6) From the injunctions of the apostles; (Acts 2: 3.8). 

(c) From the fact that the members of the New Testament churches 
were baptized believers; (Rom. 6: 3-5. Col. 2: 11, 12). 

{d) From the universal practice of such a rite in Christian churches of 
subsequent times. 

B. This external rite intended by Christ to be of universal and perpetual 
obligation. 

(a) Christ recognized John the Baptist's commission to baptize as de- 
rived immediately from heaven; (Mat. 21: 25; cf. John 1: 19-28). There 
is no evidence that proselyte baptism existed among the Jews before the 
time of John. 

See Schneckenburger, Proselytentaufe. Stuart, in Bib. Repos., 1833: 
338-355. Toy, in Baptist Quarterly, July 1872: 301-332. 



240 ECCLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. 

(6) In his own submission to John's baptism, Christ gave testimony to 
the binding obligation of the ordinance; (Mat. 3: 13-17). John's baptism 
was essentially Christian baptism (Acts 19 : 4), although the full significance 
of it was not understood until after Jesus' death and resurrection; (Mat. 
20: 17-23. Luke 12: 50. Rom. 6: 3-6). 

Versus Robert Hall, Works, 1: 367-399. 

(c) In continuing the practice of baptism, through his disciples (John 
4: 1, 2), and in enjoining it upon them as part of a work which was to last 
to the end of the world (Mat. 28 : 19, 20), Christ manifestly adopted and 
appointed baptism as the invariable law of his church. 

(d) The analogy of the ordinance of the Lord's supper also leads to the 
conclusion that baptism is to be observed, as an authoritative memorial of 
Christ and his truth, until his second coming; (1 Cor. 11 : 26). 

(e) There is no intimation whatever that the command of baptism is 
limited or to be limited in its application — that it has been or ever is to be 
repealed; and until some evidence of such limitation or repeal is produced, 
the statute must be regarded as universally binding. 

Pepper, in Madison Avenue Lectures, 85-114. Dagg, Church Order, 
9-21. 

2. The Mode of Baptism. 

This is immersion and immersion only. This appears from the following 
considerations : — 

A. The command to baptize is a command to immerse. We show this : — 
(a) From the meaning of the original word (3a7rTiCco. That this is to im- 
merse, appears: — 

First, — from the usage of Greek writers — including the church fathers, 
when they do not speak of the Christian rite, and the authors of the Greek 
version of the Old Testament. 

Stuart, in Bib. Repos., 1833 : 313. Greek Lexicons of Liddell and Scott, 

and Sophocles, sub voce. Conant, Appendix to Bible Union version of 

Matthew, 1-64. Broadus on Immersion, 57, note. 

Secondly, — every passage where the word occurs in the New Testament 

either requires or allows the meaning 'immerse;' (Mat. 3: 6-11; cf. 2 

Kings 5: 14. Mark 1: 5, 9; 7: 3, 4. Luke 11: 38; cf. Sirac 31: 25, and 

Judith 12: 7. Acts 2: 41; 16: 33). 

Cremer, N. T. LexicoD, sub voce. Ingham, Handbook of Baptism, 
373. Watson, quoted in Annot. Par. Bible, 1126. Samson, on Water- 
supply of Jerusalem, pub. by Am. Bap. Pub. Soc. Curtis, Prog, of 
Bap. Prin., 160, 161. On Scripture passages, see Com. of Meyer. 
Thirdly, — the absence of any use of the word in the passive voice with 
'water' as its subject, confirms our conclusion that its meaning is "to im- 
merse." Water is never said to be baptized upon a man. 
(b) From the use of the verb panT^o with prepositions :^— 
First, — with tig ; (Mark 1 : 9 — where 'lopddvqv is the element into which 
the person passes in the act of being baptized) . 



BAPTISM. 241 

Secondly,— with ev; (Mark 1: 5, 8; cf. Matt. 3: 11. John 1: 26, 31, 33; 
of. Acts 2: 2, 4). In these texts, ev is to be taken, not instrumentally, but as 
indicating the element in which the immersion takes place. 
See Meyer, Com. on Mat. 3: 11. 
(c) From circumstances attending the administration of the ordinance; 
(Mark 1: 10 — avaftaivov ek tov vdarog — Teschendorf and Tregelles. John 3: 
23 — vdara Tro?,'Ad. Acts 8: 38, 39 — narkftrjoav tig to vdtop — avejirjaav tvc tov vScltoq). 
(cl) From figurative allusions to the ordinance; (Mark 10: 38. Luke 
12: 50. Kom. 6: 4. 1 Cor. 10: 2. Col. 2: 12. Heb. 10: 22. 1 Pet. 3: 
20, 21). 

Trench, N. T. Syn., 216, 217. Conybeare and Howson, on Eom. 6: 3. 
(e) From the testimony of church history as to the practice of the early 
church. 

Coleman, Christ. Antiq., 275. Stuart, in Bib. Kepos., 1833: 355-363. 
Neander, Church Hist., 1: 310. 
(/) From the doctrine and practice of the Greek church. 

Broadus on Immersion, 18. De Stourdza, quoted in Conant on Mat. , 
appendix, 99. 
The prevailing usage of any word determines the sense it bears when 
found in a command of Christ, We have seen, not only that the prevailing 
usage of the Greek language determines the meaning of the word baptize 
to be ' immerse, ' but that this is its fundamental, constant and only meaning. 
The original command to baptize is therefore a command to immerse. 

For the view that sprinkling or pouring constitutes valid baptism, see 
Hall, Mode of Baptism; and especially Dale, Classic, Judaic, Christie 
and Patristic Baptism. Per contra, see Review of Dale, by Kendrick, 
in Baptist Quarterly, 1869: 129. Also Hovey, in Baptist Quarterly, 
April, 1875, and Wayland, Principles and Practices of Baptists, 85. 
Carson, Noel, Judson and Pengilly, on Baptism. 

B. No church has the right to modify or disjDense with this command 
of Christ. This is plain: — 

(a) From the nature of the church. Notice : — 

First, — that besides the local church, no other visible church of Christ is 
known to the New Testament. 

Secondly, — that the local church is not a legislative, but is simply an 
executive body. Only the authority which originally imposed its laws, can 
amend or abrogate them. 

Thirdly, — that the local church cannot delegate to any organization or 
council of churches any power which it does not itself rightfully possess. 

Fourthly, — that the opposite principle puts the church above the Scrip- 
tures and above Christ, and would sanction all the usurpations of Rome. 

(6) From the nature of the command: — 

First, — as forming a part, not only of the law, but of the fundamental 
law, of the church of Christ. The power claimed for a church to change 
it, is not only legislative but constitutional. 



242 ECCLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. 

Secondly, — as expressing the wisdom of the Lawgiver. Power to change 
the command can be claimed for the church, only on the ground that Christ 
has failed to adapt the ordinance to changing circumstances, and has made 
obedience to it unnecessarily difficult and humiliating. 

Thirdly, — as providing in immersion the only adequate symbol of those 
saving truths of the gospel, which both of the ordinances have it for their 
office to set forth, and without which they become empty ceremonies 
and forms. In other words, the church has no right to change the method 
of administering the ordinance, because such a change vacates the ordinance 
of its essential meaning. As this argument, however, is of such vital im- 
portance, we present it more fully, in a special discussion of the Symbolism 
of Baptism. 

For advocacy of the church's right to modify the form of an ordinance, 
see Coleridge, Aids to Reflection, in Works, 1 : 333-849. Per contra, 
see Curtis, Progress of Baptist Principles, 234-245. 

3. The Symbolism of Baptism. 

Baptism symbolizes the previous entrance of the believer into the com- 
munion of Christ's death and resurrection — or in other words, regeneration 
through union with Christ; (Rom. 6: 2-6. Gal. 3: 27. Col. 2: 12. 1 Pet. 
3: 21. Cf. Mat. 3: 16; Luke 12: 50; John 3: 5; Rom. 7: 4; 8: 17; Gal. 2: 
19, 20; Phil. 3: 10; Col. 3: 1, 3; 2 Tim. 2: 11). 

Boardman, in Madison Avenue Lectures, 115-135. 

A. Expansion of this statement as to the symbolism of baptism. These 
passages show that baptism is a symbol: — 

(a) Of the death and resurrection of Christ. 

(b) Of the purpose of that death and resurrection — namely, to atone for 
sin and to deliver sinners from its penalty and power. 

(c) Of the accomplishment of that purpose in the person baptized — who 
thus professes his death to sin and resurrection to spiritual life. 

(d) Of the method in which that purpose is accomplished, — by union with 
Christ, receiving him, and giving one's self to him by faith. 

(e) Of the death and resurrection of the body — which will complete the 
work of Christ in us, and which Christ's death and resurrection assure to all 
his members; (Rom. 6: 5 — avii(pvroi). 

Calvin, on Acts 8: 38. Conybeare and Howson, on Rom. 6: 4. 

B. Inferences from the passages referred to: — 

(a) The central truth set forth by baptism is the death and resurrection 
of Christ — and our own death and resurrection only as connected with that. 

(6) The correlative truth of the believer's death and resurrection, set forth 
in baptism, implies: — 

First, — confession of sin and humiliation on account of it, as deserving 
of death. 



BAPTISM. 243 

Secondly, — declaration of Christ's death for sin and of the believer's 
acceptance of Christ's substitutionary work. 

Thirdly, — acknowledgment that the soul has become partaker of Christ's 
life, and now lives only in and for him. 

(c) Baptism symbolizes purification, but purification in a peculiar and 
divine way — namely, through the death of Christ and the entrance of the 
soul into communion with that death. The radical defect of sprinkling or 
pouring, as a mode of administering the ordinance, is that it does not point 
to Christ's death as the procuring cause of our purification. 

(d) In baptism, we show forth the Lord's death as the original source of 
holiness and life in our souls, just as in the Lord's Supper we show forth 
the Lord's death as the source of all nourishment and strength, after this 
life of holiness has been once begun. As the Lord's Supper symbolizes the 
sanctifying power of Jesus' death, so baptism symbolizes its regenerating 
power. 

(e) There are two reasons, therefore, why nothing but immersion will 
satisfy the design of the ordinance: — 

First, — because nothing else can symbolize the radical nature of the change 
effected in regeneration — a change from spiritual death to spiritual life. 

Secondly, — because nothing else can set forth the fact that this change is 
due to the entrance of the soul into communion with the death and resur- 
rection of Christ. 

(/) To substitute anything for baptism, which excludes all symbolic 
reference to the death of Christ, is to destroy the ordinance, just as substi- 
tuting for the broken bread and poured out wine of the communion, some 
form of administration which leaves out all reference to the death of Christ, 
would be to destroy the Lord's Supper and to celebrate an ordinance of 
human invention. 

See Ebrard's view of Baptism, in Baptist Quarterly, 1869 : 257, and in 
Olshausen's Com. on N. T., 1: 270; 3: 594. 

4. The Subjects of Baptism. 

The proper subjects of baptism are those only who give credible evidence 
that they have been regenerated by the Holy Spirit — or, in other words, have 
entered by faith into the communion of Christ's death and resurrection. 
Robins, in Madison Avenue Lectures, 136-159. 

A. Proof that only persons giving evidence of being regenerated are 
proper subjects of baptism: — 

(a) From the command and example of Christ and his apostles. 

First, — those only are to be baptized, who have previously been made 
disciples (Mat. 28: 19 — fia^zevaare. Acts 2: 41). 

Secondly, — those only are to be baptized, who have previously repented 
and believed; (Mat. 3: 1, 2, 5, 6. Acts 2: 37, 38; 8: 12; 18: 8; 19: 4). 

(6) From the nature of the church — as a company of regenerate persons; 
(John 3: 5. Rom. 6: 13). 



244 ECCLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. 

(c) From the symbolism of the ordinance — as declaring a previous 
spiritual change in him who submits to it; (Acts 10: 48. Eom. 6: 2-5.). 
Wayland, Principles and Practices of Baptists, 93. 

B. Inferences from the fact that only persons giving evidence of being 
regenerate are proper subjects of baptism: — 

(a) Since only those who give credible evidence of regeneration are 
proper subjects of baptism, baptism cannot be the means of regeneration. 
It is the appointed sign, but is never the condition, of the forgiveness of sins. 

Passages like Mat. 3: 11, Mark 1: 4, 16: 16, John 3: 5, Acts 2: 38; 22: 16, 
Eph. 5: 26, Titus 3: 5, 6 and Heb. 10: 22, 23, are to be explained as par- 
ticular instances ' ' of the general fact that, in Scripture language, a single 
part of a complex action, and even that part of it which is most obvious 
to the senses, is often mentioned for the whole of it, and thus, in this case, 
the whole of the solemn transaction is designated by the external symbol." 
In other words, the entire change internal and external, spiritual and ritual, 
is referred to in language belonging strictly only to the outward aspect of 
it. So the other ordinance is referred to by simply naming the visible 
"breaking of bread," and the whole transaction of the ordination of minis- 
ters is termed the "imposition of hands; " (Acts 2: 42. 1 Tim. 4: 14). 

Jacob, Eccl. Polity of N. T., 255, 256. Bap. Quarterly, 1872: 214. 

On P. W. Robertson's view of Baptismal Regeneration, see Gordon, 

in Bap. Quarterly, 1869 : 405. 

(b) As the profession of a spiritual change already wrought, baptism is 
primarily the act, not of the administrator, but of the person baptized. 

Upon the person newly regenerate, the command of Christ first ter- 
minates,— only upon his giving evidence of the change within him, does it 
become the duty of the church to see that he has opportunity to follow 
Christ in baptism. Since baptism is primarily the act of the convert, no 
lack of qualification on the part of the administrator invalidates the bap- 
tism, so long as the proper outward act is performed, with intent on the 
part of the person baptized to express the fact of a preceding spiritual re- 
newal; (Acts 2: 37, 38). 

(c) As intrusted with the administration of the ordinances, however, the 
church is on its part to require of all candidates for baptism, credible evi- 
dence of regeneration. 

This follows from the nature of the church and its duty to maintain its 
own existence as an institution of Christ. The church which cannol restrict 
admission to its membership to such as are like itself in character and aims, 
must soon cease to be a church, by becoming indistinguishable from the 
world. The duty of the church to gain credible evidence of regeneration 
in the case of every person admitted to the body, involves its right to re- 
quire of candidates, in addition to a profession of faith with the lips, some 
satisfactory proof that this profession is accompanied by change in the con- 
duct. The kind and amount of evidence which would have justified the 
reception of a candidate in times of persecution, may not now constitute a 
sufficient proof of change of heart. 



BAPTISM. 245 

(d) As the outward expression of the inward change by which the be- 
liever enters into the kingdom of God, baptism is the first, in point of time, 
of all outward duties. 

Regeneration and baptism, although not holding to each other the relation 
of effect and cause, are both regarded in the New Testament as essential to 
the restoration of man's right relations to God and to his people. They 
properly constitute parts of one whole, and are not to be unnecessarily sepa- 
rated. Baptism should follow regeneration with the least possible delay, 
after the candidate and the church have gained evidence that a spiritual 
change has been accomplished within him. No other duty and no other 
ordinance can properly precede it. 

(e) Since regeneration is a work accomplished once for all, the baptism 
which symbolizes this regeneration is not to be repeated. 

Even where the persuasion exists on the part of the candidate, that at the 
time of baptism he was mistaken in thinking himself regenerated, the ordi- 
nance is not to be administered again, so long as it has once been submitted 
to, with honest intent, as a profession of faith in Christ. We argue this 
from the absence of any reference to second baptisms in the New Testa- 
mment, and from the grave practical difficulties attending the opposite view. 
In Acts 19: 1-5, we have an instance, not of rebaptism, but of the baptism 
for the first time of certain persons who had been wrongly taught with re- 
gard to the nature of John the Baptist's doctrine, and so had ignorantly 
submitted to an outward rite which had in it no reference to Jesus Christ 
and expressed no faith in him as a Savior. This was not John's baptism, 
nor was it in any sense true baptism. For this reason Paul commanded 
them to be "baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus." 

Brooks, hi Baptist Quarterly, Apr., 1867, art.: Rebaptism. 

(/") So long as the mode and the subjects are such as Christ has enjoined, 
mere accessories are matters of individual judgment. 

The use of natural rather than of artificial baptisteries is not to be elevated 
into an essential. The formula of baptism prescribed by Christ is not "into 
the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost," as Wayland 
maintained, but rather "in the name, etc.," as in Mat. 10: 41; 18: 20. 

Conant, Notes on Mat., 171. Dagg, Church Order, 13-73. Ingham, 
Subjects of Baptism. 

C. Infant Baptism. 

This we reject and reprehend for the following reasons: — 

(a) Infant baptism is without warrant, either express or implied, in the 
Scriptures. 

First, — there is no express command that infants should be baptized. 

Secondly, — there is no clear example of the baptism of infants. 

Thirdly, — the passages held to imply infant baptism, contain, when fairly 
interpreted, no reference to such a practice. In Matt. 19: 14, none would 
have 'forbidden,' if Jesus and his disciples had been in the habit of baptiz- 



246 ECCLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. 

ing infants. From Acts 16: 15; cf. 40, and Acts 16: 33; cf. 34, Neander says 
that we cannot infer infant baptism. For 1 Cor. 16 : 15 shows that the whole 
family of Stephanas, baptized by Paul, were adults; (1 Cor. 1 : 16). It is 
impossible to suppose a whole heathen household baptized upon the faith of 
its head. As to 1 Cor. 7:14, Jacobi calls this text "a sure testimony against 
infant baptism, since Paul would certainly have referred to the baptism of 
children as a proof of their holiness, if infant baptism had been practised." 
Moreover, this passage would, in that case, equally teach the baptism of the 
unconverted husband of a believing wife. It plainly proves that the children 
of Christian parents were no more baptized, and had no closer connection 
with the Christian church, than the unbelieving partners of Christians. 

Kendrick, in Christian Review, Apr. , 1863. Neander's view, in Kitto, 

Bib. Cyclopaedia, art.: Baptism. Curtis, Prog, of Bap. Prim, 96. 

Wayland, Principles and Practices of Baptists, 125. Jacob, Eccl. 

Polity of N. T., 270-275. 

(b) Infant baptism is expressly contradicted: — 

First, — by the Scriptural prerequisites of faith and repentance, as signs of 
regeneration. In the great commission, Matthew speaks of baptizing disci- 
ples, and Mark of baptizing believers, but infants are neither of these. 

Secondly, — by the Scriptural symbolism of the ordinance. As we should 
not bury a person before his death, so we should not symbolically bury a 
person by baptism, until he has in spirit died to sin. 

Thirdly, — by the Scriptural constitution of the church. The church is a 
company of persons whose union with one another presupposes and ex- 
presses a previous conscious and voluntary union of each with Jesus Christ. 
But of this conscious and voluntary union with Christ, infants are not capable. 

Fourthly, — by the Scriptural prerequisites for participation in the Lord's 
supper. Participation in the Lord's supper is the right only of those who 
can "discern the the Lord's body;" (1 Cor. 11: 29). No reason can be as- 
signed for restricting to intelligent communicants the ordinance of the 
supper, which would not equally restrict to intelligent believers the ordin- 
ance of baptism. 

(c) The rise of infant baptism in the history of the church is due to sac- 
ramental conceptions of Christianity, so that all arguments in its favor from 
the writings of the first three centuries are equally arguments for baptismal 
regeneration. 

Christian Review, Jan., 1851. Neander, Church Hist., 1: 311, 313, 
Coleman, Christian Antiquities, 258-260. Arnold, in Baptist Quarterly, 
1869: 32. Hovey, in Baptist Quarterly, 1871: 75. 

(d) The reasoning by which it is supported is unscriptural, unsound and 
dangerous in its tendency. 

First, — in assuming the power of the church to modify or abrogate a com- 
mand of Christ. This has been sufficiently answered above. 

Secondly, — in maintaining that infant baptism takes the place of circum- 
cision under the Abrahamic covenant. To this we reply that the view 



BAPTISM. 247 

contradicts the New Testament idea of the church, by making it a heredi- 
tary body, in which fleshly birth, and not the new birth, qualifies for 
membership. "As the national Israel typified the spiritual Israel, so the 
circumcision which immediately followed, not preceded, natural birth, bids 
us baptize children, not before, but after spiritual birth." 

Pepper, in Btiptist Quarterly, April, 1867. Palmer, in Baptist Quar- 
terly, 1871: 314. 

Thirdly, — in declaring that baptism belongs to the infant because of an 
organic connection of the child with the parent, which permits the latter to 
stand for the former and to make profession of faith for it — faith already 
existing germinally in the child by virtue of this organic union, and certain 
for this same reason to be developed as the child grows to maturity. "A 
law of organic connection as regards character subsisting between the par- 
ent and the child — such a connection as induces the conviction that the 
character of the one is actually included in the character of the other, as 
the seed is formed in the capsule. " 

See this view elaborated in Bushnell, Christian Nurture, 90-223. 

We object to this view that it unwarrantably confounds the personality of 
the child with that of the parent; practically ignores the necessity of the 
Holy Spirit's regenerating influences in the case of children of Christian 
parents; and presumes in such children a gracious state which facts con- 
clusively show not to exist. 

Bunsen, Hippolytus and his Times, 179, 211. Curtis, Progress of Bap- 
tist Principles, 262. 

(e) The lack of agreement among pedobaptists as to the warrant for 
infant baptism and as to the relation of baptized infants to the church, to- 
gether with the manifest decline of the practice itself, are arguments 
against it. 

The propriety of infant baptism is variously argued upon the ground of 
"natural innocence, inherited depravity, and federal holiness; because of 
the infant's own character, the parents' piety, and the church's faith; for 
the reason that the child is an heir of salvation already, and in order to 
make it such." "No settled opinion on infant baptism and on Christian 
nurture has ever been attained to." 

Bushnell, Christian Nurture, 9-89. Bib. Sac, 1872: 665. 

(/) The evil effects of infant baptism: — 

First,— in forestalling the voluntary act of the child baptized, and thus 
practically preventing his personal obedience to Christ's commands. 

Secondly, — in inducing superstitious confidence in an outward rite as 
possessed of regenerating efficacy. 

Thirdly, — in obscuring and corrupting Christian truth with regard to the 
sufficiency of Scripture, the connection of the ordinances, and the incon- 
sistency of an impenitent life with church membership. 

Fourthly, — in destroying the church as a spiritual body, by merging it 
in the nation and the world. 



248 ECCLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. 

Fifthly, — in putting into the place of Christ's command a commandment 
of men, and so admitting the essential principle of all heresy, schism, and 
false religion. 

Arnold, in Madison Avenue Lectures, 160-182. Curtis, Progress of 
Baptist Principles, 274, 275. Westminster Confession, 28: 6. Dagg, 
Church Order, 144-202. 

II. The Lord's Supper. 

The Lord's Supper is that outward rite in which the assembled church 
eats bread broken, and drinks wine poured forth by its appointed representa- 
tive, in token of its constant dependence on the once crucified, now risen 
Savior as source of its spiritual life — or in other words, in token of that abiding 
communion of Christ's death and resurrection, through which the life begun 
in regeneration is sustained and perfected. 

Weston, in Madison Avenue Lectures, 183-195. Dagg, Church Order, 

203-214. 

1. The Lord's Supper an Ordinance instituted by Christ. 

A. Christ appointed an outward rite to be observed by his disciples in 
remembrance of his death; (Luke 22: 19. 1 Cor. 11: 24, 25). It was to be 
observed after his death, — only after his death could it completely fulfil its 
purpose as a feast of commemoration. 

B. From the apostolic injunction with regard to its celebration in the 
church until Christ's second coming (1 Cor. 11: 26; cf. Mat. 26: 29; Mark 
14: 25), we infer that it Avas the original intention of our Lord to institute a 
rite of perpetual and universal obligation. 

C. The uniform practice of the N. T. churches, and the celebration of 
such a rite in subsequent ages by almost all churches professing to be Chris- 
tian, is best explained upon the supposition that the Lord's supper is an 
ordinance established by Christ himself; (Acts 2: 42, 46; 20: 7. 1 Cor. 
10: 16). 

2. The Mode of Administering the Lord's Supper. 

A. The elements are bread and wine. 

B. The communion is of both kinds. 

C. The partaking of these elements is of a festal nature. 

D. The communion is a festival of commemoration — not simply bringing 
Christ to our remembrance, but making proclamation of his death to the 
world; (1 Cor. 11: 24, 26). 

E. It is to be celebrated by the assembled church; (Acts 20: 7. 1 Cor. 
11: 18, 20, 22, 33, 34). It is not a solitary observance on the part of indi- 
viduals. No "showing forth " is possible except in company. In Acts 2 : 46, 
we have oikoq, not olida, and olxog is not a private house, but a 'worship-room' ; 
(cf. Acts 5: 42; 8: 3; Rom. 16: 5; Titus 1: 11). 

Jacob, Eccl. Polity of N. T., 191-194. 



the lord's supper. 249 

F. The responsibility of seeing that the ordinance is properly adminis- 
tered, rests with the church as a body, and the pastor is, in this matter, the 
proper representative and organ of the church. In cases of extreme exigency, 
however, as where the church has no pastor and no ordained minister can be 
secured, it is competent for the church to appoint one from its own number 
to administer the ordinance. 

G. The frequency with which the Lord's supper is to be administered is 
not indicated either by the N. T. precept or by uniform N. T. example. 
We have instances both of its daily and of its weekly observance; (Acts 2: 46; 
20: 7). With respect to this, as well as with respect to the accessories of 
the ordinance, the church is to exercise a sound discretion. 

3. The Symbolism of the Lord's Supper. 

The Lord's Supper sets forth, in general, the death of Christ as the sus- 
taining power of the believer's life. 

A. Expansion of this statement. 

(a) It symbolizes the death of Christ for our sins; (1 Cor. 11: 26). 

(6) It symbolizes our personal appropriation of the benefits of that death; 
(1 Cor. 11: 24). 

(c) It symbolizes the method of this appropriation through union with 
Christ himself ; (1 Cor. 10: 16). 

id) It symbolizes the continuous dependence of the believer for all 
spiritual life, upon the once crucified, now living Savior, to whom he is thus 
united; (cf. John 6: 53). 

(e) It symbolizes the sanctification of the Christian through a spiritual 
reproduction in him of the death and resurrection of his Lord; (Eom. 8: 10. 
Phil. 3: 10). 

(/) It symbolizes the consequent union of Christians in Christ, their 
head; (1 Cor. 10: 17). 

(jg) It symbolizes the coming joy and perfection of the kingdom of God; 
(Luke 22: 18; cf. 1 Cor. 11: 26). 

Moss, in Madison Avenue Lectures, 176-216. 

B. Inferences from this statement. 

(a) The connection between the Lord's supper and baptism consists in 
this, that they both and equally are symbols of the death of Christ. In 
baptism, we show forth the death of Christ as the procuring cause of our 
new birth into the kingdom of God. In the Lord's supper, we show forth 
the death of Christ as the sustaining power of our spiritual life after it has 
once begun. In the one, we honor the sanctifying power of the death of 
Christ, as in the other we honor its regenerating power. Thus both are 
parts of one whole — setting before us Christ's death for men in its two great 
purposes and results. 

(6) The Lord's supper is to be often repeated — as symbolizing Christ's 
constant nourishment of the soul, whose new birth was signified in baptism. 
17 



250 ECCLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. 

(c) The Lord's supper, like baptism, is the symbol of a previous state 
of grace. It has in itself no regenerating and no sanctifying power, but is 
the symbol by which the relation of the believer to Christ, his sanctifier, is 
vividly expressed and strongly confirmed. 

(d) The blessing received from participation, is therefore dependent 
upon, and proportioned to, the faith of the communicant. 

(e) The Lord's supper expresses primarily the fellowship of the believer, 
not with his brethren, but with Christ, his Lord. 

Jacob, Eccl. Polity of N. T., 285. 

4. Erroneous Views of the Lord's Supper. 

A. The Romanist view, — that the bread and wine are changed by priestly 
consecration into the very body and blood of Christ; that this consecration 
is a new offering of Christ's sacrifice; and that, by a physical partaking of 
the elements, the communicant receives saving grace from God. To 
this doctrine of ' transubstantiation, ' we reply : — 

First, — It rests upon a false interpretation of Scripture. In Mat. 26: 26, 
'this is my body' means: 'this is the symbol of my body.' Since Christ 
was with the disciples in visible form at the institution of the supper, he 
could not have intended them to recognize the bread as being his literal 
body. ' ' The body of Christ is present in the bread, just as it had been 
in the passover-lamb, of which the bread took the place;" (John 6: 53 
contains no reference to the Lord's supper, although it describes the spirit- 
ual union with Christ, which the supper symbolizes; cf. 63. In 1 Cor. 10: 16, 
17, Koivuvia rov aufiarog rov Xpiorov is a figurative expression for the spiritual 
partaking of Christ. In Mark 8: 33, we are not to infer that Peter was 
actually 'Satan, ' nor does 1 Cor. 12: 12 prove that we are all Christs. Cf. 
Gen. 41: 26; 1 Cor. 10: 4). 

Secondly, — It contradicts the evidence of the senses, as well as of all 
scientific tests that can be applied. If we cannot trust our senses as to the 
unchanged material qualities of bread and wine, we cannot trust them when 
they report to us the words of Christ. 

Thirdly, — It involves the denial of the completeness of Christ's past sac- 
rifice, and the assumption that a human priest can repeat or add to the 
atonement made by Christ once for all; (Heb. 9: 28 — a-a$ Trpoaevex&slg). 
The Lord's supper is never called a sacrifice, nor are altars, priests or con- 
secrations ever spoken of, in the New Testament. The priests of the old 
dispensation are expressly contrasted with the ministers of the new. The 
former 'ministered about holy things,' i. e. performed sacred rites and 
waited at the altar, but the latter 'preach the gospel;' (1 Cor. 9: 13, 14). 

Fourthly, — It destroys Christianity by externalizing it. Romanists make 
all other service a mere appendage to the communion. Physical and magi- 
cal salvation is not Christianity but is essential paganism. 

Fifthly, — It is idolatrous, since it enjoins the Worship of a material tiling 
as divine. 

Calvin, Institutes, 2: 585-602. 



THE lord's supper. 251 

B. The Lutheran and High Church view, — that the communicant, in 
partaking of the consecrated elements, eats the veritable body and drinks 
the veritable blood of Christ in and with the bread and wine, although the 
elements themselves do not cease to be material. To this doctrine of 'con- 
substantiation, ' we object: — 

First, — That the view is not required by Scripture. All the passages cited 
in its support may be better interpreted as referring to partaking of the 
elements as symbols. If Christ's body be ubiquitous, as this theory holds, 
we partake of it at every meal as really as at the Lord's supper. 

Secondly, — That the view is inseparable from a general sacramental system 
of which it forms a part. In imposing physical and material conditions of 
receiving Christ, it contradicts the doctrine of justification only by faith; 
changes the ordinance from a sign into a means of salvation; involves 
the necessity of a sacerdotal order for the sake of properly consecrating 
the elements; and logically tends to the Eomanist conclusions of ritualism 
and idolatry. 

Thirdly,— That it holds each communicant to be a partaker of Christ's 

veritable body and blood, whether he be a believer or not — the result, in the 

absence of faith, being condemnation instead of salvation. Thus the whole 

character of the ordinance, is changed from a festival occasion to one of 

mystery and fear, and the whole gospel method of salvation is obscured. 

For the view here combated, see Gerhard, X : 352, 397; Pusey, Tract 

No. 90, of the Tractarian Series; Wilberforce, New Birth; Nevins, 

Mystical Presence. Per contra, see Calvin, Institutes, 2 : 525-584; and 

E. G. Eobinson, in Baptist Quarterly, 1869: 85-109. 

5. Prerequisites to Participation in the Lord's Supper. 

A. There are prerequisites. This we argue from the fact: — 

First, — that Christ enjoined the celebration of the supper, not upon the 
w T orld at large, but only upon his disciples. 

Secondly, — that the apostolic injunctions to Christians, to separate them- 
selves from certain of then* number, imply a limitation of the Lord's supper 
to a narrower body, even among professed believers. 

Thirdly, — that the analogy of baptism, as belonging only to a specified 
class of persons, leads us to believe that the same is true of the Lord's 
supper. 

B. The prerequisites are those only which are expressly or implicitly laid 
down by Christ and his apostles. 

[a) The church, as possessing executive but not legislative power, is 
charged with the duty, not of framing rules for the administering and 
guarding of the ordinance, but of discovering and applying the rules given 
it in the New Testament. No elmrch has a right to establish any terms 
of communion, — it is responsible only for making known the terms estab- 
lished by Christ and his apostles. 

(6) These terms, however, are to be ascertained, not only from the in- 
junctions, but also from the precedents, of the New Testament. Since the 
apostles were inspired, New Testament precedent is the "common law" of 
the church. 



252 ECCLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. 

C. On examining the New Testament, we find that the prerequisites to 
participation in the Lord's supper are four, namely: — 

First, — Regeneration. 

The Lord's supper is the outward expression of a life in the believer, 
nourished and sustained by the life of Christ. It cannot therefore be parr 
taken of, by one who is ' dead in trespasses and sins. ' We give no food to 
a corpse. The Lord's supper was never offered by the apostles to unbelievers. 
On the contrary the injunction that each communicant ' examine himself ' 
implies that faith, which will enable the communicant to ' discern the Lord's 
body,' is a prerequisite to participation; (1 Cor. 11: 27-29). 

Edwards, on Qualifications for Full Communion, in Works, 1: 81. 

Secondly, — Baptism. 

In proof that baptism is a prerequisite to the Lord's supper, we urge the 
following considerations : — 

(a) The ordinance of baptism was instituted and administered long 
before the supper; (Mat. 21 : 25). 

(6) The apostles who first celebrated it had, in all probability, been bap- 
tized; (Actsl: 21, 22; 19: 1-5). 

(c) The command of Christ fixes the place of baptism as first in order 
after discipleship; (Mat. 28: 19). 

(d) All the recorded cases show this to have been the order observed by 
the first Christians and sanctioned by the apostles; (Acts 2: 41, 46; 8: 12; 
10: 17, 18; 22: 16). 

(e) The symbolism of the ordinances requires that baptism should pre- 
cede the Lord's supper. The order of the facts signified must be expressed 
in the order of the ordinances which signify them — else the world is taught 
that sanctification may take place without regeneration. Birth must come 
before sustenance — 'nascimur, pascimur.' To enjoy ceremonial privileges, 
there must be ceremonial qualifications. As none but the circumcised 
could eat the passover, so before eating with the Christian family, must 
come adoption into the Christian family. 

(/) The standards of all evangelical denominations, with unimportant 
exceptions, confirm the view that this is the natural interpretation of the 
Scripture requirements respecting the order of the ordinances. 

Curtis, Progress of Baptist Principles, 301. 
(g) The practical results of the opposite view are convincing proof that 
the order here insisted on is the order of nature as well as of Scripture. 
The admission of unbaptized persons to the communion, tends always to, 
and has frequently resulted in, the disuse of baptism itself, the obscuring 
of the truth which it symbolizes, the transformation of scripturally con- 
stituted churches into bodies organized after methods of human invention, 
and the complete destruction of both church and ordinances as Christ 
originally constituted them. 

Arnold, Terms of Communion, 76. Curtis, Progress of Bap. Principles, 

296-298. 



the lord's supper. 253 

Thirdly, — Churdh membership. 

{a) The Lord's supper is a church ordinance, observed by churches of 
Christ as such; (Acts 2: 46, 47; 20: 7. 1 Cor. 11: 18, 22). For this reason, 
membership in the church naturally precedes communion. Since com- 
munion is a family rite, the participant should first be member of the family. 
See Com. of Meyer, on Acts 2 : 46. 

(b) The Lord's supper is a symbol of church fellowship; (1 Cor. 10: 17). 
Excommunication implies nothiug, if it does not imply exclusion from the 
communion. If the supper is simply communion of the individual with 
Christ, then the church has no right to exclude any from it. 

Arnold, Terms of Communion, 36. 

Fourthly,— An orderly walk; (1 Cor. 5: 9-11. 2 Thess. 3: 6). 

Disorderly walking Ave may, with Arnold, class under four heads: — 

{a) Immoral conduct; (1 Cor. 5: 1-13). 

(6) Disobedience to the commands of Christ; (1 Cor. 14: 37. 2 Thess. 
1: 1; 3: 7-11, 14). 

Since baptism is a command of Christ, we cannot properly commune 
with the unbaptized. To admit such to the Lord's supper is to withhold 
protest against a plain disobedience to Christ's commands, and to that 
extent to countenance such disobedience. 

(c) Heresy; (Titus 3; 10; cf. Acts 20: 30). 

Since pedobaptists hold and propagate false doctrine with regard to the 
church and its ordinances— doctrine which endangers the spirituality of the 
church, the sufficiency of the Scriptures and the lordship of Christ, we 
cannot projoerly admit them to the Lord's supper. To admit them, or to 
partake with them, would be to treat falsehood as if it were truth. 

(d) Schism; (Horn. 16: 17). 

Since pedobaptists, by their teaching and practice, draw away many 
from scripturally constituted churches — thus dividing true believers from 
each other and weakening the bodies organized after the model of the New 
Testament, — it is imperative upon us to separate ourselves from them, so far 
as regards that communion at the Lord's table which is the sign of church 
fellowship. 

Arnold, Terms of Communion, 73. 

D. The local church is the judge whether these prerequisites are fulfilled 
in the case of persons desiring to partake of the Lord's supper. This is 
evident, from the following considerations: — 

First, — the command to observe the ordinance was given, not to individuals, 
but to a company. 

Secondly, — obedience to this command is not an individual act, but is the 
joint act of many. 

Thirdly, — the regular observance of the Lord's supper cannot be secured, 
nor the qualifications of persons desiring to participate in it be scrutinized, 
unless some distinct organized body is charged with this responsibility. 



254 ECCLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. 

Fourthly, — the only organized body known to the New Testament is the 
local church, and this is the only body, of any sort, competent to have charge 
of the ordinances. 

Fifthly, — the New Testament accounts indicate that the Lord's supper 
was observed only at regular, appointed meetings of local churches, and 
was observed by these churches as regularly organized bodies; (Acts 20: 7. 
ICor. 11: 18, 20, 22, 33). 

Sixthly, — since the duty of examining the qualifications of candidates for 
baptism and for membership is vested in the local church, and is essential 
to its distinct existence, the analogy of the ordinances would lead us to 
believe that the scrutiny of qualifications for participation in the Lord's 
supper rests with the same body. 

Sarles, and Anderson, in Madison Avenue Lectures, 217-242, 243-260. 

E. Special objections to open communion. 

The advocates of this view claim that baptism, as not being an indispen- 
sable term of salvation, cannot properly be made an indispensable term of 
communion. In addition to what has already been said, we reply: — 

(a) This view is contrary to the belief and practice of all but an insig- 
nificant fragment of organized Christendom. 

(6) It assumes an unscriptural inequality between the two ordinances. 
The Lord's supper holds no higher rank in Scripture than does baptism. 
The obligation to commune is no more binding than the obligation to pro- 
fess faith by being baptized. Open communion, however, treats baptism 
as if it were optional, while it insists upon communion as indispensable. 

(c) It tends to do away with baptism altogether. If the highest privi- 
lege of church membership may be enjoyed without baptism, baptism loses 
its place and importance as the initiatory ordinance of the church. 

(d) It tends to do away with all discipline. When Christians offend, the 
church must withdraw its fellowship from them. But upon the principle 
of open communion, such withdrawal is impossible, since the Lord's supper, 
the highest expression of church fellowship, is open to every person who 
regards himself as a Christian. 

(e) It tends to do away with the visible church altogether. For no visi- 
ble church is possible unless some sign of membership be required, in 
addition to the signs of membership in the invisible church. Open com- 
munion logically leads to open church membership, and a church member- 
ship open to all without reference to the qualifications required in Scripture, 
or without examination on the part of the church as to the existence of these 
qualifications in those who unite with it, is virtually an identification of the 
church with the world, and without protest from scripturally constituted 
bodies, would finally result in its actual extinction. 

The aim of this discussion has been accomplished, if we have correctly 
presented the subject of the Lord's supper in its doctrinal relations and 
significance. We resign to the department of Pastoral Theology, the 



THE lord's supper. 255 

consideration of the practical objections to the Scriptural view, which are 
raised by the advocates of open communion. These have to do, not so much 
with the exposition, as with the application of the doctrine. 

For the open communion view, see Robert Hall, Works, 1: 285; John 
M. Mason, Works, 1: 3-369; Princeton Review, Oct. 1850; Bib. Sac, 
21: 449; 24: 482; 25: 401; Spirit of the Pilgrims, 6: 103, 142. Per 
contra, see Arnold, Terms of Communion, 82; Hovey, in Bib. Sac, 
1862: 133; Pepper, in Baptist Quarterly, 1867: 216; Curtis, on Com- 
munion, 292; also, Progress of Baptist Principles, 285; Howell, Terms 
of Communion; Williams, The Lord's Supper; Theodosia Earnest, — 
pub. by Am. Bap. Pub. Soc 



PART VIII. 

ESCHATOLOGY, OK THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL THINGS. 

Neither the individual Christian character, nor the Christian church as a 
whole, attains its destined perfection in this life; (Rom. 8 : 24). This per- 
fection is reached in the world to come; (1 Cor. 13: 10). As preparing the 
way for the kingdom of God in its completeness, certain events are to take 
place, such as death, Christ's second coming, the resurrection of the body, 
the general judgment. As stages in the future condition of men, there is 
to be an intermediate and an ultimate state, both for the righteous and 
for the wicked. We discuss these events and states in what appears, from 
Scripture, to be the order of their occurrence. 

For treatment of the whole subject of Eschatalogy, see Luthardt, Lehre 
von den letzten Dingen. Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 : 713-880. 

I. Death physical. 

Physical death is the separation of the soul from the body. We distinguish 
it from spiritual death, or the separation of the soul from God (Is. 59: 2. 
Rom. 7: 24. Eph. 2: 1), and from the second death, or the banishment 
from God and final misery of the reunited soul and body of the wicked; 
(Rev. 2: 11; 20: 14). 

Although physical death falls upon the unbeliever as the original penalty 
of sin, to all who are united to Christ it loses its aspect of penalty, and 
becomes a means of discipline and of entrance into eternal life; (Ps. 116: 15. 
Rom. 8: 10; 14: 8. 1 Cor. 3: 22; 15: 56. 1 Pet. 4: 6. Of. Rom. 1: 18; 
Heb. 12: 5-11). 

To neither saint nor sinner is death a cessation of being. This we main- 
tain against the advocates of ann ih ilation : — 

1. Upon rational grounds. 

A. The soul is simple, not compounded. Death, in matter, is the sepa- 
ration of parts. But in the soul there are no parts to be separated. There- 
fore it cannot cease to exist. The opposite can be argued only on principles 
of materialism. This is the metaphysical argument. 

B. Man, as an intellectual, moral and religious being, does not attain 
the end of his existence on earth. His development is imperfect here. 
Divine wisdom will not leave its work incomplete. There must be a here- 
after for the full growth of man's powers and for the satisfaction of his 
aspirations. This is the teleological argument. 



DEATH PHYSICAL. 257 

C. Man is not adequately rewarded or punished in this world. The 
guilty conscience demands a state after death, for punishment. Our sense 
of justice leads us to believe that God's moral administration will be vin- 
dicated in a life to come. This may be called the ethical argument. 

D. The popular belief of all nations and ages shows that the idea of im- 
mortality is natural to the human mind. This may be called the historical 
argument. 

Hase, Hutterus Redivivus, 276. Bartlett, Life and Death Eternal, 
preface. Luthardt, Compendium der Dogmatik, 289. Tennyson, Two 
Voices. Wordsworth, Intimations of Immortality. Alger, Critical 
History of Doctrine of Future Life, especially Catalogue by Ezra Abbot, 
in the Appendix, of Works relating to the Nature, Origin and Destiny 
of the Soul. 

2. Upon Scriptural grounds. 

A. The account of man's creation, and the subsequent allusions to it in 
Scripture, show that while the body was made corruptible and subject to 
death, the soul was made in the image of God, incorruptible and immortal; 
(Gen. 1:26, 27; 2: 7; 3: 22, 23. Eccl. 12: 7. Zech. 12: 1. Mat. 10: 28. 
Acts 7: 59. 1 Cor. 15: 45, 46. 2 Cor. 12: 2). 

B. The account of the curse in Genesis, and the subsequent allusions 
to it in Scripture, show that while the death then incurred includes the 
dissolution of the body, it does not include cessation of being on the part 
of the soul, but only designates that state of the soul which is the opposite 
of true life, viz : a state of banishment from God, of unholiness and of 
misery; (Gen. 2: 17; cf. 3: 8, 16-19, 22-24 Mat. 8: 22; 25: 41-46. Luke 
15: 32. John 5: 24; 6: 47, 53, 63; 8: 51. Rom. 5: 21; 8: 13. Eph. 2: 
1; 5: 14. 1 Tim. 5: 6. James 5: 20. 1 John 3: 14. Rev. 3: 1). 

C. The Scriptural expressions, held by annihilationists to imply cessation 
of being on the part of the wicked, are used not only in connections where 
they cannot bear this meaning (Esther 4: 16), but in connections where 
they imply the opposite; (Gen. 6: 11; 34: 30. Ps. 119: 176. Isa. 49: 17; 
57: 1, 2. Dan. 9: 26. Mat. 10: 6, 39, 42. Acts 13: 41; cf. Mat. 6: 16. 
1 Cor. 3: 17. 2 Cor. 7: 2. 2 Thess. 1: 9). 

D. The passages held to prove the annihilation of the wicked at death, 
cannot have this meaning, since the Scriptures foretell a resurrection of the 
unjust as well as of the just, and a second death, or a misery of the reunited 
soul and body, in the case of the wicked; (Acts 24: 15. Rev. 2: 11; 20: 14, 
15; 21; 8). 

E. The words used in Scripture to denote the place of departed spirits, 
as well as the allusions to their condition, show that death, to the writers of 
the Old and the New Testaments, although it was the termination of man's 
earthly existence, was not an extinction of his being or his consciousness; 
(Gen. .25: 8; 35: 29; 49: 29, 33. Num. 20: 24. Job 3: 13, 19; 7: 9; 14: 22. 



258 ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL THINGS. 

Ez. 32: 21. Luke 16: 23. Skb? either from SgJf, to press, and = 'the shut- 
up or constrained place'; or from ^Kl?, to be at rest or quiet, and == ' the 
resting place. ' "Aidqg = not 'hell,' but 'the unseen world,' conceived by 
the Greeks, as a shadowy, but not as an unconscious, state of being). 

F. The argument of annihilationists is based upon the literalizing of a 
particular class of terms in Scripture, which the Jewish belief in a conscious 
existence after death shows to have been used in a metaphorical sense. 
That a belief in the immortality of the soul existed among the Jews is 
abundantly evident : from the knowledge of a future state possessed by the 
Egyptians (Acts 7: 22); from the accounts of the translation of Enoch and 
of Elijah (Gen. 5: 24; cf. Heb. 11: 5. 2 K. 2: 11); from the invocation of 
the dead which was practised, although forbidden by the law (1 Sam. 28: 
7-14; cf. Lev. 20: 27; Deut. 18: 10, 11); from allusions in the O. T. to resur- 
rection, future retribution, and life beyond the grave (Job 19 : 25, 27. Ps. 
16: 9-11. Is. 26: 19. Ez. 37: 1-14. Dan. 12: 2, 3, 13); and from distinct 
declarations of such faith by Philo and Josephus, as well as by the writers 
of the N. T.; (Mat. 22: 31, 32. Acts 23: 6; 26: 6-8. Heb. 11: 13-16). 

G. The most impressive and conclusive of all proofs of immortality, how- 
ever, is afforded in the resurrection of Jesus Christ — a work accomplished 
by his own power, and demonstrating that his spirit lived after its separa- 
tion from the body; (John 2: 19, 20; 10: 17, 18). By coming back from 
the tomb, he proves that death is not annihilation; (2 Tim. 1: 10). 

For the annihilation theory, see Hudson, Debt and Grace, and Christ 
Our Life; also Dobney, Future Punishment. Per contra, see Hovcy, 
State of the Impenitent Dead, 1-27. Luthardt, Compendium der 
Dogmatik, 289-292. Delitzsch, Bib. Psychologie, 397-407. Herzog, 
Encyclopadie, art. : Tod. Bartlett, Life and Death Eternal, 189-358. 
Josephus, Antiquities, XYIII: 1: 3; Wars of the Jews, II: 8: 10-14. 
Girdlestone, O. T. Syn. , 447. Estes, Christian Doctrine of the Soul. 
On the second death, see Trench, Epistles to the Seven Churches, 151. 

II. The Intebmediate State. 

The Scriptures affirm the conscious existence of both the righteous and 
the wicked, after death, and prior to the resurrection. In the intermediate 
state the soul is without a body, yet this state is for the righteous a state 
of conscious joy, and for the wicked a state of conscious suffering. 

1. Of the righteous, it is declared: — 

A. That the soul of the believer, at its separation from the body, enters 
the presence of Christ; (2 Cor. 5: 1-9; cf. 2 Tim. 4: 18). 

B. That the spirits of departed believers are with God; (Heb. 12: 23; 
cf. Eccl. 12: 7). 

C. That believers at death enter paradise; (Luke 23: 42, 43; cf. 2 Cor. 
12: 4. Rev. 2: 7; cf. Gen. 2: 8). 



THE INTERMEDIATE STATE. 259 

D. That their state immediately after death, is greatly to be preferred to 
that of faithful and successful labor for Christ here; (Phil. 1: 21-24). 

Edwards the younger, Works, 2: 530,531. Hovey, Impenitent Dead, 61. 

E. That departed saints are truly alive; (Mat. 22: 31, 32; cf. John 11: 
26; 1 Thess. 5: 10; Eom. 8: 10). 

F. That they are at rest and blessed; (Rev. 6: 9-11; 14: 13). 

2. Of the wicked, it is declared: — 

A. That they are in prison — that is, under constraint and guard; (1 Pet. 
3: 19 — -pi'Amoj). 

B. That they are in torment, or conscious suffering; (Luke 16: 23; 
ev Sacavoig). 

C. That they are under punishment; (2 Pet. 2: 9 — KoXafrfiivovg). 

The passages cited, enable us properly to estimate two opposite errors. 
They refute, on the one hand, the view :— 

(a) That the souls of both righteous and wicked sleep between death and 
the resurrection. 

This view is based upon the assumption that the possession of a physical 
organism is indispensable to activity and consciousness — an assumption 
which the existence of a God who is pure spirit (John 4: 24), shows to be 
erroneous. Although the departed are characterized as 'spirits' (Eccl. 12 : 7. 
Acts 7: 59. Heb. 12: 23. 1 Pet. 3: 19), there is nothing in this 'absence 
from the body ' (2 Cor. 5 : 8) inconsistent with the activity and consciousness 
ascribed to them in the Scriptures above referred to. When the dead are 
spoken of as 'sleeping' (Dan. 12: 2. Mat. 9: 24. John 11: 11. 1 Cor. 11: 
30; 15: 51. 1 Thess. 4: 14; 5: 10), we are to regard this as simply the lan- 
guage of appearance, and as literally applicable only to the body. The 
passages first cited refute on the other hand, the view : — 

(6) That the suffering of the intermediate state is purgatorial. 

According to the doctrine of the Roman Catholic church, "all who die 
at peace with the church but are not perfect, pass into purgatory." Here 
they make satisfaction for the sins committed after baptism, by suffering a 
longer or shorter time, according to the degree of their guilt. The church 
on earth, however, has power, by prayers and the sacrifice of the mass, to 
shorten these sufferings or to remit them altogether. But we urge, in reply, 
that the passages referring to suffering in the intermediate state, give no 
indication that any true believer is subject to this suffering, or that the 
church has any power to relieve from the consequences of sin, either in this 
world or in the world to come. God only can forgive, and the church is 
empowered simply to declare, that, upon the fulfilment of the appointed 
conditions of repentance and faith, he does actually forgive. This theory, 
moreover, is inconsistent with any proper view of the completeness of Christ's 
satisfaction (Gal. 2: 21. Heb. 9: 28), of justification through faith alone 
(Rom. 3: 28), and of the condition after death, of both righteous and 



260 ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL THINGS. 

wicked, as determined in this life; (Eccl. 11: 3. Mat. 25: 10. Lnke 16: 
26. Heb. 9: 27. Rev. 22: 11). 

We close onr whole discussion of this subject with a single, but an im- 
portant remark — this namely, that while the Scriptures represent the inter- 
mediate state to be one of conscious joy to the righteous, and of conscious 
pain to the wicked, they also represent this state to be one of incomplete- 
ness. The perfect joy of the saints, and the utter misery of the wicked, 
begin only with the resurrection and general judgment; (2 Cor. 5: 3, 4; 
cf. Kom. 8: 23 and Phil. 3: 11. 2 Pet. 2: 9. Rev. 6: 10). 

Bib. Sac, 13: 153. Christian Review, 20: 381. Methodist Review, 
34: 240. Herzog, Encyclopedic, art. : Hades. Stuart, Essays on Future 
Punishment. Whately, Future State. Neander, Planting and Training, 
482-484. Delitzsch, Bib. Psychologie, 407-448. For Romanist doctrine, 
see Perrone, Praelectiones Theologicae, 2: 391-420. Per contra, see 
Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 : 743-770. 

III. The Second Coming of Christ. 

While the Scriptures represent great events in the history of the indi- 
vidual Christian, like death, and great events in the history of the church, 
like the outpouring of the Spirit at Pentecost and the destruction of Jeru- 
salem, as comings of Christ for deliverance or judgment (Mat. 24: 23, 27, 
34; 16: 28. John 14: 3, 18. Rev. 3: 20), they also declare that these par- 
tial and typical comings shall be concluded by a final, triumphant return of 
Christ, to punish the wicked and to complete the salvation of his people; 
(Mat. 24: 30, 31; 25: 31. Acts 1: 11. 1 Thess. 4: 16. 2 Thess. 1: 7, 10. 
Heb. 9: 28. Rev. 1: 7). 

1. The nature of this coining. 

Although without doubt accompanied in the case of the regenerate, by 
inward and invisible influences of the Holy Spirit, the second advent is to 
be outward and visible. This we argue : — 

A. From the objects to be secured by Christ's return. These are partly 
external; (Rom. 8: 19-23). Nature and the body are both to be glorified. 
These external changes may well be accompanied by a visible manifestation 
of Him who 'makes all things new; ' (Rev. 21: 5). 

B. From the Scriptural comparison of the manner of Christ's return 
with the manner of his departure; (Acts 1 : 11 — see Com. of Hackett, in 
loco: — "bv ~p6nov= visibly, and in the air. The expression is never em- 
ployed to affirm merely the certainty of one event as compared with another. 
The assertion that the meaning is simply, that, as Christ had departed, so 
also he would return, is contradicted by every passage in which the phrase 
occurs; cf. Acts 7: 28; Mat. 23: 37; Luke 13: 34; 2 Tim. 3: 8."). 

C. From the analogy of his first coming. If this was a literal and visi- 
ble coming, we may expect the second coming to be literal and visible also. 



THE SECOKD COMING OF CHRIST. 261 

2. The time of Christ's coming. 

Although Christ's prophecy of this event, in the twenty-fifth chapter of 
Matthew, so connects it with the destruction of Jerusalem that the apostles 
and the early Christians seem to have hoped for its occurrence during their 
lifetime (1 Cor. 15: 51. 1 Thess. 4: 17. 2 Tim. 4: 8. James 5:7. 1 Pet. 
4: 7. 1 John 2: 18), yet neither Christ nor the apostles definitely taught 
when the end should be, but rather declared the knowledge of it to be re- 
served in the counsels of God, that men might ever recognize it as possibly 
at hand, and so might live in the attitude of constant expectation. 

Hence we find in immediate connection with many of these predictions 
of the end, a reference to intervening events and to the eternity of God, 
which shows that the prophecies themselves are expressed in a large way 
which befits the greatness of the divine plans; (Mat. 24: 36. Mark 13: 32. 
Acts 1:7. 1 Cor. 10: 11; 16: 22. Phil. 4: 5. 2 Thess. 2: 1-3. James 
5: 8, 9. 2 Pet. 3: 3—12 — TcpoodoKuvrec; kuI awe'vouvrag rf/v irapovoiav. Rev. 1: 3; 
22: 12, 20). 

In this we discern a striking parallel between the predictions of Christ's 
first, and the predictions of his second advent. In both cases the event was 
more distant and more grand, than those imagined to whom the prophecies 
first came. Under both dispensations, patient waiting for Christ was in- 
tended to discipline the faith and to enlarge the conceptions of God's true 
servants. The fact that every age since Christ ascended has had its Chiliasts 
and Second Adventists, should turn our thoughts away from curious and 
fruitless prying into the time of Christ's coming, and set us at immediate 
and constant endeavor to be ready, at whatsoever hour he may appear. 

3. The precursors of Christ's coming. 

A. Through the preaching of the gospel in all the world, the kingdom 
of Christ is steadily to enlarge its boundaries until Jews and Gentiles alike 
become possessed of its blessings, and a millennial period is introduced in 
which Christianity generally prevails throughout the earth; (Dan. 2: 44, 
45. Mat. 13: 31, 32; 24: 14. Rom. 11: 25, 26. Rev. 20: 1-6). 

B. There will be a corresponding development of evil, both extensive 
and intensive, whose true character shall be manifest not only in deceiving 
many professed followers of Christ, and in persecuting true believers, but 
in constituting a personal antichrist its representative and object of worship. 
This rapid growth shall continue until the millennium, during which, evil, 
in the person of its chief, shall be temporarily restrained; (Mat. 13: 30, 38; 
24: 5, 11, 12, 24. Lake 21: 12. 2 Thess. 2: 1-10. Rev. 20: 2, 3). 

C. At the close of this millennial period, evil shall again be permitted 
to exert its utmost power, in a final conflict with righteousness. This spiritual 
struggle, moreover, shall be accompanied and symbolized by political con- 
vulsions, and by fearful indications of desolation in the natural world; (Mat. 
24: 29. Luke 21: 8-25). 



262 ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL THINGS. 

4. Relation of Christ's second coming to the millennium,. 

The Scripture foretells a period, called in the language of prophecy ' ' a 
thousand years," when Satan shall be restrained and the saints shall reign 
with Christ on the earth. A comparison of the passages bearing on this 
subject, leads us to the conclusion that this millennial blessedness and do- 
minion is prior to the second advent, One passage only seems at first sight 
to teach the contrary, viz: Eev. 20: 1-10. But this supports the theory of a 
premillennial advent, only when the passage is interpreted with the barest 
literalness. A better view of its meaning will be gained, by considering: — 

A. That it constitutes a part, and confessedly an obscure part, of one of 
the most figurative books of Scripture, and therefore ought to be inter- 
preted by the plainer statements of the other Scriptures. 

B. That the other Scriptures contain nothing with regard to a resurrection 
of the righteous which is widely separated in time from that of the wicked, 
but rather declare distinctly that the second coming of Christ is immediately 
connected, both with the resurrection of the just and the unjust, and with 
the general judgment; (Mat. 16: 27; 25: 31-33. John 5: 29. 2 Cor. 5: 10. 
2 Thess. 1: 6-10. 2 Pet. 3: 7-13. Eev. 20: 11-15). 

C. That the literal interpretation of the passage — holding, as it does, to a 
resurrection of bodies of flesh and blood, and to a reign of the risen saints 
in the flesh and in the world as at present constituted — is inconsistent with 
other Scriptural declarations with regard to the spiritual nature of the 
resurrection-body and of the coming reign of Christ; (1 Cor. 15: 44, 50). 

D. That the literal interpretation is generally and naturally connected 
with the expectation of a gradual and necessary decline of Christ's kingdom 
upon earth, until Christ comes to bind Satan and to introduce the millennium. 
This view not only contradicts such passages as Dan. 2: 35, and Mat. 13: 31, 
32, but it begets a passive and hopeless endurance of evil, whereas the Scrip- 
tures enjoin a constant and aggressive warfare against it, upon the very 
ground that God's power shall assure to the church a gradual but constant 
progress in the face of it, even to the time of the end. 

E. We may therefore best interpret Kev. 20 : 1-10, as teaching, in highly 
figurative language, not a preliminary resurrection of the body in the case 
of departed saints, but a period in the later days of the church militant, 
when, under special influence of the Holy Ghost, the spirit of the martyrs 
shall appear again, true religion be greatly quickened and revived, and the 
members of Christ's churches become so conscious of their strength in 
Christ, that they shall, to an extent unknown before, triumph over the 
powers of evil both within and without. So the spirit of Elijah appeared 
again in John the Baptist; (Mai. 4: 5; cf. Mat. 11: 14). The fact that only 
the spirit of sacrifice and faith is to be revived, is figuratively indicated in 
the phrase : ' The rest of the dead lived not again until the thousand years 
were finished. ' Since resurrection, like the coming of Christ and the judg- 
ment, is twofold, first, spiritual (the raising of the soul to spiritual life), and 
secondly, physical (the raising of the body from the grave), the words in 
Rev. 20: 15 — 'this is the first resurrection,' seem intended distinctly to pre- 



THE RESURRECTION. 263 

elude the literal interpretation we are combating. In short, we hold that 
Rev. 20: 1-10 does not describe the events commonly called the second advent 
and resurrection, but rather describes great spiritual changes in the later 
history of the church, which are typical of, and preliminary to, the second 
advent and the resurrection, and therefore, after the prophetic method, are 
foretold in language literally applicable only to those final events them- 
selves. 

For a fuller elaboration of this view, see Brown, on the Second Advent, 
206-259, and Hodge, Outlines of Theology, 447-453. On the general 
subject, see Kendrick, in Baptist Quarterly, Jan., 1870. New Eng- 
ender, 1874: 356. Neander, Planting and Training, 526, 527. Bib. 
Sac, 15: 381, 625; 17: 111. Cowles, Dissertation on Premillennial 
Advent, in Com. on Jeremiah and Ezekiel. Bampton Lectures for 
1854, on the Milennium. Weiss, Premillennial Advent of Christ. Fair- 
bairn on Prophecy, 432-480. Woods, Works, 3 : 267. Seelye, on Chris- 
tian Missions, 94-127. Crosby, Second Advent. For advocacy of the 
premillennial advent, see Elliott, Horae Apocalypticae; William Kelly, 
The Second Advent of Christ Premillennial; Taylor, Voice of the Church 
on the Coming and Kingdom of the Redeemer. 

IV. The Resurrection. 

While the Scriptures describe the impartation of new life to the soul in 
regeneration as a spiritual resurrection (John 5: 24-27, especially 25. Rom. 
6: 4. Eph. 2: 1, 5; 5: 14. Phil. 3: 10. Col. 2: 12, 13. Cf. Is. 26: 19; 
Ez. 37: 1-14), they also declare that at the second coming of Christ, there 
shall be a resurrection of the body, and a reunion of the body to the soul 
from which, during the mtermediate state, it has been separated. Both the 
just and the unjust shall have part in the resurrection. To the just, it shall 
be a resurrection unto life, and the body shall be a body like Christ's — a 
body fitted for the uses of the sanctified spirit. To the unjust, it shall be 
a resurrection unto condemnation, and analogy would seem to indicate that 
here also, the outward form will fitly represent the inward state of the soul. 
Those who are living at Christ's coming, shall receive spiritual bodies with- 
out passing through death. As the body after corruption and dissolution, 
so the outward world after destruction by fire, shall be rehabilitated and 
fitted for the abode of saints; (John 5: 28-30. Acts 24: 15. 1 Cor. 15: 
12-58. Phil. 3: 21. 1 Thess. 4: 14-16. 2 Pet. 3: 7-13. Rev. 20: 13). 

Upon the subject of the resurrection, our positive information is derived 
wholly from the word of God. Further discussion of it may be most naturally 
arranged in a series of answers to objections. The objections commonly 
urged against the doctrine as above propounded, may be reduced to two : — 

1. The exegetieal objection, — that it rests upon a literalizing of meta- 
phorical language, and has no sufficient support in Scripture. To this we 
answer : — 

A. That though the phrase 'resurrection of the body' does not occur in 
the New Testament, the passages which describe the event, indicate a 



264 ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL THINGS. 

physical, as distinguished from a spiritual change; (John 5: 28. Phil. 3: 21. 
1 Thess. 4: 13-17). 

The phrase 'spiritual body' (1 Cor. 15: 44), is a contradiction in terms, 
if it be understood as signifying ' a body which is simple spirit. ' It can 
only be interpreted as meaning a material organism, perfectly adapted to 
be the outward expression and vehicle of the purified soul. The purely 
spiritual interpretation is, moreover, expressly excluded by the apostolic 
denial that 'the resurrection is past already;' (2 Tim. 2: 18). 

B. That the redemption of Christ is declared to include the body as well 
as the soul; (Rom. 8: 23. 1 Cor. 6: 13-20). 

The indwelling of the Holy Ghost has put such honor upon the frail mor- 
tal tenement which he has made his temple, that God will not permit even 
this wholly to perish; (Rom. 8: 11 — did to evolkovv avrov Uveviia kv vuiv, i. e., be- 
cause of his indwelling Spirit, God will raise up the mortal body). It is 
this belief which forms the basis of Christian care for the dead. 

C. That the nature of Christ's resurrection, as literal and physical, 
determines the nature of the resurrection in the case of believers; (Luke 
24: 39. John 20: 27). 

As, in the case of Christ, the same body that was laid in the tomb was 
raised again, although possessed of new and surprising powers, so the 
Scriptures intimate, not simply that the saints shall have bodies, but that 
these bodies shall be in some proper sense an outgrowth or transformation 
of the very bodies that slept in the dust; (Dan. 12: 2. 1 Cor. 15: 53, 54). 
The denial of the resurrection of the body in the case of believers, leads 
naturally to a denial of the reality of Christ's resurrection; (1 Cor. 15: 13). 

B. That the accompanying events, as the second coming and the judg- 
ment, since they are themselves literal, imply that the resurrection is also 
literal. 

2. The scientific objection. This is threefold: — 

A. That a resurrection of the particles which compose the body at death, 
is impossible, since they enter into new combinations, and not unfrequently 
become parts of other bodies which the doctrine holds to be raised at the 
same time. 

We reply, that the Scripture not only does not compel us to hold, but it 
distinctly denies, that all the particles which exist in the body at death are 
present in the resurrection-body; (1 Cor. 15: 37 — ov to au/ua to yevjjadfievov, 50). 
The Scripture seems only to intimate a certain physical connection between 
the new and the old, although the nature of this connection is not revealed. 
That divine care may preserve some particle or principle of the worn-out 
frame, to be the germ of the new, cannot be denied upon scientific grounds. 

B. That a resurrection-body developed from some such particle or prin- 
ciple of the present body, cannot be recognized by the inhabiting soul, nor 
by other witnessing spirits, as the same with that which was laid in the 
grave. 



THE LAST JUDGMENT. 265 

To this we reply that bodily identity does not consist in absolute sameness 
of particles during the whole history of the body, but in the organizing 
force, which, even in the flux and displacement of physical particles, makes 
the old the basis of the new, and binds both together in the unity of a single 
consciousness. In our recognition of friends, moreover, we are not wholly 
dependent, even in this world, upon our perception of bodily form, and we 
have reason to believe that in the future state, there may be methods of 
communication far more direct and intuitive than those Avith which we are 
familiar here; (Of. Mat. 17: 3, 4). 

C. That a material organism can only be regarded as a hindrance to the 
free activity of the spirit, and that the assumption of such an organism by 
the soul, which, during the intermediate state, had been separated from the 
body, would indicate a decline in dignity and power, rather than a progress. 

We reply that we cannot estimate the powers and capacities of matter, 
when brought by God into complete subjection to the spirit. The bodies 
of the saints may be more etherial than the air, and capable of swifter mo- 
tion than the light, and yet be material in their substance. That the soul 
clothed with its spiritual body, will have more exalted powers and enjoy a 
more complete felicity, than would be possible while it maintained a purely 
spiritual existence, is evident from the fact that Paul represents the culmina- 
tion of the soul's blessedness as occurring, not at death, but at the resurrec- 
tion of the body; (Eom. 8: 23. 2 Cor. 5: 2-4. Phil. 3: 11). 

Porter, Human Intellect, 631. McCosh, Intuitions, 213. Hase, Hut- 
terus Eedivivus, 280. , Ebrard, Dogmatik, 2: 226-234. Hanna, The 
Resurrection, 28. Baptist Quarterly, Oct., 1867. Moorhouse, Nature 
and Revelation, 87-112. Fuller, Works, 3: 291. Neander, Planting and 
Training, 479-487, 524-526. Goulburn, Bampton Lectures for 1850, 
on the Resurrection. Boston, Fourfold State, in Works, 8: 271-289. Un- 
seen Universe, 33. Naville, La Vie Eternelle, 253, 254. Delitzsch, 
Bib. Psychologie, 453-463. Per contra, see Baptist Quarterly, Oct., 
1868, and Apr., 1870; New Englander, Apr., 1874. Crosby, Second 
Advent. 

V. The Last Judgment. 

While the Scriptures represent all punishment of individual transgressors 
and all manifestations of God's vindicatory justice in the history of nations, 
as acts or processes of judgment (Ps. 9: 7. Isa. 26: 9. Mat. 16: 27. John 
3: 17-19; 9: 39; 12: 31), they also intimate that these temporal judgments 
are only partial and imperfect, and that they are therefore to be concluded 
with a final and complete vindication of God's righteousness. This will be 
accomplished by making known to the universe the characters of all men, 
and by awarding to them corresponding destinies; (Mat. 25: 31-46. Acts 
17: 31. Rom. 2: 16. 2 Cor. 5: 10. Heb. 9: 27, 28. Rev. 20: 12). 

From these passages, we are warranted in drawing the following conclu- 
sions with regard to the final judgment: — 
18 



266 ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL THINGS. 

1. The nature of the final judgment. 

The final judgment is not a spiritual, invisible, endless process, identical 
with God's providence in history, but is an outward and visible event, 
occurring at a definite period in the future. This we argue from the follow- 
ing considerations: — 

A. The accompaniments of the judgment, such as the second coming of 
Christ, the resurrection, and the outward changes of the earth, are events 
which have an outward and visible, as well as an inward and spiritual aspect. 
"We are compelled to interpret the predictions of the last judgment upon 
the same principle. 

B. God's justice, in the historical and imperfect work of judgment 
needs a final outward judgment as its vindication. ' ' Otherwise man is a 
Tantalus — longing, but never satisfied," and God's justice, of which his 
outward administration is the expression, can only be regarded as approxi- 
mate. 

2. The object of the final judgment. 

The object of the final judgment is not the ascertainment, but the mani- 
festation, of character, and the assignment of outward condition corres- 
ponding to it. 

A. To the omniscient Judge, the condition of all moral creatures is 
already and fully known. The last day will be only ' the revelation of the 
righteous judgment of God'; (Eom. 2: 5). 

B. In the nature of man, there are evidences and preparations for this 
final disclosure. Among these may be mentioned, the law of memory by 
which the soul preserves the record of its acts, both good and evil (Luke 
16: 25); the law of conscience, by which men involuntarily anticipate pun- 
ishment for their own sins (Rom. 2: 15, Heb. 10: 27); the law of character, 
by which every thought and deed makes indelible impress upon the moral 
nature; (Heb. 3: 8, 15). 

C. Single acts and words, therefore, are to be brought into the judgment 
only as indications of the moral condition of the soul. This manifestation 
of all hearts will vindicate not only God's past dealings, but his determin- 
ation of future destinies; (Matt. 12: 36. Luke 12: 2-9. John 3: 18. 2 Cor. 
5: 10). 

3. The Judge, in the final judgment. 

God, in the person of Jesus Christ, is to be the judge. Though God 
is the judge of all (Heb. 12 : 23), yet this judicial activity is exercised through 
Christ, at the last day, as well as in the present state; (John 5: 22, 27). 
This, for three reasons: — 

A. Christ's human nature enables men to understand both the law and 
the love of God, and so makes intelligible the grounds on which judgment 
is passed. 



THE FINAL STATES OF THE RIGHTEOUS AND OF THE WICKED. 267 

B. The perfect human nature of Christ, united as it is to the divine, 
ensures all that is needful in true judgment, viz : that it be both merciful 
and just. 

C. Human nature, sitting upon the throne of judgment, will afford con- 
vincing proof that Christ has received the reward of his sufferings, and that 
humanity has been perfectly redeemed. The saints shall ' judge the world,' 
only as they are one with Christ; (Matt. 19: 28. Luke 22: 29, 30. 1 Cor. 
6: 2, 3. Eev. 3: 21). 

4. The subjects of the last judgment. 

The persons upon whose characters and conduct this judgment shall be 
passed, are of two great classes: — 

A. All men — each possessed of body as well as soul, — the dead having 
been raised, and the living having been changed; (1 Cor. 15: 51, 52. 1 Thess. 
4: 16, 17). 

B. All evil angels (2 Pet. 2: 4. Jude 6), — good angels appearing only 
as attendants and ministers of the Judge; (Matt. 13: 41, 42; 25: 31). 

5. The grounds of judgment These will be two in number: — 

A. The law of God — as made known in conscience and in Scripture; 
(John 12: 48. Eom. 2: 12). 

B. The grace of Christ (Rev. 20: 12), — those whose names are found 
" written in the book of life" being approved, simply because of their union 
with Christ and participation in his righteousness. Their good works shall 
be brought into judgment only as proofs of this relation to the Redeemer. 
Those not found ' written in the book of life, ' will be judged by the law of 
God, as God has made it known to each individual. 

Hodge, Outlines of Theology, 456, 457. Martensen, Christian Dog- 
matics, 465, 466. Neander, Planting and Training, 524-526. Edwards, 
Works, 2: 499-500; 4: 202-225. 

VI. The Final States of the Righteous and of the Wicked. 
1. Of the righteous. 

The final state of the righteous is described as eternal life (Mat. 25: 
46), glory (2 Cor. 4: 17), rest (Heb. 4: 9), knowledge (1 Cor. 13: 8-10), 
holiness (Rev. .21: 27), service (Rsv. 22: 3), worship (Rev. 19: 1), society 
(Heb. 12: 23), communion with God (Rev. 21: 3). 

Summing up all these, we may say that it is the fulness and perfection of 
holy life, in communion with God and with other sanctified spirits. 
Although there will be degrees of blessedness and honor, proportioned to 
the capacity and fidelity of each soul (Luke 19: 17, 19. 1 Cor. 3: 14, 15), 
each shall receive as great a measure of reward as it can contain (1 Cor. 2 : 9), 
and this final state, once entered upon, shall be unchanging in kind and 
endless in duration; (Rev. 3: 12; 22: 15). 

Two questions present themselves: — 



268 ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OE FINAL THINGS. 

A. Is heaven a place, as well as a state ? This has been maintained, upon 
the ground that the presence of Christ's human body is essential to heaven, 
and that this body must be confined to place. 

We answer that, since deity and humanity are indissolubly united in Christ's 
single person, it is difficult to consider Christ's body as limited to place, 
without vacating his person of its divinity. We prefer to say, therefore, 
that if heaven be a place as well as a state, it is the place where Christ 
manifests his glory to the saints, not on account of any limitations to winch 
he is subject, but on account of the limitations to which we are subject by 
reason of our finite natures. Though there may be such a place of Christ's 
special manifestation to his people, our ruling conception of heaven must 
be that of a state of holy communion with God. 

B. Is this earth to be the heaven of the saints? We answer: — 

First, — that the earth is to be purified by fire, and perhaps prepared to be 
the abode of the saints — although this last is not rendered certain by the 
Scriptures; (Eom. 8: 19-23. 2 Pet. 3: 5-13. Rev. 21: 1). 

Secondly, — that this fitting-up of the earth for man's abode, even if it 
were declared in Scripture, would not render it certain that the saints are to 
be confined to these narrow limits; (John 14: 2). It seems rather to be 
intimated that the effect of Christ's work will be to bring the redeemed into 
union and intercourse with other orders of intelligences, from communion 
with whom they are now shut out by sin; (Eph. 1: 10. Col. 1: 20). 
Kendrick, in Baptist Quarterly, Jan. , 1870. 

2. Of the wicked. 

The final state of the wicked is described under the figures of everlasting 
fire (Mat. 25: 41), the bottomless pit (Rev. 9: 2), outer darkness (Mat. 8: 
12), torment (Rev. 14: 10, 11), everlasting punishment (Mat. 25: 46), wrath 
of God (Rom. 2: 5), second death (Rev. 21: 8), everlasting destruction 
from the presence of the Lord; (2 Thess. 1:9). 

Summing up all, we may say, that it is the loss of all good, whether physical 
or spiritual, and the misery of an evil conscience banished from God and 
from the society of the holy, and dwelling under God's positive curse forever. 

Here we are to remember, as in the case of the final state of the righteous, 
that the decisive and controlling element is not the outward, but the inward. 
If hell be a place, it is only that the outward may correspond to the inward. 
If there be outward torments, it is only because these Avill be fit, though 
subordinate accompaniments of the inward state of the soul. The doctrine 
of eternal punishment, however, is met with the following objections: — 

A. That it rests upon a misinterpretation of Scripture, since the words 
alc>v and aluvcog do not necessarily imply eternal duration. We reply:— 

(a) If these words do not imply eternal duration, there are no words in 
the Greek language, that have this meaning. 

(b) In the majority of Scripture passages where they occur, this is unmis- 
ably their signification. They are used to express the eternal duration 



THE FINAL STATES OF THE RIGHTEOUS AND OF THE WICKED. 269 

of God (1 Tim. 1: 17. Heb. 9: 14. Eev. 1: 18), and the endlessness of 
the future happiness of the saints; (Mat. 19: 29. John 6: 54, 57, 58. 2 
Cor. 9: 9.) 

(c) The fact that the same word is used, in Mat. 25: 46, to describe both 
the sufferings of the wicked and the happiness of the righteous, shows that 
the misery of the lost is eternal, in the same sense as the life of God, or the 
blessedness of the saved; (Cf. the use of cli6ioq, from aet } in Kom. 1: 20, and 
Jude 6). 

See Meyer, Com. on Mat. 24: 46. Per contra, see De Quincey, Theo- 
logical Essays, 1: 127-146. 

B. That the Scriptures teach an ultimate restoration of all human beings. 
This is maintained by appeal to such passages as Mat. 19: 28; Acts 3: 21; 
1 Cor. 15: 26; 2 Pet. 3:7. We reply:— 

(a) These passages, as obscure, are to be interpreted in the light of those 
plainer ones which we have already cited. Thus interpreted, they foretell 
only the absolute triumph of the divine kingdom, and the subjection of all 
evil to God. 

(6) The advocates of universal restoration are commonly the most stren- 
uous defenders of the inalienable freedom of the human will to make 
choices contrary to all the motives which are or can be brought to bear upon 
it. As a matter of fact, we find in this world, that men choose sin in spite 
of infinite motives to the contrary. Upon the theory of human freedom 
just mentioned, no motives which God can use will certainly accomplish the 
salvation of all moral creatures. The soul which resists Christ here, may 
resist him forever. 

(c) Upon the more correct view of the will which we have advocated, the 
case is equally hopeless. Upon this view the sinful soul is free simply to 
act out its nature. It is, in the next world, indeed, subjected to suffering. 
But suffering has in itself no reforming power. Unless accompanied by 
special renewing influences of the Holy Spirit, it only hardens and embit- 
ters the soul. We have no Scripture evidence that such influences of the 
Spirit are exerted, after death, upon the still impenitent, but abundant evi- 
dence on the contrary, that the moral condition in which death finds men, 
is their condition forever. 

{d) The declaration as to Judas, in Acts 1 : 19, could not be true upon 
the hypothesis of a final restoration. If at any time, even after the lapse of 
ages, Judas be redeemed, his subsequent infinite duration of blessedness 
must outweigh all the finite suffering through which he has passed. The 
Scripture statement that 'it were better for that man, if he had never 
been born,' must be regarded as a refutation of the theory of universal 
restoration. 

C. That the Scriptures teach the annihilation of the wicked. We have 
already furnished material for a sufficient answer to this objection, by show- 
ing that, neither for the wicked nor for the righteous, is death a cessation of 
being, but that, on the contrary, the wicked enter at death upon a state of 



270 ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL THINGS. 

conscious suffering, which the resurrection and the judgment only augment 
and render permanent. Another form of this objection, however, holds 
that the Scriptures teach a gradual weakening of the powers of the wicked, 
as the natural result of sin, so that they gradually cease to be. We reply: — 

(a) That moral evil does not, in this present life, seem to be incompatible 
with a constant growth of the intellectual powers, at least in certain direc- 
tions. 

(b) If this theory were true, the greater the sin, the speedier would be 
the relief from punishment. 

(c) Upon this view, as upon any theory of annihilation, future punish- 
ment is an act of grace, rather than an act of judgment. 

D. That eternal punishment is inconsistent with the justice of God, since 
human sins differ in their degrees of ill-desert, and no sin of a finite creature 
can be infinite. We reply: — 

(a) That so long as moral creatures are opposed to God, they deserve 
punishment. Since we cannot measure the power of the depraved will to 
resist God, we cannot deny the possibility of endless sinning. But it is 
just in God to visit endless sinning with endless punishment. Not the 
punishing, but the not-punishing, would impugn his justice. 

(6) That as there are degrees of human guilt, so future punishment may 
admit of degrees, and yet, in all these degrees, be infinite in duration. The 
Scriptures recognize such degrees in future punishment ; (Luke 12 : 47, 48. 
Kev. 20: 12, 13). 

(e) We know the enormity of sin, only by God's own declarations with 
regard to it, and by the sacrifice which he has made to redeem us from it. 
As committed against an infinite God, and as having in itself infinite possi- 
bilities of evil, it may in itself be infinite, and may deserve infinite pun- 
ishment. Hell, as well as the cross, indicates God's estimate of sin. 

E. That eternal punishment is inconsistent with the benevolence of God, 
which will not inflict punishment upon his creatures, except as a means of 
attaining some higher good. We reply: — 

(a) God is not only benevolent, but holy, and holiness is his ruling 
attribute. The vindication of God's holiness is the primary and sufficient 
object of punishment. This constitutes a good which fully justifies the 
infliction. 

(6) In this life, God's justice does involve his creatures in sufferings 
which are of no advantage to the individuals who suffer. If this be a fact 
here, it may be a fact hereafter. 

(c) The benevolence of God, as concerned for the general good of the 
universe, requires the execution of the full penalty of the law, upon all who 
reject Christ's salvation. The Scriptures intimate that God's treatment of 
human sin is matter of instruction to all moral beings. The self-chosen ruin 
of the few may be the salvation of the many. 



THE FINAL STATES OF THE RIGHTEOUS AND OF THE WICKED. 271 

F. That the doctrine of eternal punishment repels men, and that the 
preaching of it is a hindrance to the success of the Gospel. We reply : — 

(a) If the doctrine be true and clearly taught in Scripture, no fear of 
consequences to ourselves or to others can absolve us from the duty of 
preaching it. The minister of Christ is under obligation to preach the whole 
truth of God — if he does this, God will care for the results; (Ez. 2:7; 3: 
11, 18). 

(6) All preaching which ignores the doctrine of eternal punishment, just 
so far lowers the holiness of God of which eternal punishment is an expres- 
sion, and degrades the work of Christ which was needful to save us from it. 
The success of such preaching can be but temporary, and must be followed 
by a disastrous reaction toward rationalism and immorality. 

(c) The fear of future punishment, though not the highest motive, is yet 
a proper motive, for the renunciation of sin and the turning to Christ. It 
must therefore be appealed to, in the hope that the seeking of salvation 
which begins in fear of God's anger, may end in the service of faith and 
love; (Luke 12: 4, 5. Jude 23). 

(d) In preaching this doctrine, while we grant that the material images 
used in Scripture to set forth the sufferings of the lost are to be spiritually 
and not literally interpreted, we should still insist that the misery of the 
soul which eternally hates God, is greater than the physical pains which are 
used to symbolize it. Although a hard and mechanical statement of the 
truth may only awaken opposition, a solemn and feeling presentation of it, 
upon proper occasions, and in its due relation to the work of Christ and the 
offers of the gospel, cannot fail to accomplish God's purpose in preaching, 
and to be the means of saving some who hear; (Acts 20: 31. 2 Cor. 2: 14-17; 
5: 11. 1 Tim. 4: 16). 

Hodge, Outlines of Theology, 459-468. Angus, Future Punishment. 
Jackson, Bampton Lectures for 1875, on the Doctrine of Retribution. 
Dexter, Verdict of Reason. George, Universalism not of the Bible. 
Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 310, 319, 464. For the theory of 
Restoration, see Jukes, Restitution of all Things; Birks, Victory of 
Divine Goodness. Delitzsch, Bib. Psychologie, 469-476. 



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